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Foreword
The present volume collects a number of essays concerning the role 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European legal re-
gime in the field of asylum and refugees protection.
The production and collection of such essays represents one of the out-
comes of the Project “Judging the Charter”, a two-year research and training 
project, co-funded by the Justice Programme (2014-2020) of the European 
Union - Directorate General Justice and Consumers, started in September 
2016. It was aimed at increasing competencies of national judges and other 
legal professionals in relation to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, in particular at sharing knowledge, how judiciary and ac-
ademia are interpreting crucial questions relating to the applicability of the 
Charter and the rights and principles enshrined in the Charter.
The project – which was coordinated by the Ludwig Boltzmann 
Institute of Human Rights (Vienna) and implemented by the Institute 
for International Legal Studies of the National Research Council of 
Italy (ISGI-CNR, Rome), the Institute for Law and Society (INPRIS, 
Warsaw), the Croatian Ombudsman Office (Zagreb), the Centre for 
European Constitutional Law (CECL, Athens) and the Federal Minis-
try for Justice (Austria), in cooperation with the Judicial Academies of 
Croatia, Italy, Romania and Slovenia – focused especially on the role of 
the Charter in the field of asylum. 
Based on existing research and jurisprudence of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union, the significance of the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights for the European asylum system, as well as nation-
al asylum laws and practises, were analysed; and research findings fed 
into training materials on the Charter and its applicability in judiciary 
practice. In the context of elaborating materials, two pilot trainings, ad-
dressed to judges involved in asylum procedures, were also conducted 
in each Project partner country. 
Finally, at an international Conference held in Rome (National 
Research Council venues), on the 22nd and 23rd of May 2018, research 
findings as well as experience in the trainings, and a training manual 
for trainers of practitioners in the field of asylum law, were presented 
to an audience composed by judges, representatives of academia, legal 
practitioners, as well as to NGO representatives.
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 This book precisely collects research papers and studies which have 
been presented and discussed in the Rome Conference, together with 
other studies that have been developed during the Project, with a view 
to preparing trainings materials on the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and its applicability in judicial practice concerning asylum cases.
The book as a whole and the single contributions pursue some 
common objectives: determining which consequences the Charter pro-
visions have, in the light of relevant case law of the Court of Justice of 
the EU, for European asylum law and national asylum laws and prac-
tices of the Member States; and highlighting the potential role of the 
Charter for the European system as well as national legal regimes of 
Member States in the field of asylum, also by showing the added value 
of the provisions of the Charter in terms of safeguarding asylum-seek-
ers’ rights, vis-à-vis other European instruments for the protection 
of human rights (in particular, the European Convention of Human 
Rights, but also the European Social Charter). 
The thematic areas in which an in depth-analysis has been conduct-
ed are many. The most crucial are: the definition of asylum in EU law; 
the Dublin system; qualification criteria and procedural requirements 
in the EU asylum system; the right of asylum-seekers to an effective 
remedy; reception and detention conditions of asylum-seekers.
The collected essays have been divided into two parts (Sections). 
The first one (Section I) deals with some general aspects, like the 
relevance and effectiveness of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
as a legal instrument (Gabriel Toggenburg; Lorenza Violini & Alessan-
dra Osti); the impact of its application to the Dublin system, accord-
ing to the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice (Andrea Crescenzi); 
meaning and scope of the right to an effective remedy in the field of 
asylum (Marcelle Reneman), possible improvements in the application 
of the Charter principles and rights in the EU legislation and policies 
concerning asylum (Chiara Favilli).
The second part of the book (Section II) collects more specific 
contributions, dealing either with special legal issues, or with specific 
national contexts. One may find here: an essay on the legal features 
concerning the application of the right to an effective remedy to asy-
lum-seekers as particularly vulnerable persons (Rosita Forastiero); the 
issue of discrepancies between EU law and the European Convention 
of Human Rights in so far as the grounds for detention of asylum-seek-
ers are concerned (Giuliana Monina); a study on the preliminary ques-
tions in asylum cases lodged by the Courts from Central and East-
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ern Europe (Jacek Białas & Małgorzata Jaźwińska); the impact of the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights in asylum procedures in Greece, 
following the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement (Georgia 
Spyropoulou); and some reflections on the situation and treatment of 
asylum-seekers and their fundamental rights in the so-called Western 
Balkans Route (Iris Goldner Lang).
Lastly, in the Afterword, the issue of social rights and social in-
tegration in Europe of refugees and asylum-seekers is analysed, tak-
ing into particular account the potential not only of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, but also that of the Council of Europe Social 
Charter (Giuseppe Palmisano).
Considering contents and objects of the different contributions, it 
goes without saying that the analyses and studies which are included 
in this volume, and the book itself taken as a whole, have no claim to 
be complete or exhaustive, nor to propose a systematic approach to 
the global topic indicated in the title (“Asylum and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”). The intention is just to propose a series of re-
flections and insights, made by distinguished scholars and legal experts, 
on the relevance of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Charter for 
the EU asylum system, as well as on the actual and potential impact of 
the Charter rights and principles on the application of both such sys-
tem and national laws and practises of EU Member States concerning 
asylum.
The editors’ hope is that this book could give a modest contribu-
tion to clarify the meaning and improve the use of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the field of asylum, for a better judicial protec-
tion of human rights and dignity of refugees and asylum-seekers all 





The Charter of Fundamental Rights: 
An Illusionary Giant? 
Seven brief points on the relevance 
of a still new EU instrument
Gabriel N. Toggenburg*
Contents: 1. Introduction: the Charter’s Impressive Appearance and the 
destiny of Mr Tur Tur. – 2. The Charter’s Field of Application: a Foggy 
Borderline. – 3. The Charter’s Distinction Between Rights and Principles: 
Much is Left Open to Interpretation. – 4. The Charter and National Gov-
ernments: not Much Engagement so far. – 5. The Charter and National 
Legislators: no Visibility for the Charter. – 6. The Charter and the Nation-
al Judiciary: Increasing Engagement. – 7. Conclusion: After All, An Ally 
and a Lighthouse.
1. Introduction: the Charter’s Impressive Appearance and the Destiny 
of Mr Tur Tur
It is soon 10 years that the European Union is equipped with a le-
gally binding bill of fundamental rights. The Charter is likely to be the 
worlds’ most modern and encompassing legally binding human rights 
document. It not only combines both political and socio-economic 
rights – thereby going beyond the Council of Europe’s European Con-
vention on Human Rights1 – but it also makes well established rights 
more powerful such as in the case of access to justice. Moreover it in-
troduces new human rights language in areas such as data protection, 
asylum, right to good administration, the field of business and consum-
er protection.2 And it is more explicit on the need to establish inclusive 
societies by for instance addressing the needs and rights of elderly peo-
* Gabriel N. Toggenburg is Senior Legal Advisor in the Office of the Director at the 
European Union Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), Honorary Professor for European 
Union and Human Rights Law at the University of Graz. The chapter follows the style 
of the oral presentation at the conference. It reflects the personal views of the author.
1 For a graphical comparison see European Union Fundamental Rights Agency, 
Applying the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in law and 
policymaking at national level - Guidance, 2018, p. 27.
2 See articles 8, 18, 41, 41, 16, 38 of the Charter.
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ple, persons with disabilities, children etc.3 Last but not least, the Char-
ter was not drafted in a more or less obscure process of international 
horse-trading but a transparent European Convention with a strong 
participation of national and European parliamentarians.4 The Charter 
was from the outset considered “the expression, at the highest level, of 
a democratically established political consensus of what must today be 
considered as the catalogue of fundamental rights guarantees”.5
Beginning of December 2009, with the entry into force of the Lisbon 
treaty, this solemn document became the legally binding compass for the 
European Union which is home to half a billion of human beings and 
accounts for a quarter of the global GDP and is as the world’s second 
largest economy a relevant global player. It is widely recognised that the 
Charter has had considerable influence in generating a new fundamental 
rights culture within the EU’s institutional machinery6 and its application 
at the EU level is regularly reported on by the European Commission.7
But having a closer look, it becomes obvious that the Charter has 
inbuilt weaknesses and its practical potential appears underused. In that 
sense the Charter might remind of the illusionary giant Mr Tur-Tur in 
“Jim Button and Luke the Engine Driver”.8 Mr Tur Tur (his first name 
happens to be the same as his surname) suffered from a remarkable spe-
ciality: he appeared the taller, the farer he was away from the observer. 
And the closer you came to him, the more he was shrinking. Does the 
Charter and its relevance shrink when a we have closer look at it? Let’s 
briefly test this in five steps.
3 See articles 25, 26, 24 of the Charter.
4 G. De Burca, The Drafting of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, in 
European Law Review, 2001, p. 126-138.
5 Opinion of Advocate General Mischo delivered on 20 September 2001 in 
the Joined Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00, Para. 126. This view appears in a way to be 
shared by the European Court of Human Rights, see ECtHR, judgement of 7.7.2011, 
Bayatyan v. Armenia, Para 106.
6 See e.g. G.N. Toggenburg, The EU Charter: Moving from a European Fundamental 
Rights Ornament to a European Fundamental Rights Order, in G. Palmisano (ed.), 
Making the Charter of Fundamental Rights a Living Instrument, 2014, pp. 10-29 (a 
version of this article is also available online as EIF Working Paper 2014/4).
7 See most recently European Commission (2018), 2017 annual report on the 
application of the Charter, online here.
8 The book by Michael Ende was published in 1960 and is considered one of the 
most successful German language children’s books of the postwar era. It was translated 
in over thirty languages. Ende (1929-1995) said that he wrote books for all children 
aged between 80 and 8 years.
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2. The Charter’s Field of Application: a Foggy Borderline
Despite all its clear and encompassing wording the Charter surpris-
es the reader at the very end when admitting – in a sort of encrypted 
way – that the Charter is mainly addressed to the EU itself and not 
to the same degree to the EU Member States. These are only obliged 
under the Charter when “implementing European Union law”. It is 
well-known that the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) is reading this as covering all situations where the Mem-
ber States are acting within the scope of EU law. But still this is far from 
a clear-cut instruction. Besides the Charter, a second norm of primary 
or secondary EU law must be applicable to a given case in order for the 
Charter to kick in. As the president of the CJEU has put it: the Charter 
is the ‘shadow’ of EU law. Just as an object defines the contours of its 
shadow, the scope of EU law determines that of the Charter.9
Such an additional filter is unknown to other human rights instruments 
such as the ECHR. It obviously requires an examination by the legal practi-
tioner before she or he can operationalise the solemn Charter. It is here not 
the space to enter this Article 51 dilemma but I would just like to make the 
point that anecdotal evidence shows that for legal practitioners the foggy 
boundaries of the Charter’s field of application are a major disincentive to 
use it in legal practice. This is also why the Council of the European Union 
called on the European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights (FRA) to 
develop, based on the case law of the CJEU – relevant guidance for legal 
practitioners. Such practical guidance – a handbook – was just presented at 
the Charter conference of Austrian EU Presidency in October 2018.10
It is also noteworthy to mention that whereas it appears quite obvi-
ous from the wording of the Charter that the EU itself (its institutions, 
agencies and bodies) is always bound by the Charter, also this aspect 
was put into doubt in the context of Europe’s economic governance.11 
The Court has in the meantime clarified that the Charter applies to the 
EU institutions also “when they act outside the EU legal framework”.12 
9 K. Lenaerts, J.A. Gutiérrez–Fons, The Place of the Charter in the EU 
Constitutional Edifice, in S. Peers and others (eds), The EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: A Commentary, 2014, p. 1567.
10 FRA, 2018, Applying the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union in law and policymaking at national level - Guidance.
11 ECJ 27.11. 2012, Case 370/12, Pringle. 
12 ECJ 20.09.2016, Joined Cases Case 8/15P and 10/15P, Ledra, Para 67.
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But the Parliament is still not satisfied with the relevance of the Charter 
in this regard and pushes for more attention to be given in political prac-
tice to potential repercussions of any EU (or semi-EU) intervention on 
civil, economic and social rights.13 This is a valid and legitimate call.
The European Parliament is also lamenting over an “excessively 
restrictive interpretation” of the Charter’s provision on its field of ap-
plication (Article 51) by the European Commission and calls to change 
course so “to meet EU citizens’ expectations in relation to their funda-
mental rights”.14 It can be expected that the boundaries of the Charter’s 
field of application will be further fine-tuned by the case law of the 
CJEU. However, a redesign of Article 51 (and consequently also Arti-
cle 6 (TEU) via a revision of EU primary law is not in sight.15
3. The Charter’s Distinction Between Rights and Principles: Much is 
Left Open to Interpretation
Leaving Article 51, the reader of the Charter is likely to experience 
a second “Tur Tur moment” when reading Article 52. This article re-
veals in its paragraph 5 that not all Charter provisions are equal. Some 
have a more direct effect and have therefore the potential to be consid-
erably more relevant in legal practice. Only where there are “legislative 
and executive acts” taken by the EU and/or the Member States to im-
plement Charter “principles”, the latter can be “judicially cognisable”. 
As is well known, the Explanation to the Charter provide only rather 
limited guidance to understand, whether a Charter provision is a right 
or a principle. Also in this context the legal practitioner is left with 
doubts and a solid degree of responsibility is shifted to the CJEU who 
has the final say in interpreting primary law.
While not entering the discussion of what is a Charter right and 
what is a Charter principle, it is relevant here to stress that all Charter 
provisions are to the same degree legally binding. What differs is the 
13 See for instance the draft report by Barbara Spinelli on “The implementation 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the EU institutional 
framework”.
14 See European Parliament, resolution of 8 September 2015 on the situation of 
fundamental rights in the European Union (2013-2014) (2014/2254(INI)), Para 21.
15 This was called for by a former member of the European Commission, see 
Viviane Reding Vice-President of the European Commission, EU Justice Commissioner, 
speech given at the XXV Congress of FIDE in Tallinn, 31 May 2012.
THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS – AN ILLUSIONARY GIANT? 17
degree to which a provision can be used in court. Also, it is incorrect to 
assume that all socio-economic rights, or all provisions in title IV (on 
solidarity) are principles and other Charter provisions rights. Admit-
tedly, the distinction between rights and principles was introduced at 
the end of the political negotiations concerning the Charter in order to 
allow a few hesitating Member States to accept that the Charter became 
a legally binding document combining both socio-economic and polit-
ical rights. From this one can however not draw any legal conclusion 
apart from the one that the introduction of the notion of “principles” 
allows to argue that certain Charter provisions have a reduced justicia-
bility compared to others.16
The wording of the various Charter provisions does not give much 
guidance either. Some of the provisions that require implementing 
measures are labelled as “rights”17 and in the past the Court declared a 
primary law “principle” as directly applicable stating that such word-
ing is “specifically used in order to indicate the fundamental nature 
of certain provisions”.18 The difficulties for the legal practitioner are 
compounded by the fact that Article 52(4) establishes that “so far as 
this Charter recognises fundamental rights as they result from the con-
stitutional traditions common to the Member States, those rights shall 
be interpreted in harmony with those traditions”. Such a helicopter 
perspective is difficult to take for a national practitioner. All this rein-
forces the Tur Tur experience: the Charter is less of a “Charter to go” 
than it appears at first sight.
Lets in the following briefly look at how the Charter is used at the 
national level, by the three branches of government.
4. The Charter and National Governments: not Much Engagement so far
Close to two thirds of the persons living in the EU have heard of 
the Charter but only a bit more than a tenth know actually what the 
Charter is. In close to all EU Member States a majority of survey re-
16 At maximum one could go as far as to argue for a rebuttable presumption that 
Charter provisions under title IV are principles rather than rights – an avenue chosen 
by the General Advocate Opinion 18.07.2013, Case 176/12, Para 55.
17 See for instance Article 9 (right to marry and found a family), 27 (workers’ 
right to information and consultation within the undertaking) or 34 (social security 
and social assistance). 
18 ECJ 08.04.1975, Case 43/75, Defrenne II, Paras 28-29.
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spondents is interested in having more information about the Charter.19 
And it appears that even amongst persons who deal with fundamen-
tal rights, awareness of the Charter is not necessarily high.20 Against 
this background, the question arises whether the Member States took 
proactive measures to raise the awareness at national level so that the 
potential of the Charter can be fully unlocked.
According to Article 51 of the Charter, the Member States are 
not only obliged to respect the rights and observe the principle of the 
Charter but also to “promote the application thereof”. However, such 
a proactive stance is hardly visible. Not even after having addressed 
the 28 Member States directly, was the FRA able to identify policies 
in that regard. Only rare examples stuck out such as in Finland where 
a Memorandum on the Interpretation and Implementation of the EU 
Charter for fundamental rights was prepared21 to provide legal practi-
tioners practical help in identifying situations where the EU Charter 
applies, and to understand how it differs from other fundamental and 
human rights instruments, especially the ECHR and the national con-
stitutional rights. In Sweden a review of the Charter’s application was 
carried out as part of the government’s human rights strategy.22 The 
study identifies the fact that the Charter is still a young instrument as 
one reason why its use is still rather limited, noting that it also took 
a while until the ECHR was known and used in legal practice. Close 
to ten years after the entry into force one would expect more political 
energy to be invested in such such stock-taking exercises so to better 
understand how to best unfold the potential of the Charter as a new 
fundamental rights instrument.23
Against this background, the FRA called on the Member States to 
regularly assess the Charter’s actual use in national case law and leg-
19 Eurostat (2015), Flash Eurobarometer 416.
20 FRA, Challenges and Opportunities for the Implementation of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
Opinion 4/2018, 25.09.2018.
21 Finland, Ministry of Justice (2016), Document OM 1/469/2016, available only 
in Finnish. An updated version of the Memorandum is currently in progress.
22 Sweden, Ministry of Culture (2016, Official letter 2016/17:29 The government’s 
strategy on human rights on a national level (2016/17:29 Regeringens strategi för det 
nationella arbetet med mänskliga rättigheter, Skr. 2016/17:29), 13 October 2016. The 
assignment to the University of Uppsala is available here.
23 For Poland see Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2016), Application of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights by Polish Courts, Bilingual conference proceedings.
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islative and regulatory procedures, with a view to identifying short-
comings and concrete needs for better implementation of the Charter 
at national level. Based on such regular assessments, Member States 
should launch initiatives and policies aimed at promoting awareness 
and implementation of the Charter at national level, so that the Charter 
can play a relevant role wherever it applies.24
5. The Charter and National Legislators: no Visibility for the Charter
One would expect that the Charter plays a considerable role when 
national legislators and administrations adopt laws and policy docu-
ments. After all EU law is predominantly implemented at national level 
and a very significant part of national law and policy making is co-de-
termined by EU law. But it appears that the Charter hardly plays an 
adequate role when national legislation is prepared.
As stressed by FRA,25 in most Member States, there is an explicit 
obligation to check bills against national fundamental rights standards. 
Moreover, many national systems establish the explicit obligation to 
ensure draft legislation (or regulations) is assessed for its compatibility 
with international law and/or EU law. The European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), which, in contrast to the Charter, is not limit-
ed to situations falling within the scope of EU law, is often mentioned 
in such procedural rules as an explicit benchmark that bills have to be 
checked against. Given the fact that much of national law and policy 
making is indeed likely to (somehow) fall within the scope of EU law, 
the Charter should be taken into account from the very outset. But also 
in this regard awareness appears to be lacking at national level.
Against this background, the FRA recommends26 that EU Member 
States should review their national procedural rules on legal scrutiny 
and impact assessments of bills from the perspective of the EU Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights. Such procedures should explicitly refer to 
the Charter, just like they do to national human rights instruments, to 
minimise the risk that the Charter is overlooked. The Agency calls27 
on the States to consider a more consistent ‘Article 51 screening’ in the 
24 FRA, Opinion 4/2018 (see opinion number 3). 
25 FRA, Opinion 4/2018 (see opinion number 4).
26 FRA, Opinion 4/2018 (see opinion number 4).
27 FRA, Opinion 4/2018 (see opinion number 4).
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legislative process to assess at an early stage: whether or not a legislative 
file (partly) falls within the scope of EU law and thus also the Charter; 
whether the legislative proposal could potentially limit Charter rights; 
whether such limitations are in line with Article 52(2) of the Charter; 
and, whether the legislative proposal has the potential to proactively 
promote the application of Charter rights and principles.
6. The Charter and the National Judiciary: Increasing Engagement
Since the entry force till now the CJEU has referred in around 800 
decisions to the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Especially the early years 
after the entry into force of the Charter, showed a very steep increase of 
references to the Charter. Such absolute figures are missing for the national 
level as it is impossible to track the use of the Charter in all the count-
less courtrooms in all 28 EU Member States. But the requests by nation-
al courts for preliminary rulings by the CJEU provide absolute numbers 
and give an indication that the Charter indeed plays a role before national 
courts: Between 2010 and 2017, national courts lodged 392 requests for 
preliminary rulings that include references to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (on average 49 per year). During the same period, 3,528 referenc-
es for preliminary rulings were made by EU Member States overall. This 
means that the Charter was mentioned in 11% of all references.28
Whereas (apart from requests for preliminary rulings) the quan-
tity of national judgements using the Charter can hardly be assessed, 
the quality of such judgements can be analysed. The FRA is tracking 
the use of the Charter since 5 years in a dedicated chapter of its annu-
al Fundamental Rights Report.29 Selected case law (three judgements 
per country per year) is saved in the Charterpedia – a one stop shop 
for Charter related information. From the evidence collected it appears 
that the quality of references to the Charter is increasing.30 Whereas it 
is here not to space to analyse such case-law it is relevant to note that 
the Charter can also play a role in cases where it does strictly speaking 
28 FRA, Opinion 4/2018, p. 48.
29 FRA, Fundamental Rights Report 2018, p. 35-54. Links to the Charter chapters 
in former Fundamental Rights Reports can be found online here.
30 Out of the three branches of governance, the use of the Charter in the judiciary 
appears to raise most interest. See for instance L. Burgorgue-Larsen, La Charte des 
droits fondamentaux saisie par les juges en Europe, Paris, 2017. 
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not apply. The Charter serves as lighthouse or a road sign that influ-
ences the judges’ interpretation of national law. For instance, in a case 
before an Italian court, the court admitted that due to Article 51 the 
Charter did not apply but it stressed that this would not hinder it to use 
the Charter as a “source of ‘free interpretation’ of national legislation, 
being an ‘expression of common principles of European legal systems’ 
(Constitutional Court no. 135/2002) and, as a consequence, having an 
effect also within the national legal system”.31
7. Conclusion: After All, An Ally and a Lighthouse
We started with the acknowledgment of the Charter’s impressive 
appearance in terms of its clear and encompassing wording. However, 
whereas the Charter is easy to read, it is difficult to understand.32 It is 
less of a “Charter to go” than the drafters made us think.
At EU level its relevance is unconditional, compelling and overall 
a success story.33 At national level the picture is more complex. Before 
“domestic consumption” an assessment needs to be made whether the 
Charter at all applies in a given case. This is compounded by the fact 
that legal practitioners need to check the specific character of the single 
provision (“mere” principles, while having legal effects, need imple-
menting measures before they can be invoked in court). Against this 
background, it is less of a surprise that the awareness about and the 
daily use of the Charter appears still limited.
Is the Charter thus an illusionary giant like Tur Tur in the novel 
about Jim Knopf? Having a closer look at the Charter indeed makes the 
31 Italy, Corte Suprema di Cassazione, Case 41, 3 January 2013.
32 G. N. Toggenburg, The EU’s charter of fundamental rights - five years on, in 
EU Observer, 1.12.2014. 
33 But there is clearly room for improvement. See Olivier de Schutter (2016), 
The Implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the EU institutional 
Framework, study for the European Parliament, available online here. Note that the 
recent opinion of the FRA on the implementation of the Charter makes recommendations 
also for the EU level. FRA calls amongst other on the EU legislator to make more 
regularly use of external human rights expertise when assessing fundamental rights 
impacts or the compatibility of legislative drafts with fundamental rights standards. 
And it calls for an annual “Charter exchange” in the Council Working Party FREMP. 
See FRA, Opinion 4/2018, (opinions 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8).
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Charter’s relevance appear to shrink. But the story of Tur Tur shows 
that this is not necessarily negative. Whereas Jim Knopf was in the be-
ginning very afraid of Tur-Tur, the illusionary giant soon became his 
friend. It was with his guidance that he found his way home to the 
small island of Morrowland. Once back home Jim decided that the is-
land needs a lighthouse, but the island was too small to support one. 
Jim Knopf remembered Mr. Tur Tur and his ability to appear as a giant 
when seen from afar. So he invited Tur-Tur to join him in Morrowland 
in order to use this his unique ability as a living lighthouse.
What can we learn from this? For the island of the EU as it cur-
rently stands, a supranational human rights bill that applies “semper 
et ubique”, including in all purely internal situations would be “too 
heavy” as it would encroach on the delicate federal balance between the 
EU and its Member States. The EU Charter is not (and was not) meant 
to be a real giant. As such it would trample on the feet of other human 
rights documents. Adding value where it can and otherwise pointing to 
alternative avenues is the Charter’s vocation, not gigantomachy. In fact 
the Charter has the potential to become a lighthouse that guides the EU 
and that points to human rights compatible solutions at national level.
That we are not fully there yet does not come us a surprise. The 
awareness and standing of the ECHR in 1963, 10 years after its entry 
into force, was no more prominent than is the case for the Charter in 
2019. We should not forget that good things take their time.34
34 By the way, Michael Ende used to say that writing requires patience. Once he 
had finished the book “Jim Button and Luke the Engine Driver” it took him 18 very 
long months and 10 negative replies by potential publishers till his book could raise like 
a star to the sky of the most successful writings.
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1. Introductory Remarks
The EU Treaties do not have a constitutional character and, in-
deed, the term “constitution” is expressly avoided, as decided by the 
EU Council following the failure of the French and Dutch referenda.1 
However, the incorporation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights2 
(hereinafter EUCFR) in the Lisbon Treaty (2009) has certainly con-
tributed to a de facto constitutionalization of the European legal space 
and, therefore, to the emergence of the issue of the constitutional iden-
tity of the Member States.3 The scenario briefly presented here has also 
* Although resulting from a combined and coordinated effort and representing 
a shared view of the issue, the present chapter was written separately: paragraphs 1, 2 
and 5 written by Lorenza Violini (Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of 
Milan) and paragraphs 3 and 4 written by Alessandra Osti (Research Fellow in Public 
Comparative Law at the University of Milan).
1 IGC 2007 Mandate, Doc. 11218/07, 26 June 2007, 3.
2 A first version of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
had been proclaimed at Nice in 2000. It only acquired the legal status of the highest-
ranking fundamental rights catalogue with the Lisbon Treaty by the reference in article 
6 (1). Since 2009, the main, legally binding source of fundamental rights in EU were the 
general principles of the EU law derived by international convention (especially the 
ECHR) and from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States.
3 On the point of the national/constitutional identity see, among others, A. Von 
Bogdandy and S. Schill, Overcoming absolute primacy: Respect for National Identity 
Under the Lisbon Treaty, in Common Market Law Review, 48, 2011, 1417-1454; G. 
Van Der Schyff, Eu Member State Constitutional Identity: a Comparison of Germany 
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developed due to the evolving jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Justice (hereinafter CJEU), which, at least in some cases, acts as a 
proper European constitutional court or a quasi-constitutional court.4 
This might elicit opposition by national states and potentially strain 
relationships with national constitutional courts.5
As an example of the CJEU’s admittedly tentative entry into the na-
tional constitutional spaces, (“stirring up”, at times, the aforementioned 
emergence of national constitutional identities), we may consider the 
recent decision in the Portuguese case Associação Sindical dos Juízes 
Portugueses, delivered in February 2018.6 In this judgment, the CJEU, 
in its Grand Chamber composition, had to establish whether Law No. 
75/2014, which temporarily reduced the remuneration (among others) 
of the judges of the Court of Auditors, was compatible with EU Law 
(especially with the principle of judicial independence, enshrined in the 
second subparagraph of Article 19(1) Treaty of the European Union 
(hereinafter TEU) and in Article 47 EUCFR).
Even though the CJEU ruled that «the second subparagraph of Arti-
cle 19(1) TEU must be interpreted as meaning that the principle of judi-
cial independence does not preclude general salary-reduction measures», 
it is worth noting that the Court, in its reasoning, pointed out that the 
considered EU provisions relate to “the fields covered by Union law”, 
irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing Union law, 
within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Consequently, the 
Luxembourg judges elaborated on the guarantee of independence of the 
judiciary, which undeniably represents a key constitutional issue.7
and the Netherland as Polar Opposite, in ZaöRV, 76, 2016, 167-191; E. Cloots, National 
Identity, Constitutional Identity, and Sovereignty in the EU, in Netherlan Journal of 
Legal Philosophy, (45) 2, 2016, 82-98.
4 G. Itzcovich, The European Court of Justice as a constitutional Court. Legal 
Reasoning in a Comparative Perspective, STALS Research Paper 4/2014; E. Billis, The 
European Court of Justice: a “Quasi-Constitutional Court” in criminal matters? The 
Taricco Judgment and its shortcomings, in New Journal of European Criminal Law, (7) 
1, 2016, 20-38.
5 J. Komárek, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, in European 
Constitutional Law Review, 9, 2013, 420-450 and from the same author, Constitutional 
Courts in the European Constitutional Democracy, in International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, (12) 3, 2014, 525-544. 
6 CJEU (Grand Chamber) 27 February 2018, Case 64/16, Associação Sindical dos 
Juízes Portugueses v Tribunal de Contas.
7 On the same topic we can also consider the Hungarian case: CJEU (First 
Chamber) 6 November 2012, Case 286/2012, Commission v. Hungary.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 25
Focusing on the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it is worth to re-
member that this instrument is meant primarily to bind EU institu-
tions and to restrict their power; this application is uncontroversial. 
Matters become more problematic when it comes to applying the 
fundamental rights enshrined within the Charter to the obligations of 
Member States that are already constrained by the rights contained in 
their own national constitutions. As general rule, it can be said that the 
EU Charter has a limited field of application. Indeed, the Charter ap-
plies to EU Member States only “when they are implementing Union 
law” because, in such situations, they are not acting on their own but 
merely as agents for the EU: in giving effect to EU rules they are ob-
viously also required to respect EU fundamental rights. However, the 
aforementioned passage “when they are implementing the Union law”, 
contained in Article 51 (1) of the Charter, has been translated by CJEU 
jurisprudence into a much broader and less clearly defined “when they 
are acting within the scope of EU law”.8 This broader reading of Article 
51 (1) EUCFR has been the subject of intense debate among academics 
and practitioners, but it still remains a grey area of uncertainty in which 
it is difficult to orientate.
As we said, it is not always easy to define the boundaries of the 
Charter’s field of application and therefore national judges (as well as 
parliamentarians and governments) represent the core “Charter agents” 
that the EU system relies on and that should contribute to the evo-
lution of the EU legal space towards integration. However, the main 
problem is that they are still – all too often – unaware agents. This ob-
servation becomes clearer if we consider, at first, national legislators as 
core Charter agents. The Italian legislator, for instance, during the last 
legislature approved a law on the Treatment Advance Directives (an 
issue that it is quite difficult to link with EU competencies) which in its 
Article 1 expressly refers to the EUCFR, possibly paving the way for 
future intrusion of the CJEU outside the scope of EU law.
Then, if we consider the judges as “Charter agents” (or, more gener-
ally, natural allies of the EU legal system or again recipients of the Euro-
pean Mandate),9 their unawareness may produce two different kind of 
8 CJEU 26 February 2013, Case 617/10, Aklageren v. Akerneg Fransson; see also 
CJEU 26 February 2013, Case 399/11, Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal.
9 The term “Chart agents” is used by the FRA in the Fundamental Rights Report 
2018, the term allies is used by B. Schima, EU Fundamental Rights and Member 
State Action After Lisbon: Putting the CJEU’s Case Law in Context, in Fordham 
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behaviours. Firstly, judges might refer to the Charter in an inconsistent 
way, bundling to it together with other legal sources, especially national 
constitutional provisions and ECHR articles. The Fundamental Right 
Agency (FRA) justifies this practice as a signal that judges (generally 
speaking) are aware of the existence of the Charter but not of its poten-
tial added value, so that they prefer to «package various human rights 
sources in order to play it safe».10 Secondly, judges might use the Char-
ter improperly – without any consideration about its field of applica-
tion – in order to drive the national legal system towards new frontiers, 
potentially jeopardising the certainty of the rule of law. Examples of this 
tendency in the Italian context may be found in the case law concern-
ing the introduction of stepchild adoption by Court of Cassation No. 
19962/16 or, even more to the point, in the case concerning the disappli-
cation of national provisions of the criminal procedural code about legal 
aid, which the Court of Appeal had deemed in conflict with Article 47 
EUCFR,11 without any reference to its field of application.
The latter behaviour is particularly dangerous both at national 
and at EU level, since it contributes to enhance the internal tensions 
between Constitutional Courts and ordinary Courts and to trigger a 
“clash of titans” between national Constitutional courts and the CJEU. 
Moreover, it is not even useful for European integration.
The above-described context is essential for a better understand-
ing of the jurisprudence of national Constitutional Courts and of their 
sometimes strained relationship with the CJEU.
A comparative perspective, which implies the contextualization of 
the selected judgments, becomes therefore important in order to evalu-
ate the different approaches to the Charter and their impact on the EU 
integration process.
The choice of comparing the effectiveness of the Charter in Italy, 
Austria and UK in the light of recent jurisprudence of the Supreme/
Constitutional Courts can be easily explained. With judgement No. 
International Law Journal, 38, Issue 4, 2015, 1097-1133; the term recipients of the 
European Mandate is deducted from M. Bobek, The Impact of the European Mandate 
of Ordinary Courts on the Position of the Constitutional Courts, in M. De Visser and 
C. Van De Heyning (eds), Constitutional Conversations in Europe, Cambridge, 2012, 
287-308.
10 FRA, Fundamental Rights Report, 2018.
11 A. Barbera, La Carta dei diritti: per un dialogo fra la Corte italiana e la Corte 
di Giustizia, availabele at: https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/convegni…/
SIVIGLIA_BARBERA.pdf.
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269/2017 the Italian Constitutional Court has questioned CJEU com-
petence interpreting the Charter and the constitutional traditions com-
mon to the Member States,12 or, more correctly, has tried to preserve 
the concept of a centralized constitutional jurisdiction (as the Austrian 
Constitutional Court did) in order to guarantee higher certainty to the 
protection of fundamental rights. However, the probably positive in-
tentions of the Court have been misunderstood, and the most obvious 
reason is that the Constitutional Court has tried to import the model 
of the Austrian constitutional court judgment, which, as we are going 
to see in detail, had obtained positive reaction by the EU institutions, 
without considering the different context.
The judgment at hand has been strongly criticised by the majority 
of academics and practitioners, who regarded it as an inappropriate in-
terference with, and opposition to, the CJEU. Furthermore (and more 
in general) it has been argued that the judgment diminishes the role 
of ordinary judges as recipients of the European Mandate, restricting 
their freedom to disapply, on their own initiative, a national provision 
in conflict with the EUCFR.
Choosing Austria as a term of comparison is therefore an obligat-
ed choice because of the reference that the Italian Constitutional Court 
made to the Austrian Constitutional Court’s landmark decision. Moreo-
ver, this analysis will help to understand why similar decisions had such 
different outcomes. The choice of the UK as the third term of compari-
son is not only due to the fact that it represents an interesting and recent 
example of valorisation of the Charter but also to the similarities that the 
UK legal system shares with Austria. At a first glance, Austria may not 
seem to have much in common with the UK in this aspect, but a closer 
look will reveal that the two systems are more similar than it appears: in 
both countries, in the absence of a fully national bill of rights (such as the 
one found in the Italian constitution), the domestic fundamental rights 
system is in fact based mainly on the ECHR, which – either as a whole or 
in part – applies at the national level through the Human Rights Act 1998 
in UK and through its constitutionalization in Austria.13 In this scenario, 
12 R. Di Marco, “The path toward European integration” of the Italian 
Constitutional Court: The Primacy of EU Law in the light of the Judgment No. 269/17, 
in European Papers – European Forum, 14 July 2018, inserire pagine.
13 A. Müller, An Austrian ménage a trois: The Convention, The Charter and The 
Constitution, in K. S. Ziegler, E. Wicks, L. Hodson (eds.), The UK and the European 
Human Rights. A strained relationship, Oxford, 2015, 299-320.
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the valorisation of the Charter as a complementary fundamental rights 
catalogue is therefore very interesting and, at the same time, very chal-
lenging for both the national and the European legal orders.
2. The Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Light 
of the Italian Constitutional Judgment No. 269/2017
Before engaging in an examination of judgment No. 269/2017 of 
the Italian Constitutional Court, it seems necessary to mention briefly 
that, in the nine years since the Charter was first proclaimed and before 
it became legally binding, the Italian Constitutional Court has more 
than once referred directly to it in order to support its legal reasoning. 
Hence, in doing so the Court has recognised the importance of the 
Charter, among other international instruments such as the Europe-
an Convention of Human Rights (hereinafter ECHR), as an instru-
ment devoted to protect fundamental rights. Even after the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty, which conferred legally binding force to 
the Charter, its use in practice by the Italian Constitutional Court has 
not changed significantly either on the quantitative or on the qualita-
tive point of view. Indeed, on one hand, the number of references has 
certainly increased, but remains low in proportion to the total num-
ber of decision delivered; on the other hand, the quality of the refer-
ences remains insubstantial since it is usually used ad adiuvandum or 
ad definendum without even considering whether the matter is within 
the scope of the EU law. Leaving aside the so-called Taricco saga, it is 
worth noting that the trend described here may change due to the shift-
ing approach of the Constitutional Court, as inaugurated by a decision 
issued at the end of 2017.
Indeed, the Italian Constitutional Court, in a very controversial 
obiter dictum of decision No. 269/2017, describes the “state of the 
art” of the antinomy between EU law and domestic law. Therefore, (i) 
when a national law clashes with a European Union law that has direct 
effect, «it falls to the ordinary judge to evaluate the compatibility of the 
challenged internal rules with the European law, making use – where 
necessary – of a reference for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU». Then, 
in case of noncompliance, the national judges must apply the European 
rule instead of the national one.
(ii) If the situation of noncompliance regards European rules with 
no direct effect, the ordinary judge tries to resolve the evaluated incom-
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patibility through interpretation; if this fails, the judge must raise the 
question of constitutionality before the Constitutional court, which is 
the sole competent Court.
It is with the following reasoning that the Italian Constitutional 
Court inaugurates a new, and potentially slippery, path:
It bears considering that the aforementioned Charter of Rights is a 
part of Union law that is endowed with particular characteristic due 
to the typically constitutional stamp of its contents [italics added]. The 
principle and rights laid out in the Charter largely intersect with the 
principles and rights guaranteed by Italian Constitution (and by other 
Member States). It may therefore occur that the violation of an indi-
vidual right infringes, at once, upon the guarantees enshrined in the 
Italian Constitution and those codified by the European Charter (…
omissis). Therefore, violations of individual rights posit the need for 
an erga omnes intervention by this Court, including under the prin-
ciple that places a centralized system of the constitutional review of 
laws at the foundation of the constitutional structure (Article 134 of 
the Constitution).
Thus, according with the reasoning of the constitutional judges, 
(iii) when a national law clashes with the Charter the ordinary nation-
al judges must address the Constitutional court, although in princi-
ple they remain free to submit a reference for preliminary ruling to 
the CJEU. It seems quite clear that the reasoning of the Court aims to 
preserve the concept of a centralized constitutional jurisdiction (as the 
Austrian Constitutional Court did, although on a different basis) in 
order to guarantee higher certainty to the protection (erga omnes) of 
fundamental rights. Were it not so, the rights enshrined in the national 
constitution would enjoy a lesser degree of protection (only among the 
parts of the proceeding) for the sole reason that they are also protected 
in the Charter. Nevertheless, the loyal cooperation with the CJEU is 
not forgotten by the Constitutional Court that expressly recalled it by 
referring to the importance of judicial dialogue.
However, we can imagine two different scenarios resulting from this 
reasoning. In the first one, the Constitutional Court upholds the claim 
based on fundamental rights and the national provision is no longer 
available in the national legal system. In that case there would be no more 
reason for the ordinary judge to knock at the door of the CJEU.
In the second scenario, the Constitutional Court dismisses the claim 
and therefore the interpretation of the Charter by the CJEU might re-
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main the last recourse. At this point, however, the ordinary court could 
be persuaded by the legal arguments of the Constitutional judgment, 
or simply be discouraged from making another time-consuming refer-
ence within the same case. However, if it persevered, and if the Europe-
an claim based on the EUCFR provisions succeeded (and only in this 
case), the divergence in interpretation might trigger an overt conflict 
between the CJEU and the Constitutional Court, which could poten-
tially lead to questioning even the consolidated principle of the pri-
macy of the EU, since many fundamental rights find a counterpart in 
other rules of EU law.14
It is probably with the latter scenario in mind that the Court of 
Cassation has reacted to the Constitutional judgment at hand and has 
made references both to the Constitutional Court, for a Charter-based 
judicial review of legislation, and, in a different case, for a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU.15
In the first case the Court of Cassation has formally respected the 
procedural rule specified by judgment No. 269 but at the same time 
has asked for clarification on the dual preliminarity, highlighting the 
possible problems connected with this hypothesis. In the second case 
the Cassation Court has ignored that procedural rule (since it was con-
tained in a obiter dictum) and has knocked directly at the door of the 
CJEU. These two reactions demonstrate that the main problem arising 
from constitutional judgment No. 269/2017 is not at European level 
nor does it concern relationships with the CJEU; it is instead at the 
national level, where national ordinary judges may feel deprived by 
the Constitutional judges of that “European Mandate” that empowers 
them to be judges of the European legal space and to enforce EU law,16 
including the Fundamental Rights enshrined in the Charter. It is this 
element, among others that we will highlight in the next paragraph, 
which differs from the Austrian case. The conflict between the Con-
14 B. Schima, EU Fundamental Rights and Member State Action After Lisbon: 
Putting the CJEU’s Case Law in Context, in Fordham International Law Journal, 38, 
Issue 4, 2015, 1097-1133. It is quite interesting to notice that the author has forecast, in 
general terms, the described scenarios. 
15 Court of Cassation., II Civil Section, 16 February 2018, judgment No. 3831 and 
Court of Cassation, Labour Section, 30 May 2018, judgment No. 13678.
16 It is worth noting that this European Mandate has been recognized by the 
Italian Constitutional Court in 1984 (Granital decision) where the Court stated that 
a national piece of legislation which clashes with EU provisions endowed with direct 
effect must be disapplied in favour to EU law.
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stitutional Court and the CJEU is going to be an exceptional case and, 
moreover, the dialogue concerning the development of rights among 
these two Courts might eventually turn out to be very fruitful.
Concluding, however, it is important to notice that the aforemen-
tioned constitutional judgment leaves some grey areas: is it possible 
that the violation of an individual right infringes only those rights cod-
ified by the European Charter? If so, who is going to decide over this 
case? And is it even possible, in this case, to forgo the “constitutional 
content” of the Charter?
3. The Austrian Approach to the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the 
Light of the 2012 Constitutional Decision
Since Austria’s accession to the European Community in 1995, the 
Verfassungsgerichtshof (hereinafter VfGH), which has sole jurisdiction 
to declare general acts invalid and is responsible for the protection of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights, has recognized the supremacy of EU 
norms having direct effect. However, even though EU law was consid-
ered by the same VfGH as applicable law, it was not deemed to have 
constitutional status and therefore it could not be used as a standard 
of review of legislative or administrative acts before the Constitutional 
Court. Indeed, as the VfGH stated for example in 2000, “the compat-
ibility of the statute with community law as such cannot be subject of 
the Court’s control”.17
The decision of 14 March 2012, the one that the Italian Constitu-
tional Court refers to, deviates from the above-mentioned view on the 
role of EU law in the Austrian legal system and therefore represents a 
landmark decision.18
The case before the Constitutional Court concerned an issue of asy-
lum law: the applicants, two Chinese citizens who had applied for in-
ternational protection (Asylum), were claiming a violation of their right 
to an effective remedy and to a fair trial as enshrined in Article 47 of 
the Charter (not in a constitutional norm) because they had been de-
nied an oral hearing before the Asylum Court.19 The applicants’ decision 
17 VfGH, 15753/2000 but also VfGH 19496/2011.
18 VfGH, 14 March 2012, U466/11.
19 The piece of legislation under constitutional review was the Austrian Asylum Act 
(2005), which indeed omitted to provide an oral hearing before a national asylum court. 
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not to rely on the almost corresponding provision of Article 47 EUC-
FR, i.e. Article 6 of the ECHR, which – by the well-established logic 
of the VfGH – would have constituted the surest way to see their claim 
considered, is due to the fact that this convention provision was of no 
avail, since jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights had 
already made it clear that proceedings regarding asylum do not concern 
civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR.20
Therefore, Article 47 of the Charter, with its broader content, was 
the exclusive source of law invoked as a yardstick for constitutional 
complaint, and thus the Court could not avoid to verify whether the 
Charter itself would qualify as a standard of review for proceedings 
under Article 144a of the Federal Constitutional Law (B-VG).
It may be useful to follow the arguments of that decision to better 
understand its outcomes as well as its context. First of all, the VfGH 
referred to Article 6 (1) TEU and held that the Charter is a part of EU 
primary law, but it concluded that its previous case law could not be 
applied to the examined case because “the Charter is an area that is 
markedly distinct from the Treaties”.21
Having said this, the Court referred to the principle of equivalence 
and effectiveness and concluded that “rights which are guaranteed by 
directly applicable Union law must be enforceable in proceedings that 
exist for comparable rights deriving from the legal order of the Member 
States”.22 The VfGH equated the Charter rights with constitutionally 
guaranteed rights pursuant to Articles 144 and 144a B-VG and argued 
that many Charter rights are modelled on the ECHR, which has in Aus-
tria constitutional rank.23 Therefore, in order to preserve the concept of 
a centralized constitutional jurisdiction, a core concept of the Austri-
an Constitution, the VfGH concluded that it is competent to decide on 
Charter rights identical in content to the Austrian counterparts.24
20 The same VfGH considers the issue in order to estabilish that article 47 and 
article 6 have different meaning. 
21 VfGH, 14.03.2012, U466/11, para. 25.
22 VfGH, 14.03.2012, U466/11, para. 27 which refers to the CJEU case law and in 
particular to CJEU 1 December 1998, Case 326/96, Levez v. T.H. Jennings (Harlow 
Pools) Ltd. 
23 Austria acceded to the Council of Europe in 1956 and ratified the Convention 
in 1958. In 1964 the dispute about the legal status of the ECHR was solved (with 
reatroactive effects) by the (constitutional) legislator which elevated the Convention to 
the rank of constitutional law (Budesgesetzblatt 121/1956). 
24 VfGH, 14 March 2012, U466/11, para. 34.
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… it follows from the equivalence principle that the rights guaran-
teed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights may also be invoked as 
constitutionally guaranteed rights pursuant to Articles 144 and 144a 
respectively, Federal Constitutional Act (B-VG) and they constitute a 
standard of review in general judicial review proceedings in the scope 
of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in particular un-
der Articles 139 and 140, Federal Constitutional Act (B-VG)”.25
However, the Court seems to restrict this view to those Charter 
rights corresponding to constitutionally guaranteed rights under Aus-
trian law: “this is true if the guarantee contained in the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights is similar in its wording and purpose to rights that 
are guaranteed by the Austrian Federal Constitution”. Therefore, not 
the whole Charter is elevated to serve as a yardstick for constitutional 
complaints. To identify the relevant parts of the Charter that may be 
considered as standard of review, one must establish, on a case-by-case 
basis, which rights guarantee the same wording and purpose as those en-
shrined in the Austrian Federal Constitution and in the ECHR, which 
– as already mentioned – has the same constitutional rank. The VfGH 
explained that some provisions, such as e.g. Articles 22 or 37 of the 
Charter, do not resemble constitutionally guaranteed rights so much as 
“principles” and thus cannot be regarded as standard of review, since 
they cannot be compared to a detailed catalogue of rights and duties.26 
One may object to this approach on the basis of legal certainty: actu-
ally, aside of course from Article 47, on which the VfGH has already 
made its (not fully satisfactory) evaluations, it remains unclear which 
other Charter rights will qualify as constitutionally guaranteed rights. 
For instance, following that leading decision, Article 21 (1) and (2) has 
also already been afforded this “constitutional” status.
Moreover, the VfGH recognized the importance of CJEU case law 
for interpreting the Charter rights and expressly stated that, in the case 
of doubts on the interpretation of those rights enshrined in the Charter 
provisions, it would have initiated a preliminary reference procedure 
according to Article 267 TFEU.
In summary, the Constitutional Court – after having referred a matter 
for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
according to article 267 TFEU as appropriate – takes the Charter of 
25 Ibidem, para. 35.
26 Ibidem, para. 36.
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Fundamental Rights in its scope of application as a standard for na-
tional law (article 51(1) EUCFR) and sets aside contradicting general 
norms according to Article 139 and/or Article 140 Federal Constitu-
tional Act (B-VG). In this manner, the Constitutional Court fulfils its 
obligation to remove from the domestic legal order provisions incom-
patible with Community law, which is also postulate by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union”.27
The Court goes further in its argumentations by offering a distinc-
tive interpretation of the obligation of reference for preliminary ruling 
under Article 267 (3) TFEU. In particular, the Court states that, as far 
as the Charter is concerned, if a constitutionally guaranteed right (espe-
cially one of those of the ECHR) has the same scope of application as a 
right of the Charter, the Court has no obligation to bring the matter to 
the attention of the CJEU, since it can base its decision upon the Aus-
trian Constitution alone. In the wording of the VfGH, the rationale for 
this lack of obligation is linked with the interpretation of Articles 52 
and 53 of the Charter: indeed, fundamental rights are recognized in the 
Charter as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States and, therefore, must be interpreted in accordance with 
those traditions. “In so far as this Charter contains rights which cor-
respond with rights guaranteed by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the 
said Convention” (Article 52(3) EUCFR).
The Court then, after having addressed the general issue, applied 
(or at least attempted to apply) these arguments to the specific field 
of the case. It stressed that Article 47 EUCFR has a broader scope of 
application than the corresponding Article 6 ECHR. However, this 
remark did not prevent the VfGH from deciding on whether an oral 
hearing may be restricted in accordance with Article 47 EUCFR with-
out referring the issue to the CJEU, as it was, instead, quite reasonable 
to expect on the basis of the above-mentioned arguments. The Court, 
therefore, concluded that:
In the light of this case, the Constitutional Court neither holds any 
reservation as to the constitutionality of sec 41 (7) 2005 Asylum Act, 
nor does it find that the Federal Asylum Tribunal subsumed an un-
27 Ibidem, para. 39. The italics is added in order to emphasize the statement of the 
Court.
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constitutional content under this provision by desisting from holding 
an oral hearing. Desisting from holding a hearing in cases in which 
the facts seem to be clear from the case-file in combination with the 
complaint, or where investigations reveal beyond doubt that the plea 
submitted is contrary to the facts, is consistent with article 47 EUC-
FR, if preceded by administrative proceedings in the course of which 
the parties were heard.28
The principle of coherence demands that the Court can also review 
alleged violations based on the Charter and this argument seems to be a 
very important point on the relationship between the Austrian and the 
EU legal orders. However, an important condition for allowing an EU 
Charter complaint before the Austrian Constitutional Court is that the 
Charter right be similar to a national human right under the ECHR, 
which – as we have already noted – has constitutional rank and repre-
sents the main catalogue of rights. The EUCFR might therefore play 
a pivotal role in Austria as a constitutional yardstick for ordinary law, 
which can be declared null and void in case of incompatibility, but in 
principle only when the Charter right is at least “similar” to those pro-
tected within the ECHR.
The decision has received mixed reactions from the Austrian legal 
academia,29 which has generally criticized the reasoning of the Con-
stitutional Court, and from the jurisprudence of other national courts 
such the Supreme Administrative Court. The latter, in particular, with 
its judgment of 23 January 201330 repealed, based on a violation of Ar-
ticle 47 EUCFR, a decision of the independent Tax Panel, which had 
denied the applicant an oral hearing. The main point here, at least for 
our purposes, does not so much concern the outcome of the decision, 
which we may agree on, as the relationship between the courts. In fact, 
the Supreme Administrative Court has find itself obligated to imple-
ment the Charter without considering that the Constitutional Court in 
the examined judgment had qualified the rights of the Charter (certain-
ly including Article 47 EUCFR) to be equivalent to constitutionally 
guaranteed rights for which it is the sole competent judge. This eval-
uation seems especially relevant if we consider the data on the impact 
28 Ibidem, para. 64.
29 K. Lachmayer, The Austrian approach toward European human rights, in 
Vienna J. on Int’l Const. L., 2013, 105-107.
30 Austrian Supreme Administrative Court (VwGH), 23 January 2013, judgment 
No. 2010/15/0196.  
LORENZA VIOLINI E ALESSANDRA OSTI36
of the Charter at national level presented by the Fundamental Rights 
Agency (FRA) in 2018. The report of the Agency shows that in Austria 
the Constitutional Court referred to the Charter 34 times, whereas the 
Supreme Administrative Court did so 140 times.31
However, the most interesting reaction came from the CJEU: 
Vassilios Skouris, the former President of the CJEU, sent a congratula-
tory note to the President of the VfGH, Gerart Holzinger. According 
to this note, the decision at hand can be read as a substantial contribu-
tion to transforming the EUCFR into a shared asset of the EU and to 
further developing the cooperation between the CJEU and the national 
constitutional courts to the benefit of Fundamental Rights protection 
in Europe.32 Of course, this positive reaction might be influenced by 
the ongoing cooperative approach that the Austrian Constitutional 
Court has developed since its first preliminary reference to the CJEU 
back in 1999.33
In the light of this positive reaction, we may also look favourably to 
CJEU decision A v. B and others, which the Luxembourg Court deliv-
ered in 2014, and consider it as one more step forward in the constructive 
dialogue between the two Courts.34 Indeed, the CJEU held that, accord-
ing to VfGH case law, ordinary courts must apply to the Constitutional 
Court if they consider a statute to be contrary to the Charter. However, 
the obligation to refer the case to the Constitutional Court for the gen-
eral striking off of statutes does not affect the right of ordinary courts (as 
correctly expressed by the VfGH in wording borrowed from the CJEU 
judgment) to refer any question they consider necessary to the Court 
of Justice for a preliminary ruling, at whatever stage of the proceedings 
they might deem appropriate, even at the end of the interlocutory proce-
dure for the review of constitutionality. While a divergence of interpre-
tation leading to potentially dangerous conflicts between the CJEU and 
the VfGH remains possible, it seems a rather marginal risk vis a vis the 
benefits of a fruitful relationship with the VfGH.
31 FRA, Fundamental Rights Report 2018. The data considered only cases where 
the reference to the Charter is within the reasoning of the court and not cases where the 
Charter is considered merely in order to report that the parties had refer to it. 
32 Letter of 25th May 2012. The reference to the letter can be found in A. Müller, 
An Austrian ménage a trois: The Convention, The Charter and The Constitution, in 
K.S. Ziegler, E. Wicks, L. Hodson (eds.), The UK and the European Human Rights. A 
strained relationship, Oxford and Portland, 2015, 307 ss.
33 VfGH, 10 March 1999, judgment No. B 2251/87.
34 CJEU (Grand Chamber) 11 September 2014, Case 112/13, A v. B and others. 
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Facts seem to support this statement for the time being. Indeed, 
the FRA reported that in Austria the Charter does not have a decisive 
overall impact on the outcome of the judgments. This might indicate 
that, after all, the added value of the Charter is overall still limited, 
especially compared to other sources of law and the ECHR in primis.
4. The Strange Case of the UK Application of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights. Recent Developments
It can be noted that the European Charter of Fundamental Rights 
has met a rather frosty reception in the United Kingdom. Under the 
Human Rights Act, in which parliamentary sovereignty is protected, 
the courts may only issue a declaration of incompatibility, rather than 
a proper remedy, but the Charter can be directly enforced and any in-
compatible national law set aside due to the supremacy of EU law.
From the start, i.e., from the solemn proclamation of the Charter in 
Nice, the British government had taken a rather dim view of the Char-
ter, which it only tolerated insofar as it remained a non-legally binding 
statement of policy. It worth noting that by the time it obtained bind-
ing legal effect in 2009 with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, 
the Charter had already made its first steps in the European legal order 
through the jurisprudence of the CJEU.35
In 2007 the UK, through a joint UK and Poland Protocol, had ne-
gotiated an opt-out from the Charter, but this document, Protocol 30 
to the Treaty of Lisbon, showed the full extent of its weakness and am-
biguity when the Treaty entered into force in December 2009.
UK judges, at first, stated that applicants could not rely on the 
Charter, which was not applicable in UK, but at the same time argued 
that, in spite of this, the Charter still had an indirect influence as an aid 
to interpretation.36
The Government subsequently began to soften its (op)position to the 
Charter, admitting that Protocol 30 did not altogether prevent the Charter 
from applying within the UK, but only served to explain its effect. As one 
would expect, this position was endorsed by the European Court of Jus-
tice (CJEU) in its case law. Indeed, in the wording of the CJEU:
35 The first decision that refer to the Charter is CJEU (Grand Chamber) 27 June 
2006, Case 540/03, Parliament v. Council of the European Union.
36 See R (Saeedi) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 705.
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Protocol (No 30) does not call into question the applicability of the 
Charter in the United Kingdom or in Poland, a position which is 
confirmed by the recitals in the preamble to that protocol. Thus, ( … 
omissis) Article 6 TEU requires the Charter to be applied and inter-
preted by the courts of Poland and of the United Kingdom strictly in 
accordance with the explanations referred to in that article. In addi-
tion, according to the sixth recital in the preamble to that protocol, 
the Charter reaffirms the rights, freedoms and principles recognised 
in the Union and makes those rights more visible, but does not create 
new rights or principles.37
In 2012, the UK Supreme Court had the occasion to confirm that 
the Charter takes effect in national law, binding Member States when 
they are implementing EU law.38 However, although some steps in the 
direction of embracing the Charter had been taken, the issue of the 
legal status of the Charter was still unresolved and the state of uncer-
tainty regarding its effect on the UK national order persisted for several 
years. In this regard it is worth noting, for example, that key govern-
ment officials – including Secretary of State for Justice Chris Grayling 
in 2013 and Home Secretary Theresa May in 2014 – kept opposing the 
EUCFR by saying that it should not apply to the UK and that it had 
merely declaratory value. Amid this contradictory scenario, the House 
of Commons European Scrutiny Committee in its 2014 report issued 
a very strong recommendation to adopt primary legislation aiming to 
exclude the applicability of the Charter in the UK, without considering 
the fact that the UK could not unilaterally alter EU law nor disapply 
the Charter, which is EU law as well.
However, the fortunes of the Charter were going to change shortly 
afterwards. The wind of change turned in 2015, when the Court of Ap-
peal delivered two decisions which recognized that some provision of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights not only have effect in the national legal 
order but also have a horizontal, direct effect; on this basis, the Court 
disapplied the primary UK legislation in contrast with those provisions.
The first case, Benkharbouche v. Sudanese Embassy, concerned 
claims brought by foreign domestic workers employed by the London 
Embassies of Sudan and Libya. Ms Benkharbouche, a Moroccan citi-
37 CJEU 21 December 2011, Case 411/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for Home 
Department, para. 119.
38 Rugby Football Union v. Consolidated Information Services [ 2012] UKSC 55, 
paras. 26-28.
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zen, was employed as a cook at the Sudanese embassy in London be-
fore her dismissal. She brought a claim against the embassy for wrong-
ful dismissal, failure to pay the minimum wage and breach of working 
time regulation (which incorporated Directive 2003/88/EC). Ms Janah, 
also a Moroccan citizen, was instead fired from her post as a mem-
ber of the domestic staff at the Libyan embassy in London. Her claim 
against the Libyan embassy was based on wrongful dismissal, racial 
discrimination and harassment (relying on law incorporating the Race 
Discrimination Directive) as well as breach of working time regulation. 
As it will be clear shortly, the reference to the substance of the claims is 
a very important point.
Both States claimed to be covered by immunity under section 1 of 
the State Immunity Act (hereafter SIA) and thus they relied on the fact 
that UK Courts had no jurisdiction. The claimants, on the contrary, ar-
gued that the grant of immunity under the SIA infringed their own right 
to access to a court, as enshrined in Article 6 ECHR as well as in Article 
47 EUCFR. The Court of Appeal held that indeed Article 47 EUCFR 
(right to a Court and right to effective remedies) had horizontal effect 
and, therefore, the SIA (especially sections 4 (2) and 16 (1), which granted 
the embassies immunity from employment claims) had to be disapplied.
Article 47 must fall into the category of Charter provisions that can 
be the subject of horizontal effect. It follows from the (CJEU’s) ap-
proach in Kucukdeveci and AMS that EU Charter provision which 
reflect general principles of EU law will do so. (… omissis) The order 
of this court will disapply sections 4 (2) (b) and 16 (1) (a) to the extent 
necessary to enable employment claims falling within the scope of EU 
law by members of the staff service, whose work does not relate to the 
sovereign function of the mission staff.
It is worth noting that here the English judges referred to CJEU ju-
risprudence and developed it. Indeed, the CJEU judgments mentioned 
by the Court of Appeal had concluded that the Charter was capable to 
have horizontal direct effect, but they did not recognize it in the exam-
ined provisions (Articles 27 and 31 EUCFR).
In the second case, Vidal-Hall v. Google Inc., three claimants al-
leged that Google Inc. had misused their private information and acted 
in breach of confidence and in breach of its statutory duties under Data 
Protection Act 1998, by tracking and collating, without their consent 
or knowledge, information relating to their internet usage on Apple 
Safari internet browser. In particular, they claimed damages for the 
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acute distress they reportedly suffered when they realised that sensitive 
data information might be revealed to those who saw targeted adver-
tising on the claimants’ screens. The Court of Appeal concluded that 
the Data Protection Act 1998 (especially section 13 (2), which expressly 
limited damages for pure distress to specific circumstances) had to be 
disapplied because of Articles 7 (right to private and family life) and 8 
(right to protection of data) of the EUCFR, which not only have effect 
in UK, but also have horizontal direct effect.
Both these decisions seem to open up a new and more effective path 
for human right protection in the UK: while ECHR provisions, which 
have become national through the Human Rights Act, may produce 
only a declaration of incompatibility, the Charter empowers judges to 
enforce a proper remedy (a legislative disapplication), although only in 
a restrictive range of cases i.e. to the extent necessary to satisfy claims 
falling within the scope of EU law.
The abovementioned jurisprudence had a positive impact on the 
valorisation of the Charter by the lower courts, which have actually 
used the Charter to disapply legislation, and (surprisingly) by the Gov-
ernment, which has stated to accept both that claimants can rely on the 
EUCFR in UK courts when the claim is within the scope of EU law, 
and that violations of the EUCFR must be resolved by disapplication 
of divergent national provisions. Even the Supreme Court intervened 
on the EUCFR issue shortly afterwards.
In July 2017, the Supreme Court noted that the fees introduced 
by the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
Fees Order 2013, which required payment of an issue fee when a claim 
form is presented and of a hearing fee prior to the hearing of the claim 
(which for a single claimant would cost roughly up to £1,200 each), 
contravened EU law’s guarantee of an effective remedy before a court 
as enshrined in Article 47 EUCFR.39 Since the fees were unaffordable 
in practice, the Fees Order was deemed a disproportionate limitation 
of Article 47 EUCFR in light of Article 52 (1) EUCFR. In this case 
the decision was made easier by the fact that the domestic provision 
conflicting with the EUCFR was an Order and not a piece of primary 
legislation; nevertheless, this can be considered the first step in the di-
rection of a full recognition.40
39 UKSC, 26.07.2017, Case 2015/0233, R (on the application of UNISON) 
(Appellant) v Lord Chancellor (Respondent). 
40 It is interesting to notice that the FRA in its 2018 Report has named the UK as 
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However, only in October 2017 did the EUCFR reach the highest 
degree of recognition, when the Supreme Court, dealing with the ap-
peal of Benkharbouche case, confirmed, very briefly, that the EU Char-
ter could be used as a stand-alone cause of action in order to disapply 
primary legislation:
The scope of article 47 of the Charter is not identical to that of article 
6 of the Human Rights Convention, but the Secretary of State accepts 
that on the facts of this case if the Convention is violated, so is the 
Charter. (… omissis) The only difference that it makes is that a conflict 
between EU law and English domestic law must be resolved in favour 
of the former, and the latter must be disapplied; whereas the remedy in 
case of inconsistency with article 6 of the Human Rights Convention 
is a declaration of incompatibility.41
This judgment is highly interesting not only because of the out-
come but also because of its timing: in fact, the case was heard after the 
so-called Brexit and after the famous Miller case, which – in a certain 
way – “restored” the sovereignty of Parliament and confirmed the pri-
macy of EU law over domestic legislation. Reading the Benkharbouche 
case in light of the Miller one, we can argue that accepting disappli-
cation as a standard (to the extent this is required by UK legislation 
– namely European Communities Act 1972) does not challenge the key 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed, when judges disapply a 
domestic provision, they merely endorse the real will of Parliament not 
to contradict directly effective EU law.
Of course, we can only wonder now if disapplication will have a 
future after the exit day (which will depend on the content of the With-
drawal Bill) and if it will be possible to have a form of disapplication 
beyond EU law. But this is perhaps not the right place to discuss this 
very complex issue.
5. Concluding Remarks
It is important not to underestimate the Charter’s reformatory po-
tential: for instance the UK, after a long period of time in which the 
one of the few Member States where the Charter had played a substantial and a decisive 
role, and has referred to UNISON case.
41 Benkharbouche Case, para. 78.
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EUCFR was considered of merely declaratory value, has started to use 
it as a stand-alone cause of action in order to guarantee highly effective 
remedy through the disapplication of domestic primary legislation that 
violates the Charter. It is indeed worth noting that the Fundamental 
Rights Agency, in its last report, has named the UK as one of the few 
Member States where the Charter had played a substantial and decisive 
role in the considered period (2017).
At the same time, however, one must also remember that (re)ar-
ranging the balance of EU and domestic fundamental rights may strain 
relationships between institutional bodies within the State. On this 
specific point the situations of Italy and Britain are more similar than it 
appears at first glance. Indeed, the main problem arising from an exam-
ination of the jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court and of 
the UK Supreme Court concerns the relationship with other judges in 
the Italian context, and with the Parliament in the British context. The 
relationship with the CJEU may be considered safe, or at least confined 
to the border of the “dialogue”, where the CJEU is not the only par-
ty involved in the discussion on fundamental rights. Such dialogue, of 
course, can only be productive as long as the relationship between these 
courts is defined by loyal cooperation. As a good example of this we 
have considered the Austrian case, where, indeed, the choice to give the 
EUCFR an important role as a constitutional yardstick for ordinary 
law has been praised by the CJEU, due to the enduring cooperative ap-
proach that this constitutional court has developed through the years.
In conclusion, we can highlight the one point which all the “con-
stitutional” courts seem to agree on, i.e. that the issue of fundamental 
rights needs clear and consistent protection. While the specific instru-
ments may vary from country to country because of the different con-
texts, the Charter has to be considered an operational tool, emplaced 
alongside the national catalogues of rights, that can express its added 
value only within the scope of EU law.
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1. Introduction
Regulation 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation)1 establishes the crite-
ria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of 
the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person.2 
* Andrea Crescenzi is Researcher at the Institute for International Legal Studies 
(ISGI-CNR).
1 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 26 June 2013, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one 
of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604&from=IT 
2 The Dublin Convention was signed on June 15, 1990 (Convention determining 
the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the 
Member States of the European Communities). In particular, it was signed by 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. However, when we talk about the 
first phase of the a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) we refer to the three 
Directives (on Asylum Procedures, Reception Conditions, Qualification) and the two 
Regulations (Dublin II and Eurodac) adopted by the EU and transposed into national 
legislation by the Member States Between 1999 and 2005. Lastly, the second phase of 
the harmonisation process started at the end of 2011 when was adopted the revised 
Qualification Directive. As concerning the Dublin III Regulation, it was adopted by 
the Council on June 26, 2013. Cfr. M. Groen, The Dublin Regulation: an Analysis of 
the Dublin Regulation and its Effects on the Degree of Solidarity Between EU Member 
States During the Refugee Crisis, University of Leiden, 2015, pp. 1-77. 
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The Dublin III Regulation refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
both in general and in specific terms. In fact, Regulation 604/2013 “re-
spects the fundamental rights and observes the principles which are 
acknowledged, in particular, in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union”. Moreover, it reaffirms the need to ensure full 
respect of the right to asylum enshrined in Article 18 of the Charter, as 
well as the rights afforded under Articles 1 (Human dignity), 4 (Prohi-
bition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 
7 (Respect for private and family life), 24 (The rights of the child), and 
47 (Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial) of the Charter.3
The aim of this paper is to analyse some of the most critical aspects in 
the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) con-
cerning the application of the Dublin Regulation in the light of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights. Special attention will be given to the meas-
ures adopted by the Council (temporary relocation mechanism) and the 
Commission (proposed change to the Dublin III Regulation) to manage 
the crisis that started in the Mediterranean in 2015, checking whether 
they comply with the case law of the Court and with the Charter.
2. The Dublin System and the EU Charter
Despite the protections provided in the Regulation, it cannot be 
ruled out that an asylum seeker may be treated in a manner incompati-
ble with his or her fundamental rights when transferred to the Member 
State responsible under the Dublin criteria. This is what emerges from 
the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in N.S. and 
Others (pp. 79-81).4
In particular, the CJEU held that if the infringement of a funda-
mental right by the competent Member State were considered suffi-
cient to prevent the transfer of an asylum seeker, this would relieve the 
Member State responsible from the obligations arising under the Dub-
lin Regulation (Paras. 83-84).5 The potential effects of this statement 
3 S. Peers, Reconciling the Dublin System with European Fundamental Rights and 
the Charter, 2014, Springer, p. 485-494. 
4 CJEU, Grand Chamber, Secretary of State for the Home Department and N.S. 
and Others, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, 21 December 2011. 
5 According to the European Court of Justice “At issue here is the raison d’être of the 
European Union and the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, 
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were noticed by the Court itself, which immediately pointed out that at 
issue was the “raison d’être of the European Union and the creation of 
an area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, the Common 
European Asylum System, based on mutual confidence and a presump-
tion of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law 
and, in particular, fundamental rights” (Paragraph 83). Those potential 
effects would “deprive those obligations of their substance and endan-
ger the realisation of the objective of quickly designating the Member 
State responsible for examining an asylum claim lodged in the Europe-
an Union” (Paragraph 85).
It should be remembered that the principle of mutual confidence 
has always been considered an essential element of cooperation between 
Member States.6 Based on mutual confidence, in fact, each Member 
the Common European Asylum System, based on mutual confidence and a presumption 
of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law and, in particular, 
fundamental rights” and also “it would be not be compatible with the aims of Regulation 
No 343/2003 were the slightest infringement of Directives 2003/9, 2004/83 or 2005/85 to 
be sufficient to prevent the transfer of an asylum seeker to the Member State primarily 
responsible. Regulation No 343/2003 aims – on the assumption that the fundamental rights 
of the asylum seeker are observed in the Member State primarily responsible for examining 
the application – to establish, as is apparent inter alia from points 124 and 125 of the Opinion 
in Case C-411/10, a clear and effective method for dealing with an asylum application. In 
order to achieve that objective, Regulation No 343/2003 provides that responsibility for 
examining an asylum application lodged in a European Union country rests with a single 
Member State, which is determined on the basis of objective criteria”.
6 As mentioned in Article by Prechal “Although the notion of mutual trust is not 
mentioned in the Treaties, it has become an essential building block of the Union legal 
system and, in the meanwhile, has been assigned the status of a principle, arguably a 
structural principle of EU constitutional law” and “the principle of mutual trust is 
mainly related to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (hereinafter AFSJ), and 
it is in particular the fields of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters which 
have largely contributed to the development of this principle. This is basically due 
to the fact that in the AFSJ, the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of 
certain decisions in extrajudicial cases is the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in civil 
and criminal matters. Mutual recognition, whereby a decision of one Member State is 
more or less automatically accepted in another Member State and obtains legal force, 
presumes, in turn, trust in the sense that the rules of the first Member State are adequate, 
that they offer equal or equivalent protection and that they are applied correctly. In this 
way mutual recognition is based on mutual confidence. This has been confirmed many 
times in the case law and, not surprisingly, mutual trust is emphasized in the preamble 
of various instruments concerning judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters”. 
Cfr. S. Prechal, Mutual Trust Before the Court of Justice of the European Union, in 
European Papers, Vol. 2, 2017, No 1, 75-92. 
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State accepts and implements the decision adopted by the authorities of 
the other Member States, including those granting international protec-
tion. In the judgement in question, the CJEU stated that the principle 
of mutual confidence is the foundation of the Common European Asy-
lum System (CEAS), which was “was conceived in a context making it 
possible to assume that all the participating States, whether Member 
States or third States, observe fundamental rights, including the rights 
based on the Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol, and on the 
ECHR, and that the Member States can have confidence in each other 
in that regard” (Paras. 76-80). However, differently from the past, the 
Court held that the premises whereby all asylum seekers are treated 
in a way that complies with fundamental rights must be regarded as 
rebuttable (Para. 104).7 Hence, these considerations led the CJEU to 
argue that “Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Eu-
ropean Union must be interpreted as meaning that the Member States, 
including the national courts, may not transfer an asylum seeker to the 
‘Member State responsible’ within the meaning of Dublin III Regu-
lation where they cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the 
asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in 
that Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the 
asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment if transferred” (Para. 106).
For these reasons, it should be verified that the transferring State is 
capable of assessing the respect for the fundamental rights of an asylum 
seeker in the receiving Member State. This issue, raised by Belgium, Italy, 
7 In this way, the Court aligned with the case-law of the European Court for 
Human Rights. In particular to the M.S.S. Case Law (European Court of Human 
Rights, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], Application No. 30696/09, 21 January 
2011). For this reason the European Court declared that “In a situation similar to those 
at issue in the cases in the main proceedings, that is to say the transfer, in June 2009, 
of an asylum seeker to Greece, the Member State responsible within the meaning of 
Regulation No 343/2003, the European Court of Human Rights held, inter alia, that 
the Kingdom of Belgium had infringed Article 3 of the ECHR, first, by exposing the 
applicant to the risks arising from the deficiencies in the asylum procedure in Greece, 
since the Belgian authorities knew or ought to have known that he had no guarantee 
that his asylum application would be seriously examined by the Greek authorities and, 
second, by knowingly exposing him to conditions of detention and living conditions 
that amounted to degrading treatment. The extent of the infringement of fundamental 
rights described in that judgment shows that there existed in Greece, at the time of the 
transfer of the applicant M.S.S., a systemic deficiency in the asylum procedure and in 
the reception conditions of asylum seekers” (Paras 88-99).
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and Poland in N.S. and Others, was solved by the Court making refer-
ence to the reports that may be provided by NGOs. In this sense, the 
CJEU used the M.S.S. case before the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) as a reference to highlight that “information such as that cited 
by the European Court of Human Rights enables the Member States to 
assess the functioning of the asylum system in the Member State respon-
sible, making it possible to evaluate those risks” (paras. 90-91).8 Howev-
er, these statements did not give rise to an obligation for Member States 
to seek an opinion from the UNHCR before making a transfer under the 
Dublin Regulation. This discretionary power of the Member States to 
seek or not to seek an opinion from the UNHCR was clear in Halaf. In 
this decision, the CJEU held that “the Member State in which the asylum 
seeker is present is not obliged, during the process of determining the 
Member State responsible, to request the UNHCR to present its views 
where it is apparent from the documents of that Office that the Member 
State indicated as responsible by the criteria in Chapter III of the Regula-
tion is in breach of the rules of European Union law on asylum”.9
3. The Protection of Fundamental Rights and the EU Principle of Mu-
tual Confidence
Certainly, the N.S. judgment is a major development for the Dublin 
system. By this decision, the CJEU subjected the transfer of asylum 
8 “In finding that the risks to which the applicant was exposed were proved, the 
European Court of Human Rights took into account the regular and unanimous reports 
of international non-governmental organisations bearing witness to the practical 
difficulties in the implementation of the Common European Asylum System in Greece, 
the correspondence sent by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) to the Belgian minister responsible, and also the Commission reports on 
the evaluation of the Dublin system and the proposals for recasting Regulation No 
343/2003 in order to improve the efficiency of the system and the effective protection 
of fundamental rights (M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Paras 347-350). Thus, and 
contrary to the submissions of the Belgian, Italian and Polish Governments, according 
to which the Member States lack the instruments necessary to assess compliance with 
fundamental rights by the Member State responsible and, therefore, the risks to which 
the asylum seeker would be exposed were he to be transferred to that Member State, 
information such as that cited by the European Court of Human Rights enables the 
Member States to assess the functioning of the asylum system in the Member State 
responsible, making it possible to evaluate those risks”.
9 CJEU, Zuheyr Frayeh Halaf v. Darzhavna agentsia za bezhantsite pri 
Ministerskia savet, C-528/11, 30 May 2013, para. 47.
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seekers from a Member State to a preliminary check of the systemic 
deficiencies in the asylum system of the receiving Member State.
Both the CJEU and the ECtHR tried to limit the negative impacts 
of the notion of “safe Member country”, even though they started 
from a different assumption. The Court of Justice tied Member States’ 
obligations not to transfer an asylum seeker to the systemic deficiencies 
in the reception systems of some Member States (Decision N.S., obliga-
tion stated in Article 3(2) of Dublin III Regulation). Instead, the Court 
of Strasbourg considered that having doubts on the capacity of the sys-
tem to protect the fundamental rights of an individual asylum seeker 
was enough to stop his or her transfer. This different approach to the 
notion of mutual confidence that the two Courts had for a long time 
seems to have been overcome by the most recent case law of the CJEU.
In the Case C.K. and Others of 16 February 2017, in fact, the Court 
reaffirmed that, under Article 4 of the Charter, an asylum seeker cannot 
be transferred if there is a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment.10 However, the existence of substantial grounds 
for believing that there are systemic flaws in the Member State respon-
sible within the meaning of the Dublin criteria does not seem to be an 
essential condition (para 73).11 Making reference to the case law of the 
ECtHR (paras. 65-69),12 the Court held that the transfer of an asylum 
10 C.K., a national of the Syrian Arab Republic, and H.F., a national of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt, entered the territory of the European Union by means of a visa 
validly issued by the Republic of Croatia. After a short stay in that Member State, they 
crossed the Slovenian border equipped with false Greek identification. C.K. and H.F. 
were subsequently admitted to the reception centre for asylum seekers in Ljubljana 
(Slovenia) and each submitted an asylum application to the Ministry of the Interior 
of the Republic of Slovenia. On 28 August 2015, the Slovenian authorities, taking the 
view that the Republic of Croatia was, pursuant to Article 12(2) of the Dublin III 
Regulation, the Member State responsible for examining the application for asylum 
of the appellants in the main proceedings, sent a request to the authorities of that 
Member State to take charge of them. By reply of 14 September 2015, the Republic of 
Croatia accepted its responsibility in regard to those persons. CJEU, C.K. and Others 
v. Republika Slovenija, C-578/16, 16 February 2017. 
11 S. Imamovic, E. Muir, The Dublin III System: More Derogations to the Duty to 
Transfer Individual Asylum Seekers?, in European Papers, 2017, pp. 719-728. 
12 The Court declared “It follows from the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights relating to Article 3 of the ECHR, which must be taken into account 
when interpreting Article 4 of the Charter, that the suffering which flows from 
naturally occurring illness, whether physical or mental, may be covered by Article 3 
of the ECHR if it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, whether flowing from 
THE PROMINENCE OF THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 49
seeker with a particularly serious mental or physical condition would 
indeed be inhuman or degrading treatment, as that would entail a real 
risk of the applicant’s health significantly and irremediably deterio-
rating. There again, the Court held that it is for the authorities of the 
transferring Member State to check the situation, suspend the execu-
tion of that person’s transfer, and examine his or her application under 
the so-called ‘discretionary clause’, if the state of health of the asylum 
seeker concerned is not expected to improve pursuant to Article 17(1) 
of the Dublin Regulation (Para. 96).
This decision seems to introduce a crucial change in the case law of 
the European Court of Justice concerning the relationship between the 
principle of mutual confidence and the protection of individuals from in-
humane and degrading treatment. For the first time, the Court seemed to 
clearly recognise their interdependence. However, the assumption that 
the risk of violating other fundamental rights (besides the prohibition 
of inhumane and degrading treatment) may justify an exception to the 
principle of mutual confidence does not appear convincing. According 
to the Court, in fact, “that interpretation fully respects the principle of 
mutual trust since, far from affecting the existence of a presumption that 
fundamental rights are respected in each Member State, it ensures that 
the exceptional situations referred to in the present judgment are duly 
taken into account by the Member States” (Para. 95).13
4. The Reform of the Dublin System and the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights
The case law of the Court regarding the application of the Dublin 
Regulation points to the importance that the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights has acquired at a European level. At the same time, the decisions 
of the ECJ had a significant impact on the definition of the Dublin 
Regulation. In fact, the current Dublin III Regulation incorporated the 
most significant decisions of the ECJ and of the ECHR, establishing 
conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for which the authorities can 
be held responsible, provided that the resulting suffering attains the minimum level 
of severity required by that article”. In particular, the Court referred to Paposhvili v. 
Belgium Case Law (ECtHR, no. 41738/10,13 December 2016, paras. 174-175). 
13 V. Petralia, La presunzione di sicurezza degli Stati dell’Unione europea nel 
sistema di Dublino: recenti sviluppi, in Federalismi, 2017, pp. 23-24. 
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that “Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member 
State primarily designated as responsible because there are substantial 
grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum pro-
cedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member 
State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within 
the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, … the determining Member State shall become the 
Member State responsible” (Article 3(2)).
In this sense, the proposal that the Commission put forward in 2016 
to reform the Dublin system leaves Article 3(2) unchanged, providing 
for an assessment of systemic shortcomings in the asylum procedure and 
reception conditions before carrying out the transfer of an asylum seek-
er.14 In contrast, the 2017 proposal of the European Parliament does not 
make any reference to the notion of systemic shortcomings, but refers to 
“a real risk of a serious violation of his or her fundamental rights”.15 It 
is clear that the European Parliament tried to expand the possibilities of 
suspending the application of the Dublin Regulation when faced with a 
real risk of violation of fundamental rights, following the latest decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights in Tarakel16 and of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union in CK and Others.
14 Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, Establishing the 
Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an 
Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-
Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), COM(2016) 270 Final, 4 May 2016. 
15 European Parliament, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for Determining the Member 
State Responsible for Examining an Application for International Protection Lodged in 
one of the Member States by a Third-Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), 
A8-0345/2017, 6 November 2017: “Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to 
the Member State designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for 
believing that the applicant would be subjected to a real risk of a serious violation 
of his or her fundamental rights, the determining Member State shall continue to 
examine the criteria set out in Chapters III and IV in order to establish whether another 
Member State can be designated as responsible” and “Where the transfer cannot be 
made pursuant to this paragraph to any Member State designated on the basis of the 
criteria set out in Chapters III and IV the Member State responsible for examining 
the application for international protection shall be determined in accordance with the 
corrective allocation mechanism set out in Chapter VII”(Amendments  50- 51). 
16 The applicants, Golajan Tarakhel, his wife and their six minor children 
are Afghan nationals who live in Lausanne (Switzerland). On 2 February 2012 the 
applicants appealed to the Federal Administrative Court against the decision of Federal 
Migration Office who requested the Italian authorities to take charge of the applicants 
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I would like to recall that the Court of Justice in its proceedings has not 
defined the notion of “systemic deficiencies” and that the case law follow-
ing the N.S. Decision has given a restrictive interpretation. For instance, in 
the opinion in Puid, Advocate General Jaaskinen argued that the Court, 
by the N.S. decision, “has aimed at establishing a high barrier against the 
setting aside of the principle of mutual trust underlying Regulation No 
343/2003”.17 Moreover, in the Abdullahi judgement, the Court strength-
ened the presumption of security of Member States, limiting the possibil-
ity for a person to contest his or her transfer only on account of systemic 
deficiencies entailing the risk of violating Article 4 of the Charter.18
The considerations made by the European Council of Refugees 
and Exiles (ECRE) concerning Article 3(2) are also interesting.19 The 
ECRE pointed out that the scope of Article 3(2), limited to asylum 
seekers and not including beneficiaries of international protection, is 
in conflict with Member States’ obligations. In this respect, the ECRE 
echoes the latest case law of national courts blocking transfers of bene-
(they arrived in Italy on 16 July 2011). In support of their appeal they submitted that 
the reception conditions for asylum seekers in Italy were in breach of Article 3 of the 
Convention and that the federal authorities had not given sufficient consideration to 
their complaint in that regard. In a letter of 10 May 2012, the applicants applied to the 
European Court of Human Rights; ECtHR, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application no. 
29217/12, 4 November 2014. Cfr. E. Benz, Commentary on the European Court of Human 
Rights’ Judgment of 4 November 2014 in the case of Tarakhel v. Switzerland, 2015, pp. 
291-302, http://studzr.de/medien/beitraege/2015/2/pdf/StudZR-WissOn_2015-2.pdf. 
17 CJEU, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Puid, Opinion of Advocate General 
Jääskinen, Case C-4/11, 18 April 2013, para. 62. 
18 “In the present case, the decision at issue is the decision of the Member State in which 
Ms Abdullahi’s asylum claim was lodged not to examine that claim and to transfer her to 
another Member State. That second Member State agreed to take charge of Ms Abdullahi 
on the basis of the criterion laid down in Article 10(1) of Regulation No 343/2003, namely, 
as the Member State of Ms Abdullahi’s first entry into EU territory. In such a situation, 
in which the Member State agrees to take charge of the applicant for asylum, and given 
the factors mentioned in paragraphs 52 and 53 above, the only way in which the applicant 
for asylum can call into question the choice of that criterion is by pleading systemic 
deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the conditions for the reception of applicants 
for asylum in that latter Member State, which provide substantial grounds for believing that 
the applicant for asylum would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter”; CJEU, Shamso Abdullahi v. 
Bundesasylamt, Case C-394/12, 10 December 2013, para. 60. 
19 ECRE Comments on the Commission Proposal for a Dublin IV Regulation 
COM(2016) 270, October 2016, p. 18, https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/10/ECRE-Comments-Dublin-IV.pdf
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ficiaries of international protection when faced with a risk of violation 
within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR.20
The rationale of the ECRE is that non-refoulement may arise in 
relation to violations of Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of the Charter, 
regardless of whether these are caused by systemic or non-systemic 
flaws in the asylum system. According to the ECRE, the assessment of 
compatibility of transfers with any of the fundamental rights protected 
by the Charter or by other human rights instruments must be conduct-
ed independently by the courts.
However, ECRE’s proposal to expand the recipients of Article 3(2) 
to include beneficiaries of international protection was not acknowl-
edged by either the Commission or by the European Parliament.21 The 
proposals of both the Commission22 and the European Parliament,23 in 
fact, refer to asylum seekers only.
20 German Constitutional Court, Decision 2 BvR 273/16, 21 April 2016; 
Osnabrück Administrative Court, Decision of 4 January 2016, Az.5 A 83/15; Saarland 
Administrative Court, Decision of 4 January 2016, Az. 3K 86/ 15; Oldenburg 
Administrative Court, Decision of 4 November 2015, 12 A 498/15; Osnabrück 
Administrative Court, Decision of 17 December 2015, 5 B 432/15;
21 ECRE’s Proposal on Article 3.2 states “Where it is impossible to transfer an 
applicant for or beneficiary of international protection to the Member State primarily 
designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that the 
applicant would be subjected to a real risk of a serious violation of [deleted provision] 
fundamental rights, the determining Member State shall continue to examine the 
criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member State 
can be designated as responsible, provided that this does not prolong the procedure 
for an unreasonable length of time. Where the transfer cannot be made pursuant to 
this paragraph to any Member State designated on the basis of the criteria set out in 
Chapter III or to the first Member State with which the application was lodged, the 
determining Member State shall become the Member State responsible”, pp. 18-20.
22 “Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily 
designated as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there 
are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants 
in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the 
meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the 
determining Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III 
in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as responsible”.
23 “Where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State designated 
as responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant 
would be subjected to a real risk of a serious violation of his or her fundamental rights, 
the determining Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out 
in Chapters III and IV in order to establish whether another Member State can be 
designated as responsible”.
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Finally, even though the Commission’s proposal to amend the 
Dublin Regulation confirms the derogation from the Dublin criteria 
when there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic 
flaws, it restricts the possibility of resorting to the sovereignty clause 
to family grounds in relation to wider family only (new Article 19).24
The text of the new Article (19, no longer 17) of the Commission’s 
proposal on Discretionary Clauses established that “By way of deroga-
tion from Article 3(1) and only as long as no Member State has been de-
termined as responsible, each Member State may decide to examine an 
application for international protection lodged with it by a third-coun-
try national or a stateless person based on family grounds in relation to 
wider family not covered by Article 2(g), even if such examination is 
not its responsibility under the criteria laid down in this Regulation”.
5. The mass influx of persons in need of international protection and 
the failure of Dublin System: Final Remarks
The most recent events have clearly shown that at present the Dub-
lin Regulation is anachronistic and is not a suitable solution for the pe-
riods of intense migration pressure. The current asylum system results 
in an overload of applications in the countries at EU external borders, 
with a negative impact on reception standards and on the protections 
provided for in the relevant European legislation. Under the most re-
cent case law of the Court of Justice, the risk of being subject to inhu-
mane and degrading treatment may also derive from the exceptionally 
large number of third-country nationals wishing to obtain international 
protection in the Member State responsible. In the light of this remark, 
a transfer might, therefore, not be effected if, following the arrival of 
an exceptionally large number of third-country nationals wishing to 
obtain international protection, that transfer entails a real risk of the 
person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading treatment, within 
the meaning of that Article 4 of the Charter.25
24 G. Caggiano, Are You Syrious? Il diritto europeo delle migrazioni dopo la fine 
dell’emergenza alla frontiera orientale dell’Unione, in Freedom, Security & Justice: 
European Legal Studies, 2017, p. 11.
25 “It must be noted that, pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Dublin III Regulation and 
Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, an applicant 
for international protection must not be transferred to the Member State responsible if 
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The above makes it possible to make some final remarks on the 
measures adopted to tackle the unprecedented arrivals of migrants 
within EU internal borders.
5.1. The Relocation Mechanism
The most significant measures adopted for managing the migration 
emergency include the relocation mechanism set up by the Council by 
two Decisions in September 2015.26 That mechanism was a temporary 
and mandatory derogation from the responsibility criteria under the 
Dublin system.27 The legal basis of these measures is found in Article 
78(3) TFEU, establishing that “in the event of one or more Member 
States being confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a 
sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, the Council, on a pro-
posal from the Commission, may adopt provisional measures for the 
benefit of the Member State(s) concerned”. Undoubtedly, the choice to 
set up the relocation mechanism was partly influenced by the decisions 
in M.S.S. and N.S., by the ECHR and the ECJ respectively, concerning 
reception conditions of asylum seekers in first-entry countries.
The Council, referring to the particular crisis situation in the Medi-
that transfer entails a real risk of the person concerned suffering inhuman or degrading 
treatment, within the meaning of that Article 4 (see, to that effect, judgment of 16 
February 2017, C.K and Others, C-578/16 PPU, EU:C:2017:127, paragraph 65). A 
transfer might, therefore, not be effected if, following the arrival of an exceptionally 
large number of third-country nationals wishing to obtain international protection, 
such a risk existed in the Member State responsible”; ECJ, Case C-490/16, A.S. v. 
Republika Slovenija, 26 July 2017, para. 41. 
26 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 and Council Decision 
(EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015, Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of 
International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and of Greece; Council of the European 
Union, Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area 
of International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and Greece, COM(2015) 286 final, 
27 May 2015; Cfr. Guild E., Costello C., Garlick M., Moreno Lax V., Enhacing the 
Common European Aylum System and Alternatives to Dublin, in CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security in Europe, n. 83, 2015, pp. 40 ss., www.ceps.eu.
27 The relocation system was a first implementation of the principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States. The mechanism established 
that a set quota of refugees were to be transferred from the Member State of entry to a 
second Member State. The latter would become responsible for examining the asylum 
application, making an exception to the Dublin III Regulation; Cfr. Maiani F., Hotspots 
and Relocation Schemes: the Right Therapy for the Common European Asylum System?, 
in EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, 2018, http://eumigrationlawblog.eu
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terranean as well as to the principle of solidarity and sharing of respon-
sibilities between Member States (Article 80 TFUE),28 “establishes pro-
visional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit 
of Italy and of Greece, in view of supporting them in better coping with 
an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of 
third countries in those Member States”.29 The relocation mechanism 
established that a set quota of refugees (160,000) were to be transferred 
from the Member State of entry to a second Member State. The latter 
would become responsible for examining the asylum application, by 
way of derogation from the Dublin III Regulation. However, final data 
shows that the Commission’s expectations were not met30 and that the 
principle of solidarity, at the basis of the two Council decisions, was 
undermined by a lack of cooperation from a considerable number of 
Member States.31
28 Strengthened solidarity and responsibility between Member states was one of 
the action lines proposed by the European Agenda on Migration (Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, An European 
Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 Final, 13 May 2015; https://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20150513_01_en). The new approach 
to the management of the migration crisis has a strong reference to the principle of 
solidarity and sharing of responsibility between Member States, as set out in Article 
80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). On the basis of 
which “The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation 
shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, 
including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, 
the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to 
give effect to this principle” (Art. 80). Cfr. Vanheule D., Van Selm J., Boswell Chr., The 
Implementation of Article 80 TFUE on the Principle of Solidarity and Fair Sharing of 
Responsibility, including its Financial Implications, between the Member States in the 
field of Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration, European Parliament Study, Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2011, pp. 39 ss.; Betts A., Public Goods Theory and 
the Provision of Refugee Protection: The Role of the Joint-Product Model in Burden-
Sharing Theory, in Journal of Refugee Studies, No. 16, 2003, pp. 274-296. 
29 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September, Art. 1. 
30 Available data shows that only 34.691 relocations were implemented by June 
2018, as against a planned figure of 160,000 (12.692 from Italy and 21,999 from Greece); 
EU Commission, Member States’ Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism, June 
2018, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/
european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf.
31 In particular, the Visegrad countries repeatedly proposed “flexible solidarity”, 
applied on a voluntary basis, to replace the mandatory character of the decisions 
taken by the Council; Cfr. Joint Statement of the Heads of Governments of the V4 
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5.2. The Dublin IV Proposal
A few months after adopting the relocation measures, the Commis-
sion submitted a draft reform to the Dublin Regulation (April 2016).32 
In particular, the Commission took stock of the need to move from 
the current system that, by design or poor implementation, placed a 
disproportionate responsibility on certain Member States.
That document contained two possible options. The first proposal 
was based on the system set out in the Council decisions of September 
2015, supplemented with a corrective fairness mechanism to be trig-
gered as soon as a predefined threshold in the number of asylum ap-
plications (150%) was reached in a given Member State.33 The second 
proposal was intended to overcome the criterion of State of first entry 
and to introduce a mechanism for distributing asylum seekers among 
all Member States, based on some criteria, such as the Member States’ 
size, wealth, and absorption capacities.34
Despite the good intentions, the final proposal adopted by the 
Commission, currently under discussion, does not change present 
criteria.35 It imposes two preliminary obligations on the States of first 
entry. First, they have to check that applicants do not come from coun-
tries of first asylum or safe countries of origin. Second, they have to ex-
amine the applications made by all applicants from ‘safe countries’ and 
by those who present a threat for the security of the State or for public 
order, or by those who were previously returned on those grounds.36
I would like to recall that another proposal was put forward by the 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), and 
approved by a majority vote by the European Parliament on Novem-
Countries, Bratislava, 16 September 2016, https://euractiv.com/wp-content/uploads/
sites/2/2016/09/Bratislava-V4-Joint-Statement-final.docx.pdf.
32 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum 
System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to Europe, COM(2016) 197 Final, 6 April 2016; 
Cfr. F. Maiani, The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation, Study by the Directorate 
General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C for the Committtee for Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 2016, pp. 28 ss.
33 Ibidem, p. 7.
34 Ibidem, p. 8.
35 P.G. Van Wolleghem, If Dublin IV Were in Place During the Refugees Crisis…A 
Simulation of the Effect of Mandatory Relocation, 2018, pp. 1-19.
36 Ibidem, p. 10.
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ber 2017.37 The proposal of the LIBE Committee, unlike the Commis-
sion’s, gives full implementation to the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility between Member States (Article 80 TFEU). 
This proposal is intended to overcome the criterion of State of first 
entry and to distribute asylum seekers among all Member States, based 
on a permanent quota system. In particular, under the proposed mech-
anism, the State of first entry is given responsibility for registering mi-
grants, making a preliminary assessment of eligibility criteria and pro-
viding immediate transfer. It is, then, for the reception Member State to 
examine the asylum application.38
However, the failure of the relocation mechanism and the diffi-
culties encountered in finding a compromise between the interests of 
Member States make the reform proposal not very likely to succeed. 
A similar remark is found in the opinion of Advocate General Bolt in 
Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union, con-
cerning relocation measures.39
According to the Advocate General, in fact, opposition to the relo-
cation mechanism and a partial application by the Member States “may 
give the impression that, behind what is by common consent called the 
‘2015 migration crisis’, another crisis is concealed, namely the crisis of 
the European integration project, which is to a large extent based on 
a requirement for solidarity between the Member States which have 
decided to take part in that project”.40
It is therefore clear that the principle of solidarity and fair shar-
ing of responsibility was overshadowed by the national interests of the 
States. It should be remembered, however, that even though the prin-
37 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing the Criteria 
and Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an 
Application for International Protection Lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-
Country National or a Stateless Person (Recast), COM(2016)0270 – C8-0173/2016 – 
2016/0133(COD), 6 November 2017; http://www.europarl.europa.eu.
38 Ibidem, Amendment 128, Article 19, para. 2.
39 After the adoption of the relocation mechanism, Slovakia and Hungary, 
supported by Poland, decided to refer to the European Court of Justice, seeking 
annulment of Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601, on both procedural and substantive 
grounds. The case, based on sixteen pleas, was rejected by the Court. CJEU, Joined 
Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic, Hungary v. Council of the European 
Union, Opinion of Advocate General Bot, 26 July 2017.
40 Ibidem, Paras. 24−25.
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ciple of solidarity does not appear in Article 2 TEU among the funda-
mental values of the Union, it is a fundamental pillar of the European 
integration process.41 The same point was also made, in the above case, 
by Advocate General Bolt: “Solidarity is both a pillar and at the same 
time a guiding principle of the European Union’s policies on border 
checks, asylum and immigration”.42 It should not be forgotten, in fact, 
that the principle of solidarity is referred to in the EU Charter of Fun-
damental Rights among the indivisible and universal values on which 
the Union is founded, together with human dignity and equality (Pre-
amble). Moreover, since the 1970s, the case law of the European Court 
of Justice has repeatedly suggested that solidarity is a general principle 
of the European legal system, accepted by the Member States as a result 
of their accession.
41 According to Advocate General “Although surprisingly absent from the list in 
the first sentence of Article 2 TEU of the values on which the Union is founded, solidarity 
is, on the other hand, mentioned in the Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union as forming part of the ‘indivisible, universal values’ on which 
the Union is founded”; Ibidem, Para 19.
42 Ibidem, Para. 20. 
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1. Introduction
Should judges assess the credibility of the asylum seekers’ asy-
lum account and their need of international protection in appeals 
against asylum decisions? Should they replace the assessment of the 
determining authority with their own judgment? Do they need to 
have the power to grant international protection? Or must they limit 
themselves to a review of the asylum decision and refer it back to the 
determining authority, if it is not taken carefully or is insufficient-
ly reasoned? How intensive should this review be? What does an ex 
nunc examination exactly include and is a judge required to hear the 
asylum seeker?
These are all questions European courts are struggling with. Arti-
cle 46(3) of the Recast Asylum Procedures Directive (RAPD) contains 
rules regarding judicial review of asylum decisions.1 However, it does 
not give answers to the questions mentioned above. As a result, judges 
from Bulgaria, Hungary, the Netherlands and Slovakia have referred 
preliminary references to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU). Some of these preliminary references ask how Article 46(3) 
* Marcelle Reneman is Assistant Professor of Migration Law at the Amsterdam 
Centre for Migration and Refugee Law of the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.
1 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 
(recast) [2013] OJ L 180/60. 
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RAPD should be interpreted in the light of the right to an effective 
remedy laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union (the Charter). In several recent judgments the 
CJEU has given some first answers.2
This contribution will focus on the current developments regarding 
the scope and intensity of judicial review. It will show that the national 
context in which questions concerning this issue are raised differ and 
that the answers to these questions may have a major impact on the 
legal systems of the Member States. It will address the meaning of the 
term ‘full and ex nunc examination’ mentioned in Article 46(3) RAPD 
and the question whether this provision requires judges to offer a pub-
lic hearing to asylum seekers. However, first some general remarks will 
be made on Article 47 of the Charter and how it should be interpreted 
in the context of asylum procedures.
2. Interpreting Article 47 of the Charter in Asylum Cases
Article 47 of the Charter provides for the right to an effective rem-
edy and fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal. This 
provision is based on both Article 6 and Article 13 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR).3 According to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) the right to a fair trial laid down 
in Article 6 ECHR does not apply to asylum cases.4 Article 47 of the 
Charter thus provides broader protection than the ECHR, where it 
concerns asylum procedures.
The RAPD is unique, because it provides for detailed procedural 
rules and guarantees concerning in particular the administrative and 
appeal phase of the asylum procedure. However, as was mentioned 
above, the meaning of the RAPD’s provisions is not always clear. Then 
Article 47 of the Charter can be used by the CJEU and national courts 
to interpret these provisions. In order to be able to do that, the meaning 
of Article 47 of the Charter should be constructed.
2 CJEU 25.07.2018, Case C-585/16, Alheto; CJEU 27.07.2017, Case C-348/16, 
Moussa Sacko.
3 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), 
OJ C 303/17.
4 ECtHR Maaouia v France, Appl. No. 39652/98, Judgment of 5 October 2000. 
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2.1. Common Procedural Principles
First of all, this can be done on the basis of common procedural 
principles which have been derived from the right to an effective rem-
edy by the CJEU in earlier cases, often concerning other fields of EU 
law than asylum. The CJEU has for example ruled on the rights of 
the defence, which are part of the right to an effective remedy, in cases 
concerning amongst others free movement of EU citizens, EU sanction 
cases and competition cases.5
It is evident that procedural principles which have been developed 
under Article 47 of the Charter in a completely different field of EU 
law cannot directly be applied to asylum cases. In order to understand 
how the CJEU interprets Article 47 of the Charter in a particular field 
of EU law or even an individual case it is helpful to look at three basic 
concepts: the overall fairness of the procedure, the balancing of con-
flicting interests and the nature of the rights at stake and the character-
istics of the persons concerned.6
The CJEU has developed common procedural principles both un-
der Article 47 of the Charter and the principle of effectiveness. The ex-
act relationship between the right to an effective remedy and the prin-
ciple of effectiveness remains unclear.7 The CJEU may address the same 
procedural issues under both and applies the three basic concepts in a 
similar way. I will therefore also refer to case law regarding the princi-
ple of effectiveness when explaining the three basic concepts.8
The three basic concepts have been developed in the case law and 
also follow logically from the limitation clause of Article 52(1) of the 
Charter, which states:
Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised 
by this Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of 
5 A.M. Reneman, EU Asylum Procedures and the Rights to an Effective Remedy, 
Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 298-341.
6 A.M. Reneman, EU Asylum Procedures and the Rights to an Effective Remedy, 
ibid, p. 101-110 and 378-382.
7 J. Krommendijk, Is there light on the horizon? The distinction between 
“Rewe effectiveness” and the principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the 
Charter after Orizzonte, in CMLRev 2016, p. 1395-1418; A.M. Reneman, EU Asylum 
Procedures and the Rights to an Effective Remedy, Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 76-79.
8 A.M. Reneman, EU Asylum Procedures and the Rights to an Effective Remedy, 
Hart Publishing, 2014, p. 77-79.
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those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, 
limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others.
First, the CJEU looks at the overall fairness of the procedure at 
issue. Some procedural flaws directly lead to a violation of Article 47 
of the Charter. An example is the lack of an appeal with suspensive 
effect in appeals against asylum or expulsion decision, which may di-
rectly lead to the expulsion of a person in violation with the principle of 
non-refoulement.9 Such a procedural flaw may be considered to violate 
the essence of Article 47 of the Charter. However, in many cases a lim-
itation of the right to an effective remedy in one stage of the (asylum) 
procedure may be compensated by procedural guarantees in another 
stage of the procedure. In H.I.D the CJEU considered that the fact 
that decisions of the Irish Refugee Appeals Tribunal could be appealed 
before the High Court and the Supreme Court could “be capable of 
protecting the Refugee Appeals Tribunal against potential temptations 
to give in to external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardise the 
independence of its members”.10
Secondly the CJEU often balances conflicting interests at stake 
when applying Article 47 of the Charter. In the case of ZZ for example, 
which concerned the use of secret information, the CJEU had to strike 
a balance between the rights of the defence of the person concerned and 
the interest of the State to protect national security.11 Similarly in Dan-
qua the CJEU assessed in the context of the principle of effectiveness 
whether a time-limit of 15 working days to lodge an application for 
subsidiary protection was justified by the State’s interest in the proper 
conduct of the proceedings and effective return proceedings. It con-
cluded that the time-limit was “capable of compromising the ability of 
applicants for subsidiary protection actually to avail themselves of the 
rights conferred on them by [the Qualification] Directive”.12
9 CJEU 18.12.2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, para 53; CJEU 17.12.2016, Case 
C-239/14, Tall, para 58. 
10 CJEU 31.01.2011, Case C-175/11, H.I.D and B.A., para 103.
11 CJEU 04.06.2013, Case C-300/11, ZZ, paras 53-54.
12 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the 
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as 
persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection 
granted [2004] OJ L 304/12. CJEU 20.10.2016, Case C-429/15, Danqua, para 48.
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Thirdly, when balancing these interests, the CJEU takes into account 
the nature of the rights at stake and the characteristics of the persons con-
cerned. In different cases the CJEU has stressed the importance of the 
principle of non-refoulement. In Danqua for example the CJEU consid-
ered that “the procedure for examining applications for subsidiary pro-
tection is of particular importance inasmuch as it enables applicants for 
international protection to safeguard their most basic rights by the grant 
of such protection”.13 In Salahadin Abdullah the CJEU stated that the 
extent of the risk of persecution “must, in all cases, be carried out with 
vigilance and care, since what are at issue are issues relating to the integ-
rity of the person and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the 
fundamental values of the Union”.14 The principle of non-refoulement 
thus requires a high level of procedural protection.
Also, the characteristics of the group ‘asylum seekers’ may require 
important procedural protection. In Danqua the CJEU found the 15-
day time-limit for lodging an application for subsidiary protection too 
short amongst others because of “the difficulties such applicants may 
face because of, inter alia, the difficult human and material situation in 
which they may find themselves”.15
2.2. The Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights
When interpreting Article 47 of the Charter the case law of the EC-
tHR under Article 6 and 13 ECHR is an important source of inspira-
tion. According to Article 52(3) of the Charter the guarantees offered 
by Article 47 of the Charter may not be lower than the guarantees of-
fered by Article 6 and 13 ECHR. Article 47 of the Charter may provide 
more extensive protection than the ECHR.
The CJEU has referred to the ECtHR’s case law in several cases where 
it applied Article 47 of the Charter. In Abdida for example it based its de-
cision that a right to a remedy with automatic suspensive effect amongst 
others on the ECtHR’s judgment in Grebemedhin v France.16 In DEB 
13 Ibid., para 45.
14 CJEU 02.03.2010, Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, 
Salahadin Abdullah, para 90. 
15 CJEU 20.10.2016, Case C-429/15, Danqua, para 46. See also CJEU 29.10.2009, 
Case C-63/08, Pontin, paras 62 and 65.
16 ECtHR, Gebremedhin v France, Appl. No. 25389/05, Judgment of 26 April 
2007. CJEU 18.12.2014, Case C-562/13, Abdida, para 52.
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the CJEU referred to the ECtHR’s case law under Article 6 ECHR in 
order to answer the question whether the right to an effective remedy 
included a right to legal aid for a legal person.17
When Article 47 of the Charter is applied to an asylum case, the 
CJEU and national court should take into account the ECtHR’s case 
law concerning procedural guarantees developed under Article 3 and 
13 ECHR. The ECtHR requires a high level of procedural protection 
in expulsion cases under Article 3 and 13 ECHR. In this context it has 
referred to “the importance which the Court attaches to Article 3 of 
the Convention and the irreversible nature of the damage which may 
result if the risk of torture or ill-treatment materializes”.18 However, 
as was mentioned before, also the ECtHR’s case law under Article 6 
ECHR is relevant when interpreting Article 47 of the Charter in an 
asylum case.19
3. Scope and Intensity of Judicial Review in Asylum Cases
This next section will address the scope and intensity of judicial 
review. The CJEU has recently given its first rulings on the required 
scope and intensity of judicial review in asylum cases.20
The scope and intensity of judicial review performed by national 
courts depends very much on the national legal system, the nature of 
the field of law at issue and, for example, the ideas about the role of 
courts in relation to the role of the administration. It is very difficult to 
get a clear understanding of the scope and intensity of judicial review 
without thorough knowledge of a national legal system. This may be 
the reason why the ECtHR and, until recently, also the CJEU have 
not developed clear standards on the required scope and intensity of 
judicial review in asylum cases. It is difficult to apply the standards 
developed in other fields of law to asylum cases, because of the very 
different nature of these cases. It is for example much more difficult to 
17 CJEU 22.12.2010, Case C-279/09, DEB, para 37, 45-52.
18 ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 
January 2011, para 293.
19 See references to Art. 6 ECHR case law in CJEU 26.06.2017, Case C-348/16, 
Moussa Sacko, para 40
20 CJEU 25.07.2018, Case C-585/16, Alheto, CJEU 27.07.2017, Case C-348/16, 
Moussa Sacko.
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establish the facts in asylum cases than in other administrative cases, 
due to a lack of evidence.
In the original Asylum Procedures Directive (APD),21 Article 39 
provided for the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal. 
This provision did not address the scope or intensity of the review, 
which should be carried out by this court or tribunal. In Samba Di-
ouf the CJEU considered that Article 39 and the principle of effective 
judicial protection require that the reasons which led the competent 
authority to reject the asylum application as unfounded should be the 
subject of “a thorough review by the national court”.22 However, it did 
not explain what a thorough judicial review entails.
The ECtHR has held that Article 13 ECHR requires “a close scru-
tiny by a national authority and independent and rigorous scrutiny of 
any claim that there exist substantial grounds for fearing a real risk of 
treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR”.23 In very few cases the EC-
tHR found a violation of Article 3 and 13 ECHR because of a lack of a 
rigorous scrutiny by a national court.24
The ECtHR itself also carries out a rigorous scrutiny of the risk of a 
violation of Article 3 ECHR upon the expulsion of the applicant. This 
requires a “full and ex nunc evaluation.. where it is necessary to take 
into account information that has come to light after the final decision 
by the domestic authorities was taken”.25 According to the ECtHR 
such evaluation is necessary as the situation in a country of destination 
may change over the course of time. Even though the historical posi-
tion is of interest in so far as it may shed light on the current situation 
and its likely evolution, it is the present conditions which are decisive.26
21 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards 
on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ L 
326/13.
22 CJEU 18.07.2011 Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf, para 53
23 ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 
January 2011, para 293. 
24 In M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece the ECtHR held that the judicial review carried 
out by the Belgian court in the extremely urgent procedure did not comply with Art. 
13 ECHR. ECtHR, M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 30696/09, Judgment of 
21 January 2011, paras 389-390.
25 ECtHR, X v the Netherlands, Appl. No. 14319/17, Judgment of 10 July 2018, 
para 73. See also eg ECtHR, Salah Sheek v the Netherlands, Appl. No. 1948/04, 
Judgment of 11 January 2007, para 136. 
26 ECtHR, Tershiyev v Azerbaijan, Appl. No. 10226/13, Judgment of 31 July 
2014, para 50.
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It is thus clear that the ex nunc evaluation requires national courts 
to take into account new information concerning the situation in the 
asylum seeker’s country of origin. However, the ECtHR has not made 
explicit for example, whether the ex nunc evaluation should also include 
new grounds for asylum or how intensive a “full evaluation” should be. 
The requirement of a “full and ex nunc evaluation” is reflected in Arti-
cle 46(3) RAPD.27
3.1. Requirement of a Full and Ex Nunc Examination
Article 46(1) RAPD, like Article 39(1) APD provides for a right to 
an effective remedy before a court or tribunal against a negative deci-
sion on the asylum application. Article 46(3) RAPD specifies that in 
order to comply with Article 46(1), Member States shall ensure that an 
effective remedy provides for a full and ex nunc examination of both 
facts and points of law, including, where applicable, an examination of 
the international protection needs pursuant to Directive 2011/95/EU, 
at least in appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of first instance.
Judges in different States have been struggling with the interpreta-
tion of Article 46(3) RAPD. They had questions concerning their role 
and powers under this provision. In the next sections three aspects of 
Article 46(3) RAPD will be addressed: 1. the requirement of a “full ex-
amination of both facts and points of law”, 2. the requirement of an ex 
nunc examination and 3. the right to be heard by the court or tribunal.
3.2. Full Examination of Both Facts and Points of Law
The term ‘full. examination of both facts and points of law’ relates 
to the scope and intensity of judicial review and should be interpret-
ed by the Member States in a uniform manner.28 This section will pay 
attention to the interpretation of this term by the Dutch Administra-
tive Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (henceforth AJD, the 
highest court in asylum cases in the Netherlands). The AJD refused 
to refer questions for preliminary ruling to the CJEU about the inter-
pretation of the term ‘full examination’. Furthermore, it will discuss 
27 Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 
status (Recast), COM(2011) 319 final, p. 4.
28 CJEU 25.07.2018, Case C-585/16, Alheto, para 107.
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the preliminary questions posed by Bulgarian, Hungarian and Slovak 
courts about the interpretation of Article 46(3) RAPD. It will be shown 
that the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Slovak courts addressed the issue of 
the scope and intensity of judicial review from a completely different 
perspective than the Dutch AJD. Finally, the first ruling on this issue 
by the CJEU in the Alheto case will be addressed.
3.2.1. The Netherlands
In the Netherlands the discussion concerning the scope and intensity 
of judicial review by administrative courts revolve around the separa-
tion of powers (the administration is the primary decision-maker and the 
court checks its decisions)29 and the expertise of the administration and 
judges. In the Dutch administrative system, courts review the decision of 
the administration (in asylum cases the Immigration Service, henceforth 
IND). They assess on the basis of the grounds of appeal whether a de-
cision “satisfies all legal requirements and procedural safeguards, in par-
ticular with regard to the requirements of due care and accuracy, its mer-
its, and the contents and sufficiency of reasoning in that decision”.30 The 
courts do not have the power to change the administrative decision or to 
grant asylum. If the decision does not fulfil the mentioned requirements, 
the courts usually quash the decision and refer it back to the adminis-
tration. This prevents that the judge takes the role of the administration.
Before the implementation of Article 46(3) RAPD, the intensity of 
judicial review carried out by the Dutch first instance courts and the 
AJD varied according to the part of the decision, which was reviewed. 
Whereas the courts could fully review the IND’s decision about the 
risk upon return, they had to limit the review of the credibility assess-
ment to a reasonability test. This limited type of judicial review was 
criticised in the Netherlands.31
After the implementation of Article 46(3) RAPD, the question 
whether the Dutch courts should be able to assess credibility themselves 
and whether the reasonability test of the credibility assessment could 
29 See eg the annotation of Vermeulen with AJD 27 January 2003, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2003:AF5566 in Administratiefrechtelijke Beslissingen, nr. 2003/286.
30 AJD 13 April 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:890 and ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:891, para 7.
31 See eg T.P. Spijkerboer, B.P.V. Vermeulen, Vluchtelingenrecht, Ars Aequi 
Libri, Nijmegen 2005, p. 296; H. Battjes, Annotation with AJD 11 December 2003, in 
Rechtspraak Vreemdelingenrecht 2003, nr. 17. 
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be maintained, came before the Dutch courts. In two judgments of 13 
April 2013 the AJD ruled that the Dutch courts still could not replace 
the IND‘s decision with their own. It also held that the intensity of the 
judicial review of the IND’s credibility assessment had to increase, but 
that the judge should still leave some discretion to the IND.32
The AJD considered that the system of the RAPD nor the case law 
of the CJEU or ECtHR require national courts to replace the adminis-
trative decision with their own. Moreover, in the view of the AJD the 
text nor the system of the RAPD provide clear standards as to the in-
tensity of judicial review. It read Article 46(3) RAPD in the light of Ar-
ticle 47 of the Charter and Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. It concluded that 
both the CJEU and the ECtHR have accepted under these provisions 
that the administration sometimes enjoys some discretion as a result of 
the nature and subject-matter of a decision and that this influences the 
intensity of the judicial review.33
The AJD considered that such discretion should be granted to the 
IND, where it assesses the credibility of the asylum seeker’s statements, 
which are not supported by evidence (usually most statements in an asy-
lum claim). According to the AJD, the courts are not better placed to 
make a credibility assessment than the IND. It noted that both the IND 
and the courts cannot establish whether the asylum seeker’s statements 
are true. However, unlike the court, the IND is able to compare all asy-
lum decisions (those granted and those rejected) and to use its previous 
experiences to make the credibility assessment.34 The other parts of the 
asylum decision can be subjected to a full judicial review. The AJD re-
fused to refer a question to the CJEU, amongst others because most of 
the first instance courts agreed with the AJD’s interpretation.35
3.2.2. Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria
Courts from Hungary and Slovakia asked the CJEU whether they 
should have the power under Article 46(3) to grant asylum or to amend 
32 AJD 13 April 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:890 and ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:891. 
Unofficial translations of the judgment are available at www.raadvanstate.nl/uitspraken/
zoeken-in-uitspraken/tekst-uitspraak.html?id=87365 and www.raadvanstate.nl/
uitspraken/zoeken-in-uitspraken/tekst-uitspraak.html?id=87361 accessed 24 July 2018.
33 AJD 13 April 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:890, paras 5.3.1, 5.3.2 and 8.2
34 AJD 13 April 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:890, para 8.1.
35 Ibid, paras 10-11. 
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the asylum decision.36 The Slovak court also asked whether the higher ap-
peal court should have the power to grant international protection. The 
Hungarian and Slovak courts do not have this power under national law. 
In Hungary the courts are no longer able to change the asylum decision 
of the competent authority as a result of an amendment of national law, 
which entered into force on 15 September 2015.37 They can only quash the 
decision and order the competent authority to take a new decision. They 
do not have the power to order the administrative authority to grant in-
ternational protection or to punish it, if it does not comply with the judg-
ment. In Slovakia the national court is required to refer the case back to the 
administrative authority, also if new elements or findings come up during 
the appeal, which have not been taken into account by this authority.38
The questions referred to the CJEU by the Hungarian and Slova-
kian courts concern cases, in which the national courts have quashed 
the asylum decision several times in appeal. However, each time the 
immigration authorities rejected the asylum application again, resulting 
in another appeal. In the Hungarian case the administrative authority 
had ignored the court’s judgment for the third time. The applicant had 
been in an insecure situation during a period of four years.39 In the 
Slovakian case the asylum applicant had already waited seven years for 
the final result of his asylum application at the moment the preliminary 
questions were referred to the CJEU.40
The courts wanted to know whether they should be able to amend the 
asylum decision41 and/or grant international protection42 themselves, in order 
to guarantee the right to an effective remedy provided in Article 46 RAPD 
36 CJEU, Case 556/17, Torubarov (Hungary); Case 113/17 as summarised 
in Dutch by the Expertise Centre on European Law of the Dutch Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, www.minbuza.nl/ecer/hof-van-justitie/nieuwe-hofzaken-inclusief-
verwijzingsuitspraak/2018/c-zaaknummers/c-556-17.html, QJ (Slovakia), as 
summarised in Dutch by the Expertise Centre on European Law of the Dutch Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, www.minbuza.nl/ecer/hof-van-justitie/nieuwe-hofzaken-inclusief-
verwijzingsuitspraak/2017/c-zaaknummers/c-113-17-qj.html accessed 24 July 2018.
37 This amendment aimed to ensure unity of law. 
38 See § 250q (3) of the Slovak Law nr. 99/1963. 
39 CJEU, Case 556/17, Torubarov (Hungary).
40 CJEU, Case 113/17, QJ, as summarised in Dutch by the Expertise Centre on 
European Law of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.minbuza.nl/ecer/hof-
van-justitie/nieuwe-hofzaken-inclusief-verwijzingsuitspraak/2017/c-zaaknummers/c-
113-17-qj.html accessed 24 July 2018.
41 CJEU, Case 556/17, Torubarov (Hungary).
42 CJEU, Case 556/17, Torubarov (Hungary); Case 113/17, QJ.
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and Article 47 of the Charter.43 The Hungarian court is of the opinion that 
the law, which has taken away its power to amend the asylum decision, does 
not comply with the right to effective judicial protection.44 According to the 
Slovak court a national provision, which only allows the national court to 
quash the decision and refer it back to the authorities is not sufficient to 
achieve the goal of Article 46(3) RAPD to ensure an effective remedy.45
3.2.3. The Case of Alheto
In the case of Alheto the CJEU gave some first answers concerning 
the scope and intensity of judicial review. In this case the administra-
tive authority did not assess the admissibility of the asylum claim of 
a Palestinian asylum seeker, who travelled via Jordan (a possible first 
country of asylum) to Bulgaria. It also failed to address the question 
whether return to the Gaza strip would violate the principle of non-re-
foulement.46 The Bulgarian court asked the CJEU whether the national 
court should be able to examine the admissibility of the asylum appli-
cation and the risk of refoulement itself during the appeal phase.
The CJEU held that the national court should be able to examine 
a ground for inadmissibility itself (if national law has implemented the 
grounds for inadmissibility) and to hear the asylum on this ground for 
inadmissibility.47 It is not clear whether the court is required to do this 
of its own motion, but it clear that it is allowed to do so. In Alheto the 
Bulgarian authorities did not plead before the national court that the 
admissibility should be examined before the court.48
43 The Hungarian court explicitly mentions Art. 47 of the Charter in its preliminary 
question. Case C-556/17, Torubarov (Hungary).




45 CJEU, Case 113/17, QJ.




47 CJEU 25.07.2018, Case C-585/16, Alheto, para 120.




ASYLUM AND ARTICLE 47 OF THE CHARTER 71
The national court should “rigorously examine” whether the con-
ditions for declaring an asylum application inadmissible have been sat-
isfied “by inviting, where appropriate, the determining authority to 
produce any documentation or factual evidence which may be rele-
vant”.49 The CJEU thus grants the national courts extensive powers to 
independently examine the asylum case, without being bound by the 
decision of the administrative authority or the grounds of appeal.
According to the CJEU, Article 46(3) RAPD does not “govern 
what happens after any annulment of the decision under appeal” and 
therefore does not grant national courts the power to grant or reject 
international protection.50 It is up to Member States to decide whether 
the court should refer the decision back to the administrative authority 
or not. However, Article 46(3) RAPD and Article 47 of the Charter do 
require that the administrative authority takes a new decision “within a 
short period of time” and that this decision “complies with the assess-
ment contained in the judgment annulling the initial decision”.51
3.3. Ex Nunc Examination
The CJEU has first addressed the meaning of the term ‘ex nunc 
examination’ in the case of Alheto. It considered that the expression ‘ex 
nunc’ points to the court or tribunal’s obligation to make an assessment 
that takes into account, should the need arise, new evidence which has 
come to light after the adoption of the decision under appeal. Such an 
assessment makes it possible to deal with the application for interna-
tional protection exhaustively without there being any need to refer the 
case back to the determining authority.52
The CJEU also held that national courts should take into account 
arguments for rejection (inadmissibility) of the asylum claim, which 
were not examined by the administrative authority.53 In such situation 
the courts should hear the asylum seeker themselves (see further sec-
tion 3.4).
Both the Dutch AJD and the Bulgarian administrative court of So-
fia have asked the CJEU whether the national court should take into 
49 CJEU 25.07.2018, Case 585/16, Alheto, para 121.
50 Ibid, para 145.
51 Ibid, para 148.
52 CJEU 25.07.2018, Case 585/16, Alheto, paras 111-112. 
53 Ibid, para 118.
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grounds for protection which were first brought forward during the 
appeal phase by the asylum seeker.54 The AJD wanted to know wheth-
er the national court may refer such new grounds for protection to 
a subsequent asylum procedure. It has also asked whether it makes a 
difference whether a ground is (intentionally) withheld in administra-
tive phase or has been submitted in the appeal phase for justified rea-
sons and whether it concerns the appeal in a first or subsequent asylum 
procedure. Moreover, it has asked whether the court may exclude a 
new asylum ground from the ex nunc examination in the interest of the 
proper conduct of proceedings or the prevention of undue delay.55
The two Dutch cases concern Palestinian asylum seekers, of whom 
one had submitted a new ground for protection, which came up after 
the administrative decision. The other asylum seeker failed to give a 
good reason for mentioning a ground for protection first during the 
administrative phase.
Dutch law has provided for an ex nunc judicial review in asylum 
cases since 2001. However, the AJD has held that (most) grounds for 
protection (for example a conversion or sexual orientation) which have 
first been brought forward during the appeal phase, do not fall within 
the scope of the ex nunc examination. Only asylum grounds, which are 
based on facts or circumstances, which existed at the moment of the 
decision of the IND and were submitted during the appeal phase for 
justified reasons, can be examined by the appeal court.56 According to 
the AJD, a subsequent asylum procedure is better suited to examine 
new grounds for asylum. This relates to the AJD’s opinion regarding 
the distinctive roles of the administration and the courts as set out in 
section 3.2.1. Moreover, the AJD noted that if new grounds for asylum 
have to be examined during the appeal phase this could lead to long 
delays. Also, it could encourage asylum seekers to withhold asylum 
grounds during the administrative phase. Excluding those grounds 
from the ex nunc examination would thus prevent abuse.57
The Bulgarian case concerns a woman, who asked for international 
protection on the basis of the activities of the husband. Later in the le-
gal proceedings she stated that she also feared prosecution on personal 
grounds. In his opinion with this case, Advocate General Mengozzi in-
54 AJD 4 October 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2669, Case 652/16, Ahmedbekova.
55 AJD 4 October 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2669.
56 AJD 21 June 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:35, para 3.
57 CJEU, Case 586/17, D. and I, AJD 4 October 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2669.
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dicated that the question concerning the ex nunc judicial review should 
be considered inadmissible. He stated nevertheless that, if the woman 
submitted in her application that she herself had a well-founded fear 
of persecution (and did not only ask for a dependent residence per-
mit on the basis of national law), the national court should take into 
account new facts, circumstances and documents, which the woman 
has submitted in support of her personal fear for persecution. If she 
did not state that she had a personal fear for persecution at the time of 
the application, her statements concerning her personal fear should be 
considered a new asylum application, which the court is not required 
to examine under Article 46(3) RAPD.58
It may be derived from these considerations that if a person adds 
new grounds for a (personal) fear of persecution to those mentioned in 
the original application during the appeal phase, these must be taken 
into account by the court. This would also be in line with the Alheto 
case, which requires judges to examine the admissibility of an asylum 
application on their own motion. The AJD has explicitly asked the 
CJEU to take into account the general interests at stake. The case the 
CJEU thus may have to assess whether the exclusion of new asylum 
grounds from the ex nunc judicial review constitutes a limitation of 
the right to an effective remedy laid down in Article 46(1) RAPD and 
Article 47 of the Charter, which is justified in accordance with Article 
52(1) of the Charter. It then has to balance the interests of the State to 
avoid delays and prevent abuse against the interests of the individual to 
have access to an effective remedy.
3.4. The Right to a Hearing
A question, which is closely related to the scope and intensity of 
judicial review is whether the national court should offer the asylum 
applicant a hearing during the appeal phase. In its judgment in Mous-
sa Sacko the CJEU answered the question whether Articles 12, 14, 31 
and 46 RAPD precludes a national court hearing an appeal against a 
decision rejecting a manifestly unfounded application for international 
protection from dismissing the appeal without hearing the applicant, 
in particular where the applicant has already been interviewed by the 
administrative authorities and where the factual circumstances leave 
58 Opinion of AG Mengozzi in Case 652/16, Ahmedbekova, paras 75-78.
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no doubt as to whether the decision rejecting the application was well 
founded.59
According to Italian legislation and case law of the Italian courts it 
was possible to omit a hearing, where the asylum application was con-
sidered inadmissible.60
The CJEU first considered that “failure to give an applicant the op-
portunity to be heard in an appeals procedure.. constitutes a restriction 
of the rights of the defence, which form part of the principle of effective 
judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter”. In its assess-
ment whether such limitation is justified, the CJEU referred to the EC-
tHR’s case law under Article 6 ECHR, which allows for exceptions to 
the obligation to hold a public hearing.61 The CJEU also reiterated that it 
should take into account the specific circumstances of the case, including 
the nature of the act at issue, the context in which it was adopted and the 
legal rules governing the matter in question. Moreover, it needs to look at 
the context of the procedure for the examination of applications for inter-
national protection as a whole, taking into account the close link between 
appeal proceedings before a court or tribunal and the proceedings at first 
instance preceding those proceedings, during which the applicant must be 
given the opportunity of a personal interview on his or her application for 
international protection, as required by Article 14 of the directive.62
The CJEU concluded that the national court may only omit a hear-
ing if it considers that it is in a position to carry out a full and ex nunc 
examination solely on the basis of the information in the case file, in-
cluding the report or transcript of the asylum seeker’s personal inter-
view. According to the CJEU, in such circumstances the possibility 
of not holding a hearing is in the interest of both the Member States 
and asylum seekers to have a decision made as soon as possible on the 
asylum application.63 If the court thinks that a hearing is necessary to 
comply with Article 46(3) RAPD, it cannot be dispensed with on the 
grounds of speed and it may not be prevented by national legislation.64
In principle an appeal against a decision to declare an asylum appli-
cation manifestly unfounded may be decided on the basis of the case-
59 CJEU 27.07.2017, Case C-348/16, Moussa Sacko, para 23.
60 Ibid., paras 12-17.
61 Ibid., paras 40, 47. 
62 Ibid.., para 42.
63 Ibid., para 44.
64 Ibid., paras 45, 48.
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file. However, the court should assess this on a case-by case basis.65 
This also applies to cases which are considered inadmissible.66
In its judgment in Alheto, the CJEU further explained that where 
“new evidence comes to light after the adoption of the decision under 
appeal, the court or tribunal is required, as follows from Article 47 of 
the Charter, to offer the applicant the opportunity to express his views 
when that evidence could affect him negatively”.67 The court also needs 
to conduct a hearing, if it is of the opinion that the admissibility of the 
asylum application should have been examined and the asylum appli-
cant has not been interviewed about this by the determining authority. 
The applicant must receive the services of an interpreter during this 
hearing whenever necessary in order to present his or her arguments.68
4. Conclusion
The CJEU has developed common procedural principles in its case 
law concerning Article 47 of the Charter in various fields of EU law. In 
order to apply these procedural principles to the asylum context and an 
individual case the CJEU looks at the overall fairness of the procedure, 
identify the different interests at stake and to take into account the na-
ture of the right at issue (the absolute prohibition of refoulement) and 
the (often difficult) position of asylum seekers. Furthermore, Article 47 
of the Charter may not offer less procedural guarantees than Article 6 
and 13 of the ECHR. For that reason, the ECtHR’s case law should be 
taken into account when interpreting Article 47 of the Charter.
The scope and intensity of judicial review carried out by nation-
al courts is a sensitive topic, which depends very much on national 
legal systems and contexts. The national courts have very recently 
received some guidance concerning the required scope and intensi-
ty of judicial review in asylum cases from the CJEU. However, it is 
difficult to create common procedural EU principles on this topic, 
which apply to all fields of law, because here particularly the nature 
and subject-matter of the decisions influence the scope and intensity 
of judicial review.
65 Ibid., para 46.
66 CJEU 25.07.2018, Case C-585/16, Alheto, para 126.
67 Ibid., para 114. See also para 124.
68 Ibid, paras 127-128.
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National courts are struggling with the interpretation of several as-
pects of the requirement of ‘a full and ex nunc examination of both 
fact and points of law’. The Dutch AJD has refrained from making 
a preliminary reference concerning the scope and intensity of judicial 
review. It ruled that Article 46(3) RAPD and 47 of the Charter allow 
a system, in which the administrative courts can only review whether 
the IND’s decision satisfies all legal requirements and procedural safe-
guards. In the Netherlands courts are not allowed to replace the admin-
istrative decision with their own. They can only quash the decision and 
refer it back to the IND. Moreover, they should leave discretion to the 
IND where it concerns its assessment of the credibility of unsupported 
statements. The AJD thus refused to extend its own powers and that of 
the first instance courts on the basis of Article 46(3) RAPD, taking into 
account the distinctive roles of the administration and the court and the 
expertise of the IND.
The AJD did ask the CJEU whether the national court is allowed to 
refer new grounds for asylum, which have first been brought forward 
during the appeal phase, to a subsequent asylum procedure. Also here, 
the AJD argues that the distinctive roles of the administration (prima-
ry decision-maker) and the court (who checks these decisions), should 
be maintained. Moreover, it points at the risk of delays and abuse by 
asylum seekers. Likewise, the Italian courts wanted to have the oppor-
tunity to omit a public hearing in manifestly unfounded asylum cases 
in the interest of the speed of the asylum procedure.
In contrast the Bulgarian, Hungarian and Slovak courts argued be-
fore the CJEU that their powers should be extended on the basis of 
Article 46(3) RAPD and Article 47 of the Charter. These courts found 
that the fact that they do not have the power to amend the administra-
tive decision or to grant international protection violates the right to 
an effective remedy. The reason for that was that the administrative au-
thorities failed to comply with their judgments (Hungary and Slovakia) 
or to adequately examine the asylum claim (Bulgaria). In particularly 
in the first situation, this failure led to long delays in the asylum proce-
dure and insecurity for the asylum seeker.
It its first judgments the CJEU it makes clear that national courts 
should have extensive powers to examine the asylum claim apparent-
ly without being bound by the administrative decision or the grounds 
of appeal. They should be able to replace the decision of the adminis-
trative authority with their own decision on the admissibility of the 
asylum claim. It is not entirely clear yet whether the national courts 
ASYLUM AND ARTICLE 47 OF THE CHARTER 77
should also make an independent assessment of the credibility of the 
applicant’s statements. Chances are very real that the Dutch the appeal 
system in asylum cases needs to be changed on the basis of the CJEU’s 
judgments.
At the same time, the CJEU does not go as far as to impose on 
Member States that they grant national courts the power to grant or 
refuse international protection. The CJEU has held that after the an-
nulment of the administrative decision by the court, a new decision has 
to be taken by the administrative authority within a short period of 
time and in compliance with that judgment. It is questionable however, 
whether this judgment will improve the situation in Hungary and Slo-
vakia, where the administrative authorities may not obey judgments of 
the court and cannot be punished for that.
In its judgments on the pending preliminary questions concerning 
the scope and intensity of judicial review, the CJEU should take into 
the different legal systems at issue. Does the State’s and the asylum 
seeker’s interest in a speedy asylum procedure for example have to lead 
to a limitation or extension of the powers of the courts, or does this 
depend on the situation? In any case, also the outcome of the cases still 
pending before the CJEU could have important impact on the admin-
istrative systems of all Member States.

Overview and Summary of the Obligations 
of the EU Institutions and State Authorities with regard 
to the Charter in the Field of Asylum.  
Proposals for Possible Improvements 
in EU Legislation and Policies
Chiara Favilli*
Contents: 1. The EU Competence in the Field of Asylum. – 2. The Applicable 
Standard of Protection of Fundamental Rights. – 3. The Right to an Effec-
tive Remedy. – 4. The Elephant in the Room: the “Dublin Regulation”. – 
4.1. The Reasons for a Failure. – 4.2. Relocations and that Strange Way 
of Understanding Solidarity. – 4.3. Towards Dublin IV. – 5. Conclusions.
1. The EU Competence in the Field of Asylum
The EU asylum policy is one of the constituent parts of the “Area 
of  freedom, security and justice”, i.e. the area made up by all the terri-
tories of the member States where the freedom of movement must be 
enjoyed in conditions of security and justice accessible to all.1
It has been established as a shared competence that can be exercised 
through the adoption of any legislative acts, including measures to har-
monise national laws, in compliance with the principles of proportion-
ality and subsidiarity.
The current legal framework is the result of the progressive over-
coming of the traditional reluctance of States to accept sovereign re-
strictions on the treatment of foreigners. However, it was first neces-
sary to go through the phase of the three pillars of the post-Maastricht 
Union, through the intermediate phase post-Amsterdam and also mak-
ing use of international law agreements, like the 1985 Schengen Con-
* Chiara Favilli is Associate Professor of European Union Law, University of 
Florence.
1 Since 1 December 2009, rules on migration and asylum have been placed in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular in Title V, entitled 
“Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (Articles 67 to 89 of the TFEU), Chapter 2 of 
which covers “Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration” (Articles 77-80), 
which follows chapter 1 on General provisions (Articles 67-76).
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vention and the 1990 Dublin Convention, both now incorporated into 
EU law, but only thanks to an articulated differentiated application. 
Indeed, we have EU member States that are not bound by EU rules, ex-
cept for a decision to this effect (United Kingdom and Ireland); a mem-
ber State that is only bound by international law (Denmark); associated 
third States through the conclusion of specific international agreements 
(Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland).2 In short, a ‘Vari-
able-geometry’ Europe both for the involved States and for the legal 
nature of the existing obligations.
As is apparent from the first documents published by the European 
Commission following the conferral of competence to the Union in 
this field, expectations about the positive role that the Union could 
have played were very high. The same emerges from the conclusions 
of the European Council agreed at Tampere in 1999,3 where it is stated 
that the freedom typical of the European area acts as a draw for all 
those people who elsewhere may not enjoy similar freedom, and that 
“the aim is an open and secure European Union, fully committed to 
the obligations of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant 
human rights instruments, and able to respond to humanitarian needs 
on the basis of solidarity. A common approach must also be devel-
oped to ensure the integration into our societies of those third coun-
try nationals who are lawfully resident in the Union”. In following 
European Council meetings and especially after the terrorist attacks 
of 11 September 2001 and 11 March 2004, the working agenda agreed 
in Tampere was radically changed, giving priority to the fight against 
terrorism and international crime, and influencing the contents of all 
the other measures, especially those relating to asylum and migration. 
This approach has not changed, and, indeed, the so-called “migrant cri-
sis” has strengthened it, also because of a certain prevalence of officials 
2 See the protocols attached to the Treaties, in particular Protocol no. 21 on the 
position of the United Kingdom and Ireland with respect to the area of  freedom, security 
and justice and Protocol no. 22 on the position of Denmark.
3 General political guidelines adopted by consensus by the European Council 
establish the trajectory along which the other political institutions must necessarily 
move. Thus were adopted the programmes of Tampere (1999-2004); Hague (2004-
2009); Stockholm (2009-2014) and the development strategies for the area of  freedom, 
security and justice (2014-2019) approved on 27 June 2014; finally, on 13 May 2015, 
the European Agenda on Migration was adopted, which defined the strategy for 
the immigration and asylum policies of the Juncker Commission, endorsed by the 
European Council: COM(2015)240.
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of the national Home Offices in the European institutions and bodies 
dealing with migration and asylum policies.4
2. The Applicable Standard of Protection of Fundamental Rights
Following the guidelines adopted by the European Council, the EU 
institutions have created a European asylum system – developed through 
two successive phases – gradually harmonising national legislations re-
garding all the relevant aspects of the protection system: reception, pro-
cedures, qualifications and determination of the responsible State.5
The existence of a competence of the Union makes the EUCFR 
applicable, which binds the Union and the member States when they 
act within the scope of EU law (Article 51, as interpreted by the Court 
in the Fransson ruling).6 Therefore, the CJEU has already given various 
interpretations of the European asylum system in light of the EUCFR 
and the European Convention on Human Rights.7
4 Campesi, Polizia della frontiera. Frontex e la produzione dello spazio europeo, 
Rome, 2015; Savino (ed.), La crisi migratoria tra Italia e Unione europea, Napoli, 2017.
5 Directive 2001/55/ EC, Minimum standards for giving temporary protection in 
the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of 
efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences 
thereof, OJ 2001 L 187, 45 ss.; Directive 2013/32/EU of 26 June 2013 laying down 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, OJ 2013 
L 180, 60-95; Directive 2013/33/EU of 26 June 2013 laying down standards for the 
reception of applicants for international protection, OJ 2013 L 180, 96-116; Directive 
2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content 
of the protection granted, OJ 2011 L 337, 9 ss.; regulation 604/2013 of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person, OJ 2013 L 180, 31-59. Cherubini, 
Asylum Law in the European Union, London, 2015.
6 CJEU 26 February 2013, Case 617/10, Åkerberg Fransson. See Lazzerini, La Carta 
dei diritti fondamentali dell’Unione europea. I limiti di applicazione, Milano, 2018.
7 See the judgements applying the EUCFR available on the website of the 
Fundamental Rights Agency, catalogued article by article: http://fra.europa.eu/en/
charterpedia/article/18-right-asylum. See also the ECRE report, The application 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to asylum procedural law, 2014, www.
ecre.org; ACTIONES, Handbook on the Techniques of Judicial Interactions in the 
Application of the EU Charter, www.eui.eu. 
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In addition to the rights specifically related to international protec-
tion, such as Article 18 (right to asylum), Article 19 (protection against 
collective expulsions) and Article 4 (protection against expulsion), oth-
ers are equally relevant. That is especially the case for Article 7 (respect 
for private and family life), Article 1 (right to dignity), Article 24 (pro-
tection of minors), Article 41 (right to good administration) and Article 
47 (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial). These rights are 
generally protected also within the European Convention on Human 
Rights and, at national level, by the national Constitutions. Hence, the 
applicable standard is a key issue that should be addressed by applying 
the so called horizontal clauses of the EUCFR.
The meaning and scope of the rights enunciated in the EUCFR that 
correspond to the rights of the ECHR are the same as those conferred 
by that Convention, unless the law of the Union grants more extensive 
protection (Article 52.3); moreover, where the EUCFR recognises fun-
damental rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common 
to the member States, these rights are interpreted in harmony with these 
traditions (Article 52.4). Finally, based on Article 53, the EUCFR cannot 
lead to a reduction in the level of protection guaranteed to a right in the 
respective scope of application. Therefore, in the case of multiple sources 
relevant to the same right, the criterion of the most favourable standard is 
applied. However, with regard to the relationship between the EUCFR 
and national constitutional rights, in the well-known case Melloni and 
more recently in the MAS ruling (better known as Taricco bis) the CJEU 
made it clear that the highest constitutional standard can be applied in 
the absence of a harmonised law and without prejudice to the primacy 
and effectiveness of Union law.8 A similar orientation was expressed by 
the CJEU in the Opinion 2/13 on Accession of the EU to the ECHR.9
The right to asylum reveals a paradox in the application of the Mel-
loni principle, namely that what ultimately determines the identifica-
tion of the applicable standard is the presence or absence of an EU 
legislative act aiming to harmonise national laws. In order to avoid a 
conflict between norms and the race to the bottom of protections, “The 
Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with 
respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and tra-
8 CJEU 26 February 2013, Case 399/11, Melloni, points 62-63; 5 December 2017, 
Case 42/17, M.A.S. and M.B., points 45-46. TORRES PÉREZ, Melloni in Three Acts: 
From Dialogue to Monologue, in European Constitutional Law Review, 10, 2014, 308-331.
9 CJEU 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13.
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ditions of the Member States” (Article 67 TFEU). Indeed, in the impact 
assessments prepared by the European Commission before the submis-
sion of a proposal for a legislative act, the impact on human rights is 
properly considered. However, in the following phases and especially 
during the negotiations between Parliament and Council, the need to 
find an agreement between the two institutions may prevail over the 
duty to respect the national standards on fundamental rights.
It could even happen – and this is precisely the case with asylum 
– that a representative of a Government in the Council is in favour of 
adopting an act aiming to harmonise national laws that clashes with a 
cumbersome fundamental principle of its Constitution, like the consti-
tutional right of asylum. The Union could thus become the place to im-
pose the decrease of the standard deriving from national constitutions 
in the name of the European harmonisation.
It is clear that the only way to combine the principle of primacy 
of EU law and the protection of fundamental rights is to guarantee 
the application of the most favourable standard. In the crisis of values 
and identity of the Union, the revival of the principle of harmonisation 
pursuing the improvement of national standards, now little more than 
a memory of the golden age of the Union, could be a way to relaunch 
the same process of integration in which it is difficult to recognise the 
merit of ensuring the advancement of the collective well-being of the 
European peoples, including their fundamental rights.
3. The Right to an Effective Remedy
The right to an effective remedy is the main instrument to guaran-
tee the effective enjoyment of all the rights granted to persons, whether 
citizens or foreigners. In fact, even foreigners have the right to access 
to justice, so that the actions of public bodies affecting them are subject 
to an external and impartial control. The right to an effective remedy 
plays an essential role because its exercise can make a difference in the 
status of the person in relation to the host State: from regular to irregu-
lar, from present in the territory to deported or, in any case, from “vis-
ible to invisible”. In other words, for foreigners the right to an effec-
tive remedy and to a fair trial may be the only right they can exercise, 
instrumental to the exercise the other rights connected to their status.
In European Union law, the right to an effective remedy is an inte-
gral part of the human rights protection system, originally recognised 
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by the CJEU as a general principle of constitutional traditions com-
mon to the legal systems of the member States.10 The emphasis on the 
effectiveness of the remedy leads the ECtHR on the one hand, and 
the CJEU on the other, to assess whether the protection is effective-
ly guaranteed, without stopping at the formal existence of the right 
but making sure that in its practical application it ensures the effective 
protection against the infringement of rights. This is in full harmony 
with the principle of effectiveness of rights that is emblematic of the 
very essence of European Union law: a system in which substance is 
often prevalent over form; in which the tension towards the effective 
achievement of the objectives and towards the effective protection of 
rights pervades most of the activities of the institutions and becomes a 
prevailing rule in the interpretation of EU norms.11
The right to an effective remedy was then codified and expanded on 
by Article 47 of the EUCFR of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, entitled “Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial”, corre-
sponding to articles 13 (“Right to an effective remedy”) and 6 (“Right 
to a fair trial”) of the ECHR but which offers a more extensive disci-
pline of both.12
Article 47.1 recognises the right to effective remedy before a 
“judge” and not “only” in front of a national court as provided by 
Article 13 ECHR. As for the right to due process, Article 47.2, has a 
general application and not limited to disputes relating to civil rights 
and obligations in contrast with Article 6 ECHR. Article 47.2 was de-
liberately extensively formulated so that the guarantees of due process 
find a general application in all cases of remedy aimed at ascertaining a 
right deriving from the European Union’s legal system. As the “expla-
nations” of the EUCFR make clear, this extension “is one of the conse-
quences of the fact that the Union is a community of law… However, 
with the exception of the scope, the guarantees offered by the ECHR 
apply similarly in the Union”.
10 CJEU 25 July 2002, Case 50/00, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, point 39.
11 The principle of effectiveness has multiple applications in Union law. Consider, 
among others, the principle of substantive qualification of the act against formal 
qualification (CJEU 29 January 1985, Case 147/83, Binderer, point 12), or the “Effet 
Utile” principle (CJEU 9 October 2004, Case 200/02, Chen, point 45; 28 April 2011, 
El Dridi, Case 61/11, point 55).
12 Safjan, A Union of Effective Judicial Protection. Addressing a multi-level 
challenge through the lens of Article 47 CFREU, in http://www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/
centres/european/Speech-KINGS-COLLEGE.pdf.
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It is therefore necessary to apply the principles developed by the 
ECtHR in relation to articles 6 and 13 also to asylum.13 As is known, 
one of the constituent elements of due process is the right to have the 
case publicly examined, i.e. through a public hearing that, as a rule, also 
includes the right to be heard.14 The public nature of the hearing and 
listening to the interested party are however not absolute and may be 
limited where the limitation of the right is proportionate and justified 
by the particular nature of the subject matter of the judgement, but not 
by economic needs or efficiency of the judicial system that can never 
limit the exercise of fundamental rights.
A trial without a hearing at least in one level of judgement would 
be contrary not only to Article 6 ECHR but also to Article 14 of the 
ICCPR, according to which “In the determination… of his rights and 
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a 
trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national secu-
rity in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of 
the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion 
of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice 
the interests of justice…”. Article 10 of the UDHR is very clear on this 
point: “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him”.
According to international standards, as well as to the case law of 
the ECtHR, it appears that the admissible exemptions are almost al-
ways in bonam partem or, in any case, exemptions justified by reasons 
of public order. In particular, according to the ECtHR, a hearing is 
13 ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, Appl. No. 40035/98, 11 July 2000; 5 February 2002, 
Čonka v. Belgium, Appl. No. 51564/99; 26 April 2007, Gebremedhin v. France, Appl. 
No. 25389/05; 28 July 1999, Selmouni v. France, Appl. No. 25803/94. The necessity 
for individual assessment and the different impact of the same conduct on different 
parties was underlined by the ECtHR, particularly in the ruling of 7 July 1989, 
Soering v. United Kingdom, Appl. No.14038/88 and then confirmed with a consistent 
orientation. See the accurate study carried out by Reneman, EU asylum procedures and 
the right to an effective remedy, Leiden, 2013.
14 ECtHR 23 October 1995, Schmautzer v. Austria, Appl. No.15523/89; 23 
November 2006, Jussila v. Finland, Appl. No. 73053/01; 9 October 1979, Airey 
v. Ireland, Appl. No. 6289/73; Zagrebelsky, Chenal, Tomasi, Manuale dei diritti 
fondamentali in Europa, Bologna, 2016, 203-204.
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indispensable when the Court decides on important issues, when there 
are facts to be ascertained of considerable complexity or when the cred-
ibility or personal experience of the applicant plays a crucial role in 
the decision. Furthermore, the ECtHR considered the omission of the 
hearing in the field of social security to be legitimate, where the judge-
ment is based mainly on legal medical reports and a hearing was not 
requested.15
The CJEU has ruled on the right to be heard in judicial remedies 
on international protection in the Sacko case, decided on 26 July 2017 
with a preliminary ruling referred by an Italian Court.16 The CJEU has 
clarified the interpretation of Article 46 of the Procedures Directive 
in order to provide the national Court with the necessary information 
to assess whether the provision of Italian law that allows rejecting a 
remedy without listening to the applicant in the event of a manifestly 
unfounded petition is compatible with this provision, as well as with 
Article 47 of the EUCFR. No exemption or limitation is in fact allowed 
in the directive procedures concerning the judicial protection that must 
always be effective, regardless of the qualification of the petition as un-
founded or inadmissible.
However, according to the CJEU, such a limitation may be allowed 
when the court decides a case manifestly unfounded and when it can 
rely on written submissions and the minutes of the administrative pro-
cedure. The Court justifies this restrictive interpretation of a funda-
mental right (as expressly also referred to in recital 50 of the same di-
rective) in light of the relevant case law of the Court, without however 
exploring thoroughly the relevant case law, to the point that the princi-
ple of interpretation appears apodictic, also because the judgements of 
the ECtHR referred to do not seem entirely consistent. In particular, 
the Court has not given any interpretative indication on how to apply 
the conditions that may legitimise the exclusion of the hearing in light 
of the ECtHR case law. Although the Sacko case concerns only appeals 
against applications that are manifestly unfounded, and although the 
CJEU has stated that a court must always be able to order the hear-
ing of the applicant where it considers it necessary, the restriction of 
a fundamental right must be grounded and justified in light of general 
applicable criteria.
15 ECtHR, Dory v. Sweden, Appl. No. 28394/95, judgement of 12 November 2002.
16 CJEU 28 July 2011, Case 69/10, Samba Diouf; 31 January 2013, Case 175/11, 
HID; 17 December 2015, Case 239/14, Tall. 
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On the contrary, the Court considers as relevant certain topics that 
do not emerge in the case law of the ECtHR, like the close connection 
between the appeal procedure and the “first instance procedure” that 
precedes it. The Court merely repeats the unfortunate wording in the 
procedures directive whereby the administrative procedure, rather than 
simply being qualified as such, is defined as a “first instance procedure”, 
even if there is no “second administrative instance procedure”. Howev-
er, what is not admissible, as it is ontologically incorrect, is to qualify a 
judicial proceeding as a second instance of the administrative procedure. 
In fact, judicial protection does not afford only a control over the ad-
ministrative activities but it is also another chance to recognise the fun-
damental right to international protection by a judge. On the other hand, 
the argument used by the Court of the close connection between the 
appeal procedure and the procedure of first instance that precedes it is 
ineffective, since such a connection always exists in any appeal against an 
administrative act: could there not be a close link between the appeal and 
the procedure leading to the adoption of the challenged act?17
The Sacko ruling does not allow finding a justification for limiting 
the rights of due process that is consistent with the consolidated orien-
tation of the ECtHR. In fact, the latter considers relevant the impor-
tance of the protected right, the difficulty in ascertaining the facts, the 
relevance of the individual declarations and the credibility of the asylum 
seeker, all criteria being assessed. Precisely in light of ECtHR case law, it 
must be held that in judicial remedies for asylum there must be not only 
a hearing but at least one oral hearing in one of the stages of the judicial 
proceedings, and certainly when there is doubt about the credibility of 
the applicant. In fact, the Jussila ruling, referred to also by the CJEU 
in Sacko, the ECtHR affirmed the “… the obligation to hold a hearing 
is not absolute… There may be proceedings in which an oral hearing 
may not be required: for example where there are no issues of credibility 
or contested facts which necessitate a hearing and the courts may fairly 
and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the parties’ submissions 
and other written materials”.18 The ECtHR has also always stated that 
the right to the hearing is satisfied if there is at least one hearing in the 
17 Recently, the CJEU has affirmed the right to an effective remedy in relation to 
the refusal to issue a visa by an embassy of a member State; CJEU 13 December 2017, 
Case 403/16, El Hassani. 
18 ECtHR, Jussila v. Finland, Appl. No.73053/01, Judgement of 23 November 
2006, para. 41.
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context of a judicial remedy, namely that there must not necessarily be 
a hearing at all stages of the appeal, but that there must be at least one. 
On the contrary, the ECtHR has never stated that the right to a hearing, 
including an oral hearing, can be satisfied if there has been a hearing in 
the administrative procedure that is being challenged, as instead it seems 
to derive from the ambiguous language of the Sacko judgement.
In the absence of consistent and legally established criteria, the jus-
tification for limiting fair trial rights can only be found in choices of 
legal policy, primarily aimed at reducing the number of pending cases, 
as clearly indicated in the same question referred by the Tribunal of 
Milan and from which the Sacko judgement originated. If it is true that 
decisions on asylum, as well as all decisions and all judgements, must 
be taken as soon as possible, it is equally undeniable that, as the Court 
itself recognises, States and judges cannot limit the guarantees referred 
to in Article 47 of the EUCFR and reduce the effectiveness of judi-
cial protection of foreigners for reasons related to the number of ap-
peals and to the speed of administrative and jurisdictional procedures.19 
Speed  and efficiency are values  that take on meaning only if they are not 
contrasted with the quality of the administrative decision, the judicial 
appeals and the rulings. In fact, efficiency without quality reduces the 
number of pending appeals but also the level of guaranteed rights.
4. The Elephant in the Room: the “Dublin regulation”
4.1. The Reasons for a Failure
The Dublin regulation is an emblematic case of the application of the 
right to an effective remedy. The “Dublin system” was born as an inter-
national agreement, closely connected to the Schengen agreement, both 
becoming the two pillars around which the European asylum and mi-
gration policies have been developed.20 Despite the fact that the Dublin 
19 Ibidem, points 44-45.
20 Chapter VII of Title II of the Schengen Agreement precisely defined the criteria 
for determining the State responsible for examining asylum applications, which were 
later merged into the Convention on determining the member State responsible 
for examining an asylum application submitted in one of the member States of the 
European Communities, signed in Dublin on 15 June 1990 and entered into force in 
1990, OJ 1997 C 254.
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Convention was replaced in 2003 by a Union regulation, last amended 
in 2013, the criteria for determining the responsible State remained sub-
stantially unchanged with the residual, but primarily applicable, criterion 
of the State of first entry into the EU.21 This rule causes an imbalance in 
the responsibility of EU member States and overburdens those countries 
that are subjected to the twofold responsibility of controlling borders 
in the interest of all member States and also receiving a large number of 
asylum seekers. The CJEU has thus far maintained a restrictive interpre-
tation of the notion of the first irregular entry referred to in Article 13 
of the regulation, including all the hypotheses of entry without prior 
authorisation.22 On the other hand, it can be argued that at least those 
who enter the territory of a member State following a search and rescue 
operation at sea should be exempt from the application of Article 13, not 
being technically an irregular entry in a strict sense.
Between asylum seekers who try to escape the application of the 
criteria, States that do not cooperate and judgments of the ECtHR, 
Dublin is now a classic case of a patient with multiple illnesses, with 
governments determined to apply techniques of therapeutic obstinacy 
instead of accompanying it towards a peaceful end of life.
One of the factors that led to the collapse of Dublin were several 
cases brought before the ECtHR. Starting with the M.S.S. ruling, the 
Court condemned those member States that, in implementation of the 
Dublin Regulation, had transferred asylum seekers to Greece and Italy. 
The ECtHR did not implement the so-called presumption of safety of 
EU member States, which is an expression of the principle of mutual 
trust in national asylum systems and reiterated the traditional stance, 
according to which transfers from one State to another should not put 
people to a real risk of suffering a violation of the rights guaranteed 
in the Convention, especially the right not to suffer torture or inhu-
man and degrading punishment and treatment set out in article 3. There 
is no exception to this principle if the transfer is done to execute an 
obligation arising from the European Union and in application of the 
Dublin Regulation, despite the fact that the ECtHR duly takes into 
consideration the existence of special links between EU member States.
21 The Dublin Convention was replaced by EU Regulation No. 343/2003, for this 
reason commonly called “Dublin II regulation”, OJ 2003 50, 1 ss. This was followed 
by the so-called Regulation No. 604/2013, called “Dublin III”, of 26 June 2013, OJE 
2013 L 180, 31-59.
22 CJEU 26 July 2017, Case 646/16, Jafari.
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In summary, to ensure compliance with the ECHR, States should 
ensure that there is no risk of violation of rights through the transfer, 
and, in any case, since the presumption of safety must be understood 
in a relative and not absolute manner, each person must be able to chal-
lenge the risk of violation of their rights through an effective remedy 
as required by Article 13 ECHR. The right to appeal against transfer 
decisions, which corresponds to the obligation to examine each indi-
vidual situation on a case-by-case basis, is the most specific result of 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR concerning the so-called Dublin cases. 
Although it is a minimum guarantee, it has had a significant impact on 
the efficiency of the Dublin system, which was already very low.
The CJEU has then given a restrictive interpretation of the prin-
ciple expressed by the ECtHR.23 Almost the same reasoning has been 
transposed into the amended article 2 of the Dublin III Regulation, 
according to which the transfer may be impossible “[…] because there 
are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in 
the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants 
in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the EUCFR […]”. The 
different approach of the two Courts, reflected also in the text of the 
amended Dublin regulation, was echoed also in the already mentioned 
CJEU Opinion on EU accession to the ECHR.24 The CJEU deemed 
the agreement not to comply with EU Treaties as it was not enough to 
guarantee the peculiarities of EU law, which also include those legal 
instruments, such as the Dublin Regulation, that are based on mutual 
trust between member States and that, in order to work, must involve 
the existence of absolute presumptions of safety in their respective legal 
systems.
More recently, the CJEU seems to have aligned itself with the ori-
entation of the ECtHR. The Court affirmed that the lawfulness of the 
transfer must be assessed not only in light of the risk of systemic flaws 
in the destination country, but also considering the risk inherent in the 
transfer per se, “regardless of the quality of reception and the treatment 
available in the member state responsible for examining the applica-
tion… Secondly, it would be manifestly incompatible with the absolute 
character of that prohibition if the Member States could disregard a real 
and proven risk of inhuman or degrading treatment affecting an asylum 
23 CJEU 21 December 2011, Case 411/10, N.S., para. 94.
24 CJEU 18 December 2014, Opinion 2/13.
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seeker under the pretext that it does not result from a systemic flaw in 
the Member State responsible”.25
Another relevant interpretation by the CJEU on the Dublin Reg-
ulation concerned the determination of the competent State in the case 
of requests made by unaccompanied minors.26 The Court held that the 
member State in which the child finds himself is required to examine 
the application for international protection, even though the minor 
himself has already applied in another member State; the Court under-
lined the vulnerability of minors and the existing obligation requiring 
the States to act in their superior interests by virtue of Article 24 of the 
EUCFR. In order to comply with the latter ruling of the CJEU, in 2014 
the European Commission presented a proposal to amend Article 8 of 
the Dublin III regulation,27 which, however, was not approved due to 
lack of agreement between the institutions. Indeed, in accompanying 
the proposal to amend the Dublin III regulation presented in 2016, it 
is stated that “given that this provision differs from the provisions of 
the Commission proposal of June 2014, the Commission intends to 
withdraw the latter, on which it has been impossible to reach an agree-
ment until now”, in complete disregard for the fundamental right of 
the child’s best interests.
The other reason of the Dublin regulation crisis is the increase in 
the number of applications for international protection partly due to 
the worsening situation in the countries of origin, and partly due to the 
gradual closure of legal channels of entry to EU countries.28 The Dublin 
crisis has thus rapidly spread to the Schengen system with some States 
that have reintroduced internal border checks because of the threat 
posed by the massive influx of migrants and asylum seekers.29 It has 
been evident that the member States would have preferred to renounce 
the free movement of persons in order not to admit any more migrants, 
including asylum seekers. This scenario has had a negative impact on 
the whole area of  freedom, security and justice and may be devastating 
25 CJEU 16 February 2018, Case 578/16, CK, paras. 90-93.
26 CJEU 6 June 2013, Case 648/11, M.A..
27 COM (2014) 382 of 26 June 2014. See Del Guercio, Superiore interesse del 
minore e determinazione dello Stato competente all’esame della domanda di asilo nel 
diritto dell’Unione Europea, in Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2014, p. 243-248.
28 See the data published by EASO since 2010, www.easo.europa.eu. 
29 European Commission, Notifications of the Temporary Reintroduction of 
Border Control, available at www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/. 
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for the already weakened European integration process. On the other 
hand, an area of  free movement that implies the absence of border con-
trols on people, citizens or foreigners is incompatible with the prohi-
bition of secondary movements, with the prohibition of choosing the 
State in which to apply for international protection and, lastly, with 
the non-recognition of a right of residence in other member States to 
third-country nationals, at least to beneficiaries of international protec-
tion.30 On the contrary, these are the fundamental rules around which 
the EU asylum system has been created.
4.2. Relocations and that Strange Way of Understanding Solidarity
In this scenario, institutions and governments have tried to imple-
ment measures to solve the crisis, with the aim of interpreting the prin-
ciple of solidarity enshrined in Article 80 TFEU in terms other than 
technical and financial assistance.31
Thus the decisions on relocation of persons in evident need for inter-
national protection have been adopted.32 The most innovative feature of 
the decisions was the setting of mandatory quotas on the basis of which 
to distribute asylum seekers between member States, with the exception 
of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. It is noteworthy that for 
the first time objective criteria were established to identify the number 
of people that each member State can potentially accept, depending on 
the country’s population, the number of applicants already present, the 
gross domestic product and the unemployment rate. On the contrary, 
30 See Favilli, Reciproca fiducia, mutuo riconoscimento e libertà di circolazione 
di rifugiati e richiedenti protezione internazionale nell’unione europea, in Rivista di 
diritto internazionale, 2015, 3, 701-747.
31 Vanheule, Van Selm, Boswell, L’attuazione dell’articolo 80 del TFUE sul principio 
di solidarietà ed equa ripartizione della responsabilità, anche sul piano finanziario, tra 
gli Stati membri nel settore dei controlli alle frontiere, dell’asilo e dell’immigrazione, 
Study drafted on behalf of the European Parliament, 2011.
32 Council Decision 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing temporary 
measures in the field of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, 
in OJ 2015 L 239, 146; Council Decision 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing 
temporary measures in the field of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
Greece, OJ 2015 L 248, 80. Morgese, La solidarietà tra gli Stati membri dell’Unione 
europea in materia di immigrazione e asilo, Bari, 2018; Caggiano, Alla ricerca di 
un nuovo equilibrio istituzionale per la gestione degli esodi di massa: dinamiche 
intergovernative, condivisione di responsabilità fra gli Stati membri e tutela dei diritti 
degli individui, in Studi sull’integrazione europea, 2015, 465 ss.
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the definition of mandatory quotas is the point on which there has been 
the greatest conflict between member States, with Romania, Czech Re-
public, Slovakia and Hungary who voted against and the action for an-
nulment brought by the Slovakia and Hungary before the CJEU.33
However, instead of easing the burden of reception in Greece and 
Italy, they caused a net increase in asylum seekers in these countries. 
In fact, thanks to the two relocations’ decisions, the Governments of 
northern Europe and the Commission have succeeded in imposing on 
Italy and Greece the obligation to identify irregular migrants and asy-
lum seekers. That requirement was already in force but largely disre-
garded due to Italy’s lack of interest in tracking the passage of those 
who only want to cross Italy to reach another European destination.34 
This has led to the creation of reception and first care facilities managed 
according to the hotspot approach, in other words closed centres to 
ensure the effective implementation of identification, registration and 
fingerprinting procedures.35
4.3. Towards Dublin IV
It is not surprising, therefore, that after the expiry of the term of 
their application,36 given the divisions between the States and the lim-
ited success in terms of their intended purpose, the Commission has 
abandoned this sort of measures and presented a proposal to amend the 
Dublin Regulation that left the current system unchanged, in particular 
as regards the criterion of the State of first arrival.37
33 The Court, with a comprehensive and thoroughly reasoned judgement, 
dismissed all the grounds of appeal and also reiterated the centrality of the principle of 
solidarity referred to in article 80 of the TFEU. CJEU 6 September 2017, Case 643/15, 
Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council of the European Union.
34 See Article 7 common to both decisions. In November 2017, the people 
relocated from Italy were 10,842 with 2,363 still waiting, and from Greece 21,524 with 
516 waiting. The reason is that the decisions identified as eligible subjects only people 
belonging to those nationalities who obtain a status in at least 75% of cases based on 
data provided by the member States and processed by the EASO.
35 Hotspot, accoglienza e ricollocamento – Circolare del Ministero dell’interno e 
Road map italiana, www.asgi.it. 
36 As of 19 September 2017 two years have elapsed since the decision on relocation 
came into force: this can still be invoked but only for people who came to Italy or 
Greece before 19 September 2017.
37 Maiani, The Reform of the Dublin III Regulation, European Parliament, 28 
June 2016, www.europarl.eu, 2016, 53-56.
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Except for some extension to the application of the criterion of the 
presence of family members in other member states (not just spouses 
and minor children, but also brothers and sisters, and the express con-
sideration of family ties that arose after leaving the country of origin), 
the reform proposal was presented as a general tightening of the criteria 
and rules already laid down, particularly in order to prevent secondary 
movements; in fact, it clearly set out the obligations over applicants for 
international protection and the consequent sanctions for non-compli-
ance, including the exclusion from the reception system.38
A new provision is the introduction of the corrective mechanism of 
distribution of asylum seekers when a member State has a dispropor-
tionate influx of applicants for international protection and resettled 
people, namely greater than 150% of the national quota defined for 
each State through a reference key based on two criteria: the number of 
inhabitants and the gross domestic product. States are allowed not to 
participate in the redistribution mechanism by declaring their opposi-
tion and paying the sum of € 250,000 for each person not accepted. On 
16 November 2017 the European Parliament in its first reading adopted 
by a large majority numerous amendments on the basis of which the 
criterion of the country of first arrival is replaced with the introduction 
of an automatic transfer system using a method of fixed distribution, 
not conditional on exceeding 150% of the quota considered sustainable 
for each State. In addition, the choice of the country of transfer should 
be based on the relevance of existing social ties between applicants and 
the destination country: family ties (extended to dependent adult chil-
dren, brothers and sisters), having taken a course of study in the coun-
try or even just having lived there should be taken into account when 
choosing the country where to transfer the applicant for international 
protection. Transfers of people, even in the case of extradition or ex-
pulsion, tend to always be very difficult to achieve, even more so when 
they cover tens of thousands of people. For this reason, the voluntary 
participation of applicants for international protection is essential, and 
the Parliament’s proposal to introduce additional criteria enhancing the 
links with the competent State is a step in the right direction, the only 
viable one remaining within the logic of the Dublin system.
Agreement between the Parliament and the Council imposed by 
ordinary legislative procedure will be difficult to achieve given the 
38 COM(2016)197 of 6 April 2016, Reform of the common European asylum 
system and enhancing legal avenues to Europe. 
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considerable distance between the positions of the two institutions, to 
which also that of the Commission can be added. The Council, which 
represents EU governments, locked in a restrictive approach aimed at 
tightening and eliminating all the derogations in the Regulation to en-
sure that the criteria are finally applied in a rigorous way. The Parlia-
ment, on the other hand, which represents the people of the EU, pro-
poses to abandon the traditional system and innovates it profoundly.
5. Conclusions
The creation of a Common European Asylum System has showed 
all the contradictions and ambiguities of the European Union: an inter-
national organisation that is different from all the other ones as regards 
the extension of the powers and the impact of legislative measures into 
national law, which aims at regulating policies like those of migration 
and asylum without, however, that those powers prove to be sufficient.
The objective inadequacy of this hybrid structure has been further 
worsened by the inability of both governments and the Commission to 
develop measures inspired by a forward-looking vision. This explains 
the persistent centrality of the Schengen and Dublin systems, which 
were agreed in the international arena, outside the European Union, 
without significant changes brought by their incorporation into the 
EU legal order.
In fact, an extremely important game with two different visions is 
playing out over the Dublin dossier: that of the governments, divided 
and chasing short-term objectives that are almost always determined 
by electoral calculations and, at times, by the ambition to neutralise 
xenophobic waves; and that of the European Parliament, representing 
the peoples of Europe, which adopted amendments supported by a 
large majority, made up by MPs belonging to different political groups 
and also to different countries in Southern and Northern, in Western 
and Eastern Europe. A sign that a common and radically different vi-
sion on asylum in Europe is possible because it already exists.39
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1. Introduction
The right to an effective remedy is a fundamental element of the 
broader right to effective protection. The right to effective protection 
has in fact a twofold dimension, in that it serves to guarantee not 
only the protection of individuals, but also the correct application of 
the law. This right was included in the very first international human 
rights instruments and, starting from 1950, the right to effective ju-
dicial protection has also found application, at regional level, in the 
human rights protection system established by the European Con-
vention on Human Rights (ECHR). At regional level, a significant 
milestone was the recognition of the right to effective judicial pro-
tection in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the adoption of 
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of European Union 
(EUCFR), which enshrined the right to an effective remedy. Through 
the EUCFR, the right to an effective remedy has been consolidated 
within the EU’s legal system. The interpretation of the right to an ef-
fective remedy enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter must take into 
account changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty in EU primary law, 
whereby the EUCFR has achieved the same legal value as the Treaties 
and has therefore become legally binding.
* Rosita Forastiero is Researcher at the Institute for International Legal Studies 
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In the field of asylum, the right to an effective remedy is a corner-
stone of the protection of asylum seekers, and in this regard, Article 47 
of the EUCFR is the norm that national courts most frequently invoke, 
despite the fact that asylum is but one of many fields of application of 
this important Charter provision.1 As for the right to an effective rem-
edy and asylum, it is also essential to take into account the evolution of 
the Common European Asylum System (CEAS).
Major changes have taken place in the current legal context, due in 
part to the last few years’ increase of migratory flows, largely comprised 
of asylum seekers and refugees. In this respect, it should be observed 
that change is still underway, following the 2016 proposal adopted by 
the European Commission to reform the European asylum system.
Within the development of this legal framework, the protection of 
particularly vulnerable asylum seekers must be considered. In fact, when 
discussing the right to an effective remedy in the field of asylum, the con-
cept of vulnerability comes to the fore in all its complexity. In light of the 
right to asylum, the concept of vulnerability takes on a different meaning 
and dimension. On one hand, it serves to identify asylum seekers as a vul-
nerable category per se and, on the other, identifies certain groups of appli-
cants who, due to their characteristics or individual situations, are subject 
to disadvantage, prejudice and stereotyping. Accordingly, some asylum 
seekers can be seen as especially vulnerable, such as, among others, minors, 
unaccompanied minors, elderly people, persons with disabilities, pregnant 
women, persons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other seri-
ous forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, and lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people. Some of these persons 
have special needs that require treatment and particular support.
This twofold dimension of the concept of vulnerability makes it a 
priority to guarantee a higher level of protection for the human rights 
of vulnerable asylum seekers.
Here the role played by the case-law of the Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) takes 
1 In this regard, see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 
Fundamental Rights Report 2018, June 2018, 38 ss. Available at: http://fra.europa.
eu/en/publication/2018/fundamental-rights-report-2018. Accessed July 15, 2018. 
Furthermore, see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), 
Handbook on European Law relating to Access to Justice, 2016. Available at: https://
publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/1034ed26-1f53-11e7-
84e2-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. Accessed July 30, 2018.
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centre stage, since both Courts, by interpreting and implementing the 
right to effective judicial protection and the concept of vulnerability, 
have increased and strengthened the existing protection available to 
vulnerable asylum seekers.
2. The Right to an Effective Remedy and the International and Euro-
pean Legal Framework
The right to an effective remedy constitutes a fundamental element 
of effective protection. In this regard, it must be said that the right to 
effective protection has a broader scope, because it is an instrument 
that guarantees not only the protection of individuals, but also the 
correct implementation and application of the law.2 This dual concept 
of effectiveness has accompanied the human rights discourse from the 
very beginning, becoming a cornerstone of international and European 
legal framework. We can already find a codification of effective judi-
cial protection in the first international human rights instruments. The 
very first step dates back to the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948, which in its Article 8 establishes the right 
of every individual “to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the 
constitution or by law”.
This right is then reaffirmed in numerous international human 
rights treaties adopted at both universal and regional level.3 Among 
others, a reference to this right can be found in Article 6 of the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (ICERD) of 1965 and in Article 2, para. 3, of the Interna-
2 To this regard, see, among others, O. Porchia, L’effettività del diritto dell’Unione 
tra tutela del singolo e salvaguardia dell’ordinamento, in A.A.V.V., Scritti in onore 
di Giuseppe Tesauro, Napoli, 2014, 2311 ss.; M. Romito, La tutela giurisdizionale 
nell’Unione europea tra effettività del sistema e garanzie individuali, Bari, 2015; G. 
Tesauro, The Effectiveness of Judicial Protection and Cooperation between the Court 
of Justice and National Courts, in YB Eur. Law, 1993, 3 ss.; A. Arnull, The Principle of 
Effective Judicial Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?, in Eur. Law Rev., 2011, 
50 ss.; D. Leczykiewicz, ‘Effective Judicial Protection’ of Human Rights After Lisbon: 
Should National Courts be Empowered to Review EU Secondary Law?, in Eur. Law 
Rev., 2010, 326 ss.
3 See D. Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law, Oxford, New 
York, 2015.
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tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, which 
enshrine the commitment of States Parties to guarantee the right to an 
effective remedy to any person whose fundamental rights or freedoms 
have been violated.4 In this line, we must also mention Articles 9 and 
14 of the ICCPR. These provisions broaden the scope of the right to 
an effective remedy by conflating it with, among others, the right to a 
fair and public hearing before a competent, independent and impar-
tial tribunal established by law; the right to defence and, if applicable, 
to legal aid; and the right to compensation. Likewise, the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) of 1984 also partly references the right to an effec-
tive remedy as elaborated in the first international human rights treaties 
and, in Article 14, extends its scope by affirming the right of the victim 
of an act of torture to obtain redress and to have “an enforceable right 
to fair and adequate compensation”.
As is the case with other human rights treaties, the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) of 2006 also mentions 
the right to effective judicial protection. Article 13 of the CRPD places 
upon the States an obligation to guarantee effective access to justice 
for persons with disabilities, on a basis of equality with others, and 
provides that States must set in place all necessary procedural adjust-
ments to afford disabled persons full enjoyment of the right to judicial 
protection.5
4 In particular, Article 6 of the ICERD affirms that: «States Parties shall assure 
to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through the 
competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial 
discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to 
this Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate 
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination». 
In the same line, Article 2, para. 3, of the ICCPR establishes that: «Each State Party to 
the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any 
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop 
the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted».
5 For a deep analysis on Article 13 of the CRPD, see E. Flynn, Article 13 [Access to 
Justice], in V. Della Fina, R. Cera, G. Palmisano (eds.), The United Nations Convention 
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Starting from 1950, the right to effective judicial protection is also 
reflected, at regional level, in the human rights protection system estab-
lished by the ECHR, particularly within the joint statement of Articles 
6 (right to a fair trial) and 13 (right to an effective remedy). Therefore, 
this framework has undergone a substantial evolution over time, facil-
itated in turn by the action of the bodies monitoring the human rights 
treaties and by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, which have contrib-
uted to affirming the right to effective judicial protection as an interna-
tional human rights standard.
However, at regional level, a significant milestone was the recog-
nition of the right to effective judicial protection in Article 19 of the 
TEU, followed by the adoption of certain acts of EU law and by the 
action of the CJEU. Article 19, para. 1, stipulates the States’ obligation 
to establish the legal remedies necessary to ensure effective judicial pro-
tection in areas within the competence of the Union.6
Through the EUCFR, the right to an effective remedy is further 
consolidated within the EU’s legal system. In particular, with the re-
form of EU primary law following the Lisbon Treaty, by virtue of 
which the TEU and the TFEU entered into force on 1 December 2009, 
the EUCFR achieved the same legal value as the EU Treaties, thus be-
coming a legal binding instrument. Specifically, Article 47 of the Char-
ter establishes the right to an effective remedy, substantiating it as the 
right of access to an independent, impartial judge pre-established by 
law; the right to a fair trial within a reasonable timeframe; and the right 
of every person to be defended and represented, and, when necessary, 
to be granted free legal aid.
It must be said that Article 47 takes over the system of protection out-
lined by the ECHR.7 However, Article 47 contains important and novel 
elements when compared with Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR. First of 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. A Commentary, The Netherlands, 2017, 281 ss.
6 On Article 19 of the TEU, see, among others, G. Tesauro, Articolo 19, in A. 
Tizzano (ed.), Trattati dell’Unione europea, Milano, 2014, 195 ss.
7 See, among others, AA.VV., Article 47, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward 
(Eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Commentary, Oxford, Portland, 
2014, 1197 ss; T. Tridimas, The General Principles of European Union Law, Oxford, 
2016, 456 ss.; R. Barents, EU Procedural Law and Effective Legal Protection, in 
Common Market Law Review, 1437 ss.; S. Prechal, The Court of Justice and Effective 
Judicial Protection: What Has the Charter Changed?, in C. Paulussen, T. Takacs, V. 
Lazić, B. Van Rompuy (Eds.), Fundamental Rights in International and European Law. 
Public and Private Law Perspectives, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2016, 143 ss.
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all, Article 47 merges the rights and principles enshrined in the ECHR 
into a single provision. A second aspect concerns the scope of protection 
provided for by Article 47, which, according to the Explanations to the 
Charter, is broader, as it guarantees the right to an effective remedy be-
fore a judge rather than a national instance, as provided for instead by 
Article 13 of the ECHR. Lastly, Article 47 of the Charter applies to both 
the disputes relating to civil and criminal rights and obligations, and to 
administrative proceedings. This is another new element compared to 
Article 6 of the ECHR, which only applies to civil and criminal disputes.
Nevertheless, the complementarity of the Charter and the ECHR 
remains significant, in primis, as it concerns the interaction between 
the CJEU and the ECtHR, but also in light of Article 52, para. 3, of 
the Charter, whereby whenever the rights of the Charter correspond 
to those laid down by the ECHR, their meaning and scope correspond 
likewise. The Explanations to the Charter add that the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR must also be taken into account in this case, and it is thanks 
to the jurisprudence of both Courts, the CJEU and the ECtHR, that 
the scope of Article 47 has been progressively clarified and expanded.
Although asylum constitutes only one of the many fields of appli-
cation of this important provision of the Charter, the right to an effec-
tive remedy remains a key element of the protection of asylum seekers.
Focusing on the most relevant acts of secondary law, one should 
recall Directive 2013/32/EU, also known as the “Procedures Direc-
tive”,8 which introduced a few substantial changes to the previous legal 
framework adopted with Directive 2005/85/EC.9 In particular, Direc-
tive 2013/32/EU established common procedures regulating the funda-
mental guarantees for the presentation of asylum applications; the pos-
sibility for applicants to remain on the territory of the Member State 
until their application has been decided on; the individual, objective and 
impartial character of the decision; the admissibility examination pro-
cedures; the merit examination procedures; and the appeal procedures, 
whereby the asylum seeker is entitled to the right to appeal against any 
decision on the admission, or merit, of the application. Furthermore, 
8 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
On Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (Recast), 
OJ 29 June 2013, L 180. This Directive introduced a number of substantive changes to the 
Directive 2005/85/EC. In the interest of clarity, that Directive has been recast. 
9 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005, On Minimum Standards on 
Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing Refugee Status, OJ 13 December 2005, L 326.
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the Directive aims to state the principles concerning the designation of 
a safe third country and a safe country of origin.
It is interesting to note that the Preamble of the Directive makes 
repeated, express references to the EUCFR10 and the right to an effec-
tive remedy,11 which constitute the interpretative criteria for the im-
plementation of the Directive in national legal systems. Consequently, 
we should consider some of the most relevant provisions of Directive 
2013/32, interpreting them in light of Article 47 of the EUCFR.
When examining the legal regime introduced by Directive 2013/32, 
one must first consider its Article 46, para. 1, whereby Member States 
must ensure that the applicant has the right to an effective remedy 
before a judge in the cases listed by the provision and, in particular, 
against: a decision to consider the application unfounded in relation to 
refugee status and/or subsidiary protection status; a refusal to reopen 
the examination of a suspended application pursuant to Articles 27 and 
28; a decision to withdraw international protection.12
On this basis, Member States have an obligation to ensure an ade-
quate, complete and ex nunc appraisal of the circumstances that are pre-
10 In this regard, see paras. 33, 39 and 60 of the Preamble of the Directive 2013/32/
EU. Specifically, para. 60 of the Preamble recalls, among others, Article 47 of the 
Charter. It states that: «This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the 
principles recognised by the Charter. In particular, this Directive seeks to ensure full 
respect for human dignity and to promote the application of Articles 1, 4, 18, 19, 21, 23, 
24, and 47 of the Charter and has to be implemented accordingly».
11 The Preamble of the Directive 2013/32/EU, para. 50, establishes that: «it reflects a 
basic principle of Union law that the decisions taken on an application for international 
protection, the decisions concerning a refusal to reopen the examination of an application 
after its discontinuation, and the decisions on the withdrawal of refugee or subsidiary 
protection status are subject to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal».
12 Article 46, para. 1, of the Directive 2013/32/EU states: «Member States shall 
ensure that applicants have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, 
against the following:
(a) a decision taken on their application for international protection, including a decision:
(i) considering an application to be unfounded in relation to refugee status and/or 
subsidiary protection status;
(ii) considering an application to be inadmissible pursuant to Article 33(2);
(iii) taken at the border or in the transit zones of a Member State as described in 
Article 43(1);
(iv) not to conduct an examination pursuant to Article 39;
(b) a refusal to reopen the examination of an application after its discontinuation 
pursuant to Articles 27 and 28;
(c) a decision to withdraw international protection pursuant to Article 45.»
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sented. The judge is then called upon to carry out an individual assess-
ment based on both objective and subjective preconditions. In this line, 
the ‘right to be heard’ becomes an essential procedural requirement 
that must be met in order to safeguard the right to an effective remedy.
The right to be heard is enshrined, in primis, in Directive 2013/32, 
but further important references are also found in Article 6 of the 
ECHR and in Articles 47 and 41 of the EUCFR, the latter concerning 
the ‘right to good administration’. In fact, Article 41, para. 2, of the 
EUCFR provides that the right to good administration includes, inter 
alia, the right of every person to be heard before any individual meas-
ure that would affect him or her adversely is taken.13
In the case of Moussa Sacko v. Commissione Territoriale per il 
riconoscimento della protezione internazionale di Milano of 26 July 
2017, the Court clarified the scope of the right to be heard within the 
particular field of asylum.14 According to the CJEU, neither Directive 
2013/32 nor the EUCFR place any obligation on the appeal judge to 
hold a hearing so that the applicant may be heard. This is possible if the 
factual circumstances leave no doubt as to the merits of the decision, 
and if during the first instance procedure the applicant has been offered 
an opportunity to hold a personal interview on his application for in-
ternational protection. On the other hand, the judge must always retain 
the faculty to grant a hearing to the applicant seeking international pro-
tection, if he/she should consider it essential for the purpose of issuing 
a judgment. In this regard, as the CJEU said about the Moussa ruling, 
procedural speed and economic requirements are irrelevant concerns. 
In this framework, one must therefore point out that the requirement 
to implement claims for an effective remedy does not, by itself, imply 
that States have an obligation to provide for both sets of proceedings.15
13 CJEU 11 December 2014, Case C-249/13, Khaled Boudjlida v Préfet des 
Pyrénées-Atlantiques.
14 CJEU 26 July 2017, Case C-348/16, Moussa Sacko v. Commissione Territoriale 
per il riconoscimento della Protezione internazionale di Milano. In particular, the 
CJEU had already been called «to ascertain, in essence, whether Directive 2013/32, 
in particular Articles 12, 14, 31 and 46 thereof, is to be interpreted as precluding a 
national court hearing an appeal against a decision rejecting a manifestly unfounded 
application for international protection from dismissing the appeal without hearing 
the applicant, in particular where the applicant has already been interviewed by the 
administrative authorities and where the factual circumstances leave no doubt as to 
whether the decision rejecting the application was well founded».
15 In this respect, the Italian reform introduced by Law Decree No. 13/2017, 
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Lastly, in 2016, the European Commission initiated a process of reform 
of the Common European Asylum System. In particular, it presented a 
first set of proposals to reform the CEAS, aiming to establish a “sustaina-
ble and fair Dublin system” for determining the Member State responsible 
for examining asylum applications; to reinforce the Eurodac system, in or-
der to better monitor secondary movements and prevent irregular migra-
tion; and to establish a European Agency for Asylum to ensure the correct 
functioning of the European asylum system.16
The reform package elaborated by the European Commission also 
presents interesting innovations regarding the issue of the right to 
an effective remedy. With a second reform package, the Commission 
has completed the reform of the CEAS by adopting four additional 
proposals intended to supersede the existing directives (including the 
‘Procedures Directive’ 2013/32) through directly applicable acts of 
EU secondary legislation, such as regulations. The Proposal from the 
EU Commission for a Regulation on a common procedure for inter-
national protection is a relevant act, which would bridge the existing 
gaps between the procedural regimes of the Member States and lead to 
converted with amendments by Law 13 April 2017, No. 46, which has abolished 
appeal in the procedures on international protection applications, is therefore fully 
consistent with European Union law. In this respect, see M. Acierno, M. Flamini, Il 
dovere di cooperazione del giudice, nell’acquisizione e nella valutazione della prova, 
in Diritto, Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 2017, No. 1. Available at: https://www.
dirittoimmigrazionecittadinanza.it/archivio-saggi-commenti/saggi/fascicolo-2017-n-
1/62-il-dovere-di-cooperazione-del-giudice-nell-acquisizione-e-nella-valutazione-
della-prova. Accessed July 28, 2018.
16 See Proposal from the European Commission of 4 May 2016 for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national 
or a stateless person (recast), COM(2016) 270 final; Proposal from the European 
Commission of 4 May 2016 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the 
effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national or a stateless person], for identifying an illegally staying third-country national 
or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member 
States’ law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast), 
COM(2016) 272 final; Proposal from the European Commission of 4 May 2016 for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union 
Agency for Asylum and repealing Regulation (EU) No 439/2010, COM(2016) 271 final.
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establishing quicker, simpler and clearer procedures. In this line, the 
Directive 2013/32 is not so much a definitive end point, as merely the 
last stage of a process of reform in fieri.
3. ‘Protection of Vulnerable Asylum Seekers’ and ‘Right to an Effec-
tive Remedy’ throughout the Development of the Common Euro-
pean Asylum System (CEAS)
When discussing the right to an effective remedy and, particularly, the 
procedural aspects of guaranteeing it, the concept of vulnerability comes 
to the fore in all its complexity. In light of human rights law, vulnerable 
groups may be described as specific groups of individuals who often face 
discriminatory treatment, or who need a degree of special attention by 
the State to avoid being exploited or exposed to harmful environments, 
in order to bring them on a substantially equal footing with all persons.17
However, the concept of vulnerability takes on a different meaning 
and dimension in the framework of the right to asylum. In this context, 
in fact, the concept of vulnerability has a twofold value: on the one 
hand, it is useful to identify asylum seekers as a vulnerable category per 
se and, on the other, identifies certain groups of applicants who, due to 
their characteristics or individual situations, are subject to disadvan-
tage, prejudice and stereotyping. In this regard, it is worth stressing that 
some of these persons, such as, among others, minors, unaccompanied 
minors, elderly people, persons with disabilities, pregnant women, per-
sons who have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of 
psychological, physical or sexual violence, LGBTI people, have special 
needs that require treatment and/or support. Therefore, this twofold 
dimension, both universal and particular, of the concept of vulnerabili-
ty requires a greater guarantee of protection for human rights.18
17 On the definition of the notion of vulnerable groups and its complexity, see, 
among others, R. Forastiero, The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Protection 
of Vulnerable Groups: Children, Elderly People and Persons with Disabilities, in G. 
Palmisano (ed.), Making the Charter of Fundamental Rights a Living Instrument, 
Leiden, Boston, 2014, 165 ss.; S. Fredman, Discrimination Law, Oxford, New York, 
2011, 25 ss.; L. Peroni, A. Timmer, Vulnerable Groups: the Promise o Fan Emerging 
Concept in European Human Rights Convention Law, in Int. Jnl. of Constitutional 
Law, 2013, 1056 ss.; S. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Postive Rights and 
Positive Duties, Oxford, New York, 2008, 180 ss.
18 On this twofold dimension of vulnerability consisting in a both a universal and 
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This is the framework wherein the CEAS has operated ever since its 
inception with the Tampere European Council in 1999 and throughout 
its implementation with the changes introduced by the Treaty of Nice 
of 2001 and the EUCFR, which have completed the legal framework.19 
It is worth pointing out that, at that time, the EUCFR had no legally 
binding effect. This initial phase, marked by the adoption of three di-
rectives constituting the building blocks of the European asylum sys-
tem, comprised an explicit reference to the concept of vulnerability in 
relation to the existence of specific groups of asylum seekers.
In that respect, the first generation of legislative instruments adopt-
ed under the CEAS did not primarily include a definition of vulnerabil-
ity, recalling instead the concept of vulnerability in relation to material 
reception conditions and health care.20 Therefore, the notion of vulner-
ability was taken into consideration insofar as it affected an applicant’s 
physical and mental integrity, and the State’s obligation to take the spe-
cial situation of such asylum seekers into account was restricted to the 
case of applicants who had been found to have special needs.21
particular dimension, see, among others, F. Ippolito, La vulnerabilità come criterio 
emergente per una maggiore tutela del migrante nel contesto internazionale, in G. 
Nesi (ed.), Migrazioni e diritto internazionale: verso il superamento dell’emergenza?, 
Napoli, 2017, 447 ss.
19 On the Common European Asylum System, see, among others, S. Marchisio, 
Rifugiati, profughi e altre esigenze di protezione nel diritto comunitario, in U. Leanza 
(ed.), Le migrazioni: una sfida per il diritto internazionale comunitario e interno, 
Napoli, 2005, 327 ss.
20 In this respect, see among others, European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE), The concept of vulnerability in European Asylum Procedures, in Asylum 
Information Database (AIDA), Available at: file:///D:/RESEARCH%20PAPER/
aida_vulnerability_in_asylum_procedures.pdf. Accessed August 3, 2018.
21 In this regard, see Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down 
minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, OJ 6 February 2003, L 31. 
In particular, Article 17 of the 2003 Reception Conditions Directive states that: «1. 
Member States shall take into account the specific situation of vulnerable persons such 
as minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, 
single parents with minor children and persons who have been subjected to torture, 
rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence, in the national 
legislation implementing the provisions of Chapter II relating to material reception 
conditions and health care. 2. Para. 1 shall apply only to persons found to have special 
needs after an individual evaluation of their situation». In the same line, see also Article 
13 of the Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for 
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on 
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such 
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In addition, in this first phase of CEAS, certain basic procedur-
al guarantees for particularly vulnerable applicants were still missing, 
with the only exception of unaccompanied minors, for whom Directive 
2005/85 provided, in Article 17, specific procedural guarantees on ac-
count of their vulnerability.
With the reform of EU primary law following the Lisbon Treaty, 
new rules on asylum and immigration were introduced, with an addi-
tional focus on vulnerable asylum seekers. This second phase of CEAS 
was characterized by the introduction of common rules in the fields of 
asylum, procedures, reception and qualifications of international pro-
tection and by the revision of existing directives.22
As for the development of this regulatory framework, one should 
recall that the Charter, in Article 18, guarantees the right to asylum 
with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention of 1951, and 
in accordance with the TUE and the TFUE. Furthermore, the Charter 
provides enhanced protection of the rights of vulnerable people, based 
on the principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in Arti-
cles 20 and 21. Equality and non-discrimination can be considered as a 
unique, comprehensive principle that underpins the protection offered 
by the Charter to some groups of vulnerable people, such as enshrined 
in Article 24 (protection of the rights of the child), Article 25 (protec-
tion of the rights of the elderly), Article 26 (principle of integration of 
persons with disabilities).23
With the second phase of harmonization of national legislations, 
the European asylum legal framework was strengthened with basic 
procedural guarantees for such asylum seekers who may be seen as 
persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ of 7 August 2001 L 212.
22 For a deep analysis on the EU legal framework in the field of asylum, see K. 
Hailbronner and D. Thym (eds.), EU Immigration andAsylum Law. Commentary, 
2nd edition, Portland, 2016; see also, among others, D. Acosta Arcarazo and C.C. 
Murphy (eds), EU Security and Justice Law. After Lisbon and Stockholm, Portland, 
2014; S. Marchisio, Article 10, in Codice dell’immigrazione e asilo, D. Manzione (ed.), 
Milano, 2017, 3 ss.; F. Cherubini, Asylum Law in the European Union, London-New 
York, 2015; L. Azoulai and K. de Vries (eds), EU Migration Law. Legal Complexities 
and Political Rationales, New York, 2014; E. Cannizzaro, L’armonizzazione delle 
politiche di asilo in sede comunitaria e la Convenzione di Ginevra sui rifugiati del 1951, 
in Rivista di diritto internazionale, 2001, 440 ss.; L. Manca, L’immigrazione nel diritto 
dell’Unione europea, Milano, 2003.
23 In this line, see R. Forastiero, The Charter of Fundamental Rights and the 
Protection of Vulnerable Groups: Children, Elderly People and Persons with Disabilities, 
ibid. footnote 17.
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particularly vulnerable. Directive 2013/32, whilst not providing a defi-
nition of ‘vulnerable asylum seekers’, introduces in Article 2, lett. d), 
a definition of “applicant in need of special procedural guarantees”, 
namely, an applicant whose ability to benefit from rights and comply 
with obligations is limited due to individual circumstances. Secondly, it 
places specific obligations on Member States to provide such applicants 
with adequate support, so that they may effectively access asylum pro-
cedures to submit their international protection application and exer-
cise their right to an effective remedy whenever required.
In particular, Article 24 of Directive 2013/32 requires that within a 
reasonable timeframe after an application is made, Member States must 
assess whether the applicant is in need of special procedural guarantees. 
Said norm establishes that Member States must ensure adequate sup-
port, in order to allow applicants in need of special procedural guaran-
tees to benefit from the rights and comply with the obligations provid-
ed by the Directive throughout the duration of the asylum procedure.
The broad wording of Article 24 includes, inter alia, persons with 
disabilities, who need both accessibility requirements and/or specific, 
reasonable procedural accommodation.24 In such regard, the CRPD,25 in 
Article 18 (Liberty of movement and nationality), provides that persons 
24 In this regard, see D. Ferri, The Role of the European Union in Protecting the 
Rights of Asylum Seekers with Disabilities, in S. Baldin and M. Zago (eds.), Europe 
of Migrations: Policies, Legal Issues and Experiences, Trieste, 2017, 89-106. Available 
at: https://www.openstarts.units.it/bitstream/10077/15216/1/BSA3_Europe_of_
Migrations_online.pdf. Accessed August 3, 2018. See also, C. Conte, What about 
Refugees with Disabilities? The Interplay between EU Asylum Law and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in European Journal of Migration 
and Law, 2016, 327ss.; C. Fahy, Disability and Asylum Law, 2015, available at: http://
www.refworld.org/pdfid/55362e2a4.pdf. Accessed August 3, 2018; M. Crock, Where 
Disability and Displacement Intersect: Asylum Seekers and Refugees with Disabilities, 
in International Journal of Refugee Law, 2013, 24 No. 4, 735-764. 
25 The CRPD and its Optional Protocol, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 
13 December 2006, were the first human rights treaty to which the EU (at time European 
Community) was directly involved in the negotiation process and has become a Contracting 
Party, alongside the EU Member States having ratified it. In fact, in virtue of the clause 
provided by Article 44, the UNCRPD was the first human rights treaty to be opened for 
signature by a Regional Integration Organization (RIO). For the EU, the Convention 
entered into force on 22 January 2011. Since then, it has become an integral part of EU law. In 
this respect, see, among others, R. Forastiero, Article 44 [Regional Integration Organization], 
ibid. footnote 5, 679-690. See also R. Forastiero, Articolo 44 [Organizzazioni d’integrazione 
regionale], in S. Marchisio, V. Della Fina, R. Cera, (eds.), La Convenzione delle Nazioni 
Unite sui diritti delle persone con disabilità. Commentario, Roma, 2010, 505-518.
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with disabilities must not be deprived, on the basis of their disability, 
“of their ability to obtain, possess and utilize documentation of their na-
tionality or other documentation of identification, or to utilize relevant 
processes such as immigration proceedings, that may be needed to facil-
itate exercise of the right to liberty of movement”.26 Said norm cannot 
be read in isolation. Accordingly, the scope of Article 18 of the CRPD 
is significant in light of the Article 13 of the CRPD, which places, as 
mentioned above, an obligation upon the States to guarantee effective 
access to justice for persons with disabilities and Article 5 concerning the 
obligation to provide reasonable accommodation to secure compliance 
with the principle of non-discrimination, but also Article 21 which rec-
ognizes the access to information and communication as a human right. 
In particular, reasonable accommodation is a crucial substantive equality 
measure since it serves as a facilitator for the exercise of rights by persons 
with disabilities, included also asylum seekers with disabilities.27
The Asylum Procedures Directive requires applicants to be in-
formed “in a language which they understand or are reasonably sup-
posed to understand” about asylum procedure. This means that appli-
cants with disabilities must be given information in accessible format 
appropriate to different kinds of disabilities, namely, sign language, 
braille and/or all other accessible formats of communication. With re-
gard to persons with disabilities, in particular for those with mental 
health issues who may not be able to participate effectively in the inter-
view, Article 14, para. 2, lett. b), of the Asylum Procedures Directive is 
especially relevant. In fact, under this provision the personal interview 
may be omitted where applicants are unfit or unable to be interviewed 
owing to circumstances that are long-lasting and beyond their control.
In turn, the Directive 2013/32 also requires Member States to pri-
oritise an examination of an application for international protection 
where the applicant is vulnerable28 and Article 15 invites them to take 
appropriate steps “to ensure that the person who conducts the inter-
view is competent to take account of the personal and general circum-
26 On Article 18 of the CRPD and the interaction of migration with disability, see 
R. Cera, Article 18 [Liberty of Movement and Nationality], ibid. footnote 5, 339-352.
27 See R. Cera, Article 5 [Equality and Non-Discrimination], ibid. footnote 5, 
157-174. See also, R. Kayess, P. French, Out of darkness into light? Introducing the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in Human Rights Law Review, 
8 (1), 2008, 1-34.
28 See Article 31, para. 7, lett. b, of the Directive 2013/32/EU.
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stances surrounding the application, including the applicant’s cultural 
origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity or vulnerability”. 
This is particularly important to ensure that the ‘right to be heard’ re-
mains effective for vulnerable asylum seekers.
Among the different vulnerable groups of applicants, the Procedures 
Directive places a special emphasis on minors: in fact, it includes a specif-
ic provision setting out the safeguards to be respected when dealing with 
unaccompanied children. These consist, in particular, in the appointment 
of a representative and the presence of such representative and/or legal 
advisor during personal interviews, and in restricting the use of medical 
examinations for the purpose of age assessment as a last resort only. The 
Directive also provides norms concerning the examination of applica-
tions of unaccompanied children in accelerated and border procedures.
Aside from unaccompanied children, the recast Asylum Procedures 
Directive only lists the factors that may indicate a need for special guar-
antees, namely age, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, disa-
bility, serious mental illness or the aftermath of torture, rape or other 
forms of serious psychological, physical or sexual violence. In fact, said 
Directive does not include an exhaustive list of asylum seekers pre-
sumed to be in need of special procedural guarantees.
Nevertheless, vulnerable persons are listed in Article 21 of Direc-
tive 2013/33/UE, the so-called ‘Reception Directive’,29 and in Article 3, 
para. 9, of Directive 2008/115/EC.30 Both EU legal instruments include 
“minors, unaccompanied minors, disabled people, elderly people, 
pregnant women, single parents with minor children and persons who 
have been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psycho-
logical, physical or sexual violence”. In addition, the reception directive 
includes victims of human trafficking, persons with serious illnesses, 
persons with mental disorders and victims of female genital mutilation.
While official statistics on the number of asylum applications based 
on sexual orientation or gender identity are still lacking, the persecu-
tion of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people is by no 
means a new phenomenon. Many asylum countries are aware that per-
29 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection, 
OJ of 29 September 2013, L 180.
30 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ of 24 December 2008, L 348.
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sons fleeing persecution due to their sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity can be granted refugee status under Article 1, lett. A, para. 
2, of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and/or its 1967 
Protocol.31 However, in this regard, it must be mentioned that LGBTI 
applicants are not listed among vulnerable persons as per Article 21 of 
Directive 2013/33.32 Therefore, it is worth stressing that such list is far 
from exhaustive and could be extended in the future to include further 
asylum seekers who may be considered especially vulnerable.
The conclusion above, moreover, is confirmed by the European Par-
liament’s position on the Commission’s 2016 ‘Proposal for the reform 
of the directive on reception conditions’ which contains an amendment 
providing for a larger list of vulnerable persons such as, among others, 
persons with post-traumatic stress disorders, LGBTI persons, non-be-
lievers, apostates and religious minorities.33
4. The Right to Effective Judicial Protection and the Concept of Vul-
nerability: the Contribution of the Case-Law of the European Court 
of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of EU
Having framed the regulatory developments at European level, let 
us briefly consider the major role played by the case-law of the ECtHR 
and the CJEU in reinforcing and increasing the protection of the rights 
of vulnerable asylum seekers. By interpreting and implementing the 
right to effective judicial protection and the concept of vulnerability, 
in fact, the ECtHR and the CJEU have extended and strengthened the 
31 For a deep analysis on the migration situation in the EU of LGBTI asylum 
seekers see European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Report of March 
2017, Current migration situation in the EU: Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and 
intersex asylum seekers. Available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/march-
monthly-migration-focus-lgbti. Accessed August 3, 2018.
32 The ‘Qualification Directive’ 2011/95/EU, in Article 10, explicitly refers to 
sexual orientation and gender identity as possible causes of persecution. According to 
the Directives 2013/32 and 2011/95, the competent authorities are bound to establish 
whether the circumstances ascertained represent a threat that would cause the interested 
person to be justifiably afraid of facing persecution in light of their individual situation. 
In this regard, see para. 72 of the Judgment of the CJEU 7 November 2013, Case C- 
199/12 and C-201/12, X and others. 
33 European Parliament, Report of 10 May 2017, On the Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council laying down Standards for the Reception 
of Applicants for International Protection (Recast), A8-0186/2017, Amendment No. 34.
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existing protection available to many categories of vulnerable asylum 
seekers, such as, inter alia, minors and LGBTI persons.
Firstly, one should consider the ECtHR case law, which, since its 
ruling M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece, has on a number of occasions re-
ferred to asylum seekers as members of a particularly underprivileged 
and vulnerable population group and, at the same time, has confirmed 
the particular vulnerability of certain categories of asylum seekers.34
In particular, the ECtHR adopted, among others, some important 
decisions relating to children, whereby it recognised their extreme vul-
nerability as a decisive factor that must take precedence over any con-
siderations regarding their legal status (or lack thereof).35
In that respect, the ECtHR has highlighted the need for strength-
ened procedural guarantees in order to enable minors, among others, to 
seek asylum, to obtain legal assistance, to be heard, and, more generally, 
to be able to exercise their right to an effective remedy, especially if 
they have been deprived of their personal liberty due to administrative 
detention.
The above considerations provide a context for the 2016 ECtHR 
judgment in the case Abdullahi Elmi and Aweys Abubakar v. Malta. 
This case concerned the detention of two asylum seekers in a Deten-
tion Centre in Malta for eight months, pending the outcome of age-as-
sessment procedures to determine whether they were minors. In this 
instance, medical examinations confirmed that both applicants were 
minors; however, after noting that the applicants’ situation of vulnera-
bility as minors must prevail over any considerations of their status as 
irregular migrants, the ECtHR ruled that their detention was inconsist-
ent with Article 3 of the ECHR. In particular, according to the Court, 
detention in this case was arbitrary and unlawful, and the two minors 
had not received adequate procedural guarantees, including proper in-
formation about the procedure followed and the possibility of appeal.
Similarly, in the judgment of 5 July 2016 on the case O.M. v. Hun-
gary,36 the ECtHR offered another occasion to reflect on the issue of 
34 See ECtHR (Grand Chamber), M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 
30696/09, Judgement of 21 January 2011, para. 263. 
35 Among others, see ECtHR, Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 29217/12, 
Judgment of 4 November 2014, para. 9; ECtHR, A.S. v. Switzerland, Appl. No. 
39350/13, Judgment of 30 June 2015, para. 29.
36 ECtHR (Fourth Section), O.M. v. Hungary, Appl. No. 9912/15, Judgment of 
5 July 2016.
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vulnerability in asylum cases. By this judgment, the Court considered 
an applicant’s sexual orientation to be a factor to be taken into account 
when assessing the legality of a detention measure. In particular, the 
ECtHR found that authorities should exercise particular care and as-
sess whether vulnerable applicants such as LGBTI persons were safe 
or not in custody where many of the detainees included persons from 
countries with widespread cultural or religious prejudice against such 
persons. Here too, the Court acknowledged the applicant as a member 
of a particular vulnerable group.
Closely linked with this ECtHR case-law is the ruling of the CJEU 
of 25 January 2018 in which the Court addressed the protection of vul-
nerable asylum seekers as well as the right to an effective remedy en-
shrined in Article 47 of the EUCFR.37
The reference for a preliminary ruling was based on the Decision 
by the Hungarian Immigration and Citizenship Office to reject the 
asylum application of a Nigerian citizen who claimed to have fled his 
country of origin because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted 
for his homosexuality. In particular, the rejection decision was based on 
a psychological assessment that the Hungarian authorities had ordered 
to ascertain the applicant’s sexual orientation. According to the appel-
lant, the psychological tests he had had to undergo in order to verify his 
credibility constituted a serious violation of his fundamental rights and 
were unsuitable to establish his true sexual orientation.
The reference for a preliminary ruling, therefore, hinged upon 
two points: a) how the national authorities are to verify the credi-
bility of the statements made by an asylum seeker who invokes, as 
a ground for granting asylum, a fear of being persecuted for reasons 
relating to his sexual orientation; and b) whether Article 4 of Direc-
tive 2011/95, interpreted in light of Article 1 ‘Human dignity’ of the 
Charter, precludes the use by those authorities of a psychologist’s 
expert opinion.
This said, in his Opinion delivered on 5 October 2017, the Advo-
cate General Nils Whal exhorted the Court to acknowledge that the 
Procedures Directive allows national authorities to consult experts on 
specific aspects such as gender and sexual orientation, if necessary, and 
to assess the credibility of the applicant in general. However, the ad-
missibility of psychological tests must be subject to the applicant’s con-
37 CJEU 25 January 2018, Case C-473/16, F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági 
Hivatal.
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sent and to the respect of his/her fundamental rights, such as dignity 
and the right to respect for private and family life.38
In that respect, it is worth pointing out that the CJEU had already 
previously made several pronouncements on the criteria to be followed 
in ascertaining the sexual orientation of asylum seekers, by inviting na-
tional courts to take particular care in such cases and to avoid the use 
of techniques that may be deemed invasive. The UNHCR also inter-
vened on this point, releasing in 2012 the ad hoc Guidelines concerning 
the claims to Refugee Status based on sexual orientation and/or gender 
identity within the context of Article 1A, para. 2, of the 1951 Conven-
tion and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees.
Moreover, the Advocate General also emphasized that: «Article 46 
of Directive 2013/32 – especially when interpreted in the light of Arti-
cle 47 of the Charter– thus requires national courts to be able to carry 
out an in-depth, independent and critical review of all relevant aspects 
of fact and law». That necessarily includes «the possibility of disregard-
ing the findings of experts – which constitutes a piece of evidence to be 
evaluated with the other evidence – which a judge may find, for exam-
ple, to be biased, unsubstantiated or based on controversial methods 
and theories». In particular, according to the Advocate General Whal, 
the national Courts «are to safeguard their own freedom of assessment 
in determining whether such proof has been made out to the requisite 
legal standard». Accordingly, the expert’s findings are not binding for 
national Courts in reviewing the decision on the application. This is 
because «the contrary position would essentially mean that the judge 
abdicates his role, rendering ineffective the guarantees expressly pro-
vided for in Article 46 of Directive 2013/32».39
This is a key point in the Advocate General’s Opinion, further 
confirmed by the CJEU judgment of 25 January 2018.40 In this ruling, 
CJEU adopted a similar approach by choosing the EUCFR as an in-
terpretative parameter. On this basis, it addressed the issues referred 
38 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl delivered on 5 October 2017, Case C- 
473/16, F v Bevándorlási és Állampolgársági Hivatal, paras. 39 ss.
39 Paras. 50-55, ibid. footnote 38.
40 For a comment on this CJEU judgment, see F. Ferri, Assessing Credibility 
of Asylum Seekers’ Statements on Sexual Orientation: Lights and Shadows of the 
F Judgment, in European Papers, 17 July 2018, 1 ss. Available at: http://www.
europeanpapers.eu/en/system/files/pdf_version/EP_EF_2018_I_022_Federico_
Ferri_2.pdf. Accessed August 28, 2018.
ROSITA FORASTIERO118
for a preliminary ruling by underlining that EU law «must be inter-
preted as meaning that it does not preclude the authority responsible 
for examining applications for international protection, or, where an 
action has been brought against a decision of that authority, the courts 
or tribunals seised, from ordering that an expert’s report be obtained 
in the context of the assessment of the facts and circumstances relating 
to the declared sexual orientation of an applicant, provided that the 
procedures for such a report are consistent with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, that that authority and those courts or tribunals do not base 
their decision solely on the conclusions of the expert’s report and that 
they are not bound by those conclusions when assessing the applicant’s 
statements relating to his sexual orientation».
5. Concluding Remarks
The Development of the asylum legal framework and the case-law 
of the ECtHR and the CJEU have, undoubtedly, increased and rein-
forced guarantees of protection for human rights of asylum seekers 
and, especially, of particularly vulnerable asylum seekers. In this re-
spect, it is worth noting that the CJEU judicial statistics for 2016 and 
2017 show that the field of ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’, which also 
includes ‘Immigration and Asylum’, represents one of the main areas 
of resolved dispute for the CJEU, and that, in this context, the impact 
of the reference to preliminary ruling provided by Article 267 of the 
TFEU is very high. It is known that the reference for a preliminary 
ruling is the instrument that best suits the unifying tendency of EU law, 
since it ensures a correct and uniform application of EU law across all 
Member States so that it has the same effectiveness everywhere. From 
this perspective, cooperation between the courts takes on particular 
importance as an indicator of the level of protection achieved for the 
fundamental rights of asylum seekers and refugees.
It is undeniable that the right to effective remedy, in light of cur-
rent EU asylum legal system (and particularly in light of the EUCFR’s 
application by the European courts’ case-law), constitutes a significant 
step towards achieving an optimal level of protection for asylum seek-
ers. However, there remain significant shortcomings, particularly with 
regard to asylum seekers who may be considered as especially vulner-
able.
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In that respect, as developed in the EU asylum aquis, ‘vulnerable 
asylum seeker with special needs’ is a complex and multifaceted con-
cept without a clear definition. This ambiguity is reflected in the system 
of procedural safeguards required to enable vulnerable asylum seekers 
to enjoy their rights and comply with their obligations in the asylum 
process. Effective implementation of the special procedural guarantees 
to vulnerable asylum seekers remains one of the most challenging as-
pects of the CEAS and a core feature of the ongoing reform of the EU 
asylum legal framework submitted by the EU Commission in 2016.
A further challenge is the need to streamline the early identification 
of vulnerable applicants. Some vulnerable persons with special needs 
are easy to identify, but there are some more complex needs, which are 
more difficult to identify, such as victims of torture or persons with 
mental illness. In this respect, overcoming the fragmentation of the EU 
legal framework for identifying vulnerable asylum seekers will be a 
crucial step to increase the protection of individuals who are at a disad-
vantage due to their particular physical, mental or other circumstances.
The asylum legal system of the EU is still evolving within a dynamic 
framework, in which one of the main points seems to be the ‘dialogue 
between courts’. This dialogue, although not always easy, represents an 
indispensable tool for bridging the remaining gaps and facilitating the 
evolution of the regulatory framework, so that Europe may develop a 
single regional model based upon a ‘truly common procedure for in-
ternational protection which is efficient, fair and balanced’, as the 2016 
draft regulation requires.
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1. Introduction: Two Years on from the Implementation of the EU-Tur-
key Statement: Short Overview of Developments and Changes in 
Asylum Procedures and the Current Migration Situation in Greece
The implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement produced sub-
stantial asylum reforms and policy changes. Over the past two years, 
continuous changes in asylum policy and in practices have called into 
question the extent to which the right to asylum – as enshrined in Ar-
ticle 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereinafter EUC-
* G. Spyropoulou is Lawyer, Researcher in the field of human rights.
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FR) and in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees – is 
guaranteed.
The asylum framework has undergone significant reforms, 
namely with regards to the examination of asylum applications 
on the Eastern Aegean islands. The adoption of Law 4375/2016 in 
April 2016 and its subsequent amendments in June 2016, March 
2017 and August 2017 constitute four changes in the Greek asylum 
framework within a period of two years. Law 4375/2016 and its 
amendments, besides transposing the Asylum Procedures Directive, 
has introduced, among other changes, a fast-track border procedure 
applied on the Eastern Aegean islands with the use of the safe third 
country concept, EASO’s involvement in the first and second in-
stance asylum procedure, and shorter time frames, and has altered 
the composition of the Appeals Committees.1 The majority of the 
aforementioned amendments have been challenged before the na-
tional and the European Courts.
Following implementation of the EU-Turkey Joint Statement of 
18 March 2016, the Hellenic Police and the Asylum Service started 
imposing geographical restrictions on the movement of all those en-
tering the country across the sea border without formal documents 
until completion of the asylum procedure or their removal from the 
country. The vast majority cannot leave the island they arrive at and 
remain there for several months up to more than a year under pre-
carious conditions in poorly-equipped, overcrowded facilities. Apart 
from the consequences this policy has on the asylum-seeking popu-
lation, it also leads to the disruption of social cohesion on the islands. 
Local societies are radicalizing against refugees. An increase in out-
breaks of racist attitudes has been recorded by the Racist Violence 
Recording Network in its Annual Report for 2017, which explicitly 
states that “The Network stresses the link between the rise in xeno-
1 Law 4375/2016 “on the Organization and functioning of the Asylum Service, 
Appeals Authority, Reception and Identification Service, establishment of General 
Secretariat for Reception, transposition of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council ‘on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection (recast)’ (OJ L 180/29.6.2013), provisions on employment 
of beneficiaries of international protection” and other provisions. Government 
Gazette 51/A/3-4-2016, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/573ad4cb4.
html [Amended by: Law 4399/2016, Government Gazette 117/A/22-6-2016, Law 
4461/2017, Government Gazette 38/A/28-3-2017 and by Law 4485/2017, Government 
Gazette 114/A/4-8-2017]
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phobic trends and racist behaviour and the overcrowding of refugees 
over a long period of time on the islands, as a result of the implemen-
tation of the EU-Turkey Statement’’.2
Despite the introduction of the state-run legal aid scheme at second 
instance, the number of lawyers and legal aid organizations operating on 
the islands remains insufficient to address the needs of applicants for in-
ternational protection. Furthermore, different practices are implemented 
from region to region, most commonly the islands and the mainland, but 
at times the implementation of certain policies differs even among the 
Aegean islands. This makes the already complicated asylum procedure 
extremely convoluted and has led to frustration and anxiety among the 
people of concern. It also fails to guarantee respect for the applicants’ 
rights.3
The changes in the composition of the Appeals Committees has 
been followed by a drop in recognition rates. In 2017, recognition rates 
remained low, far below the EU28 average: 1.84% were granted refu-
gee status, 0.99% subsidiary protection, 3.54% were referred for hu-
manitarian protection, and 93.63% were rejected.4
During these two years, detention has been re-introduced both on 
the islands and on the mainland. Third country nationals holding ‘low 
asylum recognition’ nationalities are detained upon arrival. This policy 
has increased the use of administrative detention.
In 2017, 29,718 persons arrived in Greece by sea, compared to 
173,450 sea arrivals in 2016; an 83% decrease compared to 2016. Most 
arrivals were on the islands of Lesvos (12,700), Chios (6,600), and 
Samos (5,600). Most arrivals by sea in Greece in 2017 originated from 
the Syrian Arab Republic (42%), Iraq (20%) and Afghanistan (12%). 
41% were men, 37% were children, out of which 13% were unaccom-
panied and separated children, and 22% were women.5 The Asylum 
Service registered 51,091 asylum applications in 2016 and 58,661 asy-
2 Racist Violence Recording Network, Annual Report 2017, Greece, available at: 
http://rvrn.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Report_2017eng.pdf
3 Joint Agency Briefing Paper: Transitioning to a government-run refugee and 
migrant response in Greece, December 2017, available at: https://rescue.app.box.
com/s/vzfrvau723mfq9nxei770w8w073z4gmb
4 AIDA Country Report Greece 2017, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.
org/reports/country/greece 
5 UNHCR, Greece – Sea arrivals dashboard, December 2017, available at: http://
bit.ly/2FmOjQD; UNHCR, Refugees and Migrants Arrivals to Europe in 2017, 
available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/62023
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lum applications in 2017. The number of applications submitted to the 
Asylum Service rose by 15%.6
This report provides a brief overview of the asylum reality in Greece 
two years on from the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement with 
regards to asylum procedures and the rights enshrined in the EUCFR. It 
highlights the asylum reforms that took place during the aforementioned 
period and the most persistent fundamental rights challenges.
2. Access to the Asylum Procedure
2.1. Developments and Challenges in Accessing Asylum Procedure
Accessing the asylum procedure has been a chronic challenge and 
despite the positive developments in recent years that challenge is still 
persistent. The Asylum Service registered 51,091 asylum applications 
in 2016 and 58,661 asylum applications in 2017. The number of appli-
cations submitted to the Asylum Service rose by 15%.7 The number 
of asylum applications both on the mainland and on the islands has 
consequently been disproportionate to the capacities of the adminis-
trative mechanism set up to handle it. Greece received 8.5% of the total 
number of applications submitted in the EU, while it was the country 
with the highest number of asylum seekers per capita among EU Mem-
ber States.8 It is worth mentioning that the Greek Asylum Service was 
established in June 2013 and does not have a long “institutional memo-
ry” of processing asylum applications, as do other EU Member States’ 
authorities, and in addition it faced staff shortages and administrative 
barriers due to the financial straits faced by the country. In the past 
two years the Service’s personnel have significantly increased in num-
ber and additional Regional Offices have been established. At the end 
of 2017, the Asylum Service operated at 22 locations throughout the 
country, compared to 17 locations at the end of 2016.9 However, exces-
6 AIDA Country Report Greece 2016 and 2017, available at: http://www.
asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece
7 AIDA Country Report Greece 2016 and 2017, available at: http://www.
asylumineurope.org/reports/country/greece
8 Eurostat, Asylum in the EU Member States, 47/2018, 20 March 2018, available 
at: https://bit.ly/2u9hZMU
9 Asylum Service, The work of the Asylum Service in 2017, Greece, 25 January 
2018, available at: http://bit.ly/2BsCDGd
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sive delays during the registration and examination of the asylum ap-
plications have been observed both on the mainland and on the islands.
With regards to access to the asylum procedure on the mainland, 
the option of submitting an asylum application by physically turn-
ing up at Regional Asylum Offices is extremely limited in practice, as 
the vast majority of applicants are referred to the problematic Skype 
procedure, which was launched by the Asylum Service in 2015.10 The 
Asylum Service launched, in 2015, the Skype procedure, as a technical 
solution for the issue of access to scheduling appointments to register 
asylum applications, prior to appearing before the Asylum Service; a 
procedure which is still implemented to this day. However, this system 
has exhibited shortcomings in practice as persons have reported un-
successful attempts to book an appointment via Skype. This is highly 
problematic since persons in need of international protection who do 
not manage to lodge their application are not protected from arrest, 
detention and deportation. As noted by UNHCR, the Skype appoint-
ment process “presents serious deficiencies due to limited capacity and 
availability of interpretation but also because applicants cannot always 
have access to the internet”.11
As underlined by the Greek Ombudsman in his special report “Mi-
gration flows and refugee protection: Administrative challenges and 
human rights issues”, this restrictive system for the receipt of asylum 
applications appears to be in contrast with the principle of universal, 
continuous and unhindered access to the asylum procedure, insofar as 
the system of registration via Skype cannot respond to a large number 
of calls. In addition, it poses risks for fundamental rights, because dur-
ing the period between the scheduling of registration via Skype and the 
final submission of the asylum application there is a very real risk of 
“potential asylum seekers” being arrested, detained or returned.12
In vulnerable, urgent cases, the Asylum Service implements a flexi-
ble system for registration and examination. The Asylum Service’s rel-
10 Aitima NGO, Asylum seekers on hold: Aspects of the asylum procedure 
in Greece, Greece April 2017, available at: http://www.aitima.gr/images/pdf/
onholdenglishreport.pdf
11 UNHCR, Explanatory Memorandum pertaining to UNHCR’s submission to the 
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on developments in the management 
of asylum and reception in Greece, May 2017, available at: http://bit.ly/2BbSrAA
12 Greek Ombudsman’s Special Report, Migration flows and refugee protection: 
Administrative challenges and human rights issues, Greece April 2017, available at: 
https://www.synigoros.gr/?i=human-rights.en.recentinterventions.434107 
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evant department accepts referrals from civil society organizations and 
usually registers the applicants within a period of 15-30 days.13
Following the closure of the Western Balkan route, the vast number 
of applicants for international protection in mainland Greece led to the 
Asylum Service being placed under significant pressure. Since it was 
practically impossible to register and examine all the applications in an 
appropriate manner, the Asylum Service launched the “pre-registration 
exercise”. From 8 June to 30 July 2016, the Asylum Service with the 
help of UNHCR and EASO pre-registered 27,592 applications which 
would later be fully registered.14 The pre-registration exercise granted 
applicants a card valid for one year, which constituted legal proof of 
residence in the country, and provided its holders with all the rights 
enjoyed by asylum seekers, apart from the right to employment. How-
ever, the significant delays to family reunification procedures under the 
Dublin provisions, as well as delays for eligible relocation applicants 
should be noted as drawbacks.15
The implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement also led to a sig-
nificant increase in persons who arrived on the Eastern Aegean islands 
after 20 March 2016, wishing to apply for asylum and remaining on the 
island of arrival under geographical restrictions. Following the adop-
tion of the EU-Turkey Statement, the registration and examination of 
asylum applications was prioritized based on nationality. More specif-
ically, the applications of Syrian nationals and nationals of countries 
with a low-recognition rate below 25% were prioritized, leading to a 
discriminatory practice which created tensions and insecurity between 
the third-country nationals’ communities. For an extensive period, 
persons belonging to nationalities other than the aforementioned have 
not had effective access to the asylum procedure, or have had access 
subject to undue delays, exceeding 6 months. However, as of 2017 the 
Asylum Service started registering and examining asylum applications 
for all nationalities.
13 Aitima NGO, Asylum seekers on hold: Aspects of the asylum procedure 
in Greece, Greece April 2017, available at: http://www.aitima.gr/images/pdf/
onholdenglishreport.pdf
14 Greek Asylum Service, Pre-registration data analysis 8 June-30 July 2016, 
available at: http://asylo.gov.gr/en/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Preregistration-
data_template_5_EN_EXTERNAL.pdf
15 AITIMA NGO, Asylum seekers on hold: Aspects of the asylum procedure 
in Greece, Greece April 2017, available at: http://www.aitima.gr/images/pdf/
onholdenglishreport.pdf
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2.2.  Fast-Track Border Procedure: Examination of Asylum Claims 
based on the Safe Third Country Concept
According to Article 60 (4) of Law 4375/2016, in case of third coun-
try nationals or stateless persons arriving in large numbers and applying 
for international protection at the border or at airport / port transit zones 
or while they remain in Reception and Identification Centres, a special 
border procedure is to apply by way of exception. Better known as the 
fast-track border procedure, it introduces significant changes to the bor-
der procedure. The registration of asylum applications, notification of 
decisions and other procedural documents, as well as receipt of appeals 
can now be done by staff of the Hellenic Police or the Armed Forc-
es. Interviews with asylum seekers may also be conducted by personnel 
deployed by EASO. Furthermore, extremely short deadlines apply; the 
asylum procedure is to be concluded in no more than 2 weeks.
The fast-track border procedure is applied to applicants subject to the 
EU-Turkey Statement, i.e. applicants arriving on the islands of the Eastern 
Aegean after 20 March 2016, and takes place in the Reception and Iden-
tification Centres (RIC), where hotspots are established (Lesvos, Chios, 
Samos, Leros, Kos) and before the Regional Asylum Office of Rhodes. 
Applications by Syrian asylum seekers are examined on their admissibility 
on the basis of the Safe Third Country concept. Applications by non-Syr-
ian asylum seekers from countries with a recognition rate below 25% are 
examined only on their merits. Applications by non-Syrian asylum seek-
ers from countries with a recognition rate over 25% are examined on both 
their admissibility and merits (“merged procedure”).16 Individuals falling 
under Articles 8 to 11 of Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the Parliament 
and the Council as well as vulnerable persons under Article 14(8) of Law 
4375/2016 are exempted from the procedures described above.
It is worth mentioning that the concept of the “safe third country” 
did not apply before the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement. 
The introduction and the implementation of the fast-track procedure 
-a measure that was initially established as exceptional- objectively 
demonstrates the intrinsic disparities and the inconsistencies that pre-
vail in the asylum procedure in Greece.
The impact of the EU-Turkey Statement has, inter alia, revealed 
a de facto dichotomy in the asylum procedures applied in Greece. To 
16 AIDA Country report Greece, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/
reports/country/greece
GEORGIA SPYROPOULOU128
this end, contrary to Articles 20 and 21 of the EUCFR, applications for 
international protection are examined differently based on a person’s 
nationality, date and place of entry into the territory.17
On September 2017, the Supreme Administrative Court of Greece, 
the Council of State in its Plenary Session issued two rulings concern-
ing applications for annulment brought by two Syrian nationals on the 
application of the safe third country concept in respect of Turkey.18 The 
applicants requested the annulment of regulatory and individual ad-
ministrative acts rejecting their applications for international protection 
without an examination on the merits, as the competent administrative 
authorities recognized that Turkey fulfils the requirements of a “safe 
third country” under Article 56 of Law 4375/2016 (Article 38 of Di-
rective 2013/32/EU). “Due to the importance of the issue concerned” 
the cases were referred to the plenary session of the Council of State by 
Judgments No. 445/2017 and 447/2017 of Chamber IV. The Council of 
State rejected the applications and agreed with the Independent Appeals 
Committee that the applicants’ claims were inadmissible based on the 
“safe third country” concept.19 It also refused by a narrow majority (13 
votes to 12) to refer a preliminary question to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) on the interpretation of Article 38 of the recast 
Asylum Procedures Directive, including the issue of the characteriza-
tion as a “safe third country” of a country that has ratified the Geneva 
Convention with a geographical limitation, and, instead, proceeded with 
the interpretation of the provision concerned. As stated by the National 
Commission for Human Rights, “despite the fact that the obligation to 
protect human rights must be fulfilled effectively in practice and not in 
theory, as well as the fact that domestic legislation is not in principle ca-
pable of ensuring adequate protection, as long as its effective application 
is not secured, the Court did not consider e.g. the fact that the exercise of 
the right to work of Syrian refugees who live in Turkey seems to be com-
pletely inadequate, because, according to credible statistical data, the per-
centage of Syrians who have acquired a work permit is extremely low”.20
17 The Fast-Track Border Procedure is only applied on people arriving on the 
Eastern Aegean islands and Rhodes. 
18 Greece, Council of State, Decisions 2347/2017 and 2348/2017 (Plenary Session), 
22 September 2017
19 Council of State, Decision 2347/2017, 22 September 2017, para 63
20 National Commission on Human Rights, Report on the condition of the reception 
and asylum system in Greece, 22 December 2017, available at: http://bit.ly/2nkf1P0
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The case of another Syrian applicant for international protection, 
whose application was rejected on the basis of an inadmissibility deci-
sion, is pending before the ECtHR. The case has been prioritized under 
Rule 41 of the Rules of the Court, to assess whether the applicant would 
face degrading treatment in the event of return to Turkey, particularly 
in relation to his ethnic origin, religion and state of health.21 The AIRE 
Centre (Advice on Individual Rights in Europe), DCR (Dutch Coun-
cil for Refugees), ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles) 
and ICJ (International Commission of Jurists), Gisti and the FIDH 
(International Federation for Human Rights) submitted Third Party 
Interventions on the case before the ECtHR.22
2.3.  The Issue of EASO Personnel Conducting Interviews at First Instance
Following the establishment of hotspots on the Eastern Aegean is-
lands and the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, EASO’s par-
ticipation, providing operational support to the Greek Asylum Service, 
significantly expanded. According to the EASO Special Operating Plan 
for Greece for 2017, which set out the conditions and terms for EASO’s 
participation in asylum procedures in Greece, EASO could be involved in 
conducting interviews in different asylum procedures, drafting opinions 
and recommending decisions to the Asylum Service throughout 2017.23
Since April 2016, EASO has been conducting admissibility inter-
views under the fast-track border procedure, initially only for Syrian 
nationals and subsequently for nationalities with recognition rates over 
25%, based on the Eurostat quarterly statistics. According to Article 
60(4)(b) of Law 4375/2016, as amended by Law 4399/2016, the asylum 
interview at first instance may be conducted by personnel made availa-
ble by EASO.24 EASO personnel are also conducting the vulnerability 
21 ECtHR, J.B. v. Greece, Appl. No 54796/16, Communicated on 18 May 2017, 
available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-174322%22]}
22 AIRE Centre, ECRE, ICJ and Dutch Council for Refugees, Third party 
intervention in J.B. v. Greece, 4 October 2017, available at: http://bit.ly/2qSRxoU; 
Gisti and FIDH, Third part intervention in J.B. v. Greece, 20 September 2017, available 
at: http://bit.ly/2DFZ0h8
23 EASO Special Operating Plan to Greece, December 2016, available at: https://
www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EASO%20Special%20Operating%20
Plan%20to%20Greece%202017_%2014122016.pdf
24 Law 4399/2016, Gazette 117/A/22-6-2016, available at: http://www.
asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/resources/n_4399.2016.pdf
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assessment, a procedure which covers the gap in unidentified vulnera-
bilities faced by asylum seekers, when they arise or when stated during 
the interview.
The role of EASO in the first instance asylum procedure has been 
highly criticized by legal aid organizations and academics, in particular 
as regards the lawfulness of its involvement and the quality of the sup-
port it has being providing. According to HIAS’ latest report on EA-
SO’s operations in Greece “EASO’s Operations in the Greek hotpots is 
going beyond the mandate envisaged in the founding regulation of the 
Agency and fails to meet core quality standards. (…) Furthermore, the 
significant shortcomings in the quality of the interviews and of the sub-
sequent Opinions, product of training, direct supervision and constant 
monitoring, raise serious concerns in relation to the Agency’s capacity 
to process applications for international protection, in respect of fairness 
and neutrality”.25 The experts deployed by EASO conduct the inter-
view and provide their recommendations to the Greek Asylum Service 
personnel. The Greek Asylum Service then issues its decision based on 
the recommendation provided. EASO deployed personnel conduct the 
interview and draft the recommendation in English. Holding the inter-
view in English makes it challenging for Greek lawyers to provide legal 
aid and represent the best interests of an asylum seeker in a language 
they are not native speakers of.
In Dr. Evangelia Tsourdi’s assessment of the agency’s level of in-
teraction with the Greek administration: “The administrative reality is 
that this moves beyond assisted processing, into the realm of joint pro-
cessing. That is to say, although the asylum decision-maker at first in-
stance according to both EU and national law is the Greek Asylum Ser-
vice, de facto this decision is based on a recommendation from, and facts 
ascertained during, an interview conducted by experts deployed by an 
EU agency. Hence, this is morphing de facto into a composite process”.26
In this regard, EASO’s participation in the first instance asylum pro-
cedure is under examination by the European Ombudsman, following 
25 HIAS Greece, EASO’s Operation on the Greek Hotspots An overlooked 
consequence of the EU-Turkey Deal, Greece March 2018, available at: https://www.
hias.org/sites/default/files/hias_greece_report_easo.pdf
26 Tsourdi, Bottom-up Salvation? From Practical Cooperation Towards Joint 
Implementation Through the European Asylum Support Office, 2016, available at: 
http://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/system/files/pdf_version/EP_eJ_2016_3_15_
Agenda_Evangelia_Lilian_Tsourdi.pdf
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a complaint submitted by the European Centre for Constitutional and 
Human Rights (ECCHR) with the support of Brot für die Welt in April 
2017. On 1 June the Ombudsman declared the complaint admissible.27 
The complaint argues that EASO’s role in the decision-making process 
amounts to maladministration and asks the European Ombudsman to 
open an inquiry. ECCHR requests the suspension of EASO’s involve-
ment in admissibility interviews and the limitation of its activities to 
conduct that is not in breach of EU law.
According to ECCHR’s analysis “EASO not only violates its own 
guidelines for conducting interviews, but its involvement in the proce-
dure goes beyond the scope of its powers under EU law. Consequently, 
applicants for international protection are deprived of a fair hearing and 
denied the chance to present and substantiate their asylum case”. The 
fact that the vulnerability assessment as well as the issuing of a rec-
ommendation towards the Greek Asylum Service is done by EASO 
personnel is not founded in any provision of Greek law and, therefore, 
lacks a legal basis.
2.4.  The Right to Legal Assistance, Legal Aid and Legal Representation 
in the First Instance Procedure
By law, legal assistance is only mandatory in the second instance asy-
lum procedure and there is no state-funded free legal aid programme. 
Only UNHCR and non-governmental organizations provide free legal 
assistance and counselling to asylum seekers at first instance. However, 
taking into consideration that some 50,000 third-country nationals re-
mained in Greece at the end of January 2018, while 36,340 first instance 
asylum applications and 7,481 appeals were pending at the end of 2017, 
the number of people of concern and their needs far exceed the capacities 
of NGOs, especially on the islands of the Eastern Aegean, where a great 
number of people remain subject to geographical restrictions.28
According to FRA’s recent publication “Migration to the EU: five 
persistent challenges”, there was a lack of legal information available to 




28 AIDA Country report Greece, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/
reports/country/greece
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asylum seekers in Greece, and in particular on the islands. Legal assis-
tance at first instance examinations of asylum requests was limited and 
provided exclusively by civil society organizations.29
The Greek Legal Aid Task Force consisting of 14 NGOs issued a 
policy paper on persisting challenges concerning legal assistance and 
legal aid in all aspects of the asylum procedure, and provided its rec-
ommendations. The Task Force states that the applicants are most often 
left to navigate the complicated asylum system themselves often with-
out sufficient information, while the provision of legal aid is patchy 
due to numerous administrative, legislative and practical obstacles.30
By January 2018, the Greek Council for Refugees, Ecumenical Ref-
ugee Programme and METAdrasi had provided legal assistance in the 
form of counselling and representation to nearly 11,450 asylum-seek-
ers and beneficiaries of international protection at hotspots, in urban 
areas as well as in detention. Legal aid covers asylum procedures, fami-
ly reunification, child protection, protection of SGBV survivors, other 
relevant administrative procedures and access to rights.31
2.5.  Imposition of Geographical Restrictions on the People Arriving on 
the Eastern Aegean Islands
Shortly after the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 came into 
effect, the Police and the Asylum Service started imposing restrictions 
on the movement of people arriving in the Greek territory through the 
blue borders. People who enter the country through the blue borders 
and apply for international protection on the Eastern Aegean islands 
(Samos, Lesvos, Chios, Kos) and Rhodes are subjected to restrictions 
on freedom of movement. The vast majority cannot leave the island of 
arrival. In that respect, they remain for anything from several months 
up to more than a year in precarious conditions in poorly-equipped, 
overcrowded spaces. In practice, geographical restrictions are imposed 
29 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Migration to the EU: five persistent 
challenges, February 2018, available at:http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/five-
persistent-migration-challenges
30 Legal Aid Actors Task Force, Legal Aid (Individual Legal Representation 
in Asylum/Refugee Context) for Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Greece: 
Challenges and Barriers, Greece January 2018, available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/
documents/download/61989
31 UNHCR, Greece Fact Sheet, 1-31 January 2018, available at: http://bit.
ly/2oAeQzB
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in the majority of cases, irrespective of the applicant’s vulnerability sta-
tus, even in cases where the conditions under Dublin III are fulfilled, 
i.e. even if the applicant has the right to family reunification.32
The decision33 which imposes geographical restrictions on a specific 
island is applied indiscriminately, without any prior individual assess-
ment or proportionality test. It is also imposed indefinitely, with no 
maximum time limit provided by law and with no effective remedy in 
place.34 Furthermore, when implemented en masse, this measure vio-
lates the principle of proportionality. The principle of proportionality 
is expressly enshrined in Article 25 (2) of the Greek Constitution, ac-
cording to which “Restrictions of any kind which, according to the Con-
stitution, may be imposed upon these rights, should be provided either 
directly by the Constitution or by statute, should a reservation exist in 
the latter’s favour, and should respect the principle of proportionality”.
According to Article 7 of Directive 2013/33/EU laying down the 
standards for the reception of applicants for international protection 
(recast) and concerning their residence and freedom of movement: “2. 
Member States may decide on the residence of the applicant for reasons 
of public interest, public order or, when necessary, for the swift process-
ing and effective monitoring of his or her application for international 
protection”. According to Article 41 of Law 4375/2016 which trans-
poses Article 12 of Directive 2013/33/EU, the applicant’s freedom of 
movement may be restricted to a part of the Greek territory following 
a Decision of the Director of the Asylum Service. On the basis of the 
above provision, the Director of the Asylum Service may impose a re-
striction on the movement of applicants for international protection in 
a particular part of the Greek territory. However, the Asylum Service is 
not the competent authority for maintaining the public order and im-
plementing these kind measures. In principle, the Asylum Service lacks 
specific authorization to issue such decisions.
32 MSF, A dramatic deterioration for asylum seekers on Lesvos, Greece July 2017, 
available at: http://bit.ly/2vCJzAF
33 10464/31-5-2017 (GG b 1977/7-6-2017) decision “Restriction of movement of 





34 AIDA Country report Greece, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/
reports/country/greece
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Given that the fundamental rights of liberty and security of persons 
and freedom of movement are enshrined in Articles 1 and 6 of the EU-
CFR, any restriction of these rights must be imposed after a necessity 
and proportionality evaluation of this restriction as to its purpose. In 
addition, Article 26 of the Geneva Convention provides for the free-
dom of movement and the right to choose the place of residence. Arti-
cle 31(2) of the Geneva Convention further provides that only specific 
restrictive measures can be imposed on asylum seekers.
National and international organizations have repeatedly urged the 
Greek authorities to end this policy and refrain from indiscriminately 
imposing this measure.35
However, as a result of the abysmal living conditions on the is-
lands, many asylum seekers ignore this policy and find irregular ways 
to reach the mainland, before receiving the decision on their asylum ap-
plication. After reaching the mainland any further access to the asylum 
procedure is denied. More specifically, if an applicant does not appear 
before the island’s Regional Asylum Office during the specified period 
with regards to the asylum procedure (i.e. registration, holding of the 
interview, card renewal), the asylum request case file is closed. In or-
der for the asylum application to be further considered, the applicant 
must return to the island of arrival at his/her own expense and contact 
the competent Regional Asylum Office. Remaining on the mainland 
means that the applicant has no access to the asylum procedure or to 
all the services and facilities provided for asylum seekers (housing, cash 
assistance, health aid). Moreover, people tend not to return to the island 
due to financial reasons or out of fear of arrest and prosecution under 
Article 182 of the Criminal Code, concerning non-compliance with re-
strictive measures.36
The Greek Council for Refugees and the Bar Associations of Lesvos, 
Rhodes, Chios, Leros, Kos and Samos have filed an application be-
35 Joint letter of 19 organizations to Greek Prime Minister concerning the 
conditions for asylum seekers on the Aegean islands, October 2017, available at: http://
www.hlhr.gr/en/joint-letter-19-organizations-greek-prime-minister-conditions-
asylum-seekers-aegean-islands/
36 This practice is reflected in the judgment No. 2627/2017 of the Thessaloniki 
Court of First Instance, which acquitted asylum seekers who violated the geographical 
restriction, claiming that their actions were not illegal, on the ground that the damage 
caused through this violation of the geographical restrictions was significantly inferior 
to what was at stake, i.e. their health and safety. More information available at: https://
www.solidaritynow.org/en/geographical_restrictions/
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fore the Council of State to annul the Asylum Service’s decision, which 
imposed restrictions on the movement of applicants for international 
protection on the islands of the Eastern Aegean.37 The application was 
examined on 27 February 2018 before the Council of State. The deci-
sion, which was issued on 17 April 2018, annulled the Asylum Service 
Director Decision which imposed the geographical restriction.38 The 
Court said that the Decision of the Asylum Service Director does not 
set out legal grounds for the imposition of restrictions on asylum seek-
ers’ freedom of movement, and deduced no serious reasons of public 
interest to justify the necessity of the restriction in accordance with Ar-
ticle 31(2) of the Geneva Convention. However, the ruling was issued 
without retroactive effect and does not apply to people who arrived on 
the islands prior to the decision. On 20 April 2018 the “newly appoint-
ed” Director of the Asylum Service issued a new decision reinstating 
geographical restrictions to newly arrived asylum seekers.39
3. The Right to an Effective Remedy
3.1.  Appeals Committee Composition: The Initial Composition and the 
Change through a Rapid Legal Amendment Following Implemen-
tation of the EU-Turkey Statement
The Appeals Authority was re-established by Law 4375/2016, after 
being inactive since September 2015. The Appeals Committees were 
competent to examine, decide upon and issue quasi-judicial decisions 
on appeals against decisions issued by the Asylum Service. The Com-
mittees fall under the Appeals Authority, an autonomous Service with-
in the Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction, report-
37 Greek Council for Refugees, Press release on the application for annulment 
regarding the geographical restriction on the Aegean islands (in Greek), October 2017, 
available at: http://gcr.gr/index.php/el/news/press-releases-announcements/item/741-
to-esp-katathetei-aitisi-akyrosis-tou-periorismoy-kykloforias-sta-nisia-tou-an-aigaiou.
38 Greece, Council of State Decision 805/2018, 18 April 2018.
39 Decision οικ. 8269/2018 of the Director of the Asylum Service on restriction 






ing directly to the Minister. The Committees were to be composed of 
holders of a university degree in Law, Political or Social Sciences or the 
Humanities with experience in the fields of international protection, 
human rights or international or administrative law.
In the meantime, transitional arrangements were introduced in Ar-
ticle 80(1) and (2) of Law 4375/2016, providing that until the new Ap-
peals Committees were set up, appeals submitted after the enactment 
of Law 4375/2016 would be examined by the previous Appeals Com-
mittees established under Presidential Decree 114/2010. The Appeals 
Committees established under Presidential Decree 114/2010 were, un-
til then, competent to examine appeals at second instance that were 
submitted to the police authorities, before the Asylum Service was 
established in 2013. The three-person Committees were comprised of 
one government representative acting as president, one representative 
appointed by the UNHCR and one human rights expert drawn from a 
list compiled by the National Commission for Human Rights.
Two months after the enactment of Law 4375/2016, which desig-
nated the Appeals Committees as competent to examine asylum appli-
cations at second instance, a fast-track amendment proposed modifica-
tions to the composition of these Committees. The new Committees 
were composed of two administrative judges and an appointed UN-
HCR representative. The amendment passed. However, it was severely 
criticized on the one hand due to its hasty introduction without prior 
consultation and on the other hand because it raised issues of compati-
bility with the Constitution, since it entailed the involvement of active 
judges in an administrative decision-making body. The Greek govern-
ment supported the reform on the basis that it reinforced independence 
and the right to an effective remedy, arguing that this brings the asylum 
procedure at second instance closer to European safeguards. The Inde-
pendent Appeals Committees are today the body competent to exam-
ine appeals against first instance decisions issued by the Greek Asylum 
Service. The Independent Appeals Committees are composed of two 
judges serving in the administrative courts, appointed by the General 
Commissioner of the Administrative Courts, and one UNHCR repre-
sentative. A representative from a list compiled by the National Com-
mission for Human Rights may take part in the Committees if UN-
HCR is not in a position to appoint a member.40
40 Article 5(3) of Law 4375/2016, as amended by Article 86( 3) of Law 4399/2016.
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The speed with which the change in the composition of these Com-
mittees was proposed and executed provoked reactions from legal or-
ganizations and civil society. The National Commission for Human 
Rights, the independent advisory body of the Greek State on matters 
of protecting rights issued a public statement questioning the consti-
tutionality of the new composition of the Independent Appeals Com-
mittees.41 The Commission also expressed its grave concerns about the 
fact that the amendments to Law 4375/2016 on the composition of the 
Committees coincided with the issuance of positive decisions of the 
Appeal Committees under Presidential Decree 114/2010, where, after 
individual examination, it was ruled that Turkey was not a safe coun-
try for the respective applicants.42 It is worth noting that 18 members 
of the Appeals Committees under Presidential Decree 114/2010 com-
plained in a written statement that attempts have been made to interfere 
with the independence of the Appeals Committees.43
The amendments to the composition of the Appeals Committees 
were contested before the Council of State regarding their constitu-
tionality. The Group of Lawyers for the Rights of Migrants and Refu-
gees and the Greek Council for Refugees submitted two applications 
for annulment, on the basis of the constitutional ban on the partic-
ipation of judges in administrative bodies. The specific provision of 
the Constitution contained in Article 89(3) ensures the functional and 
personal independence of judges. In addition, the organizations argued 
that the same administrative judges who decide on the appeal commit-
tees are also sitting in the Administrative Appeals Courts that review 
those rulings, which raise issues of independence and impartiality in 
the administrative courts themselves.44
41 National Commission for Human Rights, Public Statement on the amendment 
modifying the composition of the Independent Appeals Committees, 17 June 2016 
(in Greek), available at:http://nchr.gr/images/pdf/apofaseis/prosfuges_metanastes/
Dimosia%20dilwsi%20EEDA.pdf
42 EDAL, Greece: The Appeals Committee issues decisions on Turkey as a Safe 
Third Country, Information available at: http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/
content/greece-appeals-committee-issues-decisions-turkey-safe-third-country
43 Press Project, Letter of members of the Appeals Committees, 18 June 2016, available in 
Greek: https://www.thepressproject.gr/article/96546/Epistoli-melon-Epitropis-Prosfugon
44 Group of Lawyers for the Rights of Migrants, Press Release on the application for 
annulment before the Council of State concerning the composition of the Independent 
Appeals Authorities, available at: http://omadadikigorwn.blogspot.gr/2016/09/blog-
post.html#more
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Judgments No. 1237 and 1238/2017 of the Plenary of the Council 
of the State ruled that the establishment and composition of the Inde-
pendent Appeals Committees is constitutional. The court also found 
that the fact that judges participating in these committees may later sit 
in administrative courts of appeal does not violate the principle of im-
partiality. It also ruled that the provision allowing judges participating 
in these committees to be selected by the General Commissioner of 
the Administrative Courts instead of by the judicial council does not 
violate Article 90 of the Constitution.45
The Plenary of the Council of State, in judgments No. 2347/2017 
and 2348/2017, concluded on the issue of the compatibility to the Con-
stitution, that the Independent Appeals Committees constitute a judicial 
body within the meaning of Article 86(2) of the Constitution; choosing 
not to apply its previous well-established relevant case law, according 
to which these Committees do not constitute a judicial body, given the 
fact that they decide administrative recourses against administrative acts 
without elements similar to the performance of a judicial task or exercise 
of competence of a judicial body, such as the publicity of the hearings 
and the obligation to guarantee adversarial proceedings.46
3.2. The Right to a Personal Interview
An applicant’s right to be heard is a basic procedural safeguard, as it 
secures the effective protection of the right to asylum and the prohibi-
tion of refoulement. It allows the applicant the possibility of a detailed 
presentation of the case and his motivation for seeking international 
protection before the adoption of any decision liable to adversely affect 
his interests.
Since the establishment of the Appeals Committees under Presi-
dential Decree 114/2010, the examination procedure for asylum appli-
cations at second instance has been gradually transformed from an oral 
into a written one, allowing for the possibility of an oral examination 
only under exceptional circumstances. The reform of Law 4375/2016 
by the provisions introduced by Law 4399/2016, with regards to the 
45 https://www.lawspot.gr/nomika-nea/symfoni-me-syntagma-i-symmetohi-
dikaston-stis-anexartites-epitropes-prosfygon-ste-olom
46 National Commission for Human Rights, Report on the condition of reception 
and asylum system in Greece, December 2017, available at: http://www.nchr.gr/
images/English_Site/PROSFYGES/GNCHR_Report_Asylum_system_final.pdf
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composition of the Independent Appeals Authorities further narrowed 
the right of the appellant to an oral hearing before the Appeals Com-
mittees. The amendment has removed the option for the appellant to 
request a personal hearing before the Appeals Committees at least two 
days before the appeal. The appellant may appear personally before 
the Committees only if the latter deem it appropriate. The National 
Commission for Human Rights questioned the constitutionality of the 
new composition of the Appeals Committees and whether the new law 
complied with the right to an effective remedy, arguing that removing 
the possibility for the appellant to request a personal hearing before the 
Appeals Committees is a disproportionate restriction of the right to be 
heard, which is not justified by any specific overriding reason.47
According to Article 62(1) Law 4375/2016 the procedure before 
the Independent Appeals Committees is written and the appeal is dis-
cussed by the Committees based on the information in the case file. 
The Independent Appeals Committee calls for an oral hearing with the 
applicant when: a. the appeal concerns the revocation of international 
protection status, b. questions or doubts have been raised about the 
comprehensiveness of the interview held during the first instance ex-
amination, c. the applicant submitted significant new facts, d. the case 
is very complicated.
Taking into account the fact that the legal assistance provided dur-
ing the first instance examination of the asylum application is extreme-
ly limited, combined with a complicated procedure such as the fast-
track border procedure for the people applying on the islands, and the 
non-existent right to request an oral hearing, their right to an effective 
remedy is minimized.
The Plenary of the Council of State in judgment No. 2347/2017 ex-
amined and dismissed the possible violation of the right to be heard and 
the right to an effective remedy, on the ground that the obligation to 
hear the appellant under Article 14(1) of the recast Asylum Procedures 
Directive binds the competent asylum authority at first instance but 
does not apply to appeal procedures. The Court added that Article 46 
of the recast Asylum Procedures Directive, read in the light of Article 
47 of the EUCFR, does not preclude a court or tribunal from reject-
47 National Commission for Human Rights, Public Statement on the amendment 
modifying the composition of the Independent Appeals Committees, 17 June 2016 
(in Greek) available at: http://nchr.gr/images/pdf/apofaseis/prosfuges_metanastes/
Dimosia%20dilwsi%20EEDA.pdf
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ing an application as inadmissible at second instance without hearing 
the appellant, when the facts leave no doubt as to the fair nature of 
the first instance decision, on condition: (a) that the appellant has had 
the opportunity of a personal interview at first instance and that the 
transcript of that interview is included in the case file on the one hand; 
and (b) that the authority may request a hearing if deemed necessary to 
exercise its functions.
In any case, even if the appellant had the right to a personal inter-
view at second instance, its implementation would be extremely difficult 
for asylum applicants residing on the Eastern Aegean islands, since the 
Appeals Committees are located solely in Athens and the appellants are 
restricted from leaving the island of arrival due to the imposition of ge-
ographical restrictions. In this case, the oral interview could only take 
place through teleconference. In conclusion, the transformation of the 
second instance procedure into a written one does not provide the nec-
essary guarantees for an in-depth assessment, in light of the abovemen-
tioned quality issues arising with regards to the first instance procedure.
3.3.  The Right to Legal Assistance, Legal Aid and Legal Representation 
in the Second Instance Procedure
There is a lack of legal information provided to asylum seekers 
in Greece, particularly on the islands.48 According to a Joint Agency 
Briefing Note by IRC, OXFAM and NRC, access to reliable informa-
tion is extremely limited and the few lawyers who are available to sup-
port them have an excessive case load, while legal advice in the second 
instance procedure, at the appeal stage, is often provided too late.49
With regards to the provision of legal aid, since the procedure is, 
in principle, in writing, legal aid provision is required in order to pre-
pare the appeal document per se and submit the necessary documents 
that will include the reasons for appealing the negative decision and 
the shortcomings of the procedure, in order to utilize the right to an 
effective remedy successfully, there must be effective access to a lawyer.
48 AITIMA NGO, Asylum seekers on hold: Aspects of the asylum procedure 
in Greece, Greece April 2017, available at: http://www.aitima.gr/images/pdf/
onholdenglishreport.pdf
49 Joint Agency Briefing Note, March 2017, available at: https://www.rescue-uk.
org/sites/default/files/document/1359/jointagencybriefingnote-eu-turkeystatement-
final16march-newtitle.pdf
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Article 44(2) of Law 4375/2016, which transposes Articles 19 and 
24 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (Recast), provides that “in pro-
cedures before the Appeals Authority, applicants shall be provided with 
free legal assistance”. The Ministerial Decision establishing free legal 
assistance in the second instance asylum procedure and outlining its 
modalities was issued on September 2016.50
Free legal assistance is available to applicants who appeal before the 
Appeals Committees against a negative decision on their asylum claim. 
According to the Ministerial Decision, the fee for providing legal aid to 
applicants for international protection is set at €80 per appeal. Time lim-
its for requesting free legal assistance differ based on which procedure 
appellants fall under. In particular, asylum seekers whose asylum appli-
cation is examined based on the regular procedure may request free legal 
assistance at least 10 days before the examination of their appeal; asylum 
seekers who fall under the accelerated procedure may request free legal 
assistance at least 5 days before the examination of the appeal and asylum 
seekers/appellants in the Reception and Identification Centres may re-
quest free legal assistance at the time they lodge the appeal. A registry of 
legal practitioners has been established by the Asylum Service.
Prior to the entry into force of the free legal aid scheme, a UNHCR 
project was implemented and is being continued by the Greek legal 
aid organizations Metadrasi and Greek Council for Refugees. Legal 
assistance at the appeal stage of the asylum procedure in the context 
of UNHCR’s Memorandum of Cooperation with the Ministry of Mi-
gration Policy was provided to 3,600 appellants in 2017.51 Additional 
programmes from other NGOs were also providing free legal assis-
tance. According to the Greek Legal Aid Task Force policy brief on 
challenges and barriers related to legal aid for migrants, refugees and 
asylum seekers in Greece, the state-run legal aid scheme does not cover 
the population in need of legal assistance in the second instance asylum 
procedure.52 The state-run legal aid scheme only started operating on 
50 Ministerial Decision 12205/2016 on provision of legal assistance to applicants 
for international protection, Government Gazette 2864/B/9-9-2016, available at: 
http://asylo.gov.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/apofasi-12205-9.9.16-FEK-2864.pdf
51 UNHCR, Fact Sheet, 1-31January 2018, available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/62216.pdf
52 Legal Aid Task Force policy brief on challenges and barriers related to legal aid 
for migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Greece, available at: http://www.hlhr.gr/
en/joint-announcement-legal-aid-migrants-asylum-seekers-refugees-greece/
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21 September 2017 and consists of a total of 21 lawyers. By the end of 
2017 legal assistance had been provided to 941 appellants, while the 
total number of appeals lodged in 2017 was 11,632.53
The situation is even more challenging for the asylum seekers on 
the islands who are faced with complex administrative procedures. The 
number of lawyers and legal aid organizations operating on the islands 
remains insufficient to address the needs of asylum seekers. Lawyers 
on the islands mostly take on the cases of vulnerable people and un-
accompanied minors based on their capacity. People in detention have 
even more difficulty accessing information about their rights and legal 
assistance.
3.4. Restrictions on the Right to Lodge an Appeal
In April 2017, in an attempt to limit the number of people who 
appeal and scale up the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration 
(AVRR) programme on the islands, the Ministry of Migration Poli-
cy announced a significant change in practice concerning the right of 
asylum seekers to take part in IOM’s programme after lodging an ap-
peal. The decision followed the direction set by the recommendations 
in the European Commission’s and Greek Government’s Joint Action 
Plan on the EU – Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 with regards to 
scaling up the Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) 
programme on the islands.54
This practice foresees that after receiving a negative first instance 
decision, asylum seekers are given two options: either make use of their 
right to appeal within 5 days or waive their right to appeal and partici-
pate in IOM’s AVRR programme. If they choose to appeal the negative 
first instance decision, they lose the opportunity to take part in the 
AVRR programme if their appeal is rejected, while if they choose to 
participate in the AVRR programme they are forced to forego their 
right to appeal. This procedure is implemented only on the five Eastern 
Aegean islands.
53 Greek Asylum Service data, available at: https://www.facebook.com/ 
481351218685655/photos/a.578873295600113.1073741828.481351218685655/ 
951615948325844/?type=3&theater.
54 Joint action plan on the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/december2016-action-
plan-migration-crisis-management_en.pdf
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IOM’s AVRR programme provides migrants who cannot or no 
longer wish to remain in a host country with the support to return and 
reintegrate into their country of origin. According to IOM, “The de-
cision about returning back home is 100% voluntary and based on the 
migrant’s request. A voluntary decision encompasses two elements, free-
dom of choice and an informed decision which requires the availability 
of enough accurate and objective information upon which to base the 
decision”.55 However, given the practice of losing the possibility to par-
ticipate in the programme, should the applicant choose to exercise their 
right to an appeal, 15 NGOs criticized this policy for having a coer-
cive effect on an asylum seeker’s decision to appeal a negative decision, 
thereby jeopardizing the right to a fair asylum process as provided by 
EU law, and also on their decision to return to their country of origin.56 
The right to an effective remedy and fair trial implies that access to 
the appeal should not be made impossible or very difficult as a result 
of national procedural rules or practices as is the case with the ban on 
participating in the AVRR programme. The right to an appeal should 
be exercised without preconditions of exclusion. Besides undermining 
the voluntary character of IOM’s programme, implementation of this 
policy undermines the right to an effective remedy provided by Article 
47 of the Charter.
4. Procedural Guarantees
4.1. Duration and Time-Limits in the Asylum Procedure
Lengthy asylum procedures could violate the EU principle of good 
administration guaranteed by Article 41 of the Charter, as they may 
result in a long period of uncertainty for applicants in relation to their 
legal position. Without underestimating the disproportionately large 
number of asylum applications that the Greek Asylum Service is re-
sponsible for processing, submitted both on the islands and on the 
55 IOM, Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programs (AVRR), 
information available at: https://greece.iom.int/en/assisted-voluntary-return-and-
reintegration-programs-avrr
56 15 NGOs Decry New Policy Limiting Asylum Seekers in Exercising their Right 
to Appeal, May 2017, statement available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/09/
greece-ngos-decry-policy-limiting-asylum-appeal-rights
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mainland, the duration of the asylum procedure can be characterized 
lengthy especially for the applicants that lodge their claim on the main-
land. The average processing time at first instance is reported to be at 
about 6 months as of December 2017. According to the AIDA Coun-
try Report for Greece the average actual duration of the first instance 
procedure is longer if the time period of 81 days between pre-regis-
tration and registration of the application is taken into consideration. 
4,052 applications were pending for a period exceeding one year at the 
end of December 2017.57 Taking into account that the highest number58 
of registered first-time applicants in 2017 relative to the population of 
each Member State was recorded in Greece (5,295 first-time applicants 
per million of population) and the fact that personal interview appoint-
ments on the mainland are scheduled approximately one year or more 
after full registration of the application, the number of pending appli-
cations is likely to create a significant backlog.59 However, the duration 
of the asylum procedure on the islands is more timely. According to 
the Asylum Service’s data, the average time for the processing of asy-
lum applications at first instance on the five islands, for the month of 
November 2017, stood at 72 days.60
Short time limits for lodging an appeal against a negative asylum de-
cision may undermine an applicant’s ability to substantiate his asylum 
claim and, therefore, enjoy effective protection of the EU right to asy-
lum and the EU prohibition of refoulement. Moreover, short time-lim-
its may render access to an effective remedy very difficult or impossi-
ble. This may lead to a violation of the EU right to an effective remedy 
guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter.61 Time limits for lodging an 
appeal against a negative decision must be sufficient in practical terms 
to enable the applicant to prepare and bring an effective action. The 
57 AIDA Country Report Greece, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/
reports/country/greece 
58 Eurostat, ‘Asylum in the EU Member States’, 47/2018, 20 March 2018, available 
at: https://bit.ly/2u9hZMU 
59 AITIMA, Press Release, Greece: Persisting problems in the asylum procedure, 
April 2018, available at: http://www.aitima.gr/images/pdf/pressrelease16.04.2018.pdf
60 Greek Asylum Service, Press Release, December 2017, available at: http://asylo.
gov.gr/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Press-Release-13122017.pdf
61 ECRE, The application of the EUCFR to asylum procedural law, October 
2014, available at: https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/EN-The-
application-of-the-EU-Charter-of-Fundamental-Rights-to-asylum-procedures-
ECRE-and-Dutch-Council-for-Refugees-October-2014.pdf
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deadline for submitting an appeal against a negative first instance deci-
sion of the Asylum Service differs depending on the procedure under 
which the asylum application is examined. An appeal must be lodged 
within 30 days in the regular procedure, 15 days in the accelerated pro-
cedure, in case of an inadmissibility decision or where the applicant 
is detained, and 5 days in the border procedure and fast-track border 
procedure. Law 4375/2016 has introduced extremely short deadlines 
in particular in the border and the fast-track procedure.62 It is critical 
to note that asylum seekers have access to free legal aid only in the 
second instance asylum procedure. To this end, people whose asylum 
applications are being examined under the border and, especially, under 
the fast-track border procedure, which is implemented on the Eastern 
Aegean islands and Rhodes, face challenges in exercising the right to an 
effective remedy.
4.2. Detention of Asylum Seekers
According to Article 46 of Law 4375/2016, an alien or stateless per-
son who applies for international protection shall not be held in deten-
tion for the sole reason that he/she has submitted an application for in-
ternational protection, and that he/she entered irregularly and/or stays 
in the country without a legal residence permit. An alien or a stateless 
person who submits an application for international protection while 
in detention for the purpose of removal shall remain in detention, ex-
ceptionally and if this is considered necessary after an individual assess-
ment on condition that no alternative measures exist. A new detention 
order shall be issued following an individualized assessment to estab-
lish whether detention can be ordered on grounds provided for within 
the asylum legal framework.
The law prohibits the detention of asylum seekers who apply while 
at liberty. However, asylum seekers are also detained on grounds of 
public order or national security, even if they were not in pre-removal 
62 Law 4375/2016 on the Organization and functioning of the Asylum Service, 
Appeals Authority, Reception and Identification Service, establishment of General 
Secretariat for Reception, transposition of Directive 2013/32/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council ‘on common procedures for granting and withdrawing 
international protection (recast)’ (OJ L 180/29.6.2013), provisions on employment of 
beneficiaries of international protection” and other provisions. Government Gazette 
51/A/3-4-2016, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/573ad4cb4.html
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detention at the time when they first lodged their application, in con-
travention of the law. In practice, applicants arrested within the context 
of the criminal procedure, even if accused of minor offences for which 
the Criminal Court does not impose pre-trial detention or after custo-
dial sentences have been suspended, are detained under Article 46 of 
Law 4375/2016 on public order or national security grounds.63
According to Article 6 of the EUCFR, everyone has the right to 
liberty and security of person. While EU Member States can detain 
asylum seekers and returnees under certain circumstances, they need to 
respect their fundamental rights and the safeguards provided for in the 
EU asylum acquis.64 The implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement 
increased the use of detention on the Eastern Aegean islands and the 
mainland. 9,534 asylum seekers were detained in 2017 in pre-removal 
centres compared to 4,072 in 2016. According to the AIDA Country 
Report for Greece, asylum seekers who are apprehended outside the is-
land to which they have been geographically restricted are immediately 
detained in order to be returned to that island. This detention is ap-
plied without any individual assessment and without the person’s legal 
status and any potential vulnerabilities being taken into consideration. 
In 2017, a total of 1,197 persons were returned to the Eastern Aegean 
islands after being apprehended outside their assigned island.65
Based on the Joint Action Plan on the implementation of the 
EU-Turkey Statement, in order to increase detention capacity, two 
pre-removal detention centres started operating on Lesvos and on Kos. 
Another one was established on Samos in June 2017 but has not yet be-
come operational.66 Substandard living conditions continue to prevail 
in several detention centres. Conditions in the pre-removal detention 
facilities located in Western Greece are inadequate. Monitoring reports 
by the Greek Council for Refugees reveal particularly serious over-
crowding, a lack of natural light, substandard hygiene conditions, and 
63 AIDA Country Report Greece, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/
reports/country/greece
64 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Migration to the EU: five persistent 
challenges, February 2018, available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/five-
persistent-migration-challenges
65 AIDA Country Report Greece, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/
reports/country/greece
66 Joint action plan on the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement, available 
at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/december2016-action-
plan-migration-crisis-management_en.pdf
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limitations on the time detainees can spend outdoors.67 The state of 
detention facilities on the islands is equally concerning and poses seri-
ous concerns in relation to the respect of human dignity as enshrined 
in Article 1 of the Charter. In a report on its April and July 2016 vis-
its to Greece, published in September 2017, the Council of Europe’s 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) raised concerns over the situation in 
the “hotspots” on the Aegean islands and the detention facilities on 
the mainland and the islands. The CPT considers that conditions are 
unacceptable and, in the CPT’s view, could be considered as inhuman 
and degrading.68
4.3. The Delays in the Dublin Procedures and the Right to Family Unity
Serious delays appeared to have been noted in Dublin procedures, 
while the waiting time is significant. In the majority of cases the Greek 
Dublin Unit reaches the maximum time limit to send the take-charge 
requests to the other EU countries. The average duration of the trans-
fer procedure, after a Member State had accepted responsibility, was 
approximately 5-6 months in 2017.69 In March 2017, an agreement be-
tween the German and the Greek Government reportedly led to the 
introduction of a monthly limit on the number of people transferred to 
Germany under the Dublin Regulation. The cap has been set at 70 peo-
ple per month. The limitation to 70 people per month set by German 
authorities has resulted in the systematic expiration of the 6-month 
deadline for the transfer of many applicants.70 The agreement reached 
67 NGO Greek Council for Refugees, The Greek Council for Refugees identifies 
adverse detention conditions in Western Greece press release, 31 October 2017, 
available in Greek at: http://gcr.gr/index.php/el/news/press-releases-announcements/
item/743-to-esp-diapistonei-dysmeneis-synthikes-kratisis-sti-dytiki-ellada
68 Greece, Council of Europe, Report to the Greek Government on the visits to 
Greece carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), September 2017, available at: 
https://rm.coe.int/pdf/168074f85d
69 AIDA Country Report Greece, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/
reports/country/greece




the media in May 2017.71 Following publication, 27 civil society organ-
izations sent an open letter to the European Commission on 27 July 
2017 to express their concerns that “the arrangement agreed between 
Germany and Greece on the implementation of family reunification of 
asylum seekers introducing quantitative criteria (maximum number per 
month) is in flagrant violation of international, EU and national leg-
islation establishing the principle of family unity and the best interests 
of the child and in particular Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which protects the right to family life, Article 10 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as Article 7 of the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights”.72
Dublin transfers to Greece from other Member States have been 
suspended since 2011 following two judgments: the M.S.S. v. Belgium 
& Greece ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
and Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department ruling of the CJEU, which identified systemic 
deficiencies in the Greek asylum system.73 In December 2016, in its 
Fourth Recommendation the European Commission noted that sig-
nificant progress has been achieved by Greece in putting in place the 
essential institutional and legal structures for a properly functioning 
asylum system and recommended the gradual resumption of Dublin 
returns to Greece. The Commission noted that with Dublin transfers 
suspended, there is an incentive for asylum seekers who arrive irregu-
larly in Greece to seek to move irregularly on to other Member States 
(known as ‘secondary movements’), in the knowledge they will not 
be sent back to Greece.74 The resumption of transfers will not have a 
retroactive effect and will only concern asylum applicants who have 
entered Greece irregularly from 15 March 2017 onwards or for whom 
Greece is responsible from 15 March onwards under other Dublin cri-
71 ECRE, Greece/ Germany: Cap on transfers under Dublin family provisions, 
Information available at: https://www.ecre.org/greece-germany-cap-on-transfers-
under-dublin-family-provisions/
72 27 civil society organizations’ open Letter, July 2017, available at: https://www.
proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/2_Open-letter-NGO_260717.pdf
73 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Appl. No. 30696/09, Judgment of 21 
January 2011; CJEU 21 December 2011, Joined Cases 411/10 and 493/10, N.S. v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department.
74 European Commission-Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers: Recommendation 
on the conditions for resuming Dublin transfers of asylum seekers to Greece, available 
at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4253_en.htm
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teria.75 Persons belonging to vulnerable groups such as unaccompanied 
children are to be excluded from Dublin transfers for the moment. The 
Recommendation on the resumption of Dublin transfers has been crit-
icized by numerous civil society organizations.76
During 2017, the Greek Dublin Unit received 1,998 incoming re-
quests under the Dublin Regulation, mainly from Germany. A total of 
1,489 incoming requests were refused. Only 1 person has been trans-
ferred back to Greece from Switzerland; that took place on 18 Decem-
ber 2017, while another was transferred from Germany on 1 February 
2018. Greece received 8.5% of the total number of asylum seekers in 
the EU, while it had the largest number of asylum seekers per capita. 
To this end, the gradual resumption of Dublin transfers will undoubt-
edly add more pressure on the Greek asylum system. It is worth men-
tioning that on 26 October 2017, the Administrative Court of Düs-
seldorf ruled against the transfer of an asylum seeker holding a visa to 
Greece, even though Greece had accepted the Dublin request on 8 Au-
gust 2017. The Court based its decision mainly on information and rec-
ommendations from the European Commission on 8 December 2016. 
The Court reasoned that there are substantial grounds for believing 
that systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions 
in Greece could put the applicant at risk of being subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment, in violation of Article 4 of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union.77
4.4. Concluding Observations
The Statement was meant to be a temporary and extraordinary 
measure, necessary to end human suffering and restore public order. 
75 European Commission, Fourth Recommendation on urgent measures to be 
taken by Greece in view of the resumption of transfers under the Dublin Regulation, 
available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/greece/commission-recommendation-
1022016-addressed-hellenic-republic-urgent-measures-be-taken
76 Letter addressed by ECRE, GCR, Aitima and Solidarity Now on the 
Joint Action Plan on EU-Turkey Statement and resumption of Dublin transfers to 
Greece, 15 December 2016, available at: http://test.solidaritynow.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/12/Letter_CommissionMinistryMigration_final-1.pdf
77 EDAL, Germany: Administrative Court of Düsseldorf rules against a Dublin 




However, two years have passed and, despite the fact that the number 
of arrivals has significantly dropped compared to previous years, its 
implementation in the Greek asylum procedure through practices and 
reforms has been regularized. Despite the fact that the Asylum Ser-
vice has grown rapidly in size since starting its operations, substantial 
shortcomings in the asylum system still exist. Accessing the asylum 
procedure is a persisting challenge, since the number of asylum appli-
cations remains disproportionately high for Greece. This threatens the 
realisation of the right to asylum as enshrined in Article 18 of the EU-
CFR.
In addition, the highly problematic fast-track asylum procedure 
with the use of the “safe third country” concept exposes applicants 
to the risk of refoulement and may lead to a violation of Articles 18 
and 19 of the EUCFR. Furthermore, the involvement of EASO in the 
fast-track border procedure, which provides EASO personnel with the 
right to conduct asylum interviews, issue recommendations on admis-
sibility, conduct the vulnerability assessment and provide assistance 
to the Appeals Committees in the examination of appeals, has raised 
serious concerns with regards to the right to good administration as 
enshrined in Article 41 of the EUCFR.
Asylum seekers are facing risks of arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
given the systematic imposition of geographical restrictions and im-
mediate detention of specific nationalities contrary to Articles 1, 6, 20, 
21, and 41 of the EUCFR. Moreover, due to the limited access to le-
gal aid, the almost non-existent right to an oral hearing and very brief 
time-frames in second instance proceedings, applicants for internation-
al protection do not enjoy access to an effective remedy in accordance 
with Article 47 of the EUCFR.
In conclusion it is disputed whether the amendments introduced in 
order to swiftly implement the EU Turkey Statement are in line with 
Greece’s obligations under the EUCFR.
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1. Introduction
The right to liberty and security of person is a fundamental human 
right and an essential component of legal systems enjoying the rule of 
law. As such, it is enshrined in all major human rights instruments, 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, Art. 3), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR, Art. 
9 and General Comment No. 35 of 2014), the European Convention 
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR, Art. 5) and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR or 
Charter, Art. 6).
Among the various forms of deprivation of liberty, the detention 
of asylum seekers raises particular concerns not only from a moral but 
also human rights point of view. The restrictions applied to this key 
fundamental right do not rest on criminal justice reasons but merely 
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on States sovereign right to control aliens’ entry into and residence in 
their territory.
Though the real figures of the detention of asylum seekers remain 
largely unknown, the legality of the detention of asylum seekers is be-
ing increasingly challenged before courts, which has led the two Euro-
pean Courts to develop a rich jurisprudence on this topic.
While safeguarding a rigorous application of the different grounds 
for detention exhaustively listed under Article 5(1) ECHR; the ECtHR 
has set up inexplicable low standards when it comes to the necessity 
and proportionality test legitimising an exceptionalism in the field of 
immigration detention.1
EU law, on the other hand, explicitly provides for the application of 
a necessity and proportionality test also in the context of immigration 
detention; but in comparison with ECHR seems to include broader 
possibilities to justify the detention of asylum seekers, such as for ex-
ample in the case of detention for national security and public order 
grounds.
Between 2016 and 2017 the CJEU has released two important judg-
ments interpreting Article 6 CFR and 5 ECHR: K. v. Staatssecretaris 
van Veiligheid en Justitie (SVJ) and J. N. v. Staatssecretaris voor Veilig-
heid en Justitie (SVJ).2 These were the first judgments of the CJEU on 
the issue of detention of asylum seekers, which as stated by Peers ‘may 
become seminal’.3
Both cases concern the grounds for detention provided for in Ar-
ticle 8 of the Reception Conditions Directive (RCD), particularly 
whether they are are valid considering Articles 6 and 52 EUCFR in 
light of Article 5 ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR.4 The judgments 
also raise important questions on the relationship between the EUCFR 
and the ECHR, particularly with regard to the relevance of the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.
This paper wants to analyse the said case-law, reflect on the discrep-
ancies between EU law and the ECHR law and case-law, and explore 
1 See C. Costello, Immigration Detention: The Grounds Beneath Our Feet, in 
Current Legal Problems, 2015, p. 176. 
2 CJEU 14.09.2017, Case 18/16, K v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie. 
3 S. Peers, EU Law Analysis: Detention of Asylum-Seekers: The First CJEU Judgment, 
eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2016/03/detention-of-asylum-seekers-first-cjeu.html, 20 March 
2016.
4 Directive 2013/33/EU, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 96-116 (hereinafter RCD). 
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the potential role of the Charter in resolving such discrepancies. In do-
ing so, the paper will focus on the grounds for detentions for asylum 
seekers assessed by the CJEU in its latest judgments: detention in order 
to determine or verify his or her identity or nationality (Art. 8(3)(a)) and 
detention for national security and public order reasons (Art. 8(3)(e)).
2. Article 52 of the EUCFR
2.1. The Notion of Corresponding Rights and the Rules on Limitations
Before starting with the analysis of the K v. SVJ and J.N. v. SVJ 
cases, it is worth exploring the relationship between the EUCFR and 
the ECHR.
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, EU Member 
States became bound to a new legal instrument: the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR or Charter).5
With a view to prevent EU human rights standards to become lower 
than that of the ECHR as well as EU Member States from being subject 
to two different standards of human rights protection, the drafters of 
the Charter have included a specific provision governing the relation-
ship with the ECHR. To this extent, Article 52(3) EUCFR establishes 
as follows:
‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights 
guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be 
the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision 
shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection’.6
5 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, 
pp. 391-407 (hereinafter: EUCFR). 
6 On Article 52 EUCFR and the role of the ECtHR see, ex multis: S. Peers, 
S. Prechal, Article 52: Scope of Guaranteed Rights, in S. Peers et al. (eds), The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, 2014, p. 1455; T. Lock, The ECJ 
and the ECtHR: The Future Relationship between the Two European Courts, in The 
Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, 2009, p. 375; S. Brittain, 
The Relationship Between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights: An Originalist Analysis, in European Constitutional 
Law Review, 2015, p. 482; S. Anneli, Divergence of European Union and Strasbourg 
Standards on Defence Rights in Criminal Proceedings? Ibrahim and the Others v. the 
UK, in European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, 2017, p. 327.
GIULIANA MONINA154
The Explanations to Article 52 set up two list of rights: the first 
includes the Charter and Convention rights that have the exact same 
meaning and scope;7 the second lists the Charter rights that correspond 
only in the meaning but have a “wider” scope than their Convention 
equivalent.8 This also means that when a Charter right falls within the 
first category, the limitations that can be imposed on that right should 
be the same as those laid down by the ECHR.9
The right to liberty and security enshrined by Article 6 EUCFR, 
here in analysis, belongs to the first category. Hence, in this case, the 
ECHR shall constitute a term of reference not only for the interpre-
tation of the meaning and scope of the terms liberty and security but 
also for the permissible limitations applicable under Article 5(1)(a)-(f) 
ECHR. This is also explicitly clarified by the Explanations to Article 
6 EUCFR that stipulates ‘…the limitations which may legitimately be 
imposed on them may not exceed those permitted by the ECHR’ and, 
then, proceed to recall the text of Article 5 ECHR in full.10
In addition to the rule on limitations established by Article 52(3), 
Article 52(1) EUCFR states that ‘[a]ny limitation on the exercise of the 
rights and freedoms recognised by the Charter must be provided for 
by the law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Sub-
ject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may only be made 
if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or need to protect the rights and freedoms of 
others’.11
The co-existence of these two rules on limitations raises the question 
as to which of them is applicable if there is an overlap.12 In this regard, it 
should be noted that that the Explanations explicitly affirm that the leg-
islator, in laying down limitations to those rights, must comply with the 
same standards of the ECHR but ‘without thereby adversely affecting 
the autonomy of Union law and of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’. Similarly, the CJEU has often held that the ECHR does not con-
stitute, as long as the EU has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which 
7 The list includes the following EUCFR Arts: 2, 4, 5 (1) and (2), 6, 7, 10 (1), 11, 
17, 19 (1), 19(2), Article 48, Article 49(1). 
8 The list includes the following EUCFR Arts: 9, 12(1), 14(1), 14(3), 47(2) and (3), 50. 
9 Art. 52, Explanations.
10 Art. 6, Explanations.
11 For a more detailed analysis see Peers/Prechal, p. 1461. 
12 Ibid, p. 1515.
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has been formally incorporated into EU law,13 and on the basis of these 
considerations, seems to give preference to Article 52(1) EUCFR when 
assessing the limitations to Charter corresponding Articles.14
Yet, the Explanations also clarify that ‘the level of protection af-
forded by the Charter may never be lower than that guaranteed by the 
ECHR’.15 Hence, as maintained by Peers/Prechal when assessing the 
relationship between Article 52(1) and 52(3) ‘there is a strong argument 
that the latter paragraph takes priority in the event of an overlap …
Certainly there is no convincing argument for a “lower standards inter-
pretation”, since that would lead also in some cases to setting standards 
lower than those in the ECHR’.16 This approach seems to be also con-
firmed by Wilsher in its analysis of Article 6 EUCFR, who states ‘this 
means that only the specific justifications for detention that are listed 
permitted under Article 6, not the broader public policy justifications 
implicit in Article 52’.17
2.2. The Role of the ECTHR Case Law
The text of Article 52(3) EUCFR, however, refers explicitly only 
to the ECHR but not to its case-law. In other words, it does not spec-
ify whether the “meaning and scope” of ECHR articles should be re-
trieved also in light of the ECtHR jurisprudence. Hence, the question 
as to what role has the ECtHR jurisprudence remains open.
This question had been already discussed during the drafting of the 
Charter.18 Back then, the drafters had contemplated including a specific 
provision on the ECtHR case-law in the operative part of the Charter.19 
13 CJEU 7.5.2013, Case 617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson at 20.
14 S. Peers, S. Prechal, Article 52, cit., p. 1498.
15 Art. 52, Explanations,
16 S. Peers, S. Prechal, Article 52, cit., p. 1518. 
17 D. Wilsher, Article 6: Right to Liberty and Security, in S. Peers et al. (eds), cit., 
p. 126.
18 For a more detailed analysis see ex multis T. Lock, The ECJ and the ECtHR, cit., 
p. 385; S. Brittain, The Relationship, cit., p. 500, that remembers how certain Convention 
members argued that the inclusion of a reference to the ECtHR jurisprudence would 
hamper the development of an autonomous doctrine of fundamental rights in EU law, 
which was one of the essential purposes of the EUCFR.
19 See Art. H.4 stating that ‘no provision of this Charter may be interpreted 
as restricting the scope of the rights guaranteed by… the European Convention on 
Human Rights as interpreted by the case-law of the European Court of Human 
Rights’, as cited in S. Brittain, The Relationship, cit., p. 500. 
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However, after ample discussion, they could not agree to the adoption 
of this provision. Instead, they included a reference to the ECtHR in 
the Preamble of the Charter. Another reference to the ECtHR case-law 
can be found in the Explanations to Article 52(3), which state ‘the ref-
erence to the ECHR covers both the Convention and the Protocols to 
it. The meaning and the scope of the guaranteed rights are determined 
not only by the text of those instruments, but also by the case-law of 
the European Court of Human Rights and by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union’.20
In the literature, many authors have maintained that neither the 
wording of Article 52(3) EUCFR nor the drafting history of the Char-
ter support the conclusion that the case-law of the ECtHR is binding 
in all circumstances, but rather that it should be “accorded significant 
weight”,21 or that it postulates a “duty to duly regard”,22 or “persuasive 
suggestions”.23
On the other side, it cannot be overlooked that the key object and 
purpose of Article 52(3) EUCFR was to prevent divergences between 
the ECHR and the EUCFR, and that both the Preamble and the Ex-
planations contain a specific reference to the case law of the Strasbourg 
Court, the authoritative interpreter of the ECHR.24
3. Discrepancies Between the EU and ECHR Law in the Field of Im-
migration Detention
3.1.  The Rules Governing the Detention of Asylum Seekers and Limi-
tations to the Right of Liberty and Security in the EU and ECHR 
Systems
As opposed to its equivalent in the ECHR, Article 6 EUCFR does 
not explicitly provide for an exhaustive list of permissible grounds for 
20 Art. 52, Explanations.
21 S. Brittain, The Relationship, cit., p. 503; T. Lock, The ECJ and the ECtHR, cit., 
p. 385.
22 T. Lock, The ECJ and the ECtHR, cit., p. 384.
23 D. Chalmers, G. Davies, G. Monti, European Union Law: Cases and Materials, 
2012, p. 246.
24 P. Craig, The Charter, the ECJ and National Courts, in D. Ashiagbor et al (eds), 
The European Union After the Treaty of Lisbon, 2012, p. 103. 
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detention. Yet, because it corresponds to Article 5 ECHR, a legitimate 
limitation of this Charter right can only be justified in the exact same 
cases provided by ECHR law (Article 5 (1)(a)-(f)).
Under EU law, the detention of asylum seekers is regulated un-
der various legal instruments namely, the Asylum Procedure Direc-
tive (Art. 26);25 the Dublin Regulation (in particular Art. 28);26 and the 
RCD (Arts 2 and 8), EURODAC Regulation (Arts 9 (1), 14 (1) and 
29 (1) (d)).27
The RCD, the instrument containing the most detailed rules on 
asylum seekers detention, provides an exhaustive list of six permissible 
grounds for detention.28 Moreover, EU law expressly establishes that 
detention can be applied only when it proves necessary and on the ba-
sis of an individual assessment of each case, and if other less coercive 
alternative measures cannot be applied effectively,29 thereby requiring a 
full necessity and proportionality test. In sum, to be lawful under EU 
law deprivation of liberty must comply with at least five conditions, i.e. 
have a clear legal basis in national law, fall within one of the permissi-
ble grounds set up by EU law, be necessary and proportional, respect 
procedural guarantees, and be human and dignified.30 This means that 
detention can never be for the sole reason that an individual has applied 
for international protection but must fall in one of these grounds.
Under ECHR law the right to liberty and security is regulated by 
Article 5 ECHR. Though there is no clear definition of deprivation 
of liberty, the ECtHR has consistently pointed out that the differ-
ence between deprivation of liberty and mere restrictions on liberty 
of movement remains one of ‘degree and intensity, not one of nature 
or substance’, hence, in order to determine whether a person has been 
deprived of liberty, the starting-point for the ECtHR’s assessment is 
the person’s concrete situation.31 The ECtHR has further identified a 
number criteria to identify whether a certain restriction amounts to 
deprivation of liberty: the type, duration, effects and manner of imple-
25 Directive 2013/32/EU, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 60-95. 
26 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 31-59.
27 Regulation (EU) No 603/2013, OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, pp. 1-30.
28 Art. 8(3) RCD. 
29 Art. 8(2) RCD. 
30 FRA, European Legal and Policy Framework on Immigration Detention of 
Children, 2017, p. 33.
31 ECtHR, Guzzardi v. Italy [GC], App No. 7367/76, Judgment of 6 November 
1980, at 92.
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mentation of the measure in question.32 This in practice means, on the 
one side, that the detention may assume different forms and happen in 
different places, and, other side, that national definitions are not bind-
ing for the Court to find Article 5 ECHR applicable.
Moreover, according to the ECtHR to be lawful detention must 
have a clear legal basis under national law that is also of sufficient qual-
ity, i.e. compatible with the rule of law, accessible, precise and foresee-
able.33 Detention must also be in line with the ECHR law and case law, 
namely fall within one of the specific and exhaustive list of six permis-
sible grounds under Article 5(1) ECHR.
Among these, there are two grounds that may in fact be used in 
the context of immigration detention: Article 5(1)(f) and Article 5(1)(b) 
ECHR. Only Article 5(1)(f) ECHR specifically addresses the detention 
of foreigners and permits it when it is conducted with a view to prevent 
their unauthorised entry or with a view to deportation or extradition. 
Because States enjoy an ‘undeniable sovereign right to control aliens’ 
entry into and residence in their territory’,34 the ECtHR applies dif-
ferent and less strict rules when it comes to Article 5(1)(f). This is par-
ticularly evident for the notion of arbitrariness, which includes an as-
sessment of whether detention was necessary to achieve the stated aim 
and proportional only in the contexts of sub-paragraphs (b), (d) and (e) 
but not for Article 5§1(f).35 In this last case, the ECtHR has developed 
a different and less demanding test that mainly looks at whether: de-
tention is carried out in good faith; there is in genuine conformity with 
the purpose of the ground listed in Article 5(1) ECHR; the place and 
conditions of detention are appropriate, considering that ‘the measure 
is applicable not to those who have committed criminal offences but to 
32 Eg ECtHR, Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/92, Judgment of 25 June 1996, 
at 42; ECtHR, Stanev. v. Bulgaria [GC], App. No. 36760/06, Judgment of 17 January 
2012, at 115; ECtHR, Khlaifia and others v. Italy [GC], App. No. 16483/12, Judgments 
of 15 December 2016, at 64.
33 Eg ECtHR, Medvedyev. and Others v. France [GC], App. No. 3394/03, 
Judgment of 29 March 2010, at 79; ECtHR, Khlaifia and others v. Italy [GC], App. 
No. 16483/12, Judgments of 15 December 2016, at 66.
34 ECtHR, Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/92, Judgment of 25 June 1996 at 41; 
ECtHR, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, App no. 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 
1996, at 73; and ECtHR, Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, App. 
Nos. 9214/80; 9473/81 and 9474/81, Judgment of 28 May 1985 28 May 1985, at 67-68. 
35 Eg ECtHR, Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], App. No. 13229/03, Judgment 
of 29 January 2008, at 70 ss.
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aliens who, often fearing for their lives, have fled from their own coun-
try’.36 Depending on whether the Court applies the first of the second 
limb of the Article 5(1)(f) ECHR, the ECtHR may also look at addi-
tional specific criteria, such as: whether place and conditions of deten-
tion are appropriate; the authorities act due diligence; there is realistic 
prospect of removal; and the length of the detention. The development 
by the ECtHR of the so called ‘immigration detention exceptionalism’ 
has been highly criticized in the literature.37 The other ground that is 
often used to justify detention with a view to determine or verify the 
identity or nationality of the asylum seeker is Article 5(1)(b) ECHR. 
Yet when detention is imposed under 5(1)(b) ECHR, it must also meet 
a number of additional guarantees, being Article 5(1)(b) ECHR one of 
those provisions requiring a fully fledge necessary and proportionality 
test.
The first difference that comes to mind when comparing EU and 
ECHR standards on the detention of asylum seekers concerns the ne-
cessity and proportionality test. In fact, while EU law requires a nec-
essary and proportional test, the ECtHR still considers ‘immigration 
detention’ as an exception and does not apply a classical necessity test 
when the detention falls within the scope of Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. A 
proper necessity test is required by the ECtHR only if the detention 
falls under the scope of Article 5(1)(b) ECHR. In this sense, it is evi-
dent that EU law provides higher standards than the ECHR, because 
it obliges States to apply a necessity test in any case of immigration 
detention.38
The second difference that is worth noting concerns the list of 
permissible grounds for detention. As also noted by the Fundamen-
tal Rights Agency of the European Union (FRA), given the different 
wording, it is not always easy to establish whether each of the grounds 
specified under EU secondary law falls within the permissible limita-
tions established by Article 5 ECHR.39 In practice, doubts have arisen 
especially in two situations: in the case of detention “in order to deter-
mine or verify his or her identity or nationality” Article 8(a) RCD); 
36 ECtHR, Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/92, Judgment of 25 June 1996, at 43.
37 C. Costello, Immigration Detention, cit., p. 147.
38 See also V. Moreno-Lax, Beyond Saadi v. UK: Why the Unnecessary Detention 
of Asylum Seekers Is Inadmissible under EU Law, in Human Rights and International 
Legal Discourse, 2011, pp. 195 ss.
39 FRA, European Legal and Policy Framework, cit., p. 43.
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or “when protection of national security or public order so requires” 
(Article 8(e) RCD).40
This paper will focus on the discrepancies relating to the grounds for 
detention, offering a first analysis of the K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veilig-
heid en Justitie and J.N. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie.41
3.2. Detention in Order to Determine or Verify Identity or Nationality
3.2.1. Relevant ECHR Standards
Under ECHR law, the detention in order to determine or verify 
identity or nationality may in principle fall under two categories.
One of the most common justification for detaining asylum seekers 
is the one provided by the first limb of Article 5(1)(f) which allows de-
tention with a view to prevent an ‘unauthorised entry’.
The leading ECtHR case on this issue is still Saadi v. UK, where 
the ECtHR addressed the question of whether this provision could be 
applied to asylum seekers.42 In the Saadi case, the Court did ‘not ac-
cept that as soon as an asylum-seeker has surrendered himself to the 
immigration authorities, he is seeking to effect an “authorised” entry, 
with the result that detention cannot be justified under the first limb of 
Article 5(1)(f). To interpret the first limb of Article 5(1)(f) as permitting 
detention only of a person who is shown to be trying to evade entry 
restrictions would be to place too narrow a construction on the terms 
of the provision and on the power of the State to exercise its undeniable 
right of control referred to above’.43
More recently, however, the ECtHR seemed to have nuanced the 
Saadi principles in the Suso Musa case.44 There, the ECtHR clarified 
that ‘the applicant’s argument to the effect that Saadi should not be 
interpreted as meaning that all Member States may lawfully detain im-
migrants pending their asylum claim, irrespective of national law, is 
not devoid of merit. Indeed, where a State which has gone beyond its 
40 Ibid.
41 CJEU 14.09.2017, Case 18/16, K v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie.
42 ECtHR, Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], App. No. 13229/03, Judgment of 
29 January 2008, at 45. 
43 Ibid, at 65.
44 ECtHR, Suso Musa v. Malta, App No. 42337/12, Judgment of 23 July 2013; see 
also C. Costello, Immigration Detention, cit., pp. 150, 173-176.
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obligations in creating further rights or a more favourable position – a 
possibility open to it under Article 53 of the Convention – enacts leg-
islation (of its own motion or pursuant to European Union law) ex-
plicitly authorising the entry or stay of immigrants pending an asylum 
application … an ensuing detention for the purpose of preventing an 
unauthorised entry may raise an issue as to the lawfulness of detention 
under Article 5§1(f). Indeed, in such circumstances it would be hard 
to consider the measure as being closely connected to the purpose of 
the detention and to regard the situation as being in accordance with 
domestic law’.45
Notwithstanding those considerations, the ECtHR did not reach a 
clear conclusion, affirming that ‘given that it has not been established 
that the applicant had actually been granted formal authorisation to 
stay’ the detention fell under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR first limb.46 Though 
a similar question arose in the later cases Jama v. Malta,47 and in the OM 
v. Hungary case,48 the ECtHR has not yet provided further clarifica-
tions on the issue and continued to leave open the question on whether 
Article 5 ceases to apply because the individual has been granted formal 
authorisation to enter or stay by national authorities. Yet, as argued by 
De Bruycker,49 this seemed to be because the national Courts and the 
government had a different interpretation as to the effect of their na-
tional law. It remains that in that judgment the ECtHR has very clearly 
mentioned that where the national law (of its own motion or pursuant 
to EU law) “explicitly authorises” the entry and stay of immigrants 
pending an asylum application ‘it would be hard to consider the meas-
ure as being closely connected to the purpose of the detention and to 
regard the situation as being in accordance with domestic law’.
Finally, another ground of detention that could justify detention 
with a view to determine or verify the identity or nationality of the 
45 Suso Musa v. Malta, App No. 42337/12, Judgment of 23 July 2013, at 97.
46 Ibid, at 99.
47 ECtHR, Mahamed Jama v. Malta, App No. 10290/13, Judgment of 02/05/2016, 
at 144.
48 ECtHR, OM v. Hungary, App no. 9912/15, Judgment of 5 July 2016, at 47-48, 
though here in the end the limited its scrutiny to the issue of Article 5 § 1 (b) of the 
Convention. 
49 P. De Bruycker et al. (Eds.), Alternatives to Detention in the EU: Time for 
Implementation, 2015, http://odysseus-network.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
FINAL-REPORT-Alternatives-to-detention-in-the-EU.pdf, 27 March 2018, p. 273, 
in particular footnote 50. 
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asylum seeker is Article 5(1)(b) ECHR. The ECtHR has pronounced 
itself on this provision in the context of immigration detention for the 
first time in the case OM v. Hungary.50 There, though accepting that 
Article 5(1)(b) ECHR could apply also to immigration detention, it 
specified that the detention imposed under 5(1)(b) ECHR must meet a 








fulfilment and not be punitive in character;
•	 The	arrest	and	detention	must	be	truly	necessary	for	the	purpose	
of ensuring its fulfilment.
In the present case, the applicant was arrested and placed in de-
tention, on grounds that his identity and nationality had not yet been 
clarified. The Government justified the detention referring to Art. 5(1)
(b) arguing that the applicant was under a legal obligation to cooperate 
with the asylum authority for the purposes of the asylum procedure. In 
these circumstances, the ECtHR found that there was no specific and 
concrete legal obligation incumbent upon the applicant, hence, the ap-
plicant’s detention was unlawful. In particular, it considered that Hun-
garian national law did not contain an obligation for asylum-seeker to 
provide documentary evidence of their identity and nationality. Final-
ly, the ECtHR made reference to the fact that Hungarian national law 
contained a provision concerning situations when the asylum-seeker is 
not in possession official documents proving his identity and that the 
applicant made reasonable efforts to clarify his identity and nationali-
ty.51
From a broader perspective, the classification of immigration de-
tention under Article 5(1)(b) ECHR is an interesting development in 
the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on asylum seekers. If this opens up an 
additional ground that States can spend to justify the detention of asy-
lum seekers under Article 5 ECHR, on the other side it can also be seen 
as a chance to ‘take immigration detention out of the silo of Article 5(1)
50 ECtHR, OM v. Hungary, App no. 9912/15, Judgment of 5 July 2016.
51 Ibid, at 54. 
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(f), in which migrants are treated as inherently detainable, and instead 
treat immigration detention like other forms of preventive or coercive 
detention’.52
3.2.2. Relevant International Law Standards
Beside ECHR law, detention in order to determine or verify his or 
her identity or nationality is also explicitly envisaged by the Recommen-
dation of the CoE Committee of Minister of 200353 and the UNHCR 
Guidelines of 2012.54 The CoE recommendation allows detention ‘when 
their identity, including nationality, has in case of doubt to be verified’ 
but adds that this ground should be applied ‘in particular when asylum 
seekers have destroyed their travel or identity documents or used fraud-
ulent documents in order to mislead the authorities of the host state’.55
The UNHCR Guidelines envisage the need for ‘initial identity 
and/or security verification’ as a permissible ground of detention, but 
they do so categorizing such ground under the broader issue of the 
protection of public order. The UNHCR Guidelines further add that 
‘[m]indful that asylum-seekers often have justifiable reasons for ille-
gal entry or irregular movement, including travelling without identity 
documentation, it is important to ensure that their immigration pro-
visions do not impose unrealistic demands regarding the quantity and 
quality of identification documents asylum-seekers can reasonably be 
expected to produce’.56 In other words, the Guidelines invite to inter-
pret this provision with caution, as the lack of identity documentation 
of asylum seekers is often linked to their status.57
More recently, this ground was also explicitly recognised by the 
Human Rights Committee in its General Comment 35.58
52 C. Costello, Immigration Detention, cit., p. 175. 
53 CoE, ‘Recommendation Rec (2003) 5 of the Committee of Ministers to 
Member States on Measures of Detention of Asylum Seekers’ para. 3 (hereinafter: CoE 
Recommendations). 
54 UNHCR, ‘UNHCR Detention Guidelines’ (2012) (hereinafter: UNHCR 
Detention Guidelines).
55 CoE Recommendations, para. 3.
56 UNHCR Detention Guidelines, para. 25.
57 See C. Costello, Immigration Detention, cit., p. 167; see also P. De Bruycker et 
al. (Eds.), Alternatives to Detention, cit., p. 51.
58 CCPR, ‘General Comment No 35 - Article 9: Liberty and Security of Person’ 
(hereinafter: CCPR, GC No 35). 
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3.2.3. The Position of the CJEU in K
Under EU law, detention in order to determine or verify identity or 
nationality is regulated under Article 8(3)(a) RCD. However, contrary 
to other international instruments, ECHR law does not envisage any 
situation that is exactly corresponding to Article 8(3)(a) RCD. Hence, 
the interpreter has to assess whether this provision can be justified un-
der any of the permissible grounds provided by Article 5 ECHR, in 
particular Article 5(1)(f) and Article 5(1)(b) ECHR. This assessment 
was at least to some extent conducted by the CJEU in the case K.59
The case concerned a third-country national arrived in the Netherlands 
from Austria. During a control of documents, he was suspected of using a 
false passport and was arrested first on the basis of criminal charges. Once 
the criminal charges had been dismissed and he released, the applicant ap-
plied for asylum. On the same day, the authorities decided to detain him 
again on the basis of Articles 8(3)(a) and (b) RCD in order to establish the 
identity or nationality of that applicant, and to obtain data necessary for the 
assessment of his application. Given the circumstances, the referring court 
(District Court, The Hague, sitting in Haarlem) asked the CJEU to clarify 
whether the detention of an asylum seeker not imposed with a view to de-
portation can be considered with Article 6 EUCFR and Article 5 ECHR.
In doing so, the referring court only made a specific reference to 
the ECtHR judgment of Nabil and others v. Hungary, relating to an 
individual applying for asylum while already detained with a view to 
deportation or extradition in the context of the return Directive.60 Also 
for these reasons, the CJEU could dismissed the arguments of the appli-
cants and the referring court by stating that the request did not contain 
sufficient elements to put the validity of the Article 8(3)(a) RCD into 
question. The CJEU in fact stated that ‘that request does not, however, 
contain elements allowing it to be concluded that the facts at issue in 
the main proceedings are covered by that provision of the ECHR or to 
59 CJEU 14.09.2017, Case 18/16, K v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie.
60 The preliminary reference stated: ‘(2) given the Explanation relating to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights that the limitations which may legitimately be imposed 
on the rights in Article 6 of the Charter may not exceed those permitted by the ECHR 
in the wording of Article 5(1)(f), and the interpretation by the European Court of 
Human Rights of the latter provision in, inter alia, the judgment of 22 September 
2015, Nabil and Others v. Hungary (CE:ECHR:2015:0922JUD006211612), that the 
detention of an asylum-seeker is contrary to the aforementioned Article 5(1)(f) if such 
detention was not imposed with a view to deportation?’. 
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establish to what degree the case-law deriving from the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights of 22 November 2015, Nabil and 
Others v. Hungary…, could affect the examination of the first subpar-
agraph of Article 8(3)(a) and (b) of that directive in the present case’.61
But the CJEU went on with the analysis and specified that the sit-
uation of the applicant, if not under the second limb of Article 5(1)(f) 
ECHR, could fall under the detention ground of preventing an un-
authorised entry provided under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR first limb. In 
doing so, it found that the ECHR does not exclude the application of 
Article 5(1)(f) ECHR first limb to asylum seekers, ‘provided that such 
measure is lawful and implemented in accordance with the objective 
of protecting the individual from arbitrariness’.62 In reaching this con-
clusion, the CJEU made a reference to two additional decisions of the 
ECtHR: Saadi v. United Kingdom63 and the Mahamed Jama v. Malta.64
Yet neither the CJEU judgment nor the AG opinion make any ref-
erence to the issues raised in the Suso Musa judgment65 and address 
the interesting question as to whether a State which has gone beyond 
its ECHR obligations in creating further rights or a more favourable 
position enacting legislation (of its own motion or pursuant to Euro-
pean Union law) explicitly authorising the entry or stay of immigrants 
pending an asylum application is still allowed to justify the detention 
of asylum seekers under Article 5(1)(f) first limb ECHR, given that that 
provision rests on the notion of ‘unauthorised entry’.
It is true that ECtHR did not reach a definitive conclusion in that 
specific case,66 but the ECtHR did mentioned very clearly that where 
the national law (of its own motion or pursuant to EU law) “explic-
61 CJEU 14.09.2017, Case 18/16, K v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, 
at 51. 
62 CJEU 14.09.2017, Case 18/16, K v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, at 52. 
63 ECtHR, Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], App. No. 13229/03, Judgment of 
29 January 2008.
64 ECtHR, Mahamed Jama v. Malta, App No. 10290/13, Judgment of 02 May 
2016.
65 ECtHR, Suso Musa v. Malta, App No. 42337/12, Judgment of 23 July 2013. In 
the Jama v. Malta recalled by the CJEU in this decision, the ECtHR though included a 
reference to Suso Musa principles, it does not spell out the whole argumentation included 
in para. 97 of the Suso Musa case, but limits itself to recall the conclusion that the question 
is dependent on national law and that in the present case it was possible to conclude that 
the detention fell under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR as in Suso Musa. See ECtHR, Mahamed 
Jama v. Malta, App No. 10290/13, Judgment of 02 May 2016, at 138, 144.
66 See also above para. 3.2.1.
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itly authorises” the entry and stay of immigrants pending an asylum 
application ‘it would be hard to consider the measure as being closely 
connected to the purpose of the detention and to regard the situation 
as being in accordance with domestic law’. In this sense, the Strasbourg 
Court was open to the applicant’s argument that if an asylum seeker is 
authorized to entry or stay pending an asylum application either under 
national or EU law, then a detention for the purpose of preventing an 
unauthorized entry is hardly compatible with Article 5 (1)(f) ECHR.
Moreover, this conclusion was supported by several commentators 
and by the FRA which in a recent report stated ‘[w]ith regard to de-
tention to prevent unauthorised entry, according to the ECtHR, asy-
lum applicants who have been granted formal authorisation to stay in 
a country (e.g. under EU law) cannot be held in detention under the 
second limb of Article 5 (1) (f) of the ECHR’67 and concluded that Ar-
ticle 8(3)(a) RCD falls best under Article 5(1)(b) ECHR.
Article 9(1) RCD and Article 9 APD clearly stipulate that asylum 
seekers have a ‘right to remain pending the examination of the applica-
tion’. EU law provides for a few exceptions to this right, namely: where a 
person makes a subsequent application referred to in Article 41; or where 
the Member State has to surrender or extradite a person either to another 
Member State pursuant to obligations in accordance with a European ar-
rest warrant or otherwise, or to a third country or to international crim-
inal courts or tribunals (Article 9(2) APD). An additional case in which 
EU law seems not to explicitly authorise the entry and stay can be identi-
fied in the rules on border procedures. In this regard, Art. 43 APD allows 
Member States to decide at the border or transit zones on the admissi-
bility of an application made at such locations; and/or the substance of 
an application in an accelerated procedure pursuant to Article 31(8). This 
exception to the normal procedures, however, can be prolonged only 
for a short period of time. Hence, ‘when a decision has not been taken 
within four weeks, the applicant shall be granted entry to the territory 
of the Member State in order for his or her application to be processed 
in accordance with the other provisions of this Directive’.68 Besides these 
67 C. Costello, Immigration Detention, cit., pp. 173-176; P. De Bruycker et al. 
(Eds.), Alternatives to Detention, cit., p. 50; ECRE, Comments on the Commission 
Proposal to Recast the Reception Conditions Directive COM(2016), 2016, https://
www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ECRE-Comments-RCD.pdf, p. 43.
68 P. De Bruycker et al. (Eds.), Alternatives to Detention, cit., p. 50. On this point, 
ECRE has rightly noted that Article 43(2) APD cannot be interpreted as meaning that 
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exceptions, and considering the rights to remain enshrined by EU law, it 
will be hard to justify the detention of asylum seekers under Article 5(1)
(f) ECHR first limb – for the purpose of preventing unauthorised entry.69
If these arguments are correct, then, when none of the above men-
tioned exceptions can be applied, the only possibility left to justify the 
detention in order to determine or verify identity or nationality is Ar-
ticle 5(1)(b) ECHR. Yet in this case, ECHR sets up a different and 
stricter test. This includes not only a full necessity and proportionality 
test but also the requirement that the legal obligation incumbent on 
the applicant is “specific” and “concrete” and “unfulfilled”. As noted 
above in O.M. v. Hungary, the ECtHR did not accept that the general 
obligation to cooperate with the asylum authorities could be a clear le-
gal basis for the detention of the asylum seeker in that case.70 Moreover, 
as pointed out by Matevzic, ‘[i]t is rare that a national legislation would 
actually impose an obligation on the asylum-seeker to provide docu-
mentary evidence of his identity and therefore it is highly questionable 
if the detention ground contained in Article 8(a) of the Recast Recep-
tion Directive actually falls under the scope of Article 5(1) of ECHR’.71
These considerations were, however, not part of the analysis of the 
CJEU in the K v. SVJ case. There, the CJEU based its assessment main-
ly on Article 52(1) EUCFR, conclud that ‘the legislator struck a fair 
balance between, on the one hand, the applicant’s rights to liberty and, 
on the other hand, the requirements relating to the identification of 
that applicant or his nationality or to the determination of the elements 
on which his application is based, which are necessary for the prop-
er functioning of the Common European Asylum System’.72 In doing 
so, the CJEU referred to international soft law standards such as the 
Recommendation of the CoE Committee of Minister of 200373 and the 
until such decision has been taken, the asylum seeker has no right to remain on the 
territory: see ECRE, Comments on the Commission Proposal, cit., p. 13.
69 C. Costello, Immigration Detention, cit., p. 175; ECRE, Comments on the 
Commission Proposal, cit., p. 11; P. De Bruycker et al. (Eds.), Alternatives to Detention, 
cit., p. 50; G. Matevžič, Detention of Asylum-Seekers Under the Scope of Article 5(1)(f) 
of ECHR. Some Thoughts Based on Recent ECHR and CJEU Jurisprudence, http://
www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/journal/detention-asylum-seekers-under-scope-
article-51f-echr-some-thoughts-based-recent-echr-and, 2016.
70 ECtHR, OM v. Hungary, App no. 9912/15, Judgment of 5 July 2016, at 54.
71 G. Matevžič, ibid.
72 CJEU 14.09.2017, Case 18/16, K v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, at 50.
73 CoE Recommendations, para. 3.
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UNHCR Guidelines of 2012,74 which as it was noted above, explicitly 
provide for such a ground of detention.
Only at the very end of the judgment, the CJEU assessed if the level 
of protection of Article 5(1)(f) ECHR was respected. As noted above, 
however, in its analysis under Article 52(3) EUCFR the CJEU accept-
ed that Article 5(1)(f) ECHR can be applied recalling the case Saadi v. 
United Kingdom, but made no reference to the Suso Musa nor did it 
elaborate on the argument that given that EU law explicitly authorise 
the entry and stay of immigrants pending an asylum application it is 
not possible to justify the detention to determine or verify his or her 
identity or nationality under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR.
It is hoped, however, that these questions will be clarified in the 
future. In fact, if Article 5(1)(b) ECHR is to apply, the ECtHR requires 
a different test encompassing, not only a full necessary and proportion-
ality test (anyway applicable under EU law), but also the need to verify 
if the legal obligation incumbent on the applicant fulfil certain criteria, 
including the need for the obligation to be “specific” and “concrete”.
3.3. Detention for National Security and Public Order
3.3.1. Relevant ECHR Standards
ECHR law does not provide for any specific ground justifying de-
tention for reasons of national security and public order. Hence, given 
that the grounds for detention are exhaustive and should be interpreted 
in a narrow manner, this justification cannot be invoked unless it falls 
already within one of the permissible ground of Article 5 ECHR.
The only situation in which this seems to be possible is when there 
is also the necessity to detain someone to prevent the commitment of 
an offence as indicated by Article 5(1)(c) ECHR.
The arguments of whether Article 5(1) ECHR permits a balance to 
be struck between the individual’s right to liberty and the State’s inter-
est in protecting national security (e.g. in case of terrorist threat) were 
already at least to some extent addressed by the ECtHR in A and others 
v. UK case.75 There, the argument of the UK Government were found 
‘inconsistent not only with the Court’s jurisprudence under sub-para-
74 UNHCR Detention Guidelines, pt. 4.1, particularly 4.1.3, para. 30. 
75 ECtHR, A and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], App. No. 3455/05, 
Judgment of 19 February 2009.
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graph (f) but also with the principle that paragraphs (a) to (f) amount to 
an exhaustive list of exceptions and that only a narrow interpretation of 
these exceptions is compatible with the aims of Article 5. If detention 
does not fit within the confines of the paragraphs as interpreted by the 
Court, it cannot be made to fit by an appeal to the need to balance the 
interests of the State against those of the detainee’.76 In the same judg-
ment, the Court also clarified that ‘internment and preventive detention 
without charge’ are ‘incompatible with the fundamental right to liberty 
under Article 5§1, in the absence of a valid derogation under Article 15’.77
3.3.2. Relevant International Law Standards
On the contrary, detention for national security and public order is 
explicitly envisaged by the Recommendation of the CoE Committee of 
Minister of 200378 and the UNHCR Guidelines of 2012.79
This ground is also provided for by the CCPR General Comment 
35, where national security is listed among the reasons that could justi-
fy detaining the asylum seekers after an initial brief period to determine 
the identity. Specifically, the General Comment states: ‘[t]o detain them 
further while their claims are being resolved would be arbitrary in the 
absence of particular reasons specific to the individual, such as an indi-
vidualized likelihood of absconding, a danger of crimes against others 
or a risk of acts against national security’.80
3.3.3. The Position of the CJEU in N.J.
Under EU law, the possibility to detain asylum seekers for reasons 
of national security and public order is regulated under Article 8(3)(e) 
RCD. This raises the issue as to whether this provision is in line with 
the limitations set up in Articles 6 EUCFR and 5 ECHR. The question 
was addressed for the first time by the CJEU in N.J. v. SVJ.
The case concerned an asylum seeker with past criminal convic-
tions. In the period 1999-2015, Mr N.J. had been convicted of 21 charg-
es, mostly for theft-related offences. Mr N.J. had been subjected in the 
past to a return decision, which become final in April 2014. On 27 
76 Ibid, at 171.
77 Ibid, at 172.
78 CoE Recommendations, para. 3.
79 UNHCR Detention Guidelines, 4.1.1.
80 CCPR, GC No 35, para. 18. 
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February 2015, while serving a sentence of imprisonment for failure 
to comply with an entry ban, Mr N.J. submitted his fourth asylum 
application, this time based on new grounds based on health reasons. 
Once he had served his sentence on criminal grounds, the authorities 
decided that Mr N.J. should be maintained in detention in his capacity 
of asylum seeker on grounds that he posed a threat to national security 
or public order, given that he was convicted of a number of offences in 
the past and was suspected of having committed others.81
The applicant challenged that decision arguing it to be contrary to 
Articles 6 EUCRF and 5 ECHR, in that detention could be justified 
only when action is being taken with a view to deportation and extradi-
tion, but not against a foreigner who is lawfully residing in the Member 
State pending his asylum procedure. Consequently, the Dutch Coun-
cil of State referred the question to the CJEU. In doing so, it referred 
to Article 5(1)(f) and the case ECtHR Nabil and Others v. Hungary. 
However, while in Nabil and Others v. Hungary the link with the de-
portation’s aim of the government was clear, and national law provided 
that the expulsion order against him was only suspended in view of the 
asylum applications but could have been again enforced once the asylum 
application had been decided; in the case of N.J. the national authorities 
explicitly invoked national security and public order and not the de-
portation procedures to justify detention. Moreover, the referring Court 
also stated that according to Dutch law, an earlier return decision lapsed 
when the foreign national submits an application for asylum.82
Despite all this, the CJEU found that the case could fall under Arti-
cle 5(1)(f) second limb. It specified that ‘Nabil and Others v. Hungary 
… does not exclude the possibility of a Member State ordering – in such 
a way that guarantees provided for by that provisions are observed – 
the detention of a third country national in respect of whom a return 
decision accompanied by an entry ban was adopted prior to the lodging 
of an application for international protection’.83 Moreover it held that 
81 CJEU 15.02.2016, Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid 
en Justitie, at 30.
82 See the CJEU/AG Opinion 26.01.2016, Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N. v. 
Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie at 35, 63, and footnote 36, where the AG 
concluded that ‘ because the return decision had lapsed, the detention did not constitute 
action taken with a view to deportation or extradition’.
83 CJEU 15.02.2016, Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid 
en Justitie, at 78.
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‘a procedure opened under Directive 2008/115, in the context of which 
a return decision, accompanied, as the case may be, by an entry ban, has 
been adopted, must be resumed at the stage at which it was interrupted, 
as soon as the application for international protection which interrupt-
ed it has been rejected at first instance and, accordingly, action under 
that procedure is still ‘being taken’ for the purposes of the second limb 
of Article 5(1)(f) ECHR’.84
The interpretation of the CJEU seems problematic for two main 
reasons. First, it is in doubt that the present case can be compared to 
the Nabil v. Hungary case. It is true that in the case Nabil and others 
v. Hungary the ECtHR has found that ‘the pending asylum case does 
not as such imply that the detention was no longer “with a view to 
deportation” – since an eventual dismissal of the asylum applications 
could have opened the way to the execution of the deportation orders. 
The detention nevertheless had to be in compliance with the national 
law and free of arbitrariness’.85 Yet, in that case, the ECtHR also notes 
that the under Hungarian national law the execution of the deportation 
order was only suspended, and the applicants’ detention was ordered 
with a view to their eventual deportation. As also mentioned by the 
AG, in the present case, the fact that the applicant was not subject to an 
ongoing return procedure because the return decision was elapsed (not 
suspended) and that in the case of a rejection of the asylum application 
the Secretary of State would have been required to make a new return 
decision raise doubts as to whether this detention could fall under Ar-
ticle 5(1)(f) second limb. For this reason, the present case seemed to be 
more similar to Ahmade v. Grèce and R.U. v. Grece as the facts of the 
case hardly show that the deportation was or could have been ‘in pro-
gress’ and with ‘true prospect of executing’.86
84 Ibid, at 80. 
85 ECtHR, Nabil and others v. Hungary, App. No. 62116/12, Judgment of 22 
September 2015, at 38.
86 ECtHR, Ahmade v. Greece, App. No. 50520/09, Judgment of 25 September 
2012, at 142-144; ECtHR, RU v. Greec, App. No. 2237/08, Judgment of 7 September 
2011, at 88-96, in particular 94. In R.U. v. Grece and Ahmade v. Grèce, the ECtHR 
had found violations of Article 5 § 1 (f) under its second limb on the basis that the 
applicants’ detention pending asylum proceedings could not have been undertaken 
for the purposes of deportation, given that national law did not allow for deportation 
pending a decision on asylum. In this case, national law seemed to allow for such type 
of detention only if the return order could be executed. This is in contrast with the case 
Nabil and others v. Hungary, where under Hungarian national law the execution of the 
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Secondly, the referring court mentioned Article 8(3)(e) RCD, despite 
under EU law there is a specific provision regulating detention of asylum 
seekers pending deportation (Article 8(3)(d) RCD). Under Article 8(3)(d) 
RCD, detention of an applicant who has submitted his/her application for 
international protection after being subject to detention under the return 
procedure can, yes, be justified but only on the basis of additional objec-
tive criteria, including that he or she already had the opportunity to access 
the asylum procedure, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
he or she is making the application for international protection merely in 
order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of the return decision.
The above considerations cast doubts on whether the detention of 
the present case was justifiable under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR. Especially 
considering the existence of Article 8(3)(d) RCD – when the purpose 
of the detention is linked with the deportation – it remains unclear why 
one should use national security and public order provision under Ar-
ticle 8(3)(e) RCD, if not to circumvent the additional burden of proof 
set up by the Article 8(3)(d) RCD. Moreover, justifying situations like 
the present one under Article 8(1)(e) RCD and simultaneously under 
Article 5(1)(f) ECHR de facto risks to create a new additional ground 
for detention – not provided in the list under Article 8 RCD – that 
would permit detaining asylum seekers pending a return procedure 
outside the specific situations identified under item d).
As for the K case, also in N.J. the CJEU seemed to have priori-
tised an assessment of the limitations to the right of liberty and security 
based on Article 52(1) EUCFR. Only at the very end of the judgment, 
after having replied affirmatively on the questions pertaining Article 
52(1), the CJEU analyses whether Article 8(3)(e) RCD is in line with 
the limitations provided by the ECHR in Article 5 ECHR. In doing so, 
the CJEU made arguments that seem more appropriate for an assess-
ment of the validity of Article 8(3)(d) RCD rather than Article 8(3)(e) 
RCD on the detention for national security and public order. But espe-
cially because the grounds indicated in Article 5 ECHR are exhaustive, 
should be given a narrow interpretation, and because detention should 
be carried out in good faith and be in genuine conformity with the 
purpose of the ground listed in Article 5(1) ECHR, the arguments of 
the CJEU do not seem convincing when applied to the detention for 
national security and public order grounds.
deportation order was only suspended, and the applicants’ detention was ordered with 
a view to their eventual deportation.
“JUDGING” THE GROUNDS FOR DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS 173
In other words, in the opinion of the author, if the national au-
thorities want to justify the detention of an asylum seeker under Ar-
ticle 5(1)(f) ECHR second limb, they will have to use Article 8(3)(d) 
RCD. Since the ECtHR requires that the detention is conducted in 
genuine conformity with the purpose of the ground listed in Article 
5(1) ECHR, the fact that Article 8(3)(d) RCD is not applied or cannot 
be applied is a strong indicator that the detention cannot be justified 
under Article 5(1)(f) ECHR second limb.
Further, it is believed that the detention of an asylum seeker for rea-
sons of national security and public can be justified only in two cases: 
if Article 5(1)(c) ECHR can be applied; and when the State has validly 
derogated from its obligations under Article 5§1 of the Convention 
under Article 15 ECHR. In this regard it is worth make a comparison 
with the ECtHR case A and others v. UK.87
Similar conclusions were reached by the FRA in a 2017 report, 
which argued that the detention to protect national security and public 
order did not find any corresponding ground under EU law, and there-
fore recommended that ‘[d]omestic legislation regulating immigration 
or asylum should not be used to detain individuals on grounds of public 
order, thereby circumventing the safeguards established under human 
rights law for criminal detention. EU  Member States should ensure 
that grounds for immigration detention established at national level do 
not extend beyond the exhaustive list of legitimate grounds listed in 
Article 5(1) of the ECHR, as well as those permissible under the EU 
asylum and return acquis’.88
4. Conclusions
As seen above, the right of liberty and security provided by the 
Charter must be given the same meaning and scope of Article 5 ECHR. 
This also means that the right of liberty and security can be limited only 
on the basis of one of the grounds provided for by Article 5 ECHR.
Despite a reference to the ECtHR is included in the Preamble and 
in the Explanations to the Charter, in the literature many authors have 
maintained that neither the wording of Article 52(3) nor the drafting 
87 ECtHR, A and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], App. No. 3455/05, 
Judgment of 19 February 2009. See also above para. 3.3.1.
88 FRA, European Legal and Policy Framework, cit., p. 46.
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history of the Charter support the conclusion that the case-law of the 
ECtHR is binding in all circumstances, but rather that it should be “ac-
corded significant weight”.89
In K. v. Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie and J. N. v. Staats-
secretaris voor Veiligheid en Justitie, confirming its previous jurispru-
dence, the CJEU seems to have given preference to Article 52(1) EUC-
FR when assessing the limitations to Charter corresponding Articles.90 
This notwithstanding, in both cases the CJEU has conducted – at least 
to some extent – an analysis of the Strasbourg Court jurisprudence in 
light of Article 52(3) EUCFR. These assessments were anchored to the 
ECtHR cases mentioned by the referring national court, and left sever-
al important questions opened.
As it was seen above, the K. did not offer the chance to clarify the 
repercussions of the Suso Musa judgment in the EU system, and specif-
ically the question whether a State which has gone beyond its ECHR 
obligations in creating further rights or a more favourable position en-
acting legislation (of its own motion or pursuant to European Union 
law) explicitly authorising the entry or stay of immigrants pending an 
asylum application is still allowed to justify the detention of asylum 
seekers under Article 5(1)(f) first limb ECHR, given that that provision 
rests on the notion of ‘unauthorised entry’.
Similarly, even after the J.N. judgment, there remains serious doubts 
on the compatibility of Article 8(1)(e) RCD with Article 5 ECHR, and 
a risk that this Article will be used to detain individuals with a view 
to circumvent the existing criminal procedural safeguards or erode the 
guarantees established by EU law for international protection appli-
cants in a return procedure.
It is hoped that these questions will be clarified in the future. In 
fact, even if the EU is not strictly bound to follow the ECtHR case law, 
the ECtHR case-law should certainly be accorded significant weight, 
especially in case such those highlighted above, where the standards set 
up by the ECtHR are in fact higher than those laid down by the EU. As 
clearly stated in the Explanations, ‘the level of protection afforded by 
the Charter may never be lower than that guaranteed by the ECHR’.91
89 S. Brittain, The Relationship Between, cit., p. 503; T. Lock, The ECJ and the 
ECtHR, cit., p. 385.
90 S. Peers, S. Prechal, Article 5, cit., p. 1498.
91 Art. 52, Explanations.
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1. Introduction
Authors of the paper aim to elaborate how the “new” EU coun-
tries use the possibility to lodge preliminary questions to the CJEU of 
the European Union (CJEU) in asylum and migration cases, where the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereinafter the 
EUCFR) is applicable. The situation in Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEE) being also members of the EU, except Germany, will 
be discussed. Those countries are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Baltic states: 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. In the paper below a referral to CEE 
will include all countries listed above.
The paper also aims to compare the activity of particular CEE in 
terms of the number of preliminary references made. The possible rea-
sons behind the activity or the lack of activity of CEE will be analysed.
While analysing the role of courts and tribunals of the CEE coun-
tries in the dialogue with the Court of Justice, the most important rul-
ings in the field of asylum and migration originating from the prelimi-
nary questions from those countries will be discussed.
The paper also analyses in detail the activities of Polish courts in 
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terms of preliminary references in the field of asylum and migration 
policy. Unsuccessful motions to Polish courts to request to the CJEU 
to give preliminary rulings will be analysed. The paper will also try 
to identify possible preliminary questions that could be lodged in the 
CJEU taking into account Polish asylum law and practice.
2. Definition of the Preliminary Rulings and its Importance in the 
Field of Asylum
One of the main proceedings within the jurisdiction of the CJEU is 
the preliminary ruling procedure. This procedure can only be initiated 
by the court or tribunal of one of the Member States, it has the limited 
scope of jurisdiction and has several distinct characteristics.
According to article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union the subject matter of a preliminary ruling is restricted to:
(a) the interpretation of “the Treaties”, that is EU primary law, in-
cluding TEU, TFEU, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the gen-
eral principles of EU law,
(b) the validity and interpretation of “acts of the institutions, bod-
ies, offices or agencies of the Union”, what covers EU secondary leg-
islation.
The CJEU is the only authority within the EU that can declare void 
a EU secondary legislation, if it is contrary to the EU primary law. The 
procedure can be initiated by the preliminary reference.
A second type of the preliminary ruling that can be given by the 
CJEU is the ruling on the interpretation of the EU law. Both primary 
and secondary EU law is subject to the CJEU interpretation given in 
the form of a preliminary ruling.
What has to be born in mind is that the CJEU can decide only on 
the interpretation of the EU law. It has no jurisdiction over national 
legislation. The preliminary reference procedure also does not substi-
tute for national courts. After obtaining a preliminary ruling on the 
interpretation or the validity of the EU law, it is for the national court 
or tribunal to apply it in the individual case. The CJEU does not verify 
nor establish the facts of the case. Those are being established by the 
national court or tribunal.1
1 CJEU (First Chamber) 16 March 1978, Case 104/77, Wolfgang Oehlschläger v. 
Hauptzollamt Emmerich, para. 4.
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Preliminary reference procedure is sometimes referred to in terms 
of the judicial dialogue between national and the European court. It is 
because only courts or tribunals from the Member States are entitled to 
initiate it. In the procedure they can express their view on the matter.
Preliminary ruling has a binding effect, the national court or tribu-
nal is bound by the ruling, be it an interpretative one or questioning 
the validity of the EU law. While adjudicating later a domestic case, 
they have to apply the EU law in a manner that is consistent with the 
preliminary ruling.
The term ‘court’ or ‘tribunal’ is given an autonomous meaning in 
the Union law and is not reserved to bodies having judicial power with-
in the meaning of national laws. In the case C-175/11 H.I.D., B.A., the 
CJEU held that the Irish Refugee Appeals Tribunal could be regarded 
as a tribunal within the meaning of the EU law. It was highlighted that 
the Irish Refugee Appeals Tribunal was established by law, permanent, 
applied the rules of law, its decisions in favour of asylum seekers were 
binding on national authorities and its decisions could be appealed. All 
those factors taken together led the CJEU to rule that for the purpose 
of the Union law the Irish Refugee Appeals Tribunal should be regard-
ed as a tribunal.2 While deciding whether a specific national entity can 
refer a preliminary question to the CJEU one has to analyse its compo-
sition, function and procedure in terms of the factors mentioned above.
Another important issue is, whether national courts or tribunals 
are required to initiate the preliminary ruling procedure or it is their 
discretionary power? Article 267 (2) and (3) of the Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union partly provides an answer. The crucial 
distinction has to be made between the courts and tribunals of final and 
non-final instance and between the interpretative ruling and a ruling on 
the validity of the EU law.
Courts and tribunals of lower instance have a right to request a pre-
liminary ruling should they need guidance in interpreting EU law while 
adjudicating individual cases. However they are under no obligation to 
make such a reference and seek an interpretative preliminary ruling. The 
situation changes if national court or tribunal of lower instance questions 
the validity of EU acts. Since national judges are primarily the Union 
2 ECRE, The application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to Asylum 
Procedural Law, October 2014. Available at: https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/10/EN-The-application-of-the-EU-Charter-of-Fundamental-Rights-
to-asylum-procedures-ECRE-and-Dutch-Council-for-Refugees-October-2014.pdf.
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judges they cannot disregard the EU law they believe to be unlawful, 
neither can they declare the EU act invalid (case C-314/85, Foto-Frost).
The CJEU is the only body that is authorized to decide on the va-
lidity of the EU secondary legislation. Therefore the only possibility 
for a national judge to disregard EU legislation is by lodging a prelim-
inary reference to the CJEU concerning the validity of EU law. All in 
all, if the court or tribunal believes that EU law is unlawful and does 
not want to apply it, this court or tribunal is obliged to make a prelimi-
nary reference concerning the validity of the EU legal instrument.
Courts and tribunals of final instance, against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under the national law, are obliged to 
make a preliminary reference if the individual case raises the question 
as to the interpretation or validity of the EU law. The question con-
cerning the EU law has to be relevant in the case, that is the answer to 
the question must affect the outcome of the case. There are only three 
situations when a court or tribunal can be relieved from the duty to 
lodge a preliminary question. Firstly, when the issue at question is 
identical with the one that has already been the subject of preliminary 
ruling in a similar case (joined cases 28 to 30/62, Da Costa, p. 31). Sec-
ondly, when the CJEU has already dealt with the point of law ques-
tioned even if the issue at question is not strictly identical (so called 
acte éclairé). Finally, when the proper interpretation of the EU law is 
so obvious that it does not leave room for any reasonable doubt for 
the judge of any other court or tribunal of the other Member States 
(so called acte clair). If one of those three situations occur, the court 
or tribunal of final instance is not obliged to make a preliminary ref-
erence, however is at liberty to bring the question to the CJEU if they 
consider it appropriate.3
Another distinct characteristic of the preliminary ruling procedure 
is the fact that the ruling of the CJEU is final and cannot be appealed. 
Even if a party to a proceedings does not agree with the ruling they 
have no possibility to further question it. Bearing in mind the doctrine 
of acte éclairé and the principle of sincere cooperation it can have a 
significant effect not only on the parties of the proceedings but also on 
the legal standard throughout the Union.
The preliminary rulings both on the interpretation and on the va-
lidity of EU law are declaratory in nature and in principle have retro-
3 CJEU 6 October 1982, Case 283/81, C.I.L.F.I.T. v. Ministero della Sanità.
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active effect (ex tunc). This characteristic can be important from the 
perspective of potential compensatory claims.
In cases pending before national courts or tribunals, with regard 
to persons in custody, the CJEU can use the urgent preliminary ruling 
procedure (PPU). The aim is to ensure that a preliminary ruling is giv-
en faster. This procedure is frequently used in preliminary references 
concerning the interpretation of EU secondary law provisions on the 
detention of third-country nationals in asylum or deportation proce-
dures.
Preliminary ruling procedure is an important instrument for the 
development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and 
the EU immigration policy. The jurisdiction of the CJEU in the area of 
asylum and immigration dates back to the entry into force of the Trea-
ty of Amsterdam, in May 1999. From this date, courts and tribunals 
of last instance from the Member States can ask preliminary questions 
on the validity of the secondary EU law and the interpretation of both 
primary and secondary EU law in the field of asylum and migration. 
With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon also courts and tribu-
nals of lower instances may ask preliminary questions. Since then, the 
CJEU can also declare EU secondary legislation concerning asylum or 
immigration void, should it be contrary to the fundamental rights as 
enshrined in the EUCFR. The importance of the Charter in the area of 
asylum is additionally highlighted by the fact, that all of the legal acts 
creating the Common European Asylum System contain direct refer-
ence to fundamental rights and the Charter itself.
Through the preliminary ruling procedure national courts and tri-
bunals can ask the CJEU for guidance in the interpretation of the Un-
ion law, thou leading to a more uniform application and interpretation 
of the EU law. This function seems especially important for the proper 
development of the Common European Asylum System. The ultimate 
goal of the CEAS is to ensure equal treatment of asylum seekers, refu-
gees and persons with a subsidiary protection status when it comes to 
the procedures and qualification and reception conditions. Preliminary 
references, which ensure that provisions of the EU law concerning 
asylum are uniformly applied and interpreted throughout all Member 
States, lead to a greater legal unity in everyday legal practice.
By engaging in the dialogue with the Court of Justice, through pre-
liminary reference procedure, national courts and tribunals can also 
advance the development of the Union law in the field of asylum and 
migration. Even, when it is evident that Member States apply and inter-
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pret EU law incorrectly, or that the EU provision is contrary to the pri-
mary law, the CJEU cannot act ex officio, on its own motion to correct 
the wrong. It has to wait for the case to be brought before the Court by 
the competent authority.
The development of the EU law on asylum and migration was influ-
enced by the participatory process between supranational and national 
judges. The preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice, regarding fun-
damental rights in asylum and return proceedings, had a significant im-
pact on national jurisprudence and development of the CEAS.4 Thanks 
to preliminary references the CJEU could advance the protection of 
third-country nationals subject to detention in asylum or deportation 
procedures, as well as guaranteed a right to a an effective remedy and to 
a fair trial in migration and asylum related cases. The impact of prelim-
inary references in the field of asylum and migration where a reference 
to the Charter was made will be discussed in detail below.
3. Statistics
Each year the CJEU receives numerous references for a preliminary rul-
ing. From 2010 until 2016 the number of preliminary references oscillated 
around 400 per year. In 2017 there were 533 preliminary questions asked.
In 2017 the average number of preliminary references made by each 
Member State was around 19. Yet some Member States asked signifi-
cantly more often than the others. In 2017 alone, from Germany came 
149 preliminary references, around 28% of all questions asked that 
year. Italy with 57, Netherlands with 38, Austria with 31 and France 
with 25 also exceeded the average number of preliminary questions 
asked by a Member State in 2017.5 As can be seen from those numbers 
no CEE country was a frontrunner when it comes to the number of 
preliminary references made.
According to the list prepared by ECRE and ELENA, as of Janu-
ary 2018, there were before the CJEU about 120 important judgements 
4 M. Moraru, S. Coutts, G. Renaudiere, ACTIONES Handbook on the 
Techniques of Judicial Interactions in the Application of the EU Charter. MODULE 
5 – ASYLUM AND MIGRATION. Available at: https://www.eui.eu/Projects/
CentreForJudicialCooperation/Documents/D1.1.e-Module-5.pdf
5 Statistics from the CJEU annual reports, available at: https://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/jcms/Jo2_7000/en/. 
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and pending cases referred by national courts and tribunals concerning 
asylum and migration policy.6 In about 40 cases national courts or tri-
bunals made a reference to the Charter.
Out of those 120 cases, 23 (around 18%) were initiated by a prelim-
inary question lodged by courts or tribunals from CEE countries. In 11 
of them a reference to the Charter was made.
The greatest number of preliminary references from the CEE coun-
try in the field of asylum and migration policy came from Bulgaria – 
7 preliminary questions, 4 of them included reference to the Charter. 
Three questions were asked before 2015 and four in the years 2015-
2017 (in the context of the so-called migration crisis).
Hungarian courts lodged 6 preliminary questions in the field of 
asylum and migration and one of them made reference to the Charter. 
Two references were made before 2015 and four in the years 2015-2017 
(in the context of the so-called migration crisis).
Courts and tribunals from Czech Republic made four preliminary 
references with three of them referencing the Charter. One question 
was lodged before 2015, and three were made in the years 2015-2017 
(in the context of the so-called migration crisis).
Slovenian courts asked 3 preliminary questions in the field of asy-
lum and migration policy, one involved reference to the Charter, all 
were lodged in the years 2016-2017.
In the period 2016-2017 Slovakia and Poland asked each one prelim-
inary question in the field of asylum and migration. The question asked 
by the Polish court included reference to the Charter. The question 
asked by the Slovak court has been later withdrawn (case C-113/17, QJ 
v. Ministerstvo vnútra SR - Migračný úrad),
One preliminary question concerning border control was asked by 
Latvian court in 2012. In the question Latvian court made reference to 
the Charter.
The majority of preliminary questions stemming from the CEE 
countries, in the field of asylum and migration policy, were made in 
the years 2016-2017. Courts and tribunals from Bulgaria and Hungary, 
CEE countries most affected by the migration crisis, were the most 
active. Before the crisis, only Bulgaria, Hungary and Czech Republic 
6 ECRE/ELENA, List of Relevant Asylum Judgments and Pending Preliminary 
References from the Court of Justice of the European Union, January 2018, available 
at: http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/ecreelena-list-relevant-asylum-
judgments-and-pending-preliminary-references-court-justice.
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were actively participating in the dialogue with the CJEU in the field 
of asylum and migration policy. What is worth mentioning, is the fact, 
that in the years 2016-2017 the number of asylum application in Hun-
gary and Bulgaria rapidly decreased due to the closure of the Western 
Balkan route. However it did not lead to the significant decrease of 
preliminary references in those years.
The increased activity of courts and tribunals when it comes to mak-
ing referrals to the CJEU in years 2016-2017 in the field of asylum and 
migration could be triggered if not by the greater number of asylum ap-
plications then by the greater visibility of asylum seekers and thou legal 
problems arising from migration be it a forced or a voluntary one.
It is worth mentioning that before the migration crisis Poland was 
the CEE country with the greatest number of asylum applications. Yet, 
up until today, no Polish court made a preliminary reference in the field 
of asylum policy (preliminary reference made by the Supreme Admin-
istrative Court concerned visa policy). It shows that engaging in a dia-
logue with the CJEU is not always directly connected with the number 
of cases being adjudicated.
4. Asylum Situation in the Central and Eastern European Countries
When it comes to asylum, Central and Eastern European States 
share one characteristic – most of them are treated by asylum seekers as 
a transit and not destination countries. Many asylum seekers are pass-
ing those countries trying to apply for asylum in the Western Europe, 
that is France, Germany and Sweden, etc.7 Yet, the asylum situation in 
CEE countries is not uniform. CEE countries can be divided into two 
groups based on the primary nationalities of asylum seekers present 
there. In this chapter a situation of Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) will not be discussed as the yearly number of asylum appli-
cations lodged there remains relatively low.
First group is formed by those countries where a majority of ap-
plicants are coming from Middle East, mainly from Afghanistan, Iraq 
7 For example, in 2017 in Poland, 53% of the asylum proceedings were discontinued as 
the applicants left the territory of Poland and travelled to Western Europe countries. Source: 
Urząd do spraw Cudzoziemców, Raport roczny – ochrona międzynarodowa, 2017 (Office 
for Foreigners. Annual report – international protection 2017) available at: https://udsc.
gov.pl/statystyki/raporty-okresowe/raport-roczny-ochrona-miedzynarodowa/2017-2/. 
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS IN ASYLUM CASES LODGED BY THE COURTS 183
and Syria. Those countries, mostly situated on the Balkan route, were 
affected by the refugee crisis of 2015. It is Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, 
Romania, and Slovenia that belong to this category. Out of this group, 
mostly Bulgaria and Hungary noted a rapid increase of asylum appli-
cations during the refugee crisis.
In Bulgaria, before a refugee crisis in the years 2008-2012, there 
were about 1,000 asylum applications per year. From 2013, the number 
started to grow. In 2013 there were already 7,000 applications whereas 
in 2016 almost 20,000. Those numbers decreased to 3,700 in 2017, after 
the closure of the Western Balkan route.
Hungary is the CEE country perceived to be mostly affected by the 
refugee crisis. Before the crisis Hungary received about 2,000 – 4,000 appli-
cations per year (in the years 2008-2012). Those numbers started to grow 
significantly in 2013, reaching around 19,000 applications. At the climax 
of the refugee crisis (2015), in Hungary around 178,000 applications were 
lodged (around 13% of all asylum applications lodged in all EU countries). 
After the influx of asylum applications Hungary advocated for the closure 
of the Western Balkan route and started the construction of the fence along 
its border with Serbia. It resulted in the decrease of asylum applications – 
about 30,000 were lodged in 2016, and only 3,300 in 2017.
Slovenia and Croatia are the countries where the number of asylum 
seekers remains relatively low. Until 2015, in Slovenia around 200-300 ap-
plications were lodged each year, whereas in Croatia the number oscillated 
between 200 and 2,000 applications. There was a slight increase of the ap-
plications in 2016, with Slovenia receiving 1,265 applications and Croatia 
2,225 applications. Although, apart from Greece, Croatia and Slovenia were 
the first EU countries on the Western Balkan route, those countries did not 
register a massive increase of asylum applications during the crisis. Asylum 
seekers did not want to lodge their asylum application in those countries.
Romania is yet another CEE country from this group where a num-
ber of asylum applications remained relatively stable. From 2008 till 
2016 Romania registered between 1,000 and 2,500 asylum applications 
yearly. After the closure of the Western Balkan route, Romania ob-
served an increase of asylum applications with about 4,800 applications 
lodged in 2017. The data shows that the Black Sea route connecting 
Turkey and Romania became more commonly used what could impact 
the number of asylum applications in this CEE country.8
8 Refugees and Migrants at the Western Balkans route: Regional Overview 
(September-December 2017) – Balkans Migration and Displacement Hub Data and Trends 
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The second group of CEE states is formed by those countries where 
a majority of asylum applicants are citizens of the former Soviet Union, 
mostly Ukrainians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians and Tajiks. This 
group includes Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia. Belarusian-Polish 
border crossing in Terespol is the main point of entrance into Europe of 
the former Soviet Union citizens applying for asylum in the EU.
In Poland, the number of asylum applications was relatively stable 
until 2017. There was around 7,000 – 10,000 asylum applications per 
year (with exceptional 2013 – about 15,000 applications). Out of CEE 
countries discussed, Poland held the highest number of applicants of 
the North Caucasus origin, most commonly Chechens, Dagestanis, In-
gushetians. The vast majority of Tajiks made their asylum applications in 
Poland. Relatively higher number of asylum applications made in Poland 
could be attributed to its geographical location. Poland, as the border 
country, was the first point of entry to the EU for many asylum seek-
ers from the former Soviet Union. The number of asylum applications 
in Poland decreased significantly in 2017, with only 5,000 applications 
made. It could be attributed to intensified problems with submitting asy-
lum application at the Polish border crossings and practice of pushbacks.
In the Czech Republic the number of asylum applications is stable, 
yet significantly lower. It ranges from about 700 to 1,600 applications 
per year. It must be noted however, that this country has no external 
EU border and is surrounded by EU countries, therefore under Dublin 
III Regulation it is less likely to become Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection.
In Slovakia, in 2008-2015, the number of applications was also sta-
ble, ranging between 330 and 900. There was a decrease in asylum ap-
plications made in 2016 and 2017, with respectively 145 and 160 appli-
cations registered.9 Contrary to other CEE countries from this group, 
Slovakia holds a relatively large proportion of Syrian and Afghan asy-
lum seekers.
To sum up, CEE countries with the highest number of asylum ap-
plications are Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland, all border countries. Bul-
garia and Hungary were most affected by the refugee crisis in terms of 
Analysis, December 2017, available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/refugees-and-
migrants-western-balkans-route-regional-overview-september-december-2017. 
9 Asylum and first time asylum applicants – annual aggregated data (rounded) 
persons. Statistics available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=ta-
ble&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00191&plugin=1.
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the number of asylum applications. During the refugee crisis we could 
observe a mass influx of asylum seekers through the Western Balkan 
route. The situation changed significantly in 2016 with the closure of 
the Balkan route, the EU-Turkey refugee deal, the construction of the 
fence at the Hungarian border and a routine practice of pushbacks. Po-
land, a country bordering with the former Soviet Union, did not reg-
ister any significant influx of asylum seekers during the refugee crisis. 
Yet, in 2017 the number of applicants reduced almost by half. It is being 
attributed to the policy of pushbacks. The wide spreading policy of 
pushbacks at the external borders of the EU range from the denial of 
entry to proposed legislative changes restricting access to protection.10
The influence of the closure of the Western Balkan route, and of the 
pushback policy, can be seen by comparing the percentage of asylum 
applications lodged in the CEE countries in 2015, at the climax of the 
refugee crisis, and in 2017 after the introduction of measures aiming at 
reducing the number of asylum seekers in the CEE countries. In 2015 
asylum application made in the CEE countries amounted to 16% of all 
asylum applications lodged in the EU, whereas in 2017 this percentage 
shrunk to only 3%. Although, the methods used in order to limit the 
number of applications seem to have reached the goal, its accordance 
with international law and the Charter is questionable.
5. Important CJEU Cases from the Central and Eastern European 
Countries
Courts and tribunals from CEE countries referred to the CJEU sev-
eral important preliminary questions relating to asylum and migration 
policy. Some of them, such as the case of Arslan (C-534/11), Kadzoev 
(C-357/09), Bolbol (C-31/09) or El Kott (C-364/11), influenced the 
functioning of the Common European Asylum System although did 
not refer to the EUCFR. Others, while furthering the development of 
asylum and migration policy of the EU, also advanced the interpreta-
tion and application of the EUCFR. Those preliminary questions con-
cerned mostly detention, Dublin III Regulation, border control and 
visa procedure and will be discussed in detail below.
10 Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Pushed Back at the Door: Denial of Access to 
Asylum in Eastern EU Member States, 2017, available at: https://www.helsinki.hu/wp-
content/uploads/pushed_back.pdf.
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Most important rulings concerning detention practices in the CEE 
countries in the context of the EUCFR were Mahdi (C-146/14) and Al 
Chodor (C-528/15).
In the case of Mahdi, the Bulgarian court pondered about the pro-
cedural issues of extending period of the detention of third-country 
nationals and the grounds for extending such detention in the depor-
tation procedure. The referring court acknowledged the importance of 
the EUCFR, namely the right to liberty and security and the right to an 
effective remedy and a fair trial.
The CJEU reaffirmed the central role of the EUCFR in interpret-
ing the secondary EU law. Apart from the requirement to prolong the 
detention period by the decision providing in writing reasons in fact 
and in law for that decision, the CJEU also stressed the necessary scope 
of the judicial review. While deciding on extension of the detention of 
a third-country national in the deportation procedure, national courts 
have to take into account all relevant circumstances. It means that they 
cannot rely almost entirely on information provided by the authority 
requesting the extended detention. Should it be necessary in an individ-
ual case, the national court needs to consider observations made by a 
third-country national or other evidence and facts important from the 
perspective of prolonging the detention. Furthermore, in each case the 
national court has to assess whether there is a possibility to apply less 
coercive means.
The CJEU also highlighted, that the mere lack of identity docu-
ments cannot automatically lead to the extension of the detention. Each 
case has to be individually analysed and decided.
Another important judgement, initiated from the Czech Republic, 
concerns the detention of asylum seekers transferred to another Mem-
ber State under Dublin III Regulation. The CJEU was asked to clarify 
the concept of “serious risk of absconding”. In its judgement (Al Cho-
dor, C-528/15) the CJEU stressed the importance of judicial protection 
and protection against arbitrary detention guaranteed to asylum seek-
ers. In consequence, the CJEU ruled that the national legislation must 
provide objective criteria indicating the presence of a risk of abscond-
ing. Otherwise, the detention of asylum seekers under Dublin III Reg-
ulation will not be permissible. Furthermore, the Court stressed, that 
the national legislation laying down those criteria must be sufficiently 
clear, predictable, accessible and it has to protect against arbitrariness.
The ruling was crucial to other Member States as at the time some 
still did not have the objective criteria for evaluation of the “risk of ab-
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sconding” set in their national legislation, i.e. France,11 Czech Repub-
lic or UK.12 It meant that, before enacting such legislation, they could 
not detain asylum seekers waiting to be transferred to another Member 
State under Dublin III Regulation.
Another group of preliminary questions asked by the CEE coun-
tries relates to Dublin III Regulation and its appliance in conformity 
with the EUCFR. Questions from this group were asked by courts 
situated on the Western Balkan route, that is Slovenia.
In the case C.K., H.F., A.S. (C-578/16), the Supreme Court of Slove-
nia asked a preliminary question regarding the application of Dublin III 
Regulation. The question was referred to the CJEU during the heights of 
the refugee crisis, when the migration of asylum seekers within Member 
States became one of the major issues for the governments. The issue 
to be resolved by the CJEU was: whether the state of health of the asy-
lum seeker could indicate a prohibition of a transfer to another Member 
State, where there are no systematic deficiencies in its asylum system.
The CJEU once again highlighted the requirement to interpret and 
apply secondary EU law in accordance with fundamental rights guar-
anteed by the EUCFR and the prohibition of inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment as having a fundamental importance. The 
CJEU held that in circumstances in which the transfer of an asylum 
seeker with a particularly serious mental or physical illness would re-
sult in a real and proven risk of a significant and permanent deteriora-
tion in the state of health of the person concerned, that transfer would 
constitute inhuman and degrading treatment, within the meaning of 
Article 4 of the EUCFR.
Such a determination can be made irrespective of the level of med-
ical and psychological care offered by another Member State. Author-
ities, where necessary, are always required to take precautions or post-
pone the transfer of an asylum seeker so to prevent the violation of the 
prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment.
The issue of proper application of Dublin III Regulations was 
brought to the attention of the CJEU once again by the Slovenian pre-
11 France. Grounds for detention. Asylum Information Database, available at: 
http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/france/grounds-detention.
12 UK High Administrative Court: unlawful detention based on Al Chodor and 
disputed age assessment. European Database of Asylum Law, July 2017, available 
at: http://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/en/content/uk-high-administrative-court-
unlawful-detention-based-al-chodor-and-disputed-age-assessment.
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liminary question in the case A.S. (C-490/16). In its ruling the CJEU 
held that the right to an effective remedy requires that the national 
courts do examine, whether the criteria for determining responsibility 
of the Member State to examine the asylum application were correct-
ly applied. The fact that another Member State accepted the applicant 
does not restrict the scope of the judicial review.
Another interesting area appeared to be the evidentiary rules for de-
termining sexual orientation of an applicant in an asylum procedure. In 
the case F. (C-473/16), Hungarian court asked the CJEU about the ap-
propriateness of using projective personality tests in order to establish 
sexual orientation of an asylum seeker. Although, generally allowing 
for expert opinions in asylum procedures, the CJEU held, that using 
projective personality tests to establish sexual orientation of an asylum 
seeker violates his/her right to respect for private life, as the interfer-
ence is being disproportionate. Psychological tests should not be used 
to determine a sexual orientation of an applicant. National authorities 
can carry out a personal interview and assess the applicant statements 
according to the procedural standards laid down in the EU legislation.
This referral shows that the debate over the proper and dignified 
asylum procedure for asylum seekers from the LGBT community is 
relevant throughout the Member States, including the CEE countries. 
Member States, with the significant input from the Court of Justice, 
are trying to find the most appropriate procedure, that could recon-
cile the need to establish relevant facts in an asylum procedure with 
the requirement to protect the dignity and privacy of asylum seekers. 
By using preliminary questions mechanism CEE countries are actively 
participating and advancing this debate.
Courts and tribunals of CEE countries asked also for the rulings of 
the CJEU in cases of border control and visas.
The Latvian court referred a preliminary question concerning the 
right to appeal and a right to an effective judicial remedy against in-
fringements committed in the procedure, leading to a decision author-
izing entry into the Member State. In the case Zakaria (C-23/12), the 
CJEU held that border guards performing duties are required to fully 
respect human dignity. Should they fail this obligation, Member States 
need to provide appropriate legal remedy, in compliance with Article 
47 of the EUCFR (right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial).
The Polish Supreme Administrative Court referred a preliminary 
question concerning the right to the judicial control of Schengen visa 
refusal decision. In the case El Hassani (C-403/16), the CJEU referred 
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to the Article 47 of the EUCFR and held that appeal proceedings in 
such cases must, at a certain stage, guarantee a right to judicial appeal.
The abovementioned cases do not exhaust the activities of courts 
and tribunals from CEE countries when it comes to their engagement 
in the dialogue with the European Court on the interpretation of the 
Charter in the field of asylum and migration. Before the CJEU there 
are (as of July 2018) several significant pending preliminary questions 
originating from the CEE countries. Some of them concern: the scope 
of judicial review in asylum cases (mainly whether the court or tribu-
nal can amend administrative decision refusing international protec-
tion and grant such protection),13 the possibility to revoke or refuse a 
renewal of the refugee status based on security concerns,14 the concept 
of persecution for religious reasons15 and the influence of the right to 
protect family life on asylum procedure.16
6. (Possible) Preliminary Request from the Polish Courts
Until now, Polish courts made no preliminary reference in asylum 
cases, although several motions for a preliminary reference were lodged 
by lawyers within asylum proceedings.
Polish courts dealt with number of cases concerning entry refus-
al decisions issued to the third-country nationals trying to cross the 
external EU border. Third-country nationals claimed that the Border 
Guards ignored their asylum declarations. After being removed back to 
Belarus or Ukraine, they lodged appeals against entry refusal decisions. 
Those appeals also contained asylum declarations.
In the motions for a preliminary reference, third-country nation-
als argued that there is a need for an interpretation of Article 6 of the 
2013/32 Procedures Directive in the light of the Article 18 of the Char-
13 CJUE 22 September 2017, Case 556/17, Torubarov v. Bevàndorlàsi és 
Menekültügyi Hivatal. 
14 CJUE, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Nejvyšší správní soud (Czech 
Republic) lodged on 14 July 2016 Case 391/16, M. v. Ministerstvo vnitra 
15 CJUE, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad 
(Bulgaria) lodged on 3 February 2017, Case 56/17, Fahti v. Predsedatel na Darzhavna 
agentsia za bezhantsite.
16 CJUE, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad 
(Bulgaria) lodged on 19 December 2016, Case 652/16, Akhmedbekov v. Zamestnik-
predsedateł na Dyrżawna agencija za beżancite.
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ter in order to establish whether a third-country national can lodge an 
application for international protection in any form, including in the 
appeal against entry refusal decision. The Warsaw Regional Adminis-
trative Court dismissed those motions, stating that asylum declarations 
in appeals against entry refusal decisions are not made at the border of 
the Member State as it is done after the third-country national was re-
fused an entry into Poland and already removed to Belarus or Ukraine. 
Therefore it is out of the scope of the Procedures Directive.17
In another case, asylum applicants argued, that there is a need for the 
interpretation of the provision mentioned above (Article 6 of the 2013/32 
Procedures Directive) and asking the Court of Justice, whether present-
ing to the Border Guards at the border a written asylum declaration may 
be treated as “making” an asylum application?18 In this case both the Re-
gional Administrative Court in Warsaw and the Supreme Administrative 
Court decided to not request the CJEU for preliminary reference.
Another motion for a preliminary reference was made in the case of 
an applicant excluded from being a refugee. He was recognized as been 
guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions. According to the Polish law, in cases involving security matters, 
the applicant is not provided with any information about the basis of 
the exclusion. S/he has no access to the case files and the written rea-
sons of the decision are limited. The motion for a preliminary reference 
contained an argument that such a regulation may be not consistent 
with the Article 11 and Article 23 of the 2013/32 Procedures Directive, 
interpreted in the light of the rights of defence enshrined in the Article 
47 of the EUCFR. Those provisions do not foresee a possibility to lim-
it reasons of the decision when an application is rejected. In terms of 
access to case files, in cases involving security issues this right might be 
limited, but the Member States shall establish procedures guaranteeing 
that the applicant’s rights of defence is respected. In particular, they 
may grant access to classified information to a legal representative, who 
has undergone a security check; Poland legislation provides no such 
measures.
17 The Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw, judgment of 27 October 2017, 
IV SA/Wa 1846/17.
18 The Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw, judgments of 7 March 2018, IV 
SA/Wa 3095/17, the Supreme Administrative Court, judgment of 14 December 2018, 
II OSK 2511/18. Written reasons of the Supreme Administrative Court judgment are 
not prepared yet.
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The Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the above-
mentioned motion, stating that the court has a full access to all case 
files and has a duty to conduct an independent in-depth case analysis, 
therefore a rights of defence is observed in those cases. The Court also 
stated that the Ombudsperson may be treated as a “special representa-
tive” as Ombudsperson has an access to classified documents and may 
join any case pending before administrative and judicial bodies.19 Mo-
tion for the preliminary reference in this case was also dismissed by 
the Supreme Administratice Court (judgment of 23 November 2018, 
II OSK 1710/18).
It should be also noted that the Polish system of challenging asylum 
decisions differs significantly from the system provided by the 2013/32 
Procedures Directive. It could also give a reason for lodging a prelimi-
nary reference to the Court of Justice.
Article 46 of the 2013/32 Procedures Directive ensures a right to 
an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the decision tak-
en regarding application for international protection. It also states that 
Member States shall ensure that an effective remedy provides for a full 
and ex nunc examination of both facts and points of law, including, 
where applicable, an examination of the international protection needs, 
at least in appeals procedures before a court or tribunal of the first in-
stance. The directive also gives the applicants a right to remain in the 
territory pending the outcome of the remedy.
According to the Polish law an appeal against a negative asylum de-
cision is reviewed by the Refugee Board (Rada do Spraw Uchodźców), 
which provides full and ex nunc examination of both facts and points 
of law. However, the Refugee Board is an administrative body. It does 
not provide for an adversary proceedings and it is a party to a court’s 
proceedings questioning its decisions. Therefore the Board cannot be 
treated as a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 46 of the 
2013/32 Procedures Directive.20 The decision of the Refugee Board 
may be appealed to the administrative court. The administrative court 
however, provides only ex tunc examination of points of law. More-
19 The Regional Administrative Court in Warsaw, judgment of 24 November 
2017, IV SA/Wa 1612/17.
20 P. Dąbrowski, M. Kowalski, Rada do Spraw Uchodźców jako „sąd lub trybunał” 
w rozumieniu prawa Unii Europejskiej, in G. Baranowska, A. Gliszczyńska-Grabas, 
A. Hernandez-Połczyńska, K. Sękowska-Kozłowska, (Eds.), O prawach człowieka, 
Warsaw, 2017, 435-449.
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over, pending proceedings before the administrative court the appli-
cant has no right to remain at the territory of Poland. An appeal to the 
administrative court has no suspensive effect and a return procedure 
may be initiated and a return decision given. In practice, failed asylum 
seekers make subsequent applications and, by the virtue of law, the re-
turn decision cannot be executed when the second asylum application 
is being examined (deportation is possible only during the third and 
subsequent applications being reviewed).
Before 1 May 2014, when the current Act on Foreigners21 entered 
into force, in the decisions refusing international protection the admin-
istrative authorities also ordered the expulsion of the applicant. There 
were number of cases when a failed asylum seekers were returned be-
fore the expiry of the prescribed time limit for lodging an appeal to the 
administrative court, or before the court decided about a stay of their 
expulsion, or before it considered the appeal.22 The Supreme Adminis-
trative Court dismissed a motion for a preliminary reference in this re-
spect. The court stated that, although the applicant was expelled before 
the court decided about the appeal, the applicant managed to lodge the 
appeal, appeal was considered and the applicant was represented by the 
lawyer before the court.23 Such an argumentation is doubtful, as even 
if the administrative court revoked a decision, then the applicant could 
not effectively enjoy it, since he had already been expelled.
There are serious doubts whether in asylum cases Polish law pro-
vided and currently provides a right to an effective remedy before the 
court. This is the matter which might be solved by the judgment of the 
Court of Justice.
To conclude, Polish asylum legal system gives numerous oppor-
tunities for making a preliminary reference. The questions concerning 
the right to an effective remedy or the right to asylum are all relevant 
in the European and Polish context and require an interpretation of the 
EU law as well as the Charter. Unfortunately, despite having numerous 
opportunities, Polish courts did not yet decide to make a preliminary 
reference in this area.
21 Act of 13 December 2013 on Foreigners, Journal of Laws of 2013 item 1650.
22 Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, Expulsion of foreigner may violate 
their right to court, 2012, available at: http://www.hfhr.pl/en/expulsion-of-foreigner-
may-violate-their-right-to-court/.
23 The Supreme Administrative Court, judgement of 17 February 2017, II OSK 
1660/15.
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7. Conclusions
The preliminary reference procedure gives to the courts and tribu-
nals of the Member States a unique possibility to take an active part in 
the development and the unification of the EU asylum and migration 
law. Through preliminary references national courts and tribunals can 
ask for the interpretation of the EU law or question its validity.
Courts and tribunals from the CEE countries made several impor-
tant references to the CJEU in asylum and migration cases where the 
Charter was applicable. Bulgarian and Hungarian courts and tribunals 
should be praised for being the most active in engaging in the dialogue 
with the CJEU in cases relating to asylum and migration. The activity 
of those courts and tribunals cannot be entirely attributed to the refu-
gee crisis of 2015, as even before the massive influx of asylum seekers 
they were amongst the most active in terms of the number of prelimi-
nary references lodged. Yet, the refugee crisis certainly did influence the 
activity of national courts and tribunals of the CEE countries. When it 
comes to preliminary references in the field of asylum and migration, 
the majority of them was lodged by the analysed CEE countries in the 
years 2016-2017.
Courts and tribunals from the CEE countries are engaging in the 
European debate over asylum and migration issues through the prelim-
inary reference procedure. Unfortunately the activity of some of those 
countries is incompatible with the number of third-country nationals 
and asylum seekers on their territory. Not a single preliminary ques-
tion in the area of asylum was lodged from Poland, the CEE country 
that had the highest number of asylum applications before the refugee 
crisis. This situation cannot be explained by the lack of possibilities or 
the lack of cases before the national courts that could result in the pre-
liminary reference. In Poland in asylum and migration cases there were 
several motions to make a preliminary reference, yet all of them were 
dismissed. Current legal situation and legislative plans (introduction of 
border proceedings, introduction of new appeal authority in asylum 
procedure) seem to open new possibilities to ask the CJEU for a pre-
liminary ruling and thou participate in the European asylum debate. It 
is only up to the judges from the Polish courts and tribunals to either 
seize or once again miss the opportunity.
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1. Introduction
This paper discussed the major legal and reality challenges in the 
context of the recent refugee influx into Europe and, in particular, in 
the context of the creation of the 2015/2016 Western Balkans migra-
tion route. It will be suggested that the Western Balkans Route can be 
viewed as an alternative to breaching the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights. Following the introduction, the second section explains the 
situation on the Western Balkan route in 2015 and 2016 by offering 
the timeline of events across the Route. The third section discusses the 
discrepancy between the functioning of the Western Balkans route and 
the Dublin Regulation and places the discussion into the context of 
Member States’ Charter obligations. The fourth section focuses on the 
position of Greece and Croatia. The final section examines the conse-
quences of the Western Balkans Route and the judgments of the CJEU 
in A.S. and Jafari1 on Member States’ future behaviour, in particular 
the challenges in their compliance with the Charter and Convention 
obligations.
* Iris Goldner Lang is Jean Monnet Professor of EU Law and Holder of the 
UNESCO Chair on Free Movement of People, Migration and Inter-Cultural Dialogue, 
University of Zagreb. This text is based on the following paper: I. Goldner Lang, 
Croatia and EU Asylum Law: Playing on the Sidelines or at the Centre of Events?, 
in V. Stoyanova, E. Karageorgiou (eds.), The New Asylum and Transit Countries in 
Europe During and in the Aftermath of the 2015/2016 Crisis, Brill, 2018, pp. 93-112.
1 CJEU 26.07.2017, Case C-490/16, A.S. v Slovenia; CJEU 26.07.2017, Case 
C-646/16, Jafari. 
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2. The Western Balkan Route - Timeline
The Western Balkans route was a corridor created in 2015 which 
enabled the passage of hundreds of thousands of refugees transiting 
mostly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, through Greece, FYROM, 
Serbia and Hungary, with the intention of reaching Germany.2 On 15 
September 2015 the route changed from Hungary to Croatia, when 
Hungary closed its border with Serbia, alongside its construction of 
a border fence along its 175-kilometre border with Serbia. The Serbi-
an government, consequently, decided to redirect the refugee flow to 
Croatia. Croatia, on the other hand, directed the refugee flow further 
to Slovenia, as Hungary closed its border with Croatia on 16 October 
2015 and constructed a border fence along the 348-kilometre Hungar-
ian-Croatian border.
Following the German government’s decision to reduce the num-
ber of asylum seekers in the country, in January 2016 Germany started 
allowing the entry of only those migrants who intended to seek asylum 
in Germany. This move was followed by Austria and it soon produced 
a chain reaction on the Western Balkans route by Slovenia, Croatia, 
Serbia and FYROM, which closed its border with Greece.3 Soon af-
terwards, in February 2016, Austria set a daily cap of 80 asylum ap-
plications and of no more than 3,200 migrant entries into its territory.4 
This move was followed by Croatia and Slovenia, which decided on 26 
February 2016 to impose a daily cap of 580 migrants.5
2 Since the start of the refugee influx on 16 September 2015 until the closure of the 
Western Balkans route on 8 March 2016, an estimated 658,068 refugees and migrants 
– mostly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, but also from other countries – transited 
through Croatia. See here: Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan for Europe: 
Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans Route, UNHCR, 2016 (available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/577220cf7.pdf - last accessed on 16 October 2017). See also the 
press release of the Croatian Ministry of Interior (available at: https://www.mup.hr/
novosti/364/priopcenje-za-javnost - last accessed on 16 October 2017). 
3 Balkan states attempt to limit numbers of refugees claiming asylum, The 
Guardian, 20 January 2016 (available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
jan/20/balkan-states-attempt-to-limit-numbers-of-refugees-claiming-asylum - last 
accessed on 16 October 2017). 
4 J. Rankin, Austria Dismisses Criticism of its Plan to Limit Daily Refugee 
Numbers, 18 February 2016 (available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
feb/18/austria-dismisses-criticism-of-its-plan-to-limit-daily-refugee-numbers - last 
accessed on 16 October 2016). 
5 J. Rankin, Croatia and Slovenia Impose Limits on Refugee Numbers, 26 February 
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On 11 November 2015 Slovenia started constructing a wire fence 
along its border with Croatia and, just several days later, on 19 Novem-
ber 2015, it decided to allow the entry of only those migrants “from 
countries where there is armed conflict”, thus triggering a chain re-
action in Croatia, Serbia and the FYROM.6 Consequently, the then 
Croatian minister of the interior stated that Croatia would allow in 
migrants from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestinians.7
The restrictions along the Western Balkans route continued to esca-
late in January and February 2016. Finally, at the meeting of the heads 
of police services of the Western Balkans countries, held in Zagreb on 
18 February 2016, it was agreed that entry would be allowed only for 
those individuals who had a valid travel document and a visa or a res-
idence permit, or who were arriving from war-torn areas and were in 
need of international protection, provided they could prove their na-
tionality and were in possession of a registration form issued by Greek 
authorities.8
On 7 March 2016 the EU heads of state or government held a meet-
ing with Turkey to find modes of cooperation in the context of the ref-
ugee influx. The meeting led to an agreement on the outlines of the fu-
ture deal with Turkey reached on 18 March 2016.9 This resulted in the 
Statement of the EU Heads of State or Government proclaiming that 
“irregular flows of migrants along the Western Balkans route have now 
come to an end”.10 In effect, from 8 March 2016 the countries along the 
Western Balkans route closed their borders for migration flows and 
stated they would accept only those individuals travelling with valid 
2016 (available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/feb/26/croatia-slovenia-
limits-refugee-numbers-europe-greece - last accessed on 16 October 2016). 
6 P. Teffer, Balkan Countries Close Borders to Economic Migrants, in EUobserver, 
20 November 2015 (https://euobserver.com/migration/131192 - last accessed on 16 
October 2017). 
7 Ibid.
8 Joint Statement of Heads of Police Services from the Meeting Held in Zagreb, 
Croatia on 18th February 2016, points 5 and 6 (available at: https://www.mup.hr/
UserDocsImages/topvijesti/2016/veljaca/migranti_sastanak/joint_statement.pdf - last 
accessed on 16 October 2017). 
9 EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016 (available at: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/ - last accessed on 
16 October 2017). 
10 See point 2 in the Statement, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2016/03/07-eu-turkey-meeting-statement/ (last accessed on 16 
October 2017). 
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documents and visas or who planned to request asylum or sought entry 
for humanitarian reasons.11
3. Dublin Transfers and the Western Balkans Route - Where Law and 
Reality Diverge
The functioning of the Western Balkans route represents a clear de-
parture from EU rules, in particular the Dublin Regulation. Art. 13(1) 
of the Dublin Regulation stipulates that the Member State responsible 
for examining an asylum application is the state whose border the asy-
lum applicant first crossed irregularly when coming from a third coun-
try. If asylum rules do not apply to a third-country national (TCN), the 
entry conditions of a TCN to the territory of a Member State are reg-
ulated by Art. 6(1) of the Schengen Borders Code which stipulates that 
the TCN has to have a valid travel document and a valid visa. TCNs 
should also be able to justify the purpose and conditions of their in-
tended stay and show that they have sufficient means of subsistence, 
both for the duration of the intended stay and for the return journey.12 
Exceptionally, a TCN who does not fulfil one or more of the above 
conditions may be granted entry on humanitarian grounds, on grounds 
of national interest or because of international obligations. However, as 
will be shown in the analysis of the CJEU’s judgment in A.S. and Jafari, 
the exception based on humanitarian grounds was not applicable to the 
developments on the Western Balkans route.13
The migrants on the Western Balkans route were not applying 
for asylum either in the EU state of their first entry (Greece) or in 
the Western Balkans countries, among them Croatia as the second 
EU Member State on the Western Balkans route. Instead, they were 
transiting through several EU and non-EU states until they came to 
the EU Member State of their desired destination (mostly Germany) 
11 Euractive, Balkan Route ‘closed’ after cascade of border shutdowns, 9 March 
2016 (available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/balkan-
route-closed-after-cascade-of-border-shutdowns/ - last accessed on 16 October 2017). 
12 Art. 6(1)(a), (b) and (c) of Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code). 
13 Art. 6(5)(c) of the Schengen Borders Code. For another exception, which is not 
relevant for the developments on the Western Balkans route, see Art. 6(5)(a) of the 
Schengen Borders Code. 
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and applied for asylum there. On the other hand, Greece, Croatia 
and other countries on the Western Balkans route did not apply the 
Schengen Borders Code and, thus, they did not prevent the entry of 
irregular migrants into their respective territories, but facilitated their 
further movement to other states along the route. The transit of mi-
grants on the Western Balkans route was organised by the states along 
the route, which sometimes (allegedly), contrary to the Eurodac Reg-
ulation, did not fingerprint and register the migrants before further 
transit.
Clearly, there was a tacit agreement between the Western Balkans 
states and the migrants transiting the route not to apply the Dublin 
rules. Further, there was an agreement among the states on the West-
ern Balkans route to organise and run the route contrary to the Dub-
lin rules. This was the direct consequence of two factors. First, it was 
prompted by the German willingness to take all the migrants and ex-
amine their asylum claims itself. The states on the route were allowing 
entry and transit of migrants as long as Germany was ready to accept 
them on its territory. Second, the Western Balkans route was the direct 
consequence of the states’ realisation that the alternative to not allow-
ing migrants’ entry into their respective territories would have been to 
leave hundreds of thousands of migrants stranded at national borders 
in degrading conditions which would have led to a humanitarian ca-
tastrophe and to the respective states’ breach of Art. 3 of the ECHR 
and Art. 4 of the Charter.14
Therefore, the extraordinary developments on the Western Balkans 
route can only be understood in light of the following five circum-
stances: first, the extremely high number of migrants who were transit-
ing the route in groups and not individually; second, the willingness of 
the migrants to take the route and not to apply for asylum in the state 
of first entry; third, the German open-border migration policy; fourth, 
the fact that the route was facilitated and run by the states; and fifth, the 
fact that the states on the Western Balkans route did not want to create 
a humanitarian crisis and breach their Charter and Convention obli-
gations. These five factors arguably justified and legitimised the route 
despite the fact that it ran counter to the Dublin rules.
14 In that respect, see the statement of AG Sharpston in Case 490/16, A.S. v 
Slovenia and Case 646/16 Jafari, para. 174. 
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4. The Western Balkans route and the Position of Greece and Croatia
The migrants on the Western Balkans route entered the EU via 
Greece. Therefore, Greece was the state of first irregular entry under 
the Dublin rules. However, the Greek situation was unique in that re-
spect, as Dublin transfers to Greece could not take place. Even though 
Greece was the state of first entry on the Western Balkans route, since 
the two groundbreaking judgments in MSS15 and NS16 in 2011, all Dub-
lin transfers to Greece had been suspended due to systemic deficien-
cies in the Greek asylum procedures and its reception conditions.17 The 
judgments in MSS and NS revealed the inaccuracy of the premise that 
all EU Member States provide an adequate level of quality and efficien-
cy in the asylum procedure and ensure a satisfactory level of protection 
of asylum seekers’ fundamental rights. In MSS, the ECtHR concluded 
that both Greece, as the state of the asylum seeker’s first entry into the 
EU, and Belgium, as the transferring state, violated Article 3 ECHR 
(which prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment) and also Article 13 ECHR (which proclaims the right to an ef-
fective remedy).
On the other hand, in NS the CJEU relied on the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and held that the presumption that Member States 
are observing the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter is re-
butted when there are systemic deficiencies in asylum procedures and 
in the reception conditions of asylum seekers.18 The Court of Justice, 
however, emphasised that not every violation of fundamental rights 
would suffice to rebut the presumption, but rather that the system-
ic deficiencies need to amount to a real risk of inhuman or degrading 
treatment of asylum seekers in the sense of Article 4 of the Charter.
15 ECtHR, MSS v Belgium and Greece, Application number 30696/09, 21 January 
2011.
16 CJEU 21.12.2011, Joined cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, NS v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department and ME and Others v Refugee Applications Commissioner 
and Minister for Justice, Equality and Law. 
17 The judgments in MSS and NS were followed by the subsequent ECtHR and 
CJEU judgments in Abdullahi (Case C-394/12 Shamso Abdullahi v Bundesasylamt, 
10.12.2013), Tarakhel (Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application no. 29217/12 (ECtHR, 
4 November 2014)) and C.K. v Slovenia (Case C-578/16 PPU, C.K. v Slovenia, 
16.02.2017).
18 The CJEU’s judgment in NS was embraced in Article 3(2) of the Dublin III 
Regulation.
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During the existence of the Western Balkans route, the serious de-
ficiencies of the Greek asylum system persisted.19 As a consequence, 
based on Art. 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation – despite the fact that 
Greece was the state of first entry – its non-compliance with Art. 13(1) 
could not result in Dublin transfers to Greece.
The next EU Member State on the Western Balkans route was 
Croatia. Based on the CJEU’s rulings in A.S. and Jafari, Croatia was 
deemed responsible under the Dublin rules. The cases concerned Syri-
an and Afghan nationals who applied to asylum in Slovenia (A.S.) and 
Austria (Jafari), but the Slovenian/Austrian authorities asked Croatia 
to take charge, considering Croatia as the state of first entry (as trans-
fers to Greece could not take place). The Court decided that entries 
of TCNs to Croatia that were taking place during the existence of the 
Western Balkans route must be regarded as “irregular crossings” “ir-
respective of whether they were tolerated or authorised in breach of 
the applicable rules or whether they were authorised on humanitarian 
grounds by way of derogation from the entry conditions generally im-
posed on TCNs”.20 According to the Court, the fact that such a cross-
ing took place in the context of the arrival of an unusually large number 
of TCNs could not affect the irregular character of the crossing.21 The 
only instance where the responsibility of the state of irregular cross-
ing could be precluded would be the case where Dublin transfers to 
that state could lead to a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment of 
the transferee, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter.22 Con-
sequently, EU Member States in which the asylum applicants, who 
transited the Western Balkans route, lodged their asylum application 
are entitled to carry out Dublin transfers to Croatia provided the three-
month time limit, as interpreted by the Court in Mengesteab, has not 
19 See the Commission Recommendations of 10 February 2016 (Commission 
Recommendation of 10 February 2016 addressed to the Hellenic Republic on the urgent 
measures to be taken by Greece in view of the resumption of transfers under Regulation 
(EU) No 604/2013 – C(2016) 871 final), 15 June 2016 (Commission Recommendation 
of 15 June 2016 addressed to the Hellenic Republic on the specific urgent measures to 
be taken by Greece in view of the resumption of transfers under Regulation (EU) No 
604/2013 – C(2016) 3805 final)and 8 December 2016 (Commission Recommendation 
of 8.12. 2016. addressed to the Member States on the resumption of transfers to Greece 
under Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, December 8, 2016, C(2016) 8525 final). 
20 Para. 92 in Jafari. 
21 Para. 93 in Jafari. 
22 Para. 101 in Jafari. 
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been exceeded. In reality, the three-month deadline was exceeded with 
the vast majority of TCNs transiting the Route, so only a minor frac-
tion of TCNs could be transferred back to Croatia.23
5. Concluding Remarks
The Western Balkans Route and the judgements of the Court of 
Justice in A.S. and Jafari can have serious implications for future Mem-
ber States’ behaviour in case of a new crisis. It is highly unlikely that 
Member States would allow or facilitate the creation of a new tran-
sit route through their territories, as this would breach their EU law 
obligations and enable numerous Dublin transfers to their territories. 
Consequently, in the case of a new refugee influx, an EU Member State 
confronted with a high number of TCNs on its borders, will have to 
decide whether to allow or block entry, and bear the consequences of its 
actions either way. If a Member State decides to admit numerous asy-
lum seekers to its territory – without a transit route or another mech-
anism to distribute more evenly the arriving asylum seekers across the 
EU – it might exceed its asylum capacities, thus leading to inhuman or 
degrading treatment of those admitted and a breach of Article 4 of the 
Charter and Article 3 of the ECHR. On the other hand, such a Member 
State might decide to prevent TCNs, who do not fulfil the conditions 
contained in the Schengen Borders Code, from entering its territory by 
erecting border fences or a wall, as was the case with Hungary during 
the operation of the Western Balkans route. The creation of such bar-
riers could redirect the passage of TCNs to another state, but it could 
leave numerous migrants stranded in inhuman and degrading condi-
tions, again creating a breach of Article 4 of the Charter and Article 3 
of the ECHR. Whichever pattern of behaviour Member States choose 
to take, it could lead to their breach of both the Dublin Regulation and 
their obligations stemming from the Charter and the Convention.
23 CJEU 26.07.2017, Case 670/16 Mengesteab. 
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1. Containing Asylum-Seekers in Post-Revolutionary Libya
The focus of the European Union (EU) on the external dimension 
of asylum and migration policy, including the concern “to strengthen 
the capacity of countries in North Africa to intervene,” is not new.1 It is 
an expression of the realisation that upholding human rights commit-
ments and securing borders involves an inevitable tension.2 The Libyan 
case represents a disturbing example of the consequences of the trend3 
of systematically prioritising border security.
* Adel-Naim Reyhani is a Researcher at the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of 
Human Rights in Vienna; Carlos Gómez del Tronco is an Early Stage Researcher 
at University College London; Matthias Nikolaus Mayer is a Junior Researcher on 
Migration at the University of Vienna.
1 Already in 1994, the European Commission had proposed a strong focus on 
cooperation with third countries.
2 In the European Agenda on Migration (COM/2015/0240 final), this realisation 
is formulated as follows: “Upholding our international commitments and values while 
securing our borders and at the same time creating the right conditions for Europe’s 
economic prosperity and societal cohesion is a difficult balancing act that requires 
coordinated action at the European level”.
3 For an encompassing analysis of this concern, see V. Moreno-Lax, Accessing 
Asylum in Europe, Oxford, 2017.
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1.1. A Transit Country
In the second half of the twentieth century, Libya transformed into 
a transit country for migration.4 The country’s oil reserves had attracted 
large numbers of foreign workers since the 1960s, but despite this early 
influx, Libya never set a consistent and effective legal framework for the 
protection of migrants or asylum-seekers. Instead, guarantees were high-
ly dependent on factors such as foreign policy shifts, oil recessions and 
the impact of international sanctions.5 In the 1990s, a foreign policy ori-
entation towards sub-Saharan Africa, combined with an open approach 
to migration from that region,6 influenced the flows into Libya.7 More 
stringent border security measures in Morocco and Tunisia resulting 
from cooperation with the EU,8 as well as xenophobic riots that pushed 
African migrants out of Libya,9 later turned the country into a hub for 
migration between Africa and mainly Italy in the early 2000s.10
Italy first responded within the framework of the “deterrence par-
adigm”.11 While the EU country sought to prevent the increasing de-
4 M.O. Attir, North African Regular and Irregular Migration: The Case of Libya, 
in New England Journal of Public Policy, 2018, pp. 1-4.
5 S. Hamood, African Transit Migration through Libya to Europe: The Human 
Cost, 2006, pp. 19-22.
6 A significant contribution was the creation of the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CENSAD) in 1998, whose establishing treaty enshrined the principle of free 
movement. 
7 G. Joffé, E. Paoletti, Libya’s Foreign Policy: Drivers and Objectives, 2010, p. 8; 
M. Toaldo, Migrations Through and From Libya: A Mediterranean Challenge, in IAI 
Working Papers 15|14, 2015, p. 7. 
8 N. Abdel Aziz, P. Monzini, F. Pastore, The Changing Dynamics of Cross-
border Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the Mediterranean, report for New-Med 
Research Network, 2015, pp. 32-33. 
9 S. Bredeloup, O. Pliez, The Libyan Migration Corridor, in P. Fargues, D. 
Papademetriou (ed.), Improving EU and US Immigration Systems’ Capacity for 
Responding to Global Challenges: Learning from experiences, San Domenico di Fiesole, 
2011, pp. 7-8.
10 Ibid.; Amnesty International, Libya’s dark web of collusion: Abuses Against 
Europe-Bound Refugees and Migrants, London, 2017, p. 12; IOM, Four Decades of 
Cross-Mediterranean Undocumented Migration to Europe, A Review of the Evidence, 
Geneva, 2017, pp. 10-11; Altai Consulting, Leaving Libya: Rapid Assessment of 
Municipalities of Departure of Migrants in Libya, 2017, p. 23; Guardia Costiera, 2017 
SAR Operations in the Mediterranean Sea, 2018, p. 5.
11 According to this perspective, the dominant approach of developed states to 
the refugee protection crisis has been setting barriers towards accessing asylum. The 
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parture of migrants, Muammar Gaddafi wanted to reconcile his broken 
ties with Europe, which led to a significant intensification of the co-
operation.12 Eventually, in 2012 the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) found that an Italian push-back operation conducted within 
the framework of this partnership in May 2009 had violated the non-re-
foulement principle.13 The ruling naturally challenged Italy’s approach 
to migration control.
The Libyan revolution of 2011 and, more significantly, the ensuing 
civil war of 2014 contributed to a dramatic increment in the number of 
assumption underlying this approach is that states could absolve themselves from 
responsibility by “maintaining a formal commitment to international refugee law, 
while at the same time largely being spared the associated burdens” (T. Gammeltoft-
Hansen, N.F. Tan, The End of the Deterrence Paradigm? Future Directions for Global 
Refugee Policy, in JMHS Volume 5 Number 1, New York, 2017, pp. 4, 28-56).
12 S. Bredeloup, O. Pliez, Ibidem, pp. 8-9. From the mid-2000s until the fall of 
Gaddafi, several EU projects worked on boosting the migration management capacities 
of Libya. Human rights organisations criticised the cooperation because of the many 
human rights violations of migrants detained in Libya (M. Akkerman, Expanding 
the Fortress - The Policies, the Profiteers and the People Shaped by EU’s Border 
Externalisation Programme, Amsterdam, 2018, pp. 44-45). In addition, strict visa laws 
were imposed on foreigners in Libya under threat of fines or imprisonment in the 
country’s detention centres; amendments to Law 6 of 1987 introduced these restrictions 
through Law 2 of 1372 (2004) (S. Hamood, African Transit Migration, p. 20). Italy 
and Libya established bilateral police and readmission collaboration through formal 
and informal arrangements. In the early 2000s, tighter joint migration management 
arrangements between Libya and Italy, including police cooperation as well as more 
informal measures, favoured higher numbers of repatriations, apprehensions and even 
push-backs of migrants and asylum-seekers (see P. Cuttitta, Readmission and Forcibly 
Return in the Relations between Italy and North African Mediterranean Countries, 
paper for the Ninth Mediterranean Research Meeting, 2008, pp. 5-6; also E. Paoletti, 
F. Pastore, Sharing the dirty job on the Southern front? Italian–Libyan relations on 
migration and their impact on the European Union, Oxford, 2010, pp. 11-12). Similar 
practices were present in Italian bilateral cooperation with other North-African states 
(see E. Paoletti, Migration Agreements between Italy and North Africa: Domestic 
Imperatives versus International Norms, Middle East Institute, 19 December 2012). 
The most notable legal framework for Libyan-Italian cooperation in migration control 
was the 2008 “Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation” In this document, 
amongst other goals, Italy committed to sharing satellite information, conducting 
patrols with mixed crews, donating boats and building up a satellite system to control 
Libya’s territory; for an analysis of the treaty see N. Ronzitti, The Treaty on Friendship, 
Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya: New Prospects for Cooperation 
in the Mediterranean?, in Bulletin of Italian Politics, 2009, pp. 125-133.
13 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, Application No. 27765/09, Judgement 
of 23 February 2012. 
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crossings to Italy and drownings in the Central Mediterranean Route.14 
Smugglers took advantage of the power vacuum in the North African 
country to strengthen their role and networks. Italy had to react to this 
new situation, but this time without Gaddafi as an interlocutor and the 
dimensions of the predicament of asylum-seekers becoming exceeding-
ly worrisome.
At this point, the ensuing response of the Italian government was 
to prioritise Search and Rescue (SAR) missions.15 As the 2012 ECtHR 
ruling had implied, Libya could not be considered a safe place, leading 
to the disembarkation of individuals and groups rescued in the high-
seas in Italy.16 After this one-year interlude, the EU decided to establish 
missions that would again prioritise deterrence.17
14 UNHCR, Desperate Journeys, February 2017, pp. 6-7; IOM, 2017, p. 26; see 
also Frontex Annual Risk Analysis for the period 2012-2015.
15 Two fatal shipwrecks in early October 2013 mobilised Italy to assume de-facto 
SAR responsibilities outside of Libyan territorial waters through Operation Mare 
Nostrum. Amnesty International claims that there were 560 casualties as a result of both 
incidents, but sources differ significantly on the numbers (see Amnesty International, 
2017, p. 17). The mandate of Mare Nostrum was divided into two main pillars, namely 
conducting SAR missions and fighting smuggling. Its operational zone overlapped 
with the SAR areas of Malta and Libya, thus obtaining a strategic position for the 
interception of departing boats (see Amnesty International, Lives Adrift: Refugees and 
Migrants in Peril in the Central Mediterranean, 2014, pp. 24-26).
16 Amnesty International, 2017, p. 17. Having saved more than 100,000 people 
during its first nine months of existence (A. BUSONERO, Operazione “Mare 
Nostrum”: Una Grande Operazione Umanitaria, in Informazioni della Difesa 4/2014, 
Rome, 2014, p. 16.), Mare Nostrum was discontinued in October 2014, accused of 
constituting a pull factor for human smuggling and with Italy unwilling to further 
carry the financial burden on its own (S. Panebianco, The Mare Nostrum Operation 
and the SAR approach: the Italian response to address the Mediterranean migration 
crisis, in EUMedEA JMWPS 03-2016, 2016, p. 15).
17 The European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) began the modest 
Joint Operation Triton in November 2014, limited to operating in areas much closer to 
Italy’s coast. The primary focus of the operation was on border control (S. Panebianco, 
2016, p. 16; S. Carrera, L. Den Hertog, Whose Mare? Rule of Law Challenges in the 
Field of European Border Surveillance in the Mediterranean, CEPS paper in Liberty 
and Security in Europe, 2015, p. 9). Contrary to initial expectations, however, 
departures and deaths at sea increased again after the winter months of 2014 to 2015. 
See the IOM website dedicated to documenting fatalities on migration routes, available 
at https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean (accessed 24 May 2018); also 
UNHCR, 2017, pp. 6-7. On 18 April 2015, a shipwreck left more than 600 casualties 
off Sicily’s coast and on 22 June 2015, two further ones took the lives of approximately 
1,200 people (European Political Strategy Centre, Irregular Migration via the Central 
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1.2. The Road to Libya: The Case of Niger
With the emergence of Libya as the most relevant country of depar-
ture towards Italy from Africa from 2012 onwards,18 Niger has risen in 
importance as a country of transit to the shores of North Africa. From a 
geostrategic perspective, the vast country connects Western Africa with 
Libya and Algeria, and despite various security threats in the country, 
Mediterranean - From Emergency Responses to Systemic Solutions, EPSC Strategic 
Notes, issue 22, 2017, p. 3). The EU responded to these incidents by reinforcing its efforts: 
on the one hand by setting up the military mission EU Naval Force Mediterranean 
(later rebranded Operation Sophia) in June 2015. Operation Sophia’s initial core 
mandate, namely the disrupting of smuggling and human trafficking networks, was 
later expanded twice. By June 2016, two tasks were added, namely training the Libyan 
coast guards and navy, and contributing to implementing the UN arms embargo on the 
high seas off the coast of Libya. On July 2017, surveillance activities and information 
gathering on trafficking, including information on crude oil and other illegal exports 
that are contrary to UNSCR 2146 (2014) and UNSCR 2362 (2017) were incorporated 
to the mandate of the mission; so were the set up a monitoring mechanism of the 
long-term efficiency of the training of the coast guard, as well as the enhancement of 
the possibility for sharing information on human trafficking with member state law 
enforcement agencies, Frontex, and Europol (see Council Decision(CFSP) 2017/1385 
of 25 July 2017 amending Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military 
operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean). While successful in the capture 
and disposal of vessels and arrests of suspected low-rank smugglers, the Operation’s 
direct effect on the deterrence of migrant flows has been limited (C. Loschi, L. Rainieri, 
F. Strazzari, The Implementation of EU Crisis Response in Libya: Bridging Theory 
and Practice, D6.2 Working Paper for EUNPACK project, 2018, pp. 3-4). In parallel 
to the establishment of Operation Sophia, Operation Triton moved southwards to 
operate within the Maltese SAR area in July 2015 (European Political Strategy Centre, 
2017, p. 3). Despite not being expressly tasked with SAR, both missions conducted a 
significant number of rescues (Guardia Costiera, 2018, p. 14). The recently launched 
Joint Operation Themis has replaced Triton in 2018, this time covering a much broader 
portion of the Mediterranean; the operation was launched on 1 February 2018 but 
operational details remain scarce to this day. For the initial press release, see Frontex, 
Frontex Launching New Operation in Central Med, 1 February 2018. In March 
2018, a request was made to access the operational plan of the mission, but eventually 
Frontex refused. The full request is found at https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/
operational_plan_for_operation_t?unfold=1#incoming-16618 (accessed 29 May 2018). 
Concerning Italy, the mission is expected to be operating within 24 nautical miles off 
the Italian coast (far from the 138 nautical miles with which Triton was tasked in July 
2015), see Reuters, In New EU Sea Mission, Ships Not Obliged to Bring Migrants to 
Italy, 1 February 2018.
18 Altai Consulting, Irregular Migration between West Africa, North Africa and 
the Mediterranean, November 2015, p. 39. 
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Niger benefits from a situation of relative stability.19 Additionally, Ni-
ger has long granted a liberal application of the free movement proto-
col of the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOW-
AS).20 Until a crackdown on migration in 2016, the most common and 
a comparably safe way of travelling to Agadez, a city at the outskirts 
of the Teneré desert, was by bus.21 From there on, asylum-seekers and 
other migrants had to rely on private facilitators for the further journey 
through the perilous desert, where transnational networks of semi-no-
madic tribes and age-old trading and smuggling paths have been used 
to move onwards to the Libyan border.22 These services were intrinsi-
cally linked to informal taxes and bribes paid to state authorities23 and 
led to the establishment of an economy based on migration24 that was 
more or less intact until 2016.25
EU cooperation with Niger in migration control is distinct from the 
Libyan case due to Niger’s relative political stability, which, although 
tenuous, allows the implementation of on-ground support for border 
enforcement as well as jurisdictional measures. Niger presents itself as a 
reliable and trustworthy partner to the EU, pledging to take migration 
control measures to “please the European partners”.26 This cooperation is 
feared to bear risks for the country’s social cohesion, which is built upon 
19 The relativity of this often-stated stability must be stressed; it is in contrast to 
war ridden countries such as Libya and Mali, that Niger – on whose territory currently 
several terrorist groups are active, and which saw a two year-long armed rebellion 
merely a decade ago – can be considered relatively stable. 
20 J. Bergmann, J. Lehmann, T. Munsch, W. Powell, Protection Fallout: How 
increasing Capacity for Border Management Affects Migrants‘ Vulnerabilities in Niger 
and Mali, November 2017, p. 25. Altai Consulting, Mixed Migration Trends in Libya, 
February 2017, p. 87. 
21 A. Hoffmann, J. Meester, H.M. Nabara, Migration and Markets in Agadez, 
October 2017, p. 19.
22 J. Bergmann, J. Lehmann, T. Munsch, W. Powell, 2017, p. 25.
23 P. Tinti, T. Reitano, Migrant, Refugee, Smuggler, Saviour, London, 2016, p. 180. 
Not only have bribes been a widespread and accepted phenomenon, they were considered 
essential for the functioning of Niger’s chronically underfunded security forces. 
24 A. Hoffmann, J. Meester, H.M. Nabara, 2017, p. 19. A wide variety of economic 
sectors such as the provision of shelter and nutrition, money transfer operators and 
other services have obviously been linked to transportation business thus providing 
livelihoods for considerable parts of the population in the Agadez region. 
25 G. Zandonini, The Monday that Changed Migration in Niger, Open Migration, 
15 January 2018.
26 D. Howden, G. Zandonini, Niger: Europe’s Migration Laboratory, News 
Deeply, 5 May 2018.
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a fragile basis intrinsically connected to economic opportunities that 
originate from the influx and transit of large numbers of migrants.27 A 
major legislative turn in favour of EU policies28 was the 2015 law against 
human smuggling (commonly known as Loi 36)29 drafted with the assis-
tance of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).30 
Shortly after its entry into force, the Nigerien government requested one 
billion Euros for the implementation of the law.31 Considering that mi-
gration has long been a driver of economic development rather than a 
criminal activity,32 it is not unreasonable to assume that Niger was en-
couraged by European actors to pass the law.33 The European Commis-
sion pledged one billion euros to Niger for the timeframe of 2017-2020,34 
including direct budgetary aid and projects implemented under the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF).35 These projects amount to 
229 million euro and are primarily geared towards migration control and 
security concerns.36 Furthermore, EUCAP Sahel37 supports Nigerien se-
curity forces in combating irregular migration.38
27 D. Davitti, A.E. Ursu, Why Securitising the Sahel Won’t Stop Migration, FMU 
Policy Brief No. 02/2018, University of Nottingham, p. 3. 
28 A. Massalaki, Niger Passes Law to Tackle Migrant Smuggling, First in West 
Africa, Reuters, 12 May 2018.
29 The text of Loi 36/2015 relative au trafic illicite de migrants can be found at 
https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/loi-relative-au-trafic-illicite-de-migrants_
html/Niger-_trafic_illicite_de_migrants.pdf (accessed 13 November 2018). 
30 UNODC, Niger becomes the first Sahel country to legislate against human 
smuggling, 2015. 
31 Y.S.S. Barima, B. Brice, Niger Tells Europe it Needs 1bn Euros to Fight Illegal 
Immigration, Reuters, 2016. T. Reitano, Further Criminalizing People will not Work, 
News Deeply, 30 September 2016.
32 P. Tinti, The EU’s Hollow Success Over Migrant Smuggling in Niger, News 
Deeply, 17 January 2017. 
33 J. Tubiana, C. Warin, G.M. Saeneen, Multilateral Damage: Effects of EU Policies 
in Niger, Clingendael, September 2018, p. 23. European Council On Foreign Relations, 
Migration through the Mediterranean, 2018.
34 European Commission, EU will support Niger with assistance of 1€ billon by 
2020, 13 December 2017.
35 European Commission, Cooperation de l‘UE avec le Niger, 13 December 2017. 
36 European Commission, Trust Fund for Africa: Niger; for a critical view of the 
EUTF see: Concord, Partnership or Conditionality?, Brussels, 2018.
37 EUCAP Sahel Niger, Support on Security issues in Agadez, 15 December 2017.
38 European Union External Action Service, Factsheet EUCAP Sahel Niger, 
April 2016. Upon its foundation in 2012 migration control was not included in its 
mandate, but after a 2014 repositioning the institution’s focus is said to have shifted 
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To illustrate the Niger-related migration dynamics against the back-
drop of connection with the consequences of EU cooperation with the 
country, we may look at possible scenario involving the hypothetical 
example of a potential asylum-seeker from the North-East of Nigeria.39 
There, challenges with Boko Haram are far from being resolved. In 
the second quarter of 2018, limited progress in the fight against the ex-
tremist group40 led to an increase in attacks and civilian casualties, both 
in remote areas as well as in urban centres.41 This situation of extreme 
violence has so far pushed more than 2.4 million people out of their 
homes and has led to more than 220,000 persons fleeing the country.42 
The crisis is most present in the Lake Chad Basin – in the border region 
of Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger – causing unrest and violence 
in all of these countries.43
It is especially in such circumstances that the flight process is marked 
by “fluid decision-making and fragmented journeys”.44 Europe is not 
always the originally intended destination, but accumulating factors of 
insecurity as well as economic precarity in the hosting communities 
may lead people to move onwards. Beyond this, factors such as per-
sonal connections, relatives in a host country or access to smuggling 
networks may inform the choice.45
In the case of a person from Nigeria’s Borno state seeking a safe place 
to reside, logistical questions may arise when attempting to access protec-
tion in other regions of the country due to limited freedom of movement.46 
widely towards migration control, see D. Howden, G. Zandonini: Migration, Niger at 
a Crossroads, The African Report, 24 July 2018.
39 Up until the beginning of September 2018 about 20.000 persons have reached 
the shores of Italy, roughly 6% of which are Nigerian. This represents a sharp decline 
both in absolute and relative numbers in comparison to 2017, where in the same period 
of time 17.000 persons or about 16% were of Nigerian descent. See IOM, Mixed 
Migration Flows in the Mediterranean August 2018, 2 October 2018.
40 O.S. Mahmood, Despite its Division Boko Haram is no Weaker, Institute for 
Security Studies, June 2018. 
41 UNHCR, Regional Update Nigeria, October 2018. 
42 UNHCR, Regional Update Nigeria, September 2018.
43 Ibid. 
44 V. Squire, A. Dimitriadi, N. Perkowski et alii., Crossing the Mediterranean Sea by 
Boat: Mapping and Documenting Migratory Journeys and Experiences, Warwick, 2018, p. 31.
45 V. Squire, A. Dimitriadi, N. Perkowski et alii., 2018, pp. 28-31.
46 UNHCR, Regional Protection Strategic Framework, 2017, p. 4. Persons fleeing Boko 
Haram controlled territory are at times accused of being part of the terrorist group themselves 
and may face persecution. See Toogood, Bad Blood, International Alert, 2016, p. 19.
CHALLENGING THE EXTERNALISED OBSTRUCTION OF ASYLUM 211
This obstacle may make one of the neighbouring countries a more viable 
option. Cameroon, for example, presently hosts about 90,000 displaced 
persons from Nigeria. But Cameroon is also the country with the second 
highest number of attacks by Boko Haram, and there have been reports 
about forced returns of hundreds of Nigerians to Borno state since the 
beginning of 2018.47 Persons spontaneously returning to Nigeria from 
Cameroon may face extreme violence, even in refugee camps where nu-
merous atrocious terrorist acts have occurred.48
Moving northwards to Niger can thus not be considered an en-
tirely inexplicable option. The country is currently hosting more than 
100,000 displaced Nigerians, mostly in informal refugee camps in the 
Diffa region in the South-East,49 which faces terrorist attacks, armed 
disputes and a humanitarian crisis due to the influx of large quantities 
of displaced persons into one of the poorest countries on earth.50 In 
three of Niger’s regions, a state of emergency has been declared due 
to terrorist threats linked to different Islamist groups in the bordering 
areas with Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso.51
Hence, while Niger is presented as an anchor of relative stability in 
the Sahel region, the country is confronted with a highly complex se-
curity situation. For refugees, escaping the original threat is a priority, 
but new challenges upon arrival, such as the widespread violence and 
general insecurity in refugee camps in the south of Niger52 can be seen 
as a driver to move further northwards to seek protection.53 It is also 
relevant to note that the Nigerien government does not view the coun-
try as a haven of refuge, but rather as a place of transit.54 This attitude is 
47 UNHCR, Continuing forced returns of Nigerians by Cameroon, 20 April 2018. 
An incident in July led directly to the killing of six Nigerian asylum-seekers who were 
being deported back to Nigeria, see UNHCR, Shock over Nigerian Asylum-seeker 
deaths in Cameroon, 2 August 2018.
48 UNHCR, Hoping for peace - Nigerians find violence, 3 May 2018.
49 OCHA, Diffa: Access, Insecurity and Population Movements, March 2018. 
50 Rank 189 out of 189 in the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2018 according 
to UNDP. 
51 Amnesty International, Niger Report 2017-2018, 2018.
52 Reach, Evaluation de la Situation en termes de protection des personnes deplacées 
à Diffa, May 2017, p. 38. 
53 V. Squire, A. Dimitriadi, N. Perkowski et alii., 2018, p. 15.
54 Mixed Migration Centre, Monthly Trend Analysis, July 2018. In the words of 
President Issoufou “[Niger] will welcome people who are in difficulty, who are in 
disarray. It is the tradition of our country…The main thing is that people do not stay 
long in Niger.”
A.-N. REYHANI, C. GOMEZ DEL TRONCO, M.N. MAYER212
expressed in the deportation of hundreds of Sudanese asylum-seekers 
to Libyan territory in May 2018,55 highlighting the implementation gap 
of refugee rights in Niger and other surrounding countries.56
The direct effects of EU cooperation on transits through Niger are 
hard to measure. What can be observed is a more hostile environment 
for foreigners perceived as ‘illegal migrants’, resulting in deteriorating 
conditions for asylum-seekers and other migrants.57 According to the 
European Parliament, there has been a 95% decrease of border cross-
ings from Niger to Libya from 2016-2018,58 but this alleged significant 
drop does not take into account the decreased visibility of movements.59 
The 2016 crackdown on migration led to the arrest of numerous smug-
glers and the emergence of new routes which avoid Agadez and other 
known checkpoints such as Séguedine and Dirku.60 Because of this and 
due to attacks by armed groups, new routes are longer, more expen-
sive and more dangerous; also, the higher risk of getting caught has led 
more smugglers to leave behind their human cargo in the desert.61 In 
2017 alone, more than 1,000 people were rescued in the Teneré desert 
by International Organization for Migration (IOM), and more than 
400 persons were found dead – the actual number of deaths is assumed 
to be much higher, considering the vastness of the territory.62 Moreo-
ver, the crackdown has largely tackled low key actors, which has led to 
an increasing market concentration and professionalisation, driving out 
small-scale smugglers and benefitting international criminal networks 
with ties to Libyan militias.63
55 E. Reidy, Niger sends Sudanese Refugees back to Libya, Irin News, 10 May 2018.
56 European Parliament, Refugee Policies in Africa, Open Borders but limited 
Integration, 2017. 
57 E. Reidy, Destination Europe: Desperation, Irin News, 3 July 2018. Loi 36 is 
supposed to only target human smugglers, but reportedly migrants are threatened and 
imprisoned as well. See J. Tubiana, C. Warin, G.M. Saeneen, 2018, p. 17. 
58 European Parliament, 95% decrease in migration flows to Libya and Europe, 13 
July 2018.
59 G. Zandonini, cit., 15 January 2018.
60 J. Tubiana, C. Warin, G.M. Saeneen, cit., p. 24. Some of the new routes now 
seem to lead through conflict areas in Northern Chad, adding to the highly insecure 
situation of migration paths.
61 IOM, Search and Rescue Missions in Sahara Desert help 1000 migrants, August 
2018.
62 For an account of the rising death toll in the aftermath of the enforcement of Loi 
36 see J. Tubiana, C. Warin, G.M. Saeneen, cit., p. 27.
63 D. Davitti, A.E. Ursu, 2018, p. 3; T. Reitano, Short-term Wins, Long-term Risks, 
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The remote 350 km border between Niger and Libya, which lies 
mostly in Tebu controlled territory, represents a complex area of tension 
between migrant smuggling and efforts to curb migration.64 Crossing the 
border has long been a matter of paying a bribe paid at semi-formal border 
posts.65 Since 2017, however, increased migration control efforts by the 
Nigerien army seem to have contributed to lowering the number of bor-
der-crossings.66 These efforts are in line with European demands and are 
assisted by the presence of Italian67 and French troops at a military base in 
Madama, which are deployed for “training and border control” measures 
to decrease the permeability of the border towards Libya’s south.68
1.3. Libya’s Disturbing Reality
In Libya, European efforts to obstruct the movement of asy-
lum-seekers face a different reality. The current political situation in the 
country is complicated and constantly mutating, adding to highly un-
stable security conditions. The initial cause of the Revolution had unit-
ed a proliferating number of military groups against Gaddafi, but they 
were soon divided by re-emerging political, tribal and family tensions 
after his fall.69 The security apparatus of successive governments after 
2011 has integrated some of these heterogeneous groups.70 The fact that 
Human Trafficking and People Smuggling in the Mediterranean Area, Global Initiative 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 2018, p. 3.
64 J. Tubiana, C. Warin, G.M. Saeneen, 2018, pp. 31-33. 
65 G. Zandonini, The New European Border Between Niger and Libya, Open 
Migration, 11 May 2018.
66 A newly signed security protocol by Niger, Chad, Sudan and the GNA of 
Libya calls for cross-border controls and increased border security between the signing 
countries see Fetouri, Will Libya’s newly signed border security agreement change 
anything?, Al-Monitor, 8 June 2018,. It is however questionable how the GNA is 
planning on implementing border control in an area which it defacto does not control, 
see: Tubiana, Warin, Saeneen, 2018, p. 72.
67 The Italian Ministry of Defence accounts for a maximum of 470 military personal 
deployed in Niger to contribute to border surveillance activities, see: https://www.
difesa.it/OperazioniMilitari/op_intern_corso/Niger_missione_bilaterale_supporto/
Pagine/Contributo-nazionale.aspx.
68 Infomigrants, Italy weighing military collaboration with Chad and Niger, Info 
Migrants, 9 April 2017. 
69 M. Micallef, The Human Conveyor Belt: Trends in Human Trafficking and 
Smuggling in Post-Revolution Libya, Geneva, 2017, p. 8.
70 Y. Sayigh, Crumbling States: Security Sector Reform in Libya and Yemen, 
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many of them have preserved their former chains of command adds 
a component of fragility to the nature of the alliances.71 Today, both 
the Government of National Accord (GNA) and the opposing Libyan 
National Army (LNA)72 rely on an intricate web of militias to support 
their operations and exert sovereignty in their allegedly controlled ter-
ritories.73 The dense concentration of rent-seeking armed groups vying 
for power in the process of state-formation, particularly in Tripoli, has 
translated into state-capture and a fragile balance of power.74
Powerful militias, some of which affiliated with smuggling and traf-
ficking activities and networks, also joined the efforts of the GNA mi-
gration control authorities,75 rebranding themselves to profit from EU 
funds and gain legitimacy within Libya’s future state configuration.76 
Collusion between smugglers and coast guards, as well as with deten-
tion centres77 or brigades entrusted with combating human traffick-
ing,78 has repeatedly been reported.79
Beirut, 2015; European External Action Service, EUBAM Libya Initial Mapping 
Report Executive Summary, working document of the EEAS(2017) 0109, 2017, p. 9.
71 L. Marinone, Libya at Crossroads: Between Elections and Instability, in L. v 
(ed.), The Libyan Maze. The Path to Elections and the Future of the Reconciliation 
Process, CESI, September 2018, pp. 3-11.
72 Although, according to some consulted analysts, to a lesser extent in the LNA. 
73 F. El Kamouni-Janssen, K. De Bruijne, Entering the Lion’s Den: Local Militias 
and Governance in Libya, The Hague, 2017.
74 W. Lacher, A. Al-Idrissi, Capital of Militias: Tripoli’s Armed Groups Capture 
the Libyan State, SANA Briefing Paper, June 2018. 
75 Such as the Libyan coast guards or the authorities in charge of detention centres.
76 M. Micallef, T. Reitano, The Anti-Human Smuggling Business and Libya’s 
Political End Game, 2017. These dynamics play militias against each other (see Ibid. 
pp. 13-15), and Italy is allegedly fuelling the assimilation of militias through informal 
engagement at the local level (see F. El Kamouni-Janssen, K. De Bruijne, 2017, p. 13; 
M. Michael, Backed by Italy, Libya Enlists Militias to Stop Migrants, AP News, 29 
August 2017). 
77 UN Panel of Experts on Libya, Final report of the Panel of Experts on Libya 
established
pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), June 2017, pp. 21, 61, 103.
78 See the case of the Subul al-Salam Brigade (UN Panel of Experts on Libya, Final 
report of the Panel of Experts on Libya established pursuant to resolution 1973 (2011), 
5 September 2018, pp. 15, 107-110).
79 Co-option is exemplified by an individual (Abd Al Rahman Al-Milad, 
known as Al-Bija) singled out by the UN Libya Panel of Experts in June 2017 as a 
facilitator of human smuggling, who was by the end of that same year leading most 
boat interceptions in the Western coast of Libya (in Zawiya) by means, amongst other 
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Human smuggling had already been connected to Gaddafi’s admin-
istration.80 Post-revolutionary Libya, however, was characterised by 
the emergence of new actors and the growth in the scale of operations.81 
Larger armed groups seized the opportunity to operate more profes-
sionally and cost-effectively,82 consolidating transnational networks 
with Sub-Saharan partners.83 This “industrialisation of the smuggling 
and trafficking business”84 is among the factors that have created a most 
violent environment for asylum-seekers and migrants, which has ex-
posed more individuals to slavery and human trafficking.85
It is undisputed that asylum-seekers and migrants86 face continu-
ous and grave human rights violations in Libya – a situation that well 
amounts to systemic and fundamental rightlessness.87 Detention is a 
systemic concern and widely applied. Those intercepted in Libya’s ter-
ritory or pulled back from the sea have no access to justice but are 
assets, of a boat donated by Italy (see UN Panel of Experts on Libya, June 2017, pp. 
11-13, 103). Eventually, on early June 2018, the Security Council imposed sanctions on 
Al-Bija and five other individuals connected to smuggling activities in Libya. Later that 
month, Al-Bija was reportedly suspended (United Nations Support Mission in Libya, 
Report of the Secretary-General, S/2018/780, 24 August 2018, p. 8). Al-Bija’s brigade 
was cooperating with Mohammed Kashlaf (aka al-Hadi), a prominent smuggler who 
ironically controlled detention centres for the Libyan government. Al-Bija would 
intercept boats from rivaling smugglers and take them to Kashlaf’s detention centres. 
(see Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2016/44 in Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 
2018/1285 of 24 September 2018 implementing Article 21(5) of Regulation (EU) 2016/44 
concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Libya, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L 240/7). Despite the sanctions and a reported suspension, at 
the time of writing two sources confirmed that Al-Bija is still running a coast guard 
unit in Zawiya. For this and other reported cases of collusion, see Frontex, Africa-
Frontex Intelligence Community Joint Report 2016, Warsaw, 2017, p. 18; Amnesty 
International, 2017; European External Action Service, 2017, pp. 37-8, 44; M. Micallef, 
T. Reitano, 2017; Altai Consulting, 2017, pp. 26, 51, 90-2; M. Micallef, 2017, pp. 31, 38.
80 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
81 M. Toaldo, 2015, pp. 9-10; Altai Consulting, 2017, p. 23 ss.
82 Ibidem.
83 M. Micallef, 2017, p. 5. 
84 Ibid., p. 8.
85 Ibid., p. 34 ss.
86 As of February 2017, IOM has estimated that over 700,000 foreigners currently 
live in Libya (IOM, Migrant Report Libya Jan-Feb 2018, for DTM Libya - Flow 
Monitoring, 2018, p. 5).
87 This term denotes a situation in which individuals are without a legal status that 
adequately protects them against human rights violations. 
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instead transferred to detention centres88 by default.89 These are either 
run by the DCIM, militias under the nominal control of the DCIM,90 
or non-affiliated militias.91 Overcrowding, extortion, rape, kidnap-
pings, torture, undernutrition, extrajudicial killings, slavery and human 
trafficking, as well as a lack of legal protection, are among the atrocities 
faced by migrants inside and outside detention centres that have been 
extensively documented by a broad range of sources.92
1.4. Externalised Obstruction
By mid-2016, most asylum-seekers reaching EU territory were us-
ing the Central Mediterranean Route.93 Unable to push back individ-
uals on its own or to conduct operations in Libyan territorial waters, 
the EU and Italy opted for cooperation. A “deputational twist”94 was 
given to the previous deterrence strategy by engaging mostly with the 
internationally-recognised GNA95 in the coercive management of mi-
gration, thus attempting “to sever any jurisdictional link” with asy-
88 There are discrepancies among the different institutions tracking the number 
of these centres (for an exhaustive compilation see Global Detention Project, Country 
report - Immigration Detention in Libya: “A Human Rights Crisis”, August 2018, pp. 
39-53).
89 Altai Consulting, 2017, p. 47.
90 Ibid., pp. 11, 94.
91 Amnesty International, 2017, p. 27.
92 UNSMIL, Report of the Secretary-General, 7 May 2018, pp. 7-8; European 
External Action Service, 2017; UNSMIL and OHCHR, “Detained and Dehumanised” 
Report on Human Rights Abuses Against Migrants in Libya, 2016; Amnesty 
International, 2017; UN Secretary General, Report of the UN Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) from 1 December 2016; Panel of 
Experts on Libya, June 2017, pp. 133-6; Amnesty International, Refugees and migrants 
fleeing sexual violence, abuse and exploitation in Libya, July 2016.
93 For statistics on the number of irregular border crossing towards Europe, see 
the Frontex Risk Analysis Reports 2017 and 2018; also IOM, 2017, p. 26.
94 V. Moreno-Lax, M. Giuffré, The Rise of Consensual Containment: From 
‘Contactless Control’ to ‘Contactless Responsibility’ for Forced Migration Flows, in 
S. JUSS (ed.), Research Handbook on International Refugee Law (Edward Elgar, 
forthcoming), 2017, p. 3.
95 UN Security Council Resolutions 2259 and 2278 endorse the GNA as the 
sole legitimate government. The EU has been supportive of the conciliatory Libyan 
Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat (Morocco) on December 2015. See the 
Commission’s official position on this respect at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/
headquarters-homepage_en/19163/EU-Libya%20relations (accessed 24 May 2018).
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lum-seekers.96 This aim was delineated through a more coherent and 
comprehensive EU migration strategy towards Libya by early 2017.97 
One of its key priorities became to strengthen the capacities of Libyan 
coast guards.98
Italy took the lead in the implementation of this strategy through 
a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding99 (MoU) signed with the 
GNA on 2 February 2017. A day later, EU heads of state agreed on an 
encompassing strategic document that supported Italy’s aims, known 
as the Malta Declaration.100 On this basis, the EU allocated funds for 
its pursuit, most notably through the EUTF,101 and reshaped and rein-
vigorated Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions.102
96 V. Moreno-Lax, M. Giuffré, 2017, pp. 3-4.
97 See European Commission, Joint Communication on the Central Mediterranean 
Route ‘Managing Flows, Saving Lives’, 25 January 2017.
98 This is complemented by policies that aim at broader cooperation and the sharing 
of information, assisting local communities in order to create economic alternatives to 
smuggling, improving the situation of migrants on the ground, intensifying assisted 
voluntary returns, as well as tackling smuggling in the countries of origin and transit 
(see ibid.; also European Council, Malta Declaration by the Members of the European 
Council on the External Aspects of Migration: Addressing the Central Mediterranean 
Route, 3 February 2017). For a detailed account of policy developments, see Forensic 
Oceanography, MARE CLAUSUM Italy and the EU’s Undeclared Operation to Stem 
Migration Across the Mediterranean, for Forensic Architecture, 2018, pp. 29-55.
99 Memorandum d’Intesa sulla Cooperazione nel Campo dello Sviluppo, del 
Contrasto all’Immigrazione Illegale, al Traffico di Esseri Umani, al Contrabbando e sul 
Rafforzamento della Sicurezza delle Frontiere tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica 
Italiana, available at http://www.governo.it/sites/governoNEW.it/files/Libia.pdf 
(accessed 25 May 2018).
100 European Council, Malta Declaration, 3 February 2017.
101 As of May 2018, the EU had allocated over € 208 million to country-specific 
projects for Libya. Some of these address assistances to migrants and local communities, 
while others target the enforcement of the border and migration management systems. 
Besides this, Libya is participating in five regional projects worth € 45.5 million, two of 
them paying particular attention to migration in Libya. Criticisms on EUTF highlight 
its limited consultations with Libyan authorities, the neglect of local CSOs, the little 
influence of INGOs, the consequences of a remote management in areas where no EU 
staff can access due to security reasons, and, more generally, the abuse of ODA for EU 
interests (see C. Loschi, F. Rainieri, L. Strazzari, 2018, pp. 15-7).
102 EUBAM Libya’s capacities were expanded and its mandate extended, see 
European External Action Service, EUBAM Libya, September 2017 Factsheet. 
Furthermore, as described above, Operation Sophia’s mandate was expanded in the 
summers of both 2016 and 2017, and Operation Themis has meanwhile replaced Triton, 
moving closer to the Italian coast. Additionally, it was proposed that Libya would 
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Two significant obstacles for preventing asylum-seekers from leav-
ing Libya’s Western coast towards Europe remained at this stage: the 
lack of a Libyan-coordinated SAR area, on the one hand, and the limit-
ed capacities and resources of the coast guards to prevent vessels from 
departing or intercepting them at sea, on the other.
Libya is obliged by international law103 to provide a SAR service 
within a regionally established SAR area, supervised by a corresponding 
coordination centre that is responsible for designating a port of safety for 
disembarkation during SAR missions.104 However, until recently Italy 
had been the only state providing a functioning and internationally-rec-
ognised SAR service in the Central Mediterranean,105 and the Rome 
Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre (MRCC) was coordinating 
almost all SAR events in the area over this period of increased migration.
In line with the aim of avoiding direct liability, Italy repeatedly 
supported Libya in its application for a SAR area to the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO).106 Eventually, in June 2018, the IMO 
recognised a Libyan SAR area.107 This achievement has placed Libyan 
authorities in a position to assert even more sovereignty over the area, 
while Italy has tried to refer vessels conducting SAR missions within 
this zone to contact Libya.108 In parallel, Italy has been working with-
become the first third country to join the EU’s Seahorse Mediterranean network, 
leading to shared intelligence and cooperation on migration and border control (see M. 
Monroy, A Seahorse for the Mediterranean: Border Surveillance for Libyan Search and 
Rescue Zone, Digit.site36, 3 January 2018). 
103 Libya is a party to the International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue of 1979 as amended by Resolution MSC.155(78) (adopted on 20 May 2004).
104 See amendments to chapter 4 in annex 5 of IMO’s Resolution MSC.155(78) 
(adopted on 20 May 2004). 
105 CILD, Guidance on Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean, Know your 
Rights, Rome, 2017, p. 8.
106 The initial GNA application for that purpose and the promise of taming NGOs 
operating within it came in August 2017 with the backing of Italy (A. RETTMAN, 
Italy Backs Libya as NGOs Chased out of Mediterranean, EU Observer, 14 August 
2017). The application was withdrawn in December that year, and Rome reportedly 
assisted Libya with a new one, sent a few days later (M. MONROY, 3 January 2018; 
L. BAGNOLI, Libia: una Stabilizzazione Solo Apparente, Open Migration, 21 
December 2017; Scherer, Lewis, Exclusive: Italy Plans Big Handover of Sea Rescues to 
Libya Coastguard, Reuters, 15 December 2017).
107 UNHCR, UNHCR, Position on Returns to Libya (Update II), September 
2018b, p. 15.
108 FRANCE 24, Italian Coastguard Tells Rescue Ships to Call Libya for Help, 
23 June 2018. Even when ships have completed a rescue within the Libyan SAR area, 
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in the framework of an EU-funded project towards the establishment 
of both an MRCC and an Interagency National Coordination Centre 
within the same premises in Tripoli.109 Activities have so far crystallised 
into the newly operative Libyan Joint Rescue Coordination Centre 
(JRCC),110 at which the degree of direct Italian participation in its day-
to-day operations is yet unclear.111 The “regular presence” of Italian 
officials in these centres “for both technical assistance and monitoring 
purposes”, however, had been already envisioned in the text of the pro-
gramming document.112
While Libyan authorities take full control over SAR coordination, 
there have been attempts by Italy at progressively delegating compe-
tencies to the Libyan coast guards: the Rome MRCC conceded priority 
to Libyan boats in missions where NGO vessels were better-positioned 
for the rescue; they referred the coordination of missions to the Libyan 
coast guards’ operations centre in Tripoli that acted as an unofficial 
MRCC prior to the Libyan SAR area recognition;113 or, by providing 
direct operational instructions, the Italian navy assumed a by-standing 
role and facilitated the coordination of missions and apprehensions by 
Italian authorities have refused to identify a port for disembarkation on the basis that 
they did not coordinate the rescue (see the events of 20 September 2018 in the Aquarius 
‘Maltese Patrol Boat 2018.09.20-30’ case available at https://onboard-aquarius.org/
sections/operations/sar-operations-maltese-patrol-boat-2018-09-20-30/ [accessed 14 
October 2018])
109 This activity is covered by the EUTF’s program “Support to Integrated Border 
and Migration Management in Libya – First phase” (see, Activity 2 in action fiche). 
110 Aquarius Onboard, Aquarius enters Libyan Search and Rescue Region, 18 
September 2018. To the knowledge of the German Federal Government, in the building 
there are also employees from the Libyan Foreign Ministry, both Libyan coast guard 
bodies, the Libyan Aviation Authority, as well as personnel from the Libyan Post, 
Telecommunication & IT Company (Deutscher Bundestag, Auf die Kleine Anfrage der 
Abgeordneten Andrej Hunko, Heike Hänsel, Michel Brandt, Weiterer Abgeordneter 
und der Fraktion DIE LINKE. – Drucksache 19/4521 – Über 100 Ertrunkene nach 
Unterbliebener Seenotrettung vor Malta, 30 October 2018, question 7).
111 Whether the Libyan JRCC only depends on Italian technical capacities or 
whether there is direct interference or coordination from Italian actors remains obscure. 
A feasibility study of the Centre carried out by Italy should have been delivered to the 
European Commission by 30 October 2018 (Deutscher Bundestag, 30 October 2018, 
question 17).
112 See p. 13 in EUTF’s “Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management 
in Libya - First Phase” action fiche. 
113 See case of 31 March 2018 in SOS Méditerranée, Three Days of Complex 
Operations in the Central Mediterranean, Press Release, 1 April 2018. 
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the Libyan coast guards.114 The interests and loyalties of NGOs’ mis-
sions frequently clashed with those of Libyan coast guards during SAR 
operations, reflected in critical tensions during these interventions.115
An internationally-recognised Libyan SAR area has further placed 
rescuers in a thorny position when it comes to identifying which au-
thority (Italian, Maltese or Libyan) is best-suited to coordinate a SAR 
event, as well as whose instructions they should follow in order not 
to breach international law.116 A controversy has been sparked by the 
case of the Asso Ventotto, a commercial Italian-flagged ship which was 
working for an oil platform in Libya when it conducted a rescue opera-
tion in international waters and was subsequently instructed by Libyan 
authorities to disembark the migrants aboard in Tripoli.117 Even before, 
survivors of another incident filed an application against Italy with the 
ECtHR in a case that involved their coordination with Libya of a pull-
back operation.118 Thereupon, the United Nations High Commission-
er for Refugees (UNHCR) expressed that it “does not consider that 
Libya meets the criteria for being designated as a place of safety for 
disembarkation…”.119
Cooperation is furthermore not only pursued at arm’s length. Since 
August 2017, shifting Italian warships have docked at the Abu Sitta 
114 For a detailed account of such cases, see Forensic Oceanography, 2018, pp. 
57-85. 
115 Sea Watch, Breaking: Dramatic First Rescue Operation for Sea-Watch 3, 6 
November 2017; Belhumeur, Libyan Coastguard Opened Fire at Refugee Boats: NGOs, 
Al-Jazeera, 25 May 2017; Assad, Libyan Navy, Proactiva Open Arms Exchange Blame 
for Stumbled Sea Rescue Operation, Libya Observer, 17 March 2018; EURACTIV, 
AFP, Libyan Coastguard Prevents NGO Boat From Rescuing Migrants, 7 May 2018; 
Y. Behrakis, Spanish Migrant Rescue Ship Threatened by Libyan Coastguard: Witness, 
Reuters, 15 August 2017.
116 See Amnesty International, 2018.
117 In doing so, it might have violated the non-refoulement principle, see L. 
Bagnoli, F. Floris, Asso Ventotto: lo Scenario si Complica per le Navi Commerciali, 
Open Migration, 16 August 2018. 
118 The LCGPS’s boat involved in the incident had been donated by Italy, eight 
out of the 13 crew members had been trained by Operation Sophia, their actions were 
partly coordinated by the Rome MRCC, and the ‘pulled back’ migrants were later 
exposed to flagrant human rights abuses (Glan, Legal Action Against Italy Over Its 
Coordination of Libyan Coast Guard Pull-Backs Resulting in Migrant Deaths and 
Abuse, 8 May 2018). 
119 UNHCR, September 2018, p. 22; the position of UNHCR, however, seems to 
only apply to operations in international waters, thus leaving space for interceptions by 
the coast guards in Libyan waters.
CHALLENGING THE EXTERNALISED OBSTRUCTION OF ASYLUM 221
port in Tripoli.120 These have provided technical and logistical support 
as part of Italy’s MoD’s support missions to Libya,121 and also have 
been partly used by Libya as a surrogate centre for coordination and 
communication.122 As an Italian judge stated, the Italian navy is “sub-
stantially entrusted with coordinating [the Libyan coast guard] by both 
their own naval means and the ones provided to the Libyans”.123 For-
mally, there are two coast guard bodies in Libya: the General Adminis-
tration for Coastal Security (GACS), dependent on the Ministry of In-
terior (MoI), and the Libyan Coast Guard and Port Security (LCGPS, 
sometimes referred to as the Libyan navy), dependent on the Ministry 
of Defence (MoD).124 As mentioned, revolutionary and post-revolu-
tionary armed groups were incorporated into the structures of both 
bodies (directly or as external support units), and their chains of com-
mand seem to exist only on paper.125
Libyan coast guards have been supported through training, infor-
mation sharing, advice, as well as equipment and infrastructure by dif-
ferent channels, funds and actors, amongst others the CSDP missions 
EUBAM Libya and Operation Sophia, Frontex, EUTF programs,126 
120 Ministero della Difesa, Missioni Militari: Nave Caprera sostituisce la Capri 
nella missione bilaterale di assistenza e supporto in Libia, 30 March 2018. While the ship 
Caprera returned to Italy in July 2018, the ship Gorgona reportedly remains in Tripoli, 
see F. Biloslavo, Le forze tricolori in campo: 6 navi, 5 aerei e 400 soldati, Il Giornale, 4 
September 2018.
121 Cooperation between the Italian Ministry of Defence’s Mare Sicuro operation 
and the Bilateral Assistance and Support Mission (MIASIT).
122 Forensic Oceanography, 2018, p. 49.
123 A. Pagano Dritto, Italy’s Navy Directly Coordinates Tripoli’s Coast Guard, 
Libya, Official Documents From The Inquiry On The “Open Arms” Reportedly 
Reveal, Between Libya and Italy, 31 March 2018. See also, Italy’s Undersecretary of 
Defence, Raffaele Volpi, 24 June 2018, on Twitter: https://twitter.com/volpi_raffaele/
status/1010957505004998656 (accessed 6 October 2018).
124 GACS is a law enforcement entity responsible for a 30-km band of land along 
the approx. 1,700 km of Libyan coast as well as the first 12 nautical miles off the Libyan 
coast. The LCGPS is part of the Libyan Navy and it operates at both territorial and 
international waters.
125 Altai Consulting, cit., 2017, p. 42. According to security analysts, only the coast 
guards in Misrata and at the Abu Sitta naval base had a functioning chain of command 
which was directly responsive to the Ministry of Defence. 
126 Implemented and co-financed by Italy, the program ‘Support to Integrated 
border and migration management in Libya’ (42.223.927 €) contemplates in its 
first phase the provision to both coast guard bodies of “repair [and maintenance] of 
existing vessels […], supply of communication and rescue equipment, rubber boats 
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EUROSUR,127 as well as by individual EU member states,128 particular-
ly Italy. Until September 2018, Operation Sophia alone had trained 213 
personnel of the Libyan Navy Coast Guard.129 In consonance with the 
overall EU strategy, Italy has repaired four patrol boats130 that it had 
donated to Libya in the times of Gaddafi, and it has recently provided 
(at least) twelve more.131
This strategy of enabling Libyan coast guards to obstruct movements 
towards Italy does not tolerate NGOs’ rescue missions to operate in the 
Central Mediterranean freely. NGOs had increased their presence in in-
ternational waters off the Libyan coast in 2014132 as the SAR efforts of the 
EU and its Member States dwindled.133 As NGOs progressively patrolled 
and vehicles”, see a detailed list of types of assets in the description of Activity 1 of the 
program (EUTF’s “Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya 
- First Phase” action fiche, pp. 2, 9-10). Within this framework, in an answer to MEP 
Sabine Lösing, EU Commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos acknowledged that by early 
2018 vessels were repaired and given to the Libyan Coastguard (post on personal blog, 
Sabine Lösing, Unterstützung der libyschen Küstenschutzverwaltung, 11 July 2018). 
127 “Capacity delivery to the Libyan coastguard is provided through a number of 
activities channels, including Op Sophia, EUBAM Libya, Project Seahorse, Frontex, 
(including provision of tailored Eurosur Fusion Services), on-going MS initiatives and 
the information exchange network of the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA).” 
(European External Action Service, Strategic Review on EUNAVFOR MED Operation 
Sophia, EUBAM Libya & EU Liaison and Planning Cell, Brussels, 27 July 2018, p. 19). 
A connection to the Seahorse Mediterranean Network has been for a long time foreseen, 
and even future EU-Libya joint patrols’ potential is contemplated (ibid, pp. 35-6).
128 For example, through a donation of 35€ million from the four Visegrad 
countries in December 2017 aimed at supporting the second phase of the above-
mentioned EUTF program.
129 Ibid, p. 25; training materials were partly disclosed in response to an access to 
documents request by Access Info Europe; see the publication on the website of the 
organization at https://www.access-info.org/article/30058 (accessed 24 May 2018). It is 
however unclear whether this training actually serves the interests and needs of Libyan 
coast guards (see C. Loschi, L. Rainieri, F. Strazzari, 2018, pp. 6-7). 
130 A. Lewis, S. Scherer, Italy Tries to Bolster Libyan Coast Guard, despite 
Humanitarian Concern, Reuters, 15 May 2017.
131 D. Ghighlione, Italy Donates 12 More Vessels to Libya to Stem Migration, 
Financial Times, 7 August 2018. Allegedly, three additional boats would have been 
delivered by early 2018, see G. Pelosi, Libia e Niger: il Bilancio dell’Italia e l’Eredità 
per il Prossimo Governo, Il Sole 24 Ore, 24 February 2018. The latter are likely to be 
part of an EUTF program.
132 European Political Strategy Centre, 2017, p. 2.
133 see P. Cuttitta, Pushing Migrants Back to Libya, Persecuting Rescue NGOs: 
The End of the Humanitarian Turn (Part I), Border Criminologies, 18 April 2018; also 
CHALLENGING THE EXTERNALISED OBSTRUCTION OF ASYLUM 223
southwards134 and conducted up to 40% of the rescues,135 they became 
criticised for creating a pull-factor and were even accused of colluding 
with smugglers.136 Italy imposed a Code of Conduct on NGOs in August 
2017 to exert further control over their activities.137 Many of the organisa-
tions refused to sign138 or abandoned the area.139 Since May 2018, a new-
ly-formed Italian government has substantially aggravated the conditions 
under which SAR missions are conducted in the region. Rhetorical vilifi-
cation of NGOs has been accompanied, most notably, by repeated refus-
als to allow vessels of different nature to disembark rescued asylum-seek-
ers at Italian ports.140 On top of this, in June 2018, the European Council 
reminded “[a]ll vessels operating in the Mediterranean” their obligation 
to comply with “applicable laws” and their duty of “not obstruct[ing] 
operations of the Libyan Coastguard”.141 Overall, the aggression on be-
half of the Libyan coast guards,142 the Italian (and Maltese)143 prosecution 
P. Cuttitta, Repoliticization Through Search and Rescue? Humanitarian NGOs and 
Migration Management in the Central Mediterranean, 2017.
134 See Guardia Costiera, Search and Rescue Activity and Migratory Flows in 
Central Mediterranean Sea - Year 2016, 2017, p. 16; also G. Baczynska, Ferry Service 
or Humanitarian Rescue Boat: EU’s Mediterranean Dilemma, Reuters, 12 May 2017.
135 See, for example, early 2017 in Guardia Costiera, 2018, p. 14.
136 A. Pécoud, M. Esperti, Are NGOs Responsible for the Migration Crisis in the 
Mediterranean?, The Conversation, 20 June 2017; Momigliano, In Italy, Conspiracy 
Theories About Collusion Between Smugglers and Charities Rescuing Migrants Are 
Spreading, The Washington Post, 2 May 2017.
137 In Italian, Codice di Condotta per le ONG Impegnate nelle Operazioni di 
Salvataggio dei Migranti in Mare”; the code of conduct partly also responds to worries 
expressed by Frontex reports on the lack of adequate communication of decisions of 
NGO boats with authorities (Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2017, Warsaw, 2017, p. 32).
138 E. Zalan, NGOs Divided by Italy’s New Rescue Code, EU Observer, 1 August 
2017.
139 ANSA, NGOs Are Facing Difficult Times in Italy, Infomigrants, 21 March 2018. 
140 Including commercial, navy and Italian coastguard vessels, see Amnesty 
International, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea. Europe Fails Refugees and 
Migrants in the Central Mediterranean, 2018, pp. 7-10.
141 European Council, European Council conclusions, 28 June 2018, Press Release 
421/18, p. 1.
142 When the Libyan coast guards were confronted with accusations of increased 
aggression towards NGOs, they blamed it on the NGOs (A.K. Assad, 2018), and 
officials responded that they were aiming at causing a good impression on their 
European partners, since NGOs can constitute a threat to coastal security (C. Loschi, 
F. Rainieri, L. Strazzari, 2018, p. 8).
143 G. Panigiani, Malta Cracks Down on a Humanitarian Ship That Carried 
Migrants, The New York Times, 2 July 2018. 
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against NGOs,144 as well as political criticism have added to the crimi-
nalisation and intimidation of NGO activities.
1.5. What Remains
As a donor, through direct institutional involvement, and by provid-
ing a mission framework for Member States, the EU has established a 
strategy of externalised obstruction of asylum that is contributing to the 
complete containment of asylum-seekers in a situation of fundamental 
rightlessness in Libya. Drawing on this support, the Libyan coast guards 
– among them militia groups and (former) smugglers – apprehend and 
intercept those aiming to access asylum in Europe, either before their 
departure,145 in Libyan territorial waters, or in international waters.146
Attempts at crossing the Central Mediterranean route from Libya 
have abruptly decreased since July 2017,147 mostly due to the co-option 
144 For the case against Jugend Rettet, see Reuters, Italy Seizes NGO Rescue Boat 
for Allegedly Aiding Illegal Migration, 2 August 2017. For the case against Proactiva 
Open Arms, see N. Squires, H. Strange, Italy Impounds Rescue Vessel After Crew 
Refuses to Hand Migrants to Libya, The Telegraph, 19 March 2018.
145 Interceptions also take place on land, for example during raids at warehouses 
used by smugglers (M. Micallef, T. Reitano, 2017, p. 8). As there is not a robust 
legal framework for migrants in Libya, they are easy to become targets of detention 
and abuse, and consequently many try to live as hidden as possible (Reach, Mixed 
migration routes and dynamics in Libya The impact of EU migration measures on mixed 
migration in Libya, study for UNHCR, April 2018). The UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights in a statement in late 2017 expressed strong concern about the 
impact of EU policies (see OHCHR, UN Human Rights Chief: Suffering of Migrants 
in Libya Outrage to Conscience of Humanity, 14 November 2017). For an example 
of interception before departure, see The Associated Press, Libyan Coast Guard 
Intercepts More Migrants in Mediterranean, The New York Times, 7 May 2018. 
146 Whereas in the period January-September 2017, the percentage of migrants 
brought back to Libya stood at an estimated average of 14.46%, during the same period 
in 2018 this number raised to 50.62%. To put this into perspective, when the dead 
or missing are excluded, in between January-September 2017 an estimated 83.22% of 
those who left Libya reached a European coast, and during the same period in 2018, 
the average was 43.98%. These figures are computed from the records of the Italian 
Institute for International Political Studies, which are routinely updated, and are 
available at: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ncHxOHIx4ptt4YFXgGi9TIb
wd53HaR3oFbrfBm67ak4/edit#gid=0 (accessed 9 November 2018). See also Forensic 
Oceanography, 2018, pp. 57-85.
147 Guardia Costiera, 2018, p. 11. A relevant share of asylum-seekers who make it 
to Italy come from countries of origin with currently relatively high recognition rates 
CHALLENGING THE EXTERNALISED OBSTRUCTION OF ASYLUM 225
of armed groups into anti-smuggling activities (which ignited local con-
flicts and engrossed the lists of migrant detainees),148 rather than a decline 
in the number of persons seeking to access asylum in the EU or the ac-
tivities of NGOs.149 The latest analyses also highlight a distressing spike 
in relative mortality rates at sea since June 2018,150 immediately following 
the hardened position of the new Italian government towards rescuers, 
epitomised in the informal ban on disembarkation at Italian ports.
UNHCR has noticed a recent increase in the number of refugees and 
asylum-seekers who, despite being registered with the organisation by 
mid-2018, are reportedly attempting to cross the Mediterranean.151 An 
additional factor discouraging to remain in the country might be the es-
calation of armed violence between rival groups in the summer of 2018 in 
Tripoli, where an estimated 22% of migrants in Libya152 find themselves. 
The re-ignition of the conflict created a despairing scenario, where many 
were evicted,153 kidnapped or left to survive by their own means, while 
UNHCR and IOM personnel were hardly able to provide assistance.154
in the EU (data from UNHCR, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/
mediterranean/location/5205 [accessed 9 November 2018]). The recognition rates 
by the third quarter of 2018 stood at: Eritrea 80.6%, Sudan 40.3%, Iraq 38.5%, 
Pakistan 22%, Nigeria 18.8%, Côte d’Ivoire 20.2%, Mali 27%, Guinea 21.8% and 
Libya 37.7%, see http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_
asydcfstq&lang=en [accessed 9 November 2018]).
148 T. Abderrahim, Advancing the Impossible? Progress of The Joint African, 
European and International Response to the Migration Crisis in Libya, ECDPM, 
Discussion Paper No. 229, September 2018, p. 5. 
149 Frontex recognises the most notable reason behind this drop are “internal 
developments in Libya” (Frontex, Risk Analysis for 2018, p. 18). See further reasoning 
by the Italian Coast Guard in Guardia Costiera, 2018, pp. 18-9. Co-option of militias 
and in-fighting is also recognised as a key factor in M. Micallef, T. Reitano, 2017, p. 8.
150 M. Villa, R. Gruijters, E. Steinhilper, Outsourcing European Border Control: 
Recent Trends in Departures, Deaths and Search and Rescue Activities in the Central 
Mediterranean, Border Criminologies, 11 September 2018. Whereas the latter study 
estimates the number of casualties for June 2018 to be 451, data from the IOM Missing 
Migrants Project recorded 564.
151 In addition, many IDPs are allegedly seeking ways to leave the country 
(UNHCR, September 2018b, pp. 16-7).
152 IOM, Libya’s Migrant Report: Round 21 July-August 2018, for DTM LIBYA - 
Flow Monitoring, August 2018, p. 3.
153 UNHCR, Militias evict and disperse 1,900 displaced people in Libya, 14 August 
2018.
154 S. Hayden, Libya is a war zone. Why is the EU still sending refugees back 
there?, The Guardian, 4 October 2018. At the time of writing, the head of the UN 
A.-N. REYHANI, C. GOMEZ DEL TRONCO, M.N. MAYER226
Asylum-seekers in Libya continuously await grave human rights vio-
lations, including systematic detention. Because of the intensified control 
of the coast that the EU demands, more asylum-seekers remain for ex-
tended periods of time in unsafe accommodations on the route, exposed 
to traffickers and waiting for smugglers to arrange onward movement.155
Fledgling efforts to improve the situation do exist: the EU and its 
partners are aiming at addressing detention conditions,156 evacuating in-
dividuals,157 and resettling them to Europe.158 Some may also have the 
chance to be released from detention after a UNHCR request,159 to be 
hosted in the UNHCR Gathering and Departure Centre in Tripoli to 
Support Mission in Libya stated that “the violence in Tripoli finally ended” (UNSMIL, 
Remarks of SRSG Ghassan Salamé to the United Nations Security Council on the 
Situation in Libya, 9 November 2018). Intermittent clashes were still being reported 
until recently, after repeated failures to implement a UN-sponsored ceasefire signed 
in early September (Mahmoud, Libya: UN Ceasefire Collapses As Clashes Erupt in 
Tripoli, Asharq Al-Awsat, 17 October 2018). Most recently, the Al-Jalaa Hospital in 
Tripoli was attacked by militias (UNSMIL, UN Statement on Attacks against Medical 
Facilities and Personnel, 5 November 2018). 
155 Reach, April 2018.
156 See, for example, the EUTFA’s “Supporting protection and humanitarian 
repatriation and reintegration of vulnerable migrants in Libya” program or measures 
outlined under the title “Cooperation on migration and protection of migrants” on the 
European External Action Service briefing on EU-Libya relations. 
157 UNHCR reported that, by 2 November 2018, 2,082 refugees have been 
evacuated from Libya through the Emergency Transit Mechanism, which started 
in November 2017 by resettling vulnerable refugees from Libya. From those 2,082 
individuals, an estimated 407 were taken to facilities in Italy and Romania, while 
the remaining 1,675 were taken to the ones in Niger (see UNHCR, Flash Update 26 
October - 2 November, 2 November 2018).
158 Between 1 September 2017 to 2 November 2018, a further 930 refugees were 
submitted for resettlement directly to six European countries and Canada (ibid.). 
Currently, UNHCR can only register individuals from nine nationalities which the 
Libyan government recognise that can have a claim for international protection (see 
footnote 98 in UNHCR, September 2018b, p. 11). Furthermore, those on board of 
apprehended vessels (reaching a port that UNHCR has access to) are processed and 
scanned to evaluate eligibility for international protection (UNHCR, Libya Fact Sheet 
- April 2018, 2018, p. 2 ). 
159 This had been the case for 950 people from January to December 2017 (Amnesty 
International, 2017, p. 29), whereas by early November 2018, there were 56,444 refugees 
asylum-seekers registered with UNHCR (see UNHCR, Flash Update 2 – 9 Nov. 2018, 
9 November 2018). In November 2018, UNHCR reported that an “estimated 5,413 
refugees and migrants are presently held in DCIM-operated detention centres in Libya, 
of whom 3,988 are persons of concern” (UNHCR, 9 November 2018). 
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await evacuation or resettlement,160 or to join an IOM return program.161 
Overall, however, the fundamental rightlessness of individuals trapped 
in Libya162 devoid of access to asylum currently remains unchallenged.
The effects generated by EU policies on migration towards Libya 
are ambiguous. A shift towards the Western Mediterranean Route can 
be observed, but not for all nationalities.163 The quantitative repercus-
sions of the efforts to control the Nigerien-Libyan border are hard to 
verify due to the inaccessibility of the territories in question. The Fez-
zan region in southern Libya, which is inhabited by rivalling tribes who 
rely on the income of different smuggling activities,164 is far from being 
under the GNA’s control and is affected by skirmishes which involve 
neighbouring foreign fighters who seek control over these profits.165 
IOM numbers suggest a drastic decrease, whereas other sources observe 
160 UNHCR, First Group of Refugees Evacuated from New Departure Facility in 
Libya, Press Release, 6 December 2018.
161 Voluntary return operations have been scaled-up by early 2018 with EU 
support (IOM, Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean, Compilation of Available 
Data and Information, March 2018a, p. 13). By November 2018, IOM had coordinated 
the return of 14,622 people from Libya (International Organization for Migration, 
Suspended for Two Years, IOM Resumes Voluntary Humanitarian Return Flights from 
Southern Libya, 9 November 2018). 
162 Amnesty International reported in May 2018 that a „group of around 145 people 
– including women and children – [that] had fled Libya because of the brutal conditions 
they endured there, and had been living in a displacement camp in the Nigerien city 
of Agadez where they hoped to claim asylum”, have been deported back to Libya (see 
Amnesty International, Niger: More than a hundred Sudanese nationals deported to 
Libya in critical situation and at risk of serious abuses including torture, 11 May 2018).
163 Y. Brenner, R. Forin, B. Frouws, The “Shift” to the Western Mediterranean 
Migration Route: Myth or Reality?, Mixed Migration Centre, 22 August 2018. Over 
the summer of 2018, the number of migrants who arrived in Italy claiming to have 
departed from Turkey or Tunisia exceptionally surpassed those who left via Libya 
(International Organization for Migration, DTM Europe Displacement Tracking 
Matrix (DTM) July – September 2018, October 2018, p. 8). The latest reports analysing 
the increased importance of Tunisia in the sub-Saharan migration routes point to a 
possible but still unclear dynamic of illegal land crossings from Libya into Tunisia 
(Reach, Tunisia, Country of Destination and Transit for sub-Saharan African migrants, 
October 2018, p. 3). 
164 T. Westcott, The Tebu: the Little-Known Community at the Heart of Libya’s 
People Smuggling Trade, IRIN, 6 September 2018.
165 For thorough analysis of dynamics see F. Wehrey, Insecurity and Governance 
Challenges in Southern Libya, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 March 
2017; J. Tubiana, C. Gramizzi, Tubu Trouble: State and Statelessness in the Chad-
Sudan-Libya Triangle, Small Arms Survey report, Geneva, 2017, pp. 111-121.
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that the smuggling business has been pushed underground, negatively 
impacting the safety of migrants, while remaining intact.166 The conse-
quences of the deteriorating conditions in Libya on the willingness of 
asylum-seekers and other migrants to move through the country also 
remain unclear.167 As illustrated in the case scenario above, it is not an 
entirely incomprehensible option for a potential asylum-seeker from 
Western Africa to move towards the shores of Libya to seek protection 
in Europe. It seems, however, that increased insecurity and decreasing 
transit possibilities through Libya have incited at least some groups to 
move back southwards. Yet, conditions for asylum-seekers in Niger re-
main dire and lead to a situation of limbo and uncertainty.168
2. Applying the Right to Asylum
Several commentators have already convincingly spelt out the ille-
gality of the approach of European states towards Libya.169 In this arti-
cle, we add a perspective to the discussion based on the right to asylum 
in Art. 18 of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter (EUCFR). With this 
approach – which naturally involves obvious enforcement limitations 
– we hope to contribute to the development of an encompassing frame-
work that allows a more coherent assessment of the multi-layered real-
ity of the containment of asylum-seekers in Libya.
166 Reach, April 2018.
167 Ibid.
168 As seen in a case of Sudanese refugees who were fleeing the desperate situation 
in Libya towards Niger only to find themselves pushed back again by Nigerien 
authorities to Libya.
169 Traditionally, arguments against interception at sea draw on the non-refoulement 
principle in connection with the rules of state responsibility in cases of derived 
responsibility for aiding and abetting. In the Libyan case, the right to leave has been 
rightly added to the debate, allowing an adequate legal assessment of actions undertaken 
within Libyan territory or territorial waters; see eg. V. Moreno-Lax, M. Giuffré, 2017; 
P. Biondi, The Case for Italy’s Complicity in Libya Push-Backs, 24 November 2017; N. 
Markard, The Right to Leave by Sea: Legal Limits on EU Migration Control by Third 
Countries, EJIL, 2016, p. 591; J.C. Hathaway, T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Non-Refoulement 
in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, 2015, Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 53, no. 2: 235-84; 
M. Den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum, 2010, PhD Thesis, University of 
Leiden, 2010; J.P. Gauci, Back to Old Tricks? Italian Responsibility for Returning People 
to Libya, 6 June 2017, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/back-to-old-tricks-italian-
responsibility-for-returning-people-to-libya/ (accessed 29 May 2018). 
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The establishment of the right to asylum in the EU was from the out-
set linked to the efforts to create a Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS). First steps were taken in 1998, when, after the war in Kosovo 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, a consensus on the need to harmonise na-
tional asylum systems emerged.170 In Tampere, it was decided that, with-
in the gradual development of a common system, the “absolute respect 
of the right to seek asylum” and full commitment “to the obligations 
of the Geneva Refugee Convention and other relevant human rights in-
struments” should be upheld. The EU asylum system should be “open 
to those who forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection”.171
Some months before Tampere, the European Council had already 
decided that “[…] the fundamental rights applicable at Union lev-
el should be consolidated in a Charter and thereby made more evi-
dent”.172 The Tampere conclusions then established the conditions for 
the implementation of this Charter in “close connection with the area 
of freedom, security and justice”. In the EUCFR, which was given full 
legal effect only by the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 
December 2009, the ‘right to asylum’ was included in Art. 18. The Lis-
bon Treaty conferred legally binding status on the EUCFR, obliging 
the EU to respect the rights that it enumerates. Today, virtually all EU 
asylum instruments reflect the Tampere conclusions and ask for the 
“full observance” of the right to asylum in their preambles.173
Art. 18 EUCFR states:
The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules 
of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 Jan-
uary 1967 relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union.
170 See K. Hailbronner, Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy in the European 
Union, 2000, Leiden; E. Guild, Immigration Law in the European Community, 2011, 
The Hague; G. Noll, Negotiating Asylum. The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection 
and the Common Market of Deflection, 2011, EJML 3(3-4): 475-478. 
171 Action Plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement 
the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and justice 
– Text adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 3 December 1998, Official 
Journal C 019, 23/01/1999 P. 0001 – 0015.
172 Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, Conclusions of the Presidency.
173 See V. Moreno-Lax, 2017, p. 371 ss.
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The EU itself has made clear through the formulation of policy 
documents and legislation that the Charter shall also guide the external 
dimensions of asylum and migration policy. The Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility (GAMM) stated that “respect for the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU is a key component of EU policies 
on migration.” In the Partnership Framework, it was later confirmed 
that “all of this work must take place in a context which fully respects 
international law and fundamental rights.” Furthermore, according to 
Art. 21(1) TEU, the EU’s international action shall, amongst others, be 
guided by the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms, and respect for human dignity and international 
law.174 The Frontex Regulation,175 which also elaborates on the compe-
tencies of the agency to cooperate with third countries,176 states that it 
“seeks to ensure full respect for […] the right to asylum.”177
Art. 18 itself is not limited in its territorial scope.178 It applies to the 
Libyan case because EU institutions and bodies are involved, and EU 
law applies.179 Formally, EU cooperation with Libya is viewed mostly 
as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or CSDP 
framework under Section 2 TEU180 as well as development policy. In 
174 The CJEU confirmed that this applies to the CFSP area (see C-263/14).
175 Regulation (Eu) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation 
(EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC.
176 Art. 52 and 54 of the Regulation.
177 Recital 49 of the Regulation; for an analysis of the cooperation of Frontex with 
third countries, see V. Moreno-Lax, 2017, p. 173 ss.
178 See V. Moreno-Lax, 2017, p. 381.
179 While the Charter itself does not contain a jurisdictional clause and the EU does 
not even possess its own sovereign territory, Art. 51(1) of the Charter clarifies that its 
provisions apply to both EU organs and Member States when they implement EU law; 
see also V. Moreno-Lax, C. Castello, The Extraterritorial Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, in S. Peers, T. Hervey, J. Kenner, A. Ward (ed.), The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, 2014, Oxford and Portland; S. Peers, Immigration, Asylum and the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, EJML, 2001, p. 146-48; D.M. Curtin, 
The Sting is Always in the Tail, The Personal scope of Application of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, 2001, Maastricht Journal, 102; for relevant CJEU case law, see e.g. 
C-400/10 PPU McB, 2010, C-377-98, The Netherlands v Parliament and Council, 2001, 
C-404/92 P X v Commission, 1994, and C-185/98 P Baustahlgewebe v Commission, 1998.
180 Missions EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia and EUBAM Libya are being 
implemented under the CSDP framework; see Council Decision 2016/1339/CFSP of 
CHALLENGING THE EXTERNALISED OBSTRUCTION OF ASYLUM 231
substance, however, Art. 78(2)(g) Treaty on the Functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union (TFEU) is the overall treaty basis for action in Libya, 
clarifying that “cooperation with third countries for the purpose of 
managing inflows of people applying for asylum […]” is part of the 
CEAS.
2.1. Understanding Asylum
Commentators disagree considerably on the scope or content as 
well as the character of the right to asylum in Art. 18 CFR. This disa-
greement may, to some degree, be grounded in the linguistically vague 
formulation of Art. 18,181 a general uncertainty as regards the term asy-
lum, and the fact that there exists no equivalent right to asylum in the 
ECHR.182 Moreover, the CJEU has so far only contributed to the rath-
er obvious, namely that the non-refoulement principle in Art. 4 of the 
Charter is also covered by Art. 18.183
Unfortunately, legal commentary has too often opted for positions 
that limit Art. 18 to a minimum or misconstrue its character. Some have 
argued that the right to asylum does not entail an (individual) right to 
asylum,184 that Art. 18 is confined to the rights provided by the Refugee 
Convention185 or to the principle of non-refoulement therein.186 These 
4 August 2016 amending and extending Decision (CFSP) 2013/233 on the European 
Union Integrated Border Management Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM 
Libya), and Council Decision 2017/1385/CFSP, of 14 July 2017 amending Decision 
(CFSP) 2015/778 on a European Union military operation in the Southern Central 
Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED operation SOPHIA).
181 See G. Noll, 2005, p. 548.
182 While a right to enter and to obtain asylum might be derived from the non-
refoulement principle and other ECHR rights, the ECtHR has repeatedly stated that 
contracting states have the right to regulate entry, residence and extradition according 
to relevant human rights treaties; e.g. in Ahmed/Austria, 25.964/95, 11 January 
2007, Salah Sheekh/Netherlands, 1948/04; see also Nußberger, Flüchtlingsschicksale 
zwischen Völkerrecht und Politik - Zur Rechtsprechung des EGMR zu Fragen der 
Staatenverantwortung in Migrationsfällen, NVwZ 2016, p. 815.
183 CJEU in N.S. and ME, and Halaf.
184 See G. Jochum, Art. 18 GRC, in K. Stern, M. Sachs (ed.), Europäische 
Grundrechte-Charta, 2016.
185 See M. Graßhof, Art. 18 GRC, in J. Schwarze (ed.), EU-Kommentar, 2012; M. 
Rossi, Art. 18 GRC, in C. Calliess, M. Ruffert (ed.), EUV/AEUV, 2016; M.P. Folz, Art 18 
GRC, in C. Vedder, W. Heintschel Von Heinegg (ed.), Europäisches Unionsrecht, 2012.
186 W. Obwexer, Völker-und unionsrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen für eine Begrenzung 
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restrictive positions adhere to the outdated notion of asylum as a right 
of the state and lack contextual as well as textual foundations.
Art. 18 itself refers to the Refugee Convention and EU treaties. 
However, neither of those defines asylum. Consequently, one must 
consult other sources. At the outset, the history of asylum187 informs 
the content of Art. 18. This history reflects, amongst others, the evolve-
ment of a territorial and normative conception of asylum under the in-
fluence of varying social and political circumstances and agreements188 
– from its normative roots in the context of Jewish tradition,189 as well 
as the ancient Greek190 and Roman191 conceptions, to the strengthening 
of the territorial notion through the Church,192 and, later, its expression 
des Zustroms von Schutzsuchenden (Richtwert/“Obergrenze“), JRP, 2016, 152 (163); H.M. 
Wolffgang, Art 18 GRCh, in C.O. Lenz, D. Borchardt (ed.), EU-Verträge Kommentar.
187 References to the protection provided to individuals by sovereigns are found 
in the oldest religious scriptures as well as in the legal practices of most ancient 
civilisations; the oldest international legal agreement for which content is documented, 
the Egyptian-Hittite peace treaty (‘Kadesh Treaty’) from 1258 BC, already contained 
clauses addressing the protection of individuals, holding that populations should be 
exchanged between the two powers under the condition of amnesty.
188 For an encompassing account of the territorial conception of asylum, see A. 
Grahl-Madsen, Territorial Asylum, 1980, Stockholm.
189 When asylum was, according to the holy text, granted to the innocent who 
took refuge at the altar, and later in cities; it is contested, however, whether cities ever 
actually served as places of refuge (see C. Trauisen, Das sakrale Asyl in der Alten Welt, 
2004, Tübingen; see also T. Gil-Bazo, Asylum as a General Principle of International 
Law, in IJRL, 2015, p. 18 ss.; I. Bau, This Ground is Holy: Church Sanctuary and 
Central American Refugees, in Refugee Law and Policy, 2011, p. 8 ss.).
190 There, asylum was understood as an expression of divine power, where human 
justice had led to unsatisfactory situations. E.g. in cases of involuntary crimes when the 
temples served as a refuge; ibid.
191 In Rome, the Temple of Asylaeus on the Capitoline Hill, founded by Romulus, 
provided protection to those outside the pale of law; see T. Gil-Bazo, cit., 2015, p. 18 
ss.; I. Bau, cit., 2011, p. 8 ss.
192 A turning point for the evolvement of the institution of asylum was the influence 
exercised on it by the Christian Church in the fourth Century. As Christianity became 
the dominant religion in the Roman Empire during the reign of Constantine the Great, 
the Church also contributed to the strengthening of the territorial character of asylum; 
there is, however, no direct link between the tradition of asylum as referenced in the 
Old Testament and church asylum (C. Trauisen, 2004, p. 308); what connects both, 
however, is the personal character of asylum deriving from a particular place that 
provides protection based on Greek religion (ibid., p. 309); territorial protection, thus, 
could be projected to the different Church territories, such as convents, monasteries, 
etc.; the Codex Theodosianus codified the authority of churches to grant asylum, as 
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in the legislation of European kingdoms.193 As the concept of sover-
eignty also obtained a territorial rather than a personal form, the devel-
opment of the modern nation-state consolidated the process of territo-
rialisation of asylum and the understanding of asylum as an expression 
of sovereignty.194 The Age of Enlightenment established asylum as an 
institution for the protection of the politically persecuted.195 Togeth-
er with the evolvement of the notion of a sovereign people and the 
strengthening of democratic principles, asylum eventually also became 
an expression of an obligation – a perspective that was also translated 
into state constitutions.196
However, international relations and international law did not re-
flect these developments. In particular, following the establishment of 
the modern nation-state, the understanding that asylum is an exclusive 
right of states persisted.197 Echoing this view, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR), in Art. 14, merely recognises a right to 
well as its territorial limits (see T. Gil-Bazo, 2015, p. 21); the various Christian Councils 
reinforced and expanded the position of the Church on the institution of asylum, 
transferring the universal claim of the Church also to the sphere of asylum and the 
growing importance of asylum in the Church found its climax in the twelfth century, 
when the inviolability of asylum within the limits of Church territory was established, 
while its infringement was punished by excommunication (ibid.).
193 For instance, in Spanish legislation of the 13th century, the Church’s privilege 
was confirmed. Not only a duty to respect asylum was codified but also a standard of 
treatment for asylees (ibid.). 
194 Ibid., p. 22; this process also led to the codification of asylum in state legislation 
and the weakening of the Church’s authority in relation to asylum; contrasting this 
development, asylum as an authority of the Church continued to exist in the German 
states until the nineteenth century as well as in Spain (ibid.; see also L. Bolesta-
Kowiebrodzki, Le droit d’asile, 1962, p. 14).
195 Following the French Revolution and the division between the political 
conceptions of monarchies and republics, the category of the political refugee was 
established; see G. Burgess, Refuge in the Land of Liberty, 2008.
196 The political perspective on asylum as an obligation or duty based on the 
people’s sovereignty was, amongst others, reflected in the French Constitution of 
1793 (T. Gil-Bazo, 2015); in the view of Reale (Le droit d’asile, 1938), the sentiment 
of the public conscience that the extradition of political refugees was an offence to 
humanity and honour was transformed into a legal principle; Article 120 of the French 
Constitution stated that “[The French people] give asylum to foreigners banished from 
their homeland for the cause of freedom.” which today still constitutes a reference for 
other constitutions in their definition of asylum (Gil-Bazo, 2015, p. 23).
197 See also G. Goodwin-Gill, J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 
2007, Oxford, p. 355. 
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seek and enjoy asylum, but not a right to be granted asylum.198 The 
weak wording of Art. 14 encouraged further attempts to codify a right 
to asylum, which, however, likewise failed, such as, most prominently, 
the Convention on Territorial Asylum.199
Despite the failure to explicitly codify an individual right to asylum 
in international law, the second half of the twentieth century witnessed 
legal developments that effectively contributed to the strengthening of 
protection mechanisms for asylum-seekers. Through the emergence of 
modern refugee and international human rights law – the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, and in Europe notably the European Convention of Hu-
man Rights (ECHR) – a comprehensive legal framework was created 
that includes rights which are substantially comparable to or even coex-
tensive with a right to asylum.200 These developments moreover led to a 
new category of refugee – adding to the political understanding of the 
French Revolution a human right based perspective.201 Building upon the 
ancient tradition of asylum and its normative character, the institution 
of asylum is furthermore embedded in the constitutions of numerous 
states worldwide202 as well as regional human rights documents.203 It is 
thus evident that the right to asylum of the individual precedes Art. 18.204
198 Within the drafting process of Art. 14 UDHR, the conception of asylum as a 
right of individuals was also put forth; however, no agreement could be achieved in this 
regard (see also T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, H. Gammeltoft-Hansen, The Right to Seek 
Revisited, in EJML, 2008, p. 442 ss.); against it the argument was presented that there 
is no right of foreigners to access territories of sovereign states (see V. Moreno-Lax, 
2017, p. 339).
199 The establishment of the right of asylum in the ICCPR failed against the same 
argument (see Commission on Human Rights, Report to the Economic and Social 
Council on the eighth session of the Commission, held in New York, from 14 April to 
14 June 1952, para 201 and 202).
200 Both the ECHR and the Refugee Convention (notwithstanding evident 
shortcomings in respect of enforceability and clarity, eg. in relation to access to 
citizenship) establish state obligations and corresponding rights and freedoms of 
individuals which contribute to abolishing discrimination between asylum-seekers or 
refugees and the nationals of asylum states.
201 The definition of “refugee” in the Refugee Convention encompasses also 
properties of the individual that exist independent of political opinion.
202 Ibid.; see also T. Gil-Bazo, 2015; the Member States Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia 
and Croatia codified a constitutional right of asylum (see M. Den Heijer, 2014, p. 534).
203 See Art. 22(7) of the American Convention on Human Rights or Art. 12(3) of 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
204 See UNHCR public statement in relation to Zuheyr Freyeh Halaf v. the 
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That Art. 18 provides an individual right can, therefore, be derived 
from Art. 52(4) of the Charter, which requests that the right to asylum 
must be interpreted “in harmony with” the constitutional traditions in 
Europe.205 Asylum “is an integral part of the common heritage of Euro-
pean traditions”, the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE had already 
stated in 1965.206 The use of the phrase “right to asylum” instead of 
“right to seek asylum” or “right of asylum” also requests this interpre-
tation, as well as the fact that Art. 18 is embedded within the EUCFR, 
explaining that the EU “places the individual at the heart of its activi-
ties” (Preamble of the Charter).207
Understanding asylum as an individual right has implications for 
any approach the EU pursues in all asylum-related actions, including 
its current attitude towards migration from Libya. While it is true that 
asylum-seekers may often be affected by situations of material need 
and vulnerability, and thus require aid that developed states may wish 
to provide, the right to asylum calls for a rights-based answer. As laud-
able as the efforts to improve the living conditions of asylum-seekers 
in Libya as well as towards resettling a few to other countries or facil-
itating voluntary return may be, they cannot release the EU from its 
obligations to uphold the right to asylum.
2.2. A Response to Rightlessness
The necessity of a right to asylum, as well as the limitations of a 
purely humanitarian approach, become particularly evident when ex-
ploring the development of the Refugee Convention. The 1951 Refugee 
Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees pending before the CJEU; Maduro, 9 September 
2008, Conclusions in C-465/07; T. Gil-Bazo, The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union and the Right to be Granted Asylum in the Union’s Law, in 
Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2008, p. 51.
205 See also M. Den Heijer, 2014, p. 55.
206 Parliamentary Assembly, Granting of the Right of Asylum to European 
Refugees, Recommendation 434, 1965.
207 See UNHCR public statement in relation to Zuheyr Freyeh Halaf v. the 
Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees pending before the CJEU, for the discussions 
regarding the wording of Article 18 of the EU Charter within the travaux préparatoires 
of the EU Charter, see: Doc. CHARTE 4332/00 CONVENT 35, at pp. 496-528; see 
also, T. Gil-Bazo, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the 
right to be Granted Asylum in the Union’s Law, 2008, Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol. 
27 no. 3, p. 46.
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Convention and its 1967 Protocol are rightfully considered the centre-
piece of international refugee law, containing a binding definition of 
the category ‘refugee’ as well as related rights of individuals and obliga-
tions of states. Although the Convention itself does not touch upon the 
topic of asylum, refugee protection under the Convention and asylum 
are often viewed as the same. While this position does not consider the 
broader development of the institution of asylum and its extensive his-
tory, it is accurate that the Refugee Convention strongly influences the 
modern conceptualisation of asylum.
The establishment of the Refugee Convention was a consequence of 
the collective European experience of rightlessness and displacement208 
in the first half of the twentieth century. The dilemma in the relationship 
between refugees and the international order became apparent209 when 
the refugee had lost the protection of the country of origin which was 
tantamount to losing the protection of the entire system of international 
law. States thus decided it was in their mutual interest to establish a legal 
basis for the protection and assimilation of the millions of displaced per-
sons as an exception to the norm of communal closure.210 It is a common 
misunderstanding that the Refugee Convention provides protection 
only against persecution. As the absence of persecution does not resolve 
the fundamental predicament of rightlessness that has accrued, the Con-
vention instead also aims at reconnecting the refugee to the international 
system, that refugees who have become rightless shall again “shall enjoy 
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination.”211
In this sense, the reality of asylum-seekers stranded in Libya today is 
comparable to that of European refugees in the first half of the twentieth 
century. The Libyan case is evidence for the fact that despite the develop-
ments in international refugee and human rights law, asylum-seekers can 
still fall outside the entire international legal order, depending primarily 
on humanitarian discretion to escape massive human rights violations. 
By circumventing the application of a framework designed to protect 
208 See N. Oudejans, Asylum, a Philosophical Inquiry into the International 
Protection of Refugees, 2011, Oisterwijk, p. 10. 
209 “A refugee is an anomaly in international law”, the International Refugee 
Organization wrote in 1949, “and it is often impossible to deal with him in accordance 
with the legal provisions designed to apply to aliens who receive assistance from their 
national authorities”.
210 See J.C. Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees Under International Law, 2005, 
Cambridge, p. 85. 
211 Preamble of the Refugee Convention.
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refugees, the EU has decided to pursue a strategy that contributes to the 
same rightlessness that had initially given rise to its emergence.
2.3. Non-Refoulement
Among the essential rights and obligations the Convention pro-
vides, the duty of non-refoulement, as stipulated in its Art. 33(1), has 
traditionally received most attention, and has been understood as its 
core principle.212 This principle – that states must not return any person 
to face the risk of a severe human rights violation – is also codified in a 
number of human rights instruments, including the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)213 and the ECHR,214 
and there has been considerable state practice reflecting this norm 
since. Against this backdrop, it has been claimed that the principle of 
non-refoulement has even become universally binding customary in-
ternational law.215
During the drafting process of the Refugee Convention states had 
insisted they be allowed to decide who should be admitted to their 
territory and to remain there.216 However, because a person is a refugee 
212 See UNHCR public statement in relation to Zuheyr Freyeh Halaf v. the 
Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees pending before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union; on the principle of non-refoulement see also G. Goodwin-Gill, 
J. McAdam, 2007, p. 201 ss.; In EU law, the principle of non-refoulement is already 
guaranteed by Art. 78(1) TFEU; however, contrary to e.g. Art. 3 ECHR, Art. 33(1) is 
not an absolute right, as 33(2) states that “a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds 
for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger 
to the community of that country” may not claim non-refoulement.
213 The ICCPR was ratified by Libya in 1976.
214 See also the 1984 Convention Against Torture, the 1989 Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, and the 1989 American Convention on Human Rights.
215 See E. Lauterpacht, D. Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Duty of Non-
Refoulement, in E. Feller, Refugee Protection in International Law, 2001, 87-177; but 
arguing against it see J.C. Hathaway, Leveraging Asylum, 2009, Texas ILJ, p. 503. In this 
connection it is also worth noting that that CJEU has clarified that both Art. 18 and Art. 19 
of the Charter can be used as a source for this principle (see CJEU, 24 June 2015, C-373/13).
216 From the position that prioritizes state sovereignty derives also the failure to 
include any duty to grant asylum in the Refugee Convention; see also A. Castillo, 
J.C. Hathaway, Temporary Protection, in J.C. Hathaway, Reconceiving International 
Refugee Law, 1997. A. Grahl-Madsen (Territorial Asylum, 1980, p. 52) had noted in 
the context of the drafting of the Convention on Territorial Asylum: “As ‘asylum’ is 
used in the draft conventions as a notion different from non-refoulement and non-
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because of circumstances rather than by validation, states will be con-
fronted by persons legally entitled to non-refoulement as soon as they 
come under that state’s jurisdiction.
Through Art. 3 ECHR,217 this notion is even expanded to include all 
asylum-seekers, and the explanations to Art. 18 in conjunction with the 
Protocol on Asylum218 and the Preamble to the Charter219 clarify that the 
ECHR is a relevant source for understanding Art. 18. EU legislation, the 
ECHR and its interpretation by the ECtHR have considerably penetrated 
the field of asylum and gave rise to the notion of subsidiary protection.220
extradition, it would seem that it must have something to do with residence. In my 
opinion, this ought to be reflected in the text of the Convention.” Residence, according 
to him, amounts to allowing refugees to live in the territory, instead of lingering there.
217 Also through Art. 7 ICCPR, which Libya has ratified.
218 As the explanations to Art. 18 elucidate, this Article has been based on Art. 
63 TEU (now Art. 78 TFEU), “which requires the Union to respect the Geneva 
Convention on refugees”, and that this “Article is in line with the Protocol on Asylum 
annexed to the Treaties”, see Official Journal of the European Union C 303/17, 14 
December 2007; Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union, Protocol (No 24) on asylum for nationals of Member States of the European 
Union; and in the Protocol on Asylum it is already affirmed that the ECHR is part of 
EU law as general principles (see also CJEU Case C-36/75); the argument that Art. 18 
cannot add anything to Art. 78 is thus rather flawed.
219 See Recital 4 and 5 of the Charter.
220 See also M. Den Heijer, 2014, p. 534; for an analysis of the notion of subsidiary 
protection in relation to the ECHR and ECtHR case-law, see IARLJ-Europe, 
Qualification for International Protection (Directive 2011/95/EU), 2016; against this 
backdrop it can also be argued that subsidiary protection must be covered by Art. 
18, as essentially, in the EU context, refugee status was complemented by the status 
of subsidiary protection to provide protection to those who would face a real risk 
of suffering serious harm in case of return, but who do not qualify as refugees; a 
person entitled to subsidiary protection, like the refugee, is effectively unable to (re-)
establish a meaningful link to his or her country of origin. It is thus only reasonable 
and a conceptual necessity to provide refugees and other individuals who must not 
be returned the same legal protection and include both statuses within the right to 
asylum; see also Art. 15-18 of Directive 2011/95/EU; and according to Recital 39 of 
Directive 2011/95/EU “[…] with the exception of derogations which are necessary 
and objectively justified, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection status should be granted 
the same rights and benefits as those enjoyed by refugees under this Directive, and 
should be subject to the same conditions of eligibility”; it must be noted that, despite 
there not being any legitimate reason to protect refugees better than those who cannot 
be returned based on the broader principle of non-refoulement, since they all share 
the same need for international protection, EU law still draws a distinction between 
asylum status and subsidiary protection status (see Art. 78 TFEU) and individuals 
entitled to subsidiary protection often still fall within a discriminatory regime; see for 
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Practically, then, the non-refoulement principle amounts to a 
de-facto duty to admit asylum-seekers. Naturally, this poses a signif-
icant limit to attempts of controlling the movement of asylum-seek-
ers.221 There is rather an inevitable tension between efforts to manage 
migration and upholding non-refoulement. It is in this connection that 
the non-refoulement principle provides a right to access asylum proce-
dures and residence rights for the duration of a procedure.222
As discussed, the current EU approach towards Libya is a response 
to an interpretation of the non-refoulement principle put forth by the 
ECtHR in the case of Hirsi Jamaa.223 The ECtHR established that 
push-backs to Libya constitute a breach of non-refoulement in cases 
of both de jure and de facto control over a vessel and independent of 
territoriality. The migration control strategy towards Libya is an at-
tempt to avoid the applicability of this variation of the non-refoulement 
principle.
In the current arrangement, however, there are good reasons to 
assume that the non-refoulement principle is being violated through 
complicit action – not only by Italy but also through the acts of EU 
institutions. Whenever the Libyan coast guards act in international wa-
ters to intercept asylum-seekers and return them to Libya where ram-
pant human rights violations await them, this act constitutes a breach 
of non-refoulement.224 When EU institutions or missions provide “aid 
or assistance with knowledge of the circumstances” – e.g. through pro-
viding training and equipment for interception and return –, they are 
responsible for the wrongful act according to Art. 16 of the Interna-
tional Law Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (ASR). The violation of the absolute 
example also T. Gil-Bazo, Refugee Status, Subsidiary Protection, and the Right to be 
Granted Asylum Under EC Law, 2006, UNHCR Research Paper No. 136.
221 See K. Hailbronner, Comments on the Right to Leave, Return and Remain, 
in V. Gowlland-Debbas, The Problem of Refugees in the Light of Contemporary 
International Law Issues, 1996, p. 114; J.C. Hathaway, T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, Non-
Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 53, no. 2, 
p. 237-238.
222 See also H.D. Jarass, Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union, 2016, 
Art. 18 GRC.
223 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECHR, Application no. 27765/09, 23 February 
2012.
224 Libya is bound by the non-refoulement principle enshrined in the ICCPR 
framework.
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non-refoulement principle is foreseen, while the support is directly 
aiming at allowing Libyan actors to conduct the intended operations.
2.4. Beyond Non-Refoulement
Thus, the question remains whether Art. 18 also embeds rights 
beyond the Refugee Convention and the broader principle of non-re-
foulement. Art. 18 itself implies that it does not only entail Convention 
rights – using the formula “with due respect for”, thus leaving space 
for other asylum rights. Furthermore, the rich history of the institution 
of asylum presented above informs the understanding that the term 
asylum denotes a concept that is not limited to refugee protection and 
non-refoulement.225
It is reasonable to assume that, for an adequate understanding of Art. 
18, both the CEAS as well as relevant international treaties addressing the 
rights of asylum-seekers must be taken into consideration. The relevance 
of the fundamental propositions and aims of CEAS for interpreting the 
scope of the right to asylum is prompted by Art. 18 itself, which makes 
explicit reference to the rules of the EU Treaties. Through secondary EU 
asylum law, which regularly refers to the right to asylum, the EU legisla-
tor expresses its understanding of asylum.226 It follows that Art. 18 must 
be interpreted in harmony with the fundamental tenets of the CEAS, 
including the right to access an asylum procedure,227 and the right to be 
granted territorial protection.228 Ultimately, the historical use of the term 
225 A closer look at the use of the term in the EU context points towards the same 
direction. While in Art. 78(1) TFEU the term asylum is used to denote protection under 
the Refugee Convention as distinguished from subsidiary protection, the universal use 
of the term international protection in secondary EU legislation, encompassing both 
refugee status and subsidiary protection status, relativises the differentiation made by 
Art. 78(1) TFEU. Furthermore, in EU policy documents asylum is used as a general 
term for the activities under Art. 78, including measures addressing subsidiary protection 
status; see also M. Den Heijer, 2014, p. 532; this reading is also supported by the case law 
of the CJEU. In the case of B and D, the Court assumed the understanding that asylum 
may refer to protection beyond the Refugee Convention (CJEU C-57/09 and C-101/09).
226 As Art. 52(3) of the Charter further elucidates, EU law is not prevented to 
(even if Article 18 would correspond to a right guaranteed by the ECHR) provide 
more extensive protection; see also M. Den Heijer, 2014, 18.41.
227 Art. 7(1) Directive 2013/32/EU; see also V. Moreno-Lax, 2017, p. 379.
228 Art. 13 and 18 Qualifications Directive; See e.g. C. Teitgen-Colly, Article II-
78-Droit d’asile, 2005, p. 265; V. Moreno-Lax, 2017, p. 377. T. Gil-Bazo, 2006, p. 228. 
See also UNHCR public statement in relation to Zuheyr Freyeh Halaf v. the Bulgarian 
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asylum as set out above similarly requests an interpretation of the right 
to asylum as an individual right to territorial protection.
Furthermore, Art. 53 EUCFR, which aims at maintaining the level 
of protection afforded by “Union law and international law and by in-
ternational agreements”, requests that international human rights that 
give effect to access to asylum should inform the interpretation of Art. 
18. Among these rights is certainly the right “to leave any country, in-
cluding his own” in Art. 12(2) ICCPR – a human rights treaty of general 
applicability.229 This freedom, which relates to the right to seek asylum 
in Art. 14 UDHR, applies irrespective of the legal status of individuals 
concerned.230 Moreover, while limitations are permissible,231 they must 
not render the right to leave ineffective in law or practice. Restrictions 
must remain exceptions and not impair the essence of the right. They 
must be proportionate and not discriminatory.232 As a precondition for 
the right to an asylum procedure, the right to leave thus complements 
the principle of non-refoulement,233 practically amounting to a right to 
access asylum in the EU.
State Agency for Refugees pending before the CJEU; but also V. Moreno-Lax, cit., 
2017 or M. Den Heijer, cit., 2014; regarding the connection between the principle of 
non-refoulement and access to asylum procedures, see also the Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Pinto de Albuquerque in the case of Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, ECHR, 
Application no. 27765/09, 23 February 2012.
229 The right to leave is also enshrined in Article 2(2) of Protocol No. 4 to the 
ECHR. 
230 In this connection it is relevant to note that the case law of the HRC has 
excessively addressed the extraterritorial applicability of the right to leave.
231 For restrictions the CCPR and ECtHR have accepted, see N. Markard, 2016, 
pp. 591-616.
232 See V. Moreno-Lax, 2017, p. 343; also N. Markard, 2016.
233 See N. Markard, 2016; G. Goodwin-Gill, J. McAdam, 2007, p. 370; Goodwin-
Gill, The Right to Seek Asylum: Interception at Sea and the Principle of Non-
Refoulement, IJRL, 2011, p. 444; S. Trevisanut, The Principle of Non-Refoulement 
and the De-Territorialization of Border Control at Sea, LJIL, 2014, p. 667; a possible 
right to enter that may be available to asylum-seekers beyond cases of non-refoulement 
is highly contested. While there are reasonable arguments for its existence, most 
commentators, however, deny that there is a human right to enter the territory of an 
asylum state; V. Moreno-Lax (2017, p. 389) has argued for an “implicit right to gain 
effective access to (territorial) asylum”. The right to access territories of states to apply 
for asylum can be seen as a necessary corollary to the right to asylum, she claims; 
see also K. Hailbronner, D. Thym, Die Flüchtlingskrise als Problem europäischer 
Rechtsintegration, 2016, Juristen Zeitung, Volume 71, Numbers 15-16, pp. 753-763; 
also, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, in House of Lords, 9 December 2004, UKHL 55.
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In the Libyan case, commentators have already made the argument 
for the violation of the right to leave in conjunction with Art. 16 ASR.234 
Unlike non-refoulement, the right to leave does not have absolute char-
acter and restrictions are possible. However, measures restricting the 
departure of asylum-seekers are permissible only in cases of life-saving 
operations.235 In relation to a coastal state like Libya, rescue and assis-
tance obligations regarding persons in distress according to the Law of 
the Sea236 must similarly be considered; particularly the duty of states 
to operate adequate SAR services that deliver individuals to a place of 
safety.237 As long as Libya cannot be regarded as safe,238 international 
obligations require the establishment of Libyan SAR services which 
will not disembark asylum-seekers (rescued in Libyan waters) at Lib-
yan ports.
Thus, when interpreted in harmony with international law and the 
CEAS, and applied to the Libyan case – notwithstanding evident chal-
lenges of enforceability – Art. 18 practically and conceptually amounts 
to a right of asylum-seekers to leave Libya, not be returned to Libya 
(after life-saving operations), and access an asylum procedure – once 
rescued in international waters – with the prospect of obtaining terri-
torial asylum.
3. Conclusion
In an attempt at impeding movements of asylum-seekers from the 
African to the European continent, the external dimensions of EU asy-
lum and migration policy have gained unprecedented prominence in 
234 Despite detrimental effects on the safety of the route and the stability of the 
economy, attempts to restrict the right to leave (and thus the right to access asylum in 
Europe) before arrival in in Niger may constitute a legally less problematic issue.
235 See N. Markard, 2016.
236 Under Art. 98(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), Regulation V/33 of the International Convention for the Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention), para 2.1.10 of the International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR), Art. 10 of the Salvage Convention, as well as 
under customary international law (see also B. Oxman, Human Rights and the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, CJTL (1998) 399, 1998).
237 Resolution MSC.155(78) (adopted on 20 May 2004) amendments to the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, as amended, 3.1.
238 See also UNHCR, September 2018, p. 22.
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the last years. While migration control cooperation with states on the 
road to Libya, such as Niger, might be useful for the somewhat legit-
imate aim of curbing movements northwards, notwithstanding detri-
mental effects on the safety of the route and the stability of the country, 
the Libyan dynamics are of a different nature. There, the excess of ex-
ternalisation policy has led to the implementation of a strategy of ob-
struction of asylum in collaboration with Libyan actors that contrib-
utes to the containment of asylum-seekers in fundamental rightlessness 
– the same dilemma in the relationship between asylum-seekers and the 
international order that had initially given rise to modern refugee law. 
This approach assumes that enabling non-EU actors – amongst them 
militia groups and (former) smugglers – to prevent the movement of 
asylum-seekers towards Europe would absolve the EU from its legal 
responsibilities.
The Libyan case exemplifies the seemingly irresolvable tension 
between the right to asylum and the prioritisation of border security. 
As a right of the individual, the right to asylum encompasses several 
consecutive phases in the movement of asylum-seekers towards access-
ing territorial protection in the EU, aiming at overcoming situations 
of rightlessness. For this purpose, it not only embeds within its reach 
the Refugee Convention and the non-refoulement principle, but it ex-
tends its scope to include further essential dimensions, such as the right 
to leave. In the context of the movement of asylum-seekers from EU 
neighbours that do not protect refugee rights, the right to asylum prac-
tically and conceptually amounts to a right to overcome rightlessness 
through accessing asylum. The acts of EU institutions in support of 
Libyan actors currently stand in contradiction to this European right 
to asylum.
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1. Protecting Social Rights of Asylum Seekers at the European Level in 
Times of Economic Crisis and Austerity Measures: the Potential of 
the European Social Charter
In the last three years, more than a million migrants and refugees 
crossed into Europe, seeking refuge from war, terror, torture, persecu-
tion and poverty, and creating division in Europe, namely in the EU 
and EU member States, over how best to deal with resettling people.
Whatever may be the international legal obligations of the European 
States concerned to grant the persons in question asylum (or other kind of 
protection) by an administrative recognition of refugee status (or other spe-
cially protected status), guaranteeing this million people hospitality, respect 
for their dignity and fundamental rights, prompt and proper social integra-
tion in host countries, when such people actually stay in Europe and live 
under the jurisdiction of European State authorities, is a major challenge for 
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European States and EU institutions, one that cannot be missed.
Unfortunately, meeting such challenge is made even more difficult 
due to the fact that, in the last decade, social rights and social justice 
are under stress throughout Europe, mostly as a result of the economic 
crisis. In fact, since 2008 the economic crisis – maybe not a temporary 
but a structural one – had an extremely negative impact on European 
workers, families and most vulnerable people; and the measures adopt-
ed by States and EU institutions to cope with such crisis, in particu-
lar so-called austerity measures, also disproportionately affected those 
who are most vulnerable – the poor, the elderly, the sick. In this respect, 
one could indeed say that traditional and consolidated high standards 
in the protection of social rights, and some basic features of the wel-
fare state – which are essential for the enjoyment of such rights, and of 
which European States should be proud – have begun to be in danger. 
Increasing poverty and unemployment rate (in particular youth unem-
ployment); social and economic inequalities; job insecurity for many 
categories of employees; regressive changes in social security schemes 
and benefits; increases in the cost of healthcare: these are among the 
most worrying signals about the state of health of social rights in Eu-
rope, today.
But by consequence such signals also tell us that reinforced atten-
tion must be paid to the need for effectively protecting social rights, of 
both European citizens and asylum seekers, at the European level, and 
not only at the national level, as well as to the need for ensuring access 
to remedies in case of violation of social rights.
In this sense, the economic and migration crisis also represent an 
opportunity to grasp the importance of achieving such rights, and help 
the political conviction growing that respect for social rights consti-
tutes the best way forward to prevent and way out of crises, and – what 
is even more important – to increase people’s participation in demo-
cratic processes, reinforce their trust in European construction, by pro-
moting inclusion and social cohesion.
On this background, consensus seems to be progressively gathering 
around the idea that there is an urgent need both to bring the European 
instruments for the protection of social rights back to the centre of the 
European legal and political stage, allowing it to show their full poten-
tial, and to enhance existing synergies, at the European level, to better 
protect social rights and strengthen the European model, centred on 
respect for social rights and advanced welfare systems.
In this respect, the revised European Social Charter has been in 
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particular identified as a living, integrated system of guarantees, whose 
implementation at national level has the potential to reduce economic 
and social tensions, and promote political consensus to facilitate the 
adoption of the necessary reforms.1
The decision of the Council of Europe to launch, in October 2014, 
the so-called “Turin process” stemmed precisely from such conviction. 
In fact, the Turin process is nothing but a number of political and dip-
lomatic initiatives aimed precisely at re-situating the Revised Social 
Charter at the centre of the European human rights architecture, and at 
improving the implementation of the Charter at national level, as well 
as the synergy between the Charter and EU law, especially in times of 
economic crisis and austerity measures.2
And it is worth noting that not only the Council of Europe but also 
the EU institutions recently decided to make a meaningful reference 
1 The European Social Charter (ESC) is a legally binding treaty for the protection 
of social rights, which is embedded in the institutional framework of the Council 
of Europe. It has been signed in Turin more than fifty years ago, in 1961, but it has 
progressively changed by virtue of a process of institutional reform started in the late 
Eighties and continued during the Nineties of the last Century. This process took the 
form of three Protocols, adopted in 1988, 1991 and 1995, and the Revised Social Charter, 
in 1996. In 1988 came the first additional Protocol which added new rights. In 1991, 
it was adopted the Amending Protocol improving the supervisory mechanism; and 
in 1995 another additional Protocol, providing for a system of collective complaints, 
was adopted. The culmination of this reform process came in 1996 with the adoption 
of the Revised Charter, which added a number of new rights, while at the same time 
incorporating the basic content of the 1961 Charter and its Protocols. To date, 43 out 
of the 47 member States of the Council of Europe have ratified either the 1961 Charter 
or the Revised Charter. The countries that have not yet ratified the Charter at all are 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland.
On the European Social Charter, see inter alios: J.-F. Akandji-Kombé, S. Leclerc 
(Eds.), La Charte Sociale Européenne (Actes des Premières Rencontres Européennes 
de Caen organisées à Caen, le 17 mars 2000), Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2001; J. Darcy J., 
D. Harris, The European Social Charter, 2nd edition, New York, Hotei Publishing, 
2001; A.M. Šwiątkowski, The Charter of Social Rights of the Council of Europe, The 
Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2007; O. De Schutter (ed.), The European Social 
Charter: a Social Constitution for Europe, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2010; C. Benelocine, La 
Charte Sociale Européenne, Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing, 2011; O. Dörr, 
‘European Social Charter’, in S. Schmahl, M. Breuer (Eds.), The Council of Europe: Its 
Laws and Policies, Oxford, OUP, 2017, pp. 507-541.
2 On the “Turin Process” see https://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-process. See also 
J. Luther, L. Mola (Eds.), Europe’s Social Rights Under the ‘Turin Process’ / Les droits 
sociaux de l’Europe sous le «processus de Turin», Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica, 2016.
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to the Social Charter within the framework of the EU acts establishing 
the European Pillar of Social Rights: I refer namely to the reference to 
the Charter in paragraph 16 of the Preamble to the European Pillar of 
Social Rights, as solemnly proclaimed by the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission, on 17 November 2017, in Gothenburg.
And rightly so.
The European Social Charter is indeed today, at the European level, 
the major legal instrument, the most wide-ranging and effective legal 
tool, specifically devoted to the protection of social rights.
The 31 substantive articles of the Revised Charter cover a broad 
range of individual and collective rights, spanning across many social 
areas.
Among such rights, employment rights represent certainly one of 
the main pillars of the Charter, probably the most traditional one. So-
cial protection is another pillar of the Charter and a cornerstone in the 
construction of the Council of Europe concerning social rights. The 
Charter addresses all aspects of social protection. It provides for the 
right to social security in its various branches, such as pensions, sick-
ness cover, unemployment benefits, occupational accident insurance 
and family benefits; and it guarantees an enforceable right to social and 
medical assistance for persons in need.
But the Revised Charter goes far beyond employment rights, la-
bour law and social protection, providing an overarching approach to 
what are known today as “societal” issues. I refer, for example, to the 
right to protection of health, the right to housing, the protection of the 
family, the protection and education of children and young persons, 
the right of disabled persons to social integration and participation in 
the life of the community, the right to protection against poverty and 
social exclusion. And it is worth stressing that the Charter guarantees 
all the above rights in a non-discriminatory way. Non-discrimination 
is not only guaranteed in matters of employment and between men and 
women, but it is a fundamental principle which indeed applies to all the 
rights of the European Social Charter.
Therefore, from the standpoint of persons protected, it is correct 
to say that the Charter, more than any other international (and Euro-
pean) normative instrument, takes care of the essential social needs of 
individuals in their daily lives, and that the common rationale of all its 
provisions is the assumption that human beings must have the right to 
enjoy decent living conditions as members of the organized commu-
nity in which they live: conditions such as to allow for them to live in 
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dignity, rather than merely survive. At the same time, from the stand-
point of the political and legal commitment required by States Parties, 
it can be said that the European Social Charter, more than any other 
international instrument, pushes States to provide themselves with an 
advanced and efficient public welfare system.
Furthermore, the Charter is not a mere “bill of rights”, that is, a 
simple catalogue of rights that States declare to uphold, or which they 
try to promote. It also provides for a specific monitoring mechanism 
aimed at guaranteeing the implementation of the obligations assumed 
by States parties, which has a significant impact on national laws and 
practices (and by consequence, on the effective enjoyment of the rights 
by the individuals and groups protected by the Charter).
Such a mechanism, which focuses on the role played by the Europe-
an Committee of Social Rights (ECSR),3 envisages two main distinct su-
pervision procedures. One is a typical “reporting procedure”, consisting 
in the evaluation by the ECSR of periodic reports presented by States on 
the implementation of the Charter in their legislation and actual practice. 
The other is the so-called “collective complaints procedure”, which con-
cerns only those States Parties that have expressly accepted it (only 15 
States at the moment, unfortunately). According to this procedure social 
partners and non-governmental organisations are enabled to directly ap-
ply to the European Committee of Social Rights for rulings on possible 
violations of the Charter in the country concerned.4
3 See https://www.coe.int/en/web/turin-european-social-charter/european-
committee-of-social-rights. 
4 The collective complaints procedure was inserted into the Social Charter system 
with the Additional Protocol of 9 November 1995. To date, only 15 States (out of the 
43 States Parties to the European Social Charter) have accepted it; they are: Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden. According to this procedure, 
four categories of organisations may lodge com plaints, alleging that a State Party is in 
breach of the Charter: firstly, international organisations of trade unions and employers 
organisations; secondly, non-govern mental organisations which have consultative status 
within the Council of Europe and have been put on a special list; thirdly, the trade unions 
and employers’ organi sations in the country concerned; and fourthly, national non-
governmental organisa tions (this last category is only entitled to submit complaints if 
the State Party concerned has expressly agreed to it; to date, only Finland has accepted 
this option). Complaints are examined by the ECSR, which, if the complaint is declared 
admissible, proceeds to decide on the merits of the case, that is whether the situation is in 
conformity with the Charter or not. The decision is taken on the basis of an exchange in 
writing of arguments between the parties. If necessary, the Committee may also decide 
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In the last years the collective complaints procedure – which is in-
deed a quasi-judicial procedure – has proved to be an effective and ef-
ficient mechanism for supervising State compliance with social rights. 
And this for many reasons. In the first place, the collective complaints 
procedure allows to identify specific cases of social rights violations, 
giving – on the one hand – the opportunity to the State concerned to 
remedy them and to prevent new violations, and giving also – on the 
other hand – the possibility to affected groups of individuals to obtain 
the reestablishment of their rights.
Second, such a procedure permits to put the abstract normative 
prescriptions of the Social Charter to the test of reality, that is to the 
test of specific, concrete situations. In other words, it permits to specify 
what states actually have to do, or must avoid to do, or have to prevent, 
in order to guarantee in a given situation the rights of many individuals.
Last, but not least, the collective complaints procedure is important 
because it opens the door of the Social Charter to the civil society, to 
NGOs and the world of workers. This means opening the European 
system for the protection of social rights to its beneficiaries, who are 
– more than States and governments – directly and individually inter-
ested in the implementation and enjoyment of such rights. This kind of 
subjects are indeed the best guardians, I would say, of the rights estab-
lished by the European Social Charter.5
to hold a public hearing where arguments are presented orally by the parties. Finally, the 
ECSR transmits its decision to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 
which adopts a resolution and may invite the State concerned to take the necessary 
measures to bring the situation into conformity with the Charter.
On the collective complaints procedure see, inter alios, R.R. Churchill, U. Khaliq, 
The Collective Complaints System of the European Social Charter: An Effective 
Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social Rights?, in European 
Journal of International Law, 2004, pp. 417-456; R. Priore, Les systemes de contrôle de 
l’application de la Charte sociale européenne: la procedure de réclamations collectives, 
in M. D’Amico, G. Guiglia (Eds), European Social Charter and the Challenges of the 
XXI Century , Napoli, Edizioni scientifiche italiane, 2014, pp. 159-170.
5 Evidence of the importance of the collective complaints procedure is the fact 
that, since its entry into force, it has become the Charter’s flagship procedure, thanks 
to which the Charter is now talked about and attracts the kind of media coverage it 
had never experienced before. And it also caused the European Committee of Social 
Rights to build up an important body of case law, clarifying the meaning, implications 
and actual effects of the Charter rights with respect to many different subject matters.
And it is also worth noting that is precisely due to the contribution of the 
jurisprudence produced by the European Committee of Social Rights within the 
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2. The Limits of the European Social Charter in Terms of Persons Pro-
tected and the Protection of the Rights of Refugees
Having said this, it has to be noted that if it is true that taking ad-
vantage of the Social Charter system’s potential represents indeed a 
major tool for building up a more social and democratic Europe, it is 
also true that such system does have some shortcomings and has to be 
strengthened, improved and even updated if we want it to adequately 
meet the challenges that confront, today, the protection of social rights 
in Europe. And I refer in particular to the migration challenge and the 
presence of millions migrants and asylum seekers in Europe.
In this regard, the major shortcoming in the system of the Euro-
pean Social Charter derives from its personal scope of application, as 
it is established in paragraph 1 of the Appendix to the Charter (which 
constitutes an integral part of the Charter).
According to this paragraph: “Without prejudice to Article 12, par-
agraph 4, and Article 13, paragraph 4, the persons covered by Articles 
17 and 20 to 31 include foreigners only in so far as they are nationals of 
other Parties lawfully resident or working regularly within the territory 
of the Party concerned, subject to the understanding that these articles 
are to be interpreted in the light of the provisions of Articles 18 and 19”.
In essence, and regardless of the special regime related to the Char-
ter provisions expressly excepted by the Appendix (Arts. 12, para. 4; 
13, para. 4; 18 and 19), the effect of this paragraph is that the system 
for the protection and control of social rights provided for by the Eu-
ropean Social Charter does not apply to third State nationals, and to 
nationals from other States parties who, in a short but not appropriate 
definition, are usually referred to as “irregular migrants”.
Fortunately, paragraph 2 of the same Appendix to the Revised 
Charter provides for a different regime for the specific case of refugees.
Paragraph 2 of the Appendix reads: “Each Party will grant to ref-
ugees as defined in the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, 
signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951 and in the Protocol of 31 January 
framework of the collective complaints procedure, which has clarified contents and 
also possible direct effects of many provisions of the Charter, that in the last years we 
are seeing an increasing application of the Charter by national judges and courts in 
many States, like Spain, Italy, Greece and France, particularly in areas such as labour 
relationships, workers’ rights, and pensions. And we refer not only to ordinary judges 
but also to Constitutional Courts.
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1967, and lawfully staying in its territory, treatment as favourable as 
possible, and in any case not less favourable than under the obligations 
accepted by the Party under the said convention and under any other 
existing international instruments applicable to those refugees”.
In 2015, the European Committee of Social Rights has adopted a 
Statement of Interpretation concerning precisely this paragraph of the 
Appendix and the rights of refugees under the European Social Char-
ter.6 In such Statement of Interpretation, the Committee clearly high-
lighted the responsibilities undertaken by States Parties under the Eu-
ropean Social Charter to provide protection to refugees in Europe, to 
treat them with dignity, and to guarantee their fundamental rights.
The Committee pointed out, inter alia, the following:
“11. The wording of the Appendix to the Charter demonstrates the 
express undertaking to provide ‘treatment as favourable as possible’ 
to the persons it covers. The Committee thus considers that the rights 
contained in the Charter should as far as possible be guaranteed to 
refugees on an equal footing with other persons subject to the juris-
diction of the host State. It is therefore incumbent upon them to take 
meaningful steps towards the achievement of equality for refugees un-
der each article of the Charter by which they are bound. In any case, 
as is expressly stated in the Appendix to the Charter, the treatment of 
refugees must not be less favourable than that guaranteed by the CSR 
[Convention relating to the Status of Refugees].
[…]
13. The CSR coincides with the Charter in guaranteeing many social 
and economic rights to refugees.
14. Refugees must be accorded treatment equal to nationals in respect 
of elementary education (Article 22 CSR), which is guaranteed by Ar-
ticle 17§1 of the Charter; and public relief and assistance (Article 23 
CSR), which is accorded under Article 13 of the Charter (social and 
medical assistance) and implied by Article 30 of the Charter (the right 
to protection against poverty and social exclusion).
15. Labour legislation and social security (Article 24 CSR) are the 
areas of greatest correspondence between the two instruments. The 
following Articles of the Charter all cover rights for which the CSR 
guarantees the same treatment as nationals: Article 2 (working hours, 
holidays with pay, overtime arrangements); Article 4 (remuneration); 
Article 6 (the enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining); Ar-
6 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 2015, Statement of 
Interpretation on the rights of refugees under the European Social Charter.
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ticle 7 (a minimum age of employment, young persons’ employment 
rights and apprenticeships); Article 8 (rights of women in the work-
place); Article 10 (training opportunities); Article 11 (healthcare); 
Article 12§§1, 2, 3 (the right to social security covering healthcare, 
sickness, unemployment, old age, employment injury or disease,fami-
ly benefits and maternity benefits); Article 16 (family benefits); 19§7 
(access to courts); and Article 23 (rights of the elderly).
16. The CSR guarantees the right to the most favourable treatment 
accorded to nationals of a foreign country in respect of the right to 
belong to trade unions (Article 15 CSR), which is guaranteed by Arti-
cles 5 and 19§4 of the Charter; and the right to engage in wage-earning 
employment (Article 17 CSR), which is guaranteed by Articles 1 and 
18 of the Charter.
17. [T]he CSR guarantees treatment as favourable as possible and, in 
any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally 
in the same circumstances, in relation to the right to self-employment 
(Article 18 CSR), which is covered in Article 1 and 18 of the Charter; 
the right to access to housing (Article 21 CSR), which is dealt with 
under Articles 16 and 31 of the Charter; and the right to further edu-
cation (Article 22 CSR), which is guaranteed by Article 10 (vocational 
education) and Article 17 (secondary education) of the Charter.
[…]
20. Finally, Article 32 of the CSR stipulates that the Contracting States 
shall not expel a refugee lawfully on their territory save on grounds 
of national security or public order, in which case expulsion shall take 
place only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due 
process of law. The Committee thus considers that refugees must be 
guaranteed the protection of the Charter in respect of expulsion (cf. 
Article 19§8) on an equal footing with nationals of other States Parties 
to the Charter”.
3. The Problematic Issue of Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants: 
the Anomaly and Inadequacy of the Social Charter as regards the 
Exclusion of Third State Nationals
But if the above protection applies, by virtue of the Appendix, to 
“refugees lawfully staying in the territory of a State party to the Euro-
pean Social Charter”, what about asylum seekers who do not fall under 
this category of persons, either because they do not meet the conditions 
provided for by the CSR and its 1967 Protocol, or because their status as 
refugees is uncertain or doubtful and it takes a long time to be assessed by 
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host State authorities, or because they are seeking asylum and protection 
for (humanitarian) reasons other than those provided for by the CSR?
With respect to all such cases, the application of the European So-
cial Charter is unfortunately highly problematic, due to paragraph 1 of 
the Appendix to the Charter, according to which the persons covered 
by the Charter, as we have said, “include foreigners only in so far as 
they are nationals of other Parties lawfully resident or working regular-
ly within the territory of the Party concerned.”
The most questionable aspect of this limit in the personal scope of 
the Charter concerns indeed the exclusion of foreigners who, though 
being within the jurisdiction of the States parties and legally resident 
within their territory, are third State (non-European) nationals.
Whatever the reasons for deciding – decades ago – not to extend the 
scope of the European Social Charter to third State nationals, such a de-
cision hardly appears consistent with the rationale and legal nature of the 
Charter, intended as a human rights instrument aimed at protecting human 
dignity and rights which are essentials for upholding such dignity. From 
the point of view of the personal scope of application, the Charter is indeed 
a sort of anomaly: one cannot find the same kind of limitation in other in-
ternational legal instruments aimed at protecting human rights in general, 
or social rights in particular. A few references suffice to confirm this fact.
At the universal level, the 1966 International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example, obliges States parties 
to apply its provisions to all individuals, without distinction between 
citizens and foreigners, or between foreigners according to their na-
tionality.7 In similar way, the various Conventions on labour rights and 
standards adopted within the framework of the International Labour 
Organization consistently provide that their respective provisions be 
applied by States parties to all workers (legally) residing in the State 
territory, regardless of their nationality.
Turning towards the regional level, the system of the American 
Convention on Human Rights – on the basis of the 1969 Convention, 
as well as the provisions of the Additional Protocol of 1988 on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights – does not provide any restriction to 
the scope of application of its provisions due to the nationality of the 
7 The only exception in this regard is provided for with reference to developing 
countries, which “with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may 
determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights in the Covenant to 
non-nationals” (Art. 2, para. 3, of the Covenant).
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persons concerned. The approach of the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 is exactly the same: all states Parties must 
guarantee the rights enshrined in the Charter, including social rights 
(which are dealt with specifically in Arts. 15 and 16), to every individ-
ual, and not only to their own nationals and nationals of other States 
parties to the African Charter.
At the European level, it is hardly necessary to recall that under 
Art. 1 of the 1950 European Convention of Human Rights – in re-
lation to which the European Social Charter is rightly considered as 
complementary – States parties are under the obligation to secure the 
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention (and its successive 
Protocols) “to everyone within their jurisdiction”, and not just to their 
own citizens and to nationals of other States parties to the Convention.
In brief, the facts and remarks so far reveal that, on the one hand, 
the exclusion of third State nationals from the scope of the European 
Social Charter represents a real anomaly in the framework of interna-
tional instruments dealing with human rights.
Moreover, It has to be added that today, more than a decade ago, 
the demographic and social changes brought about by the increasing 
migration to Europe, due also to the massive influx of refugees, make 
more evident the inadequacy of the personal scope limitation imposed 
by the Appendix to the European Social Charter, as well as the need 
to overcome this limitation. In other words, it becomes less and less 
understandable and acceptable that under the European Social Charter 
a State party (e.g. Sweden, Italy or Germany) is obliged to ensure the 
right to a fair remuneration, or to safe and healthy working conditions, 
or to adequate medical assistance, to workers from another Europe-
an country (nationals from, for example, Ukraine, Portugal, or Tur-
key), while it is not obliged to ensure the same rights to workers from 
non-European states (e.g., Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, or Niger), even 
if the person is permanently resident in the State or holds a long term 
residence or working permit. The fact that the latter – non-European 
– persons, in contrast to the former, cannot under the European Social 
Charter invoke and obtain, from the State in which they live and work, 
respect for social rights constitutes a serious discrimination.
It is in full awareness of such a criticality of the European Social 
Charter that the ECSR, following an extensive interpretation of the 
Charter’s provisions – on which I will come back when dealing with 
the issue of so-called “irregular migrants” – sought to temper the limit 
set out in the Appendix to the Charter.
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In its Conclusions in 2004, the Committee in fact noted that “the 
Parties to the Charter (in its 1961 and revised 1996 versions) have guar-
anteed to foreigners not covered by the Charter rights identical or in-
separable from those of the Charter by ratifying human rights treaties 
– in particular the European Convention of Human Rights – or by 
adopting domestic rules whether constitutional, legislative or other-
wise without distinguishing between persons referred to explicitly in 
the Appendix and other non-nationals. In so doing, the Parties have 
undertaken these obligations”. In light of this, according to the Com-
mittee, “the implementation of certain provisions of the Charter could 
in certain specific situations require complete equality of treatment be-
tween nationals and foreigners, whether or not they are nationals of 
member States, Party to the Charter”.8
However, beyond the possibilities offered by the ars interpretandi, 
as applied by the ECSR in view of overcoming the limit imposed by 
the wording of the Appendix, it is clear that overcoming it completely 
– which is indispensable for improving the European Social Charter as 
an instrument for the protection of human rights and for bringing it 
in line with the social changes that have taken place in recent decades 
– could only come from a deletion or substantial modification of the 
limitation, which would have to be expressly established and formally 
accepted by the States parties to the Charter.
Of course, the main road to achieving such a result would be an 
amendment to paragraph 1 of the Appendix, to be adopted in accord-
ance with the procedure envisaged in Article J of the Charter, or in the 
context of a new additional Protocol.
However, by comparison with a formal amendment to the Appen-
dix, an alternative way (procedurally and politically less problematic) 
of reducing the ratione personarum limitation of the European Social 
Charter, could be that of unilateral declarations made by willing States 
parties aimed at affirming their intention to extensively apply the pro-
visions of the Charter (or most of them) not only to foreigners who are 
nationals of other States parties to the Charter but also to all other for-
eigners lawfully resident or working regularly within their territories.
Having precisely this option in mind, the ECSR took the initiative – in 
2011, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Social Charter – to 
send a letter to all States parties containing a proposal of adopting a dec-
8 European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 2004, Statement of 
Interpretation, p. 10.
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laration of this kind.9 In advancing the proposal, the Committee rightly 
highlighted that the unilateral extension of the rights guaranteed by the So-
cial Charter to all foreigners, far from being contrary to the system of the 
Charter, would be fully in line with Paragraph 2 of the Appendix, accord-
ing to which the interpretation of the scope of the Charter set out in Para-
graph 1 “would not prejudice the extension of similar facilities [“de droits 
analogues”, in the French text] to other persons by any of the Parties”.
It must nevertheless be noted that the Committee’s initiative has 
not thus far been able to achieve the desired result: only two States have 
replied to the Committee’s invitation (Lithuania and the Netherlands), 
and both have responded negatively.
One reason for the initiative’s lack of success probably lies in the 
fact that the ECSR’s proposal was perceived as too wide-ranging and 
questionably including the situation of “irregular” migrants. In fact, 
the Committee did not limit the proposed extension of the personal 
scope of the Charter to third State nationals lawfully resident or work-
ing legally in the territory of States parties; but drafted it in such a 
way so as to present States parties with the possibility of applying the 
Charter (by analogy to Art. 1 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights) “to everyone within their jurisdiction”.
In view of the well-known strong resistance of many European 
States with respect to any recognition and granting of social rights to 
“irregular” migrants which may have the effect of both increasing ille-
gal immigration and limiting the possibilities and procedures for expul-
sion or repatriation, it can be surmised that had the Committee been 
less generic and more circumscribed in its proposal, restricting it solely 
to third State nationals “legally” present in the territory of States par-
ties, perhaps its initiative would have been more successful.
4. The Questionable Total Exclusion of So-Called Irregular Migrants 
from the Scope of Application of the European Social Charter and the 
Jurisprudence of the European Committee of Social Rights Aimed at 
Not Excluding Irregular Migrants from All Forms of Protection
The reasonable assumption that at the basis of the failure of the 
ECSR’s initiative to encourage States to extend the personal scope of 
9 See, European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions 2011, Personal Scope of 
the Charter, p. 9. In its letter the Committee also provided a possible “model declaration”.
GIUSEPPE PALMISANO258
the Charter there is also – if not primarily – the opposition of States to 
taking care of social rights of irregular migrants brings me to the last 
part of my reflections on the scope of the Charter in terms of persons 
protected. I refer in particular to the fact that the Charter is applicable, 
as regards foreigners, only to nationals of other Parties who are law-
fully resident or working legally in the territory of the State party con-
cerned, thus entirely excluding nationals of States parties (or obviously, 
third State nationals) who do not find themselves in this situation, and 
whom I can refer to – for the sake of brevity – as “irregular migrants”.
In this case, the restriction imposed by the Appendix to the Char-
ter cannot, in all honesty, be defined as an anomaly, since the exclu-
sion of irregular migrants from the list of persons who benefit from 
the obligations which States commit themselves to (whether con-
cerning social and economic rights, or political rights, or certain civil 
rights) is a common feature of many international instruments for the 
protection of human rights.10 Therefore, in a general context of lack 
of consideration for the specific situation of irregular migrants, the 
fact that the personal scope of the European Social Charter does not 
cover this category of persons, or that the text of the Charter does not 
provide them with any social rights, does not constitute an anomaly, 
nor can it be stigmatized – however much one disapproves it – as a 
contradiction with the nature and purpose of the Charter itself, con-
sidered as a human rights treaty.
However, what constitutes a problem in this respect is the fact that 
the personal scope limitation envisaged in the Appendix ends up com-
pletely excluding irregular migrants from the application of all the pro-
visions of the Charter, including those provisions whose lack of appli-
cation on the part of a State may lead to a serious violation of certain 
fundamental rights (such as the right to life, to physical integrity and 
respect for human dignity).
A rigid interpretation of such a summary and total exclusion of ir-
regular migrants from the protection afforded by the Charter would 
determine, therefore, a paradoxical situation whereby State conduct 
(legislative or administrative practice, acts or omissions) denying the 
respect for the rights established by the Charter to irregular migrants, 
10 On the recognition and protection of the rights of irregular migrants at the 
international level, let me refer to G. Palmisano, ‘Trattamento dei migranti clandestini 
e rispetto degli obblighi internazionali sui diritti umani’, (2009) Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, vol. 3, pp. 509-539.
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so as to endanger or jeopardize their fundamental rights, would never-
theless be considered in conformity with the European Social Charter 
due to the restriction of its personal scope set out in the Appendix.
In addition to clashing with a common sense of humanity and with 
the spirit and purpose of the Charter, intended as an instrument for the 
protection of human rights, such an outcome of the Appendix is indeed 
difficult to reconcile – at the legal level – with the fact that the obli-
gation not to allow or admit conduct which would infringe the most 
basic rights of any person (and in particular, which would undermine 
the right to life, physical integrity and respect for human dignity) is im-
posed on all States, as members of the so-called international commu-
nity, by peremptory norms of general international law. Furthermore, 
it must be recalled that States parties to the European Social Charter 
are also parties to other human rights insatruments, according to which 
certain State conducts failing to respect the social rights of irregular 
migrants (which in the light of a rigid interpretation of the Appendix 
would be in conformity with the Charter) would constitute violations 
– and in some cases, serious violations – of legal obligations assumed 
by the same States. I refer to, for example, the European Convention 
of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
Despite the letter of the Appendix, it would be in other words 
hardly acceptable and consistent to conclude that the European treaty 
specifically designed to protect social rights would, with respect to ir-
regular migrants and on the sole basis of their irregular situation of stay 
in the territory of the State, consent to violations of social rights that 
the States parties to the same treaty consider unlawful in the frame-
work of other human rights instruments, even when such violations are 
committed against irregular migrants.
In order to avoid such a contradictory result – and so as not to de-
prive irregular migrants (including asylum seekers who do not have the 
status of refugees) of minimum protection – the ECSR has, in the frame-
work of the so-called “collective complaints procedure”, developed a 
significant jurisprudence, aimed at limiting the undesirable effects of the 
limited personal scope of the Charter set out in the Appendix.
This ECSR’s case law originated in complaints submitted in the last 
fifteen years by non-governmental organisations concerning mostly 
the situation of foreign minors in an irregular situation of stay within 
GIUSEPPE PALMISANO260
the territory of a State party, that is, a category of persons who, ac-
cording to the provisions of paragraph 1 of the Appendix, are excluded 
from the scope of the European Social Charter.11
What clearly stands out in this case law is the tendency of the Com-
mittee on the one hand, to distinguish between provisions of the Char-
ter that are more or less essential for protecting the most fundamental 
human rights (such as the right to life, to physical integrity, and to pres-
ervation of human dignity) and, on the other hand, to subordinate the 
exceptional possibility of applying the Charter to so-called irregular 
migrants on the basis that the failure to apply the provisions of the 
Charter would end up determining, in the specific case, a serious injury 
to the safeguarding of such fundamental rights.
The ECSR has thus far considered that the risk of such an injury 
may occur in case of non-compliance with the rights envisaged in Arts. 
7, 17, 11, 13, 16 and 31, para. 2, of the Charter, in the event that vic-
tims of the violation are minors (children or adolescents). Of course, 
it is not ruled out that the Committee could in the future arrive at the 
same conclusions also for other provisions of the Charter – for exam-
ple Art. 3, para. 3 (on the enforcement of safety and health regulations 
in the working environment), Art. 8 (the right of employed women 
to protection of maternity), or Art. 15 (on the rights of persons with 
disabilities) –, and not necessarily with reference to children but also to 
“irregular” adult migrants.
However, even if the number of provisions and concrete situations 
for which the Committee considers applicable the protection offered by 
the European Social Charter to irregular migrants should in the future 
become wider, it is likely that – given the limitation expressly imposed 
by Paragraph 1 of the Appendix to the Charter – such an application 
11 See in particular the following decisions: Fédération Internationale des Ligues 
des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH) v. France, Complaint No. 14/2003, of 8 September 2004; 
Défense des Enfants International (DEI) v. The Netherlands, Complaint No. 47/2008, 
of 20 October 2009, Défense des Enfants International (DEI) v. Belgium, Complaint 
No. 69/2011, of 23 October 2012; European Federation of National Organisations 
working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v. The Netherlands, Complaint No 86/2012, 
of 2 July 2014; Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. The Netherlands, Complaint 
No 90/2013, of 1st July 2014. For an in-depth analysis of this jurisprudence, and in 
particular of the decision in Complaint 69/2011 (Défense des Enfants International 
(DEI) v. Belgium), see G. Palmisano, On the Limits of the European Social Charter in 
Terms of Persons Protected, in B. Cortese (Ed.), Studi in onore di Laura Picchio Forlati, 
Torino, Giappichelli, 2014, pp. 97-103.
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would still be considered as exceptional by the Committee, “justified 
solely – to use the Committee’s words in the Decision of Collective 
Complaint 69/2011 – in the event that excluding unlawfully present 
foreigners from the protection afforded by the Charter would have se-
riously detrimental consequences for their fundamental rights […] and 
would consequently place the foreigners in question in an unacceptable 
situation, regarding the enjoyment of these rights, as compared with 
the situation of nationals and of lawfully resident foreigners” (Para-
graph 35 of the Decision).



